States that Congress condemns: (1) the failure of the Government of Iran for nearly two decades to report material, facilities, and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement; and (2) Iran's continuing nuclear program deceptions to the IAEA and the international community.
Urges the President to provide to the IAEA the resources necessary to enable it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear activities.
Commends (and contrasts) Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities.
Calls upon other nations (including, specifically, members of the European Union, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates) and the United Nations (UN) Security Council to take a variety of measures to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by Iran, including through trade and investment restrictions and suspension of nuclear cooperation arrangements, and achieve Iranian compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Urges UN Security Council sanctions on nonnuclear weapon states that commit significant violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing or engage in activities intended to support a military nuclear program.
Urges the UN Security Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the IAEA, other relevant international entities, and all states party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to seek consensus, no later than the 2005 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, on the best means to limit the right of nonnuclear weapons states to engage in those nuclear fuel cycle activities that could contribute to nuclear weapons development.
[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 398 Introduced in House (IH)]
108th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. CON. RES. 398
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means
to produce nuclear weapons.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 25, 2004
Mr. Hyde (for himself, Mr. Lantos, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Ackerman, Mr.
Blunt, Mr. Berman, Mr. Sherman, and Mr. Chabot) submitted the following
concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on
International Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means
to produce nuclear weapons.
Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert the international
community to Iran's covert nuclear activities in support of an intention
to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary to its obligations under the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to produce nuclear weapons
are finally beginning to be revealed to the international community;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the
production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz
until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was
revealed by an opposition group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce
enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-
half to two years;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when
completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25-30
nuclear weapons per year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General of the IAEA stated
that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into
Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride from China
in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities
involved in the use and processing of the material;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify
its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not
to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment
Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions
about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors in August
2003 that, after further investigation, Iran failed to disclose
additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement
and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium
enrichment activities;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to
suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing
activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully
with the Agency, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional
Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to
strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and
requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the
Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with
discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director General of the IAEA,
Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium
conversion processes at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the
Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such
activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated
that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing
activities as defined by the IAEA;
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified nuclear
technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied international concerns
about its nuclear development program;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that
it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric
Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported
uranium hexafluoride from China;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium
enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of uranium not previously
declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kg of
uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium,
another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities
under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify
the Additional Protocol agreement for further safeguards, and would act
in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-
force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General
that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing
activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment
processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and
elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran in numerous lies about its
nuclear activities;
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors
on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its
nuclear activities from the IAEA, which constituted breaches of its
obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of
its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in
his report of February 24, 2004, found that Iran continued to engage in
deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to
disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced
enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and
noncredible explanations involving experiments to create a highly toxic
isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear
weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons development program;
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards
Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the
international community for full transparency;
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it
has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and
continued to import and manufacture uranium enrichment centrifuge parts
and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment
activities whenever it chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the
Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to
reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated ``P2'' uranium
enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no
intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
(1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October 16, 2003, by
the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's Atomic Energy
Organization that Iran would present a ``full picture of its nuclear
activities'' and ``full transparency'';
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to
resolve all outstanding issues; and
(3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12,
2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to ``leave no stone
unturned'' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons
program;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear
weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used,
raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon
design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation has recently
announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with
enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring
the need to sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons
development program;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was
adopted unanimously, noted with ``serious concern that the declarations
made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final
picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered
essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution'', and also noted that
the Agency has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge
associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two mass
spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs for hot
cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted ``with equal concern that Iran has not
resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment
technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions
remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in
Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of
the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of
activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to
support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments'';
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would
be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of
Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently
agreed to readmit inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls
into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its
nuclear activities; and
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA,
the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and
the international community, its receipt from other countries of the
means to enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also violated its legal
obligation under article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance
in acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
That the Congress--
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's
continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community
about its nuclear programs and activities;
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United
States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending
all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the
provision of dual use items), until Iran fully implements the
Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the
application of safeguards;
(3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18
years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited
the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel
cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's
nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-
applicable research activities, as detailed in the report of
February 24, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, along
with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not
disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of
Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and
spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and
the Additional Protocol;
(5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease all
efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to
immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear
enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing
related equipment;
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and
legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full
unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the investigation
of its nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and
honesty about all its nuclear programs;
(7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which
Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons
program and to provide full, complete, and transparent
disclosure of all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA
to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the
extent and scope of Libya's program;
(8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to
resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements
until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased
all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent
cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing activities;
(9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what
further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to
persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the
IAEA;
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance
of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the
NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and
ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States,
and the international community regarding Iran's military
nuclear activities--
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial
entities not proceed with the development of Iran's
Azadegan oil field;
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French
and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with
their agreement for further cooperation in expanding
Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with their
commercial entities to ensure that these entities
refrain from or cease all investment and investment-
related activities that support Iran's energy industry;
and
(D) calls on the President to enforce the
provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
to discourage foreign commercial entities from
investing in Iran's energy industry;
(11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any
nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls
upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not
conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr
reactor, until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
(12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose
nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian
nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United
Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such
assistance, to grant the IAEA full access to individuals,
sites, and all information related to the investigations, and
to immediately review and rectify their export control laws,
regulations, and practices in order to prevent further
assistance to countries seeking to develop nuclear programs
that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
(13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest
opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council
that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the
IAEA;
(14) urges the President of the United States to provide
whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are
necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's
nuclear activities;
(15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant
international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon
states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards
agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium
reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a
military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the
NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
(16) further urges the United Nations Security Council to
consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts
by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in
clandestine nuclear activities; and
(17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and
currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this
resolution.
<all>
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
Committee Agreed to Seek Consideration Under Suspension of the Rules, by Voice Vote.
Mr. Burton (IN) moved to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution.
Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H2617-2623)
DEBATE - The House proceeded forty minutes of debate on H. Con. Res. 398.
At the conclusion of debate, the Yeas and Nays were demanded and ordered. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 8, rule XX, the Chair announced that further proceedings on the motion would be postponed.
Considered as unfinished business. (consideration: CR H2699)
Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 376 - 3, 14 Present (Roll no. 152).(text: CR 5/5/2004 H2617-2619)
Roll Call #152 (House)On motion to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 376 - 3, 14 Present (Roll no. 152). (text: CR 5/5/2004 H2617-2619)
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Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
Received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged by Unanimous Consent.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged by Unanimous Consent.
Measure laid before Senate by unanimous consent. (consideration: CR S8798-8799)
Passed/agreed to in Senate: Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amendment to the Title and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent.
Message on Senate action sent to the House.