Nuclear Security Initiative Act of 2003 - Declares it is the policy of the United States to seek to cooperate with the Russian Federation and each other independent state of the former Soviet Union to: (1) effect as quickly as is reasonably practical basic security measures at each facility in the Russian Federation and each such state that is used for storing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials and is not yet protected by such measures; (2) the Russian Federation to accelerate the closure of facilities in the Russian Federation used for the production of nuclear weapons; (3) improve the security at facilities, in the Russian Federation and each such state, that contain radioactive materials that could be used in radiological dispersal devices; and (4) improve border controls and other measures to track and intercept illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction and the materials and technologies for developing and producing such weapons.
Authorizes the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) to expand the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program of the Department of Energy to encompass countries other than the Russian Federation and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union.
Declares it is the policy of the United States to seek to: (1) cooperate with all appropriate nations to attempt to ensure that all nuclear weapons and nuclear materials worldwide are secure and accounted for according to stringent standards; (2) work with international partners to install, at critical international ports, appropriate devices to detect and intercept illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction that are nuclear or radiological in nature and the materials and technologies for developing and producing such weapons; (3) prevent the proliferation, from the Russian Federation and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union to countries of proliferation concern, of scientists, engineers, and technicians possessing the expertise to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction; (4) establish and promote programs to prevent the proliferation, from scientists, engineers, and technicians of the Russian Federation and other independent states of the former Soviet Union to countries of proliferation concern, of expertise to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction; and (5) seek to assist independent states of the former Soviet Union that have been helpful to the United States in the war on terrorism so as to promote the creation of jobs that foster economic stability and democracy.
Authorizes appropriations for accelerated disposition for highly enriched uranium.
Directs the Secretary to carry out a Silk Road Initiative to develop sustainable employment opportunities in the United States and in Silk Road nations (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) for scientists, engineers, and technicians formerly engaged in activities to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction in such nations.
Authorizes appropriations to assist the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Science for Peace program.
Directs the Secretary to: (1) analyze and report to Congress on the effect on threat reduction and nonproliferation programs of applicable congressional oversight measures; (2) report annually to Congress on the use of funds appropriated for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the Russian Federation and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union.
Amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, as amended by section 1205 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, to direct the President submit to Congress a comprehensive, detailed plan to: (1) secure and destroy all chemical and biological weapons, and the chemical and biological materials designed for use in such weapons, that are located in Russia and the independent states of the former Soviet Union; and (2) prevent the outflow from those states of the technology and scientific expertise that could be used for developing those weapons, including delivery systems.
for coordination of chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation programs with states of the former soviet union.
Declares it is U.S. policy to seek to establish jointly with the Russian Federation comprehensive inventories and data exchanges of Russian Federation and U.S. nuclear weapons-grade material and nuclear weapons, with particular attention to tactical warheads and warheads that are no longer operationally deployed.
Urges the United States to seek to work with the Russian Federation to develop such inventories.
Establishes a Duma-Congress Nuclear Threat Reduction Working Group as an interparliamentary group of the United States and the Russian Federation.
Declares it is U.S. policy that the President should seek to ensure that the United States takes the lead in arranging for the United States, in conjunction with NATO, to enter into appropriate cooperative relationships with the Russian Federation with respect to the development and deployment of theater-level ballistic missile defenses.
Declares it is U.S. policy: (1) to encourage joint efforts by the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce the chances of a Russian nuclear attack anywhere in the world as the result of misinformation or miscalculation by developing the capabilities and increasing the reliability of Russian ballistic missile early-warning systems, including the Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) program; and (2) to encourage other United States-Russian programs to ensure that the Russia Federation has reliable information, including real-time data, regarding launches of ballistic missiles anywhere in the world.
Directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure interim funding of the RAMOS program pending the execution of a new agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation providing for it.
Directs the Secretary of Energy to seek to enter into an agreement with the Minister of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation to carry out a cooperative venture, to be known as the (Edward) Teller-(Igor) KurchatovAlliance for Peace, to develop and promote peaceful, safe, and environmentally sensitive uses of nuclear energy.
Authorizes the Administrator for Nuclear Security to award international exchange Teller-Kurchatov Fellowships in the nuclear nonproliferation sciences to scientists employed at the Kurchatov Institute of the Russian Federation and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (California).
Declares the sense of Congress in favor of discussions on nuclear and radiological security and safety between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for the purpose of exploring issues of nuclear and radiological security and safety, including the creation of new sources of revenue (including debt reduction) for states to provide nuclear security; and (2) the discussions referred to in paragraph (1) should also provide a forum to explore possible sources of funds in support of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1719 Introduced in House (IH)]
108th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 1719
To promote enhanced nonproliferation cooperation between the United
States and the Russian Federation and foster various other actions that
will increase the national security of the United States, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
April 10, 2003
Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania (for himself, Mr. Edwards, Mr. McHugh, Mr.
Spratt, Mr. Souder, Mrs. Tauscher, Mr. Shays, Mr. Ortiz, Mr. Leach, Ms.
Corrine Brown of Florida, Mr. Hastings of Florida, Mr. Wilson of South
Carolina, Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Reyes, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Abercrombie, Mr.
Taylor of North Carolina, Mr. Smith of Michigan, Mr. Bartlett of
Maryland, Mr. Stearns, Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Sherwood, Mr. Cox, and Mr. Farr)
introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on
International Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To promote enhanced nonproliferation cooperation between the United
States and the Russian Federation and foster various other actions that
will increase the national security of the United States, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Security
Initiative Act of 2003''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS
Sec. 101. Acceleration and expansion of International Nuclear Materials
Protection and Cooperation program.
Sec. 102. Funding for efforts to close nuclear weapons production
facilities in Russia.
Sec. 103. Funding to improve security at facilities in the former
Soviet Union containing nuclear materials
that could be used in radiological
dispersal devices.
Sec. 104. Enhanced funding for accelerated disposition for highly
enriched uranium.
Sec. 105. Improving measures to track and intercept illicit transfers
of weapons of mass destruction and the
materials and technologies for developing
and producing such weapons.
Sec. 106. Enhanced funding for Russian Transition Initiative.
Sec. 107. Silk Road Initiative.
Sec. 108. NATO Science for Peace program.
TITLE II--ADMINISTRATION AND OVERSIGHT OF THREAT REDUCTION AND
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS
Sec. 201. Analysis of effect on threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs of congressional oversight
measures with respect to such programs.
Sec. 202. Annual report on the use of funds appropriated for threat
reduction and nonproliferation in states of
the former Soviet Union.
Sec. 203. Plan for and coordination of chemical and biological weapons
nonproliferation programs with states of
the former Soviet Union.
TITLE III--UNITED STATES-RUSSIA RELATIONS
Sec. 301. Comprehensive inventories and data exchanges on nuclear
weapons-grade material and nuclear weapons.
Sec. 302. Establishment of Duma-Congress nuclear threat reduction
working group.
Sec. 303. Joint United States/North Atlantic Treaty Organization
cooperation with Russia on theater-level
ballistic missile defenses.
Sec. 304. Encouragement of enhanced collaboration to achieve more
reliable Russian early warning systems.
Sec. 305. Teller-Kurchatov Alliance for Peace.
Sec. 306. Nonproliferation fellowships.
TITLE IV--OTHER
Sec. 401. Promotion of discussions on nuclear and radiological security
and safety between the International Atomic
Energy Agency and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development.
TITLE I--NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS
SEC. 101. ACCELERATION AND EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS
PROTECTION AND COOPERATION PROGRAM.
(a) Policy With Respect to Former Soviet Union.--It is the policy
of the United States to seek to cooperate with the Russian Federation
and each other independent state of the former Soviet Union to effect
as quickly as is reasonably practical basic security measures (such as
the replacement of doors, the bricking of or placement of bars in
windows, the clearing of underbrush from facility perimeters, and the
erection of fences) at each facility in the Russian Federation and each
such state that is used for storing nuclear weapons or nuclear
materials and is not yet protected by such measures.
(b) Policy Worldwide.--It is the policy of the United States to
seek to cooperate with all appropriate nations--
(1) to attempt to ensure that all nuclear weapons and
nuclear materials worldwide are secure and accounted for
according to stringent standards; and
(2) to minimize the number of facilities worldwide at which
separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium are present, so
as to achieve the highest and most sustainable levels of
security for such facilities in the most cost-effective manner.
(c) Expansion of Program to Additional Countries Authorized.--(1)
The Secretary of Energy may expand the International Nuclear Materials
Protection and Cooperation program of the Department of Energy to
encompass countries other than the Russian Federation and the other
independent states of the former Soviet Union.
(2) In carrying out such program with respect to countries other
than the Russian Federation and the other independent states of the
former Soviet Union, the Secretary of Energy may provide such funds as
are needed to remove nuclear materials from potentially vulnerable
facilities, including funds to cover the costs of--
(A) transporting such materials from those facilities to
secure facilities;
(B) purchasing such materials;
(C) converting those facilities to a use that no longer
requires nuclear materials; and
(D) providing incentives to facilitate the removal of such
materials from such facilities.
(3)(A) In carrying out such program with respect to countries other
than the Russian Federation and the other independent states of the
former Soviet Union, the Secretary of Energy may provide technical
assistance to the Secretary of State in the efforts of the Secretary of
State to assist such countries to review and improve their security
programs with respect to nuclear weapons and nuclear materials.
(B) The technical assistance provided under subparagraph (A) may,
where consistent with the treaty obligations of the United States,
include the sharing of technology or methodologies to the countries
referred to in that subparagraph. Any such sharing shall take into
account the sovereignty of the country concerned and the nuclear
weapons programs of such country, as well as the sensitivity of any
information involved regarding United States nuclear weapons or nuclear
weapons systems.
(C) The Secretary of Energy may include the Russian Federation in
activities under this paragraph if the Secretary determines that the
experience of the Russian Federation under the International Nuclear
Materials Protection and Cooperation program would make the
participation of the Russian Federation in those activities useful in
providing technical assistance under subparagraph (A).
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, in addition to any sums
otherwise authorized to be appropriated, to the Department of Energy
for the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation
program a total of $40,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out the
policies specified in subsections (a) and (b) and the expansion of the
program authorized by subsection (c).
SEC. 102. FUNDING FOR EFFORTS TO CLOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION
FACILITIES IN RUSSIA.
(a) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to seek to
cooperate with the Russian Federation to accelerate, to the maximum
extent feasible, the closure of facilities in the Russian Federation
used for the production of nuclear weapons.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, in addition to any sums
otherwise authorized to be appropriated, to the Department of Energy
for the Russian Transition Initiatives program a total of $35,000,000
for the purpose of carrying out the policy specified in subsection (a).
SEC. 103. FUNDING TO IMPROVE SECURITY AT FACILITIES IN THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION CONTAINING NUCLEAR MATERIALS THAT COULD BE
USED IN RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES.
(a) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to seek to
cooperate with the Russian Federation and each other independent state
of the former Soviet Union to improve the security at facilities, in
the Russian Federation and each such state, that contain radioactive
materials that could be used in radiological dispersal devices.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, in addition to any sums
otherwise authorized to be appropriated, to the Department of Energy
for the National Nuclear Security Administration a total of $60,000,000
for the purpose of carrying out the policy specified in subsection (a).
SEC. 104. ENHANCED FUNDING FOR ACCELERATED DISPOSITION FOR HIGHLY
ENRICHED URANIUM.
There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and
2005, in addition to any sums otherwise authorized to be appropriated,
to the Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security
Administration a total of $40,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out
section 3157 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-314; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note), to remain
available until expended.
SEC. 105. IMPROVING MEASURES TO TRACK AND INTERCEPT ILLICIT TRANSFERS
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE MATERIALS AND
TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEVELOPING AND PRODUCING SUCH WEAPONS.
(a) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to seek to--
(1) cooperate with the Russian Federation and each other
independent state of the former Soviet Union to improve border
controls and other measures to track and intercept illicit
transfers of weapons of mass destruction and the materials and
technologies for developing and producing such weapons; and
(2) work with international partners to install, at
critical international ports, appropriate devices to detect and
intercept illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction that
are nuclear or radiological in nature and the materials and
technologies for developing and producing such weapons.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, in addition to any sums
otherwise authorized to be appropriated, to the Department of Energy
for the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation
program a total of $60,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out the
policy specified in subsection (a) with respect to weapons of mass
destruction that are nuclear or radiological in nature.
SEC. 106. ENHANCED FUNDING FOR RUSSIAN TRANSITION INITIATIVE.
(a) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to prevent the
proliferation, from the Russian Federation and the other independent
states of the former Soviet Union to countries of proliferation
concern, of scientists, engineers, and technicians possessing the
expertise to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction.
(b) Findings Regarding the Former IPP Program and Nuclear Cities
Initiative Program.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program
(hereinafter in this section referred to as ``IPP'') has been a
very successful nonproliferation program.
(2) Through cost-sharing partnerships between companies in
the United States and scientists employed at nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons facilities in the independent
states of the former Soviet Union, IPP has supported the
creation of sustainable commercial jobs that reduce incentives
for the proliferation, to countries of proliferation concern,
of expertise to develop and produce weapons of mass
destruction.
(3) More than 125 companies, actively engaged in the part
of the Russian Transition Initiative program that derives from
IPP, are developing high-technology commercial products and
creating new jobs in the United States and the independent
states of the former Soviet Union.
(4) The Nuclear Cities Initiative has also been successful
in helping to prevent the proliferation of scientists and
others with weapons expertise from the Russian Federation and
other independent states of the former Soviet Union.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, in addition to any sums
otherwise appropriated, to the Department of Energy for the Russian
Transition Initiative program a total of $60,000,000 for the purpose of
carrying out the policy specified in subsection (a) in a manner
consistent with the practices described in subsection (b).
SEC. 107. SILK ROAD INITIATIVE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) a number of independent states of the former Soviet
Union have been helpful to the United States in the war on
terrorism; and
(2) these states are new and struggling democracies and
would benefit considerably from assistance to create
sustainable jobs for their underemployed or unemployed
scientists, engineers, and technicians who were formerly
engaged in activities to develop and produce weapons of mass
destruction for the Russian Federation or another independent
state of the former Soviet Union.
(b) Policies.--(1) It is the policy of the United States to seek to
establish and promote programs to prevent the proliferation, from
scientists, engineers, and technicians of the Russian Federation and
other independent states of the former Soviet Union to countries of
proliferation concern, of expertise to develop and produce weapons of
mass destruction.
(2) It is also the policy of the United States to seek to assist
independent states of the former Soviet Union that have been helpful to
the United States in the war on terrorism so as to promote the creation
of jobs that foster economic stability and democracy.
(c) Program Required.--(1) The Secretary of Energy shall carry out
a program, to be known as the Silk Road Initiative, to develop
sustainable employment opportunities in the United States and in Silk
Road nations for scientists, engineers, and technicians formerly
engaged in activities to develop and produce weapons of mass
destruction in the Silk Road nations. The program shall--
(A) incorporate best practices under the former Initiatives
for Proliferation Prevention program; and
(B) facilitate commercial partnerships between private
entities in the United States and scientists, engineers, and
technicians in the Silk Road nations.
(2) Before implementing the program with respect to multiple Silk
Road nations, the Secretary of Energy shall carry out a pilot program
with respect to one Silk Road nation selected by the Secretary. It is
the sense of Congress that the Secretary should select the Republic of
Georgia.
(d) Silk Road Nations Defined.--In this section, the Silk Road
nations are Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Republic of Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.-- There is authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to the Department of Energy
a total of $30,000,000 to carry out the Silk Road Initiative under
subsection (c).
SEC. 108. NATO SCIENCE FOR PEACE PROGRAM.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter in
this section referred to as ``NATO'') has been successful in
sponsoring scientific research in the states of the former
Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union through the program referred to as
the ``NATO Science for Peace program''.
(2) As operated as of the the date of the enactment of this
Act, the NATO Science for Peace program does not lead to
commercialization of results and the creation of sustainable
technical jobs.
(3) The NATO Science for Peace program could be improved--
(A) through the use of appropriate private entities
and industrial NATO members to select current projects
of that program that offer prospects of
commercialization with United States companies; and
(B) through assistance in developing future Science
for Peace projects with commercial potential.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to the Department of
Defense a total of $1,500,000 for the purpose of providing assistance
to the NATO Science for Peace program consistent with subsection
(a)(3).
TITLE II--ADMINISTRATION AND OVERSIGHT OF THREAT REDUCTION AND
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS
SEC. 201. ANALYSIS OF EFFECT ON THREAT REDUCTION AND NONPROLIFERATION
PROGRAMS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MEASURES WITH RESPECT
TO SUCH PROGRAMS.
(a) Analysis of and Report on Congressional Oversight Measures.--
(1) The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, shall carry out an analysis of the effect on threat reduction
and nonproliferation programs of applicable congressional oversight
measures. The analysis shall take into account--
(A) the national security interests of the United States;
(B) the need for accountability in the expenditure of funds
by the United States;
(C) the effect of such congressional oversight measures on
the continuity and effectiveness of such programs; and
(D) the oversight responsibilities of Congress with respect
to such programs.
(2) In carrying out the analysis, the Secretary of Energy shall
consult with the chairs and ranking minority members of the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(b) Report.--Not later than November 1, 2004, the Secretary of
Energy shall submit to Congress a report on the analysis required by
subsection (a). The report shall--
(1) identify, and describe the purpose of, each
congressional oversight measure; and
(2) set forth such recommendations as the Secretary
considers appropriate as to whether the measure should be
retained, amended, or repealed, together with the reasoning
underlying that determination.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) the term ``congressional oversight measure'' means--
(A) the restrictions in subsection (d) of section
1203 of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993
(22 U.S.C. 5952);
(B) the eligibility requirements in paragraphs (1)
through (4) of section 502 of the FREEDOM Support Act
(22 U.S.C. 5852);
(C) the prohibition in section 1305 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public
Law 106-65; 113 Stat. 512; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note); and
(D) any restriction or prohibition on the use of
funds otherwise available for threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs that applies absent the
submission to Congress (or any one or more officers or
committees of Congress) of a report, certification, or
other matter.
(2) The term ``threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs'' means--
(A) the programs specified in section 1501(b) of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2731; 50 U.S.C.
2362 note); and
(B) any programs for which funds are made available
under the defense nuclear nonproliferation account of
the Department of Energy.
SEC. 202. ANNUAL REPORT ON THE USE OF FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR THREAT
REDUCTION AND NONPROLIFERATION IN STATES OF THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION.
(a) Report.--Not later than December 31 of each year, the Secretary
of Energy shall submit to Congress a report on the use, during the
fiscal year ending September 30 of that year, of funds appropriated for
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the Russian
Federation and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union.
The report shall be prepared in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense and shall include the following:
(1) A description of the use of such funds and the manner
in which such funds are being monitored and accounted for,
including--
(A) the amounts obligated, and the amounts
expended, for such activities;
(B) the purposes for which such amounts were
obligated and expended;
(C) the forms of assistance provided, and the
justification for each form of assistance provided;
(D) the success of each such activity, including
the purposes achieved for each such activity;
(E) a description of the participation in such
activities by private sector entities in the United
States and by Federal agencies; and
(F) any other information that the Secretary of
Energy considers appropriate to provide a complete
description of the operation and success of such
activities.
(2) An accounting of the financial commitment made by the
Russian Federation, as of the date of the end of the fiscal
year covered by the report, to the destruction of its weapons
of mass destruction and to threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs.
(3) A description of the efforts made by the United States
to encourage the Russian Federation to continue to maintain its
current level of financial commitment at a level not less than
the level of its commitment for fiscal year 2003, and the
response of the Russian Federation to such efforts.
(4) A description of the access provided by the Russian
Federation to the United States during the fiscal year covered
by the report to the facilities with respect to which the
United States is providing assistance under threat reduction
and nonproliferation programs.
(b) Consultation Required.--In preparing the report, the Secretary
of Energy shall consult with the chairs and ranking minority members of
the following congressional committees:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services, Committee on
Appropriations, and Committee on International Relations of the
House of Representatives.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services, Committee on
Appropriations, and Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
(c) Information From Russian Federation.--In the case of activities
covered by the report that are carried out in the Russian Federation,
the Secretary of Energy shall, in preparing the report, include
information provided by the Russian Federation with respect to those
activities.
(d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs'' has the meaning given such term in section
201.
SEC. 203. PLAN FOR AND COORDINATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS WITH STATES OF THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION.
(a) Chemical and Biological Weapons Plan.--Section 1205 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law
107-107; 115 Stat. 1247), as amended by section 1205 of the Bob Stump
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-314; 116 Stat. 2664) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new
subsection (d):
``(d) Chemical and Biological Weapons.--(1) Not later than June 1,
2004, the President shall prepare and submit to Congress a
comprehensive, detailed plan--
``(A) to secure and destroy all chemical and biological
weapons, and the chemical and biological materials designed for
use in such weapons, that are located in Russia and the
independent states of the former Soviet Union; and
``(B) to prevent the outflow from those states of the
technology and scientific expertise that could be used for
developing those weapons, including delivery systems.
``(2) The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include the
following:
``(A) Specific goals and measurable objectives for the
programs that are designed to carry out the objectives
specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).
``(B) Identification of all significant obstacles to
achieving those objectives and the means for overcoming those
obstacles.
``(C) Criteria for success for those programs and a
strategy for eventual termination of United States
contributions to those programs and assumption of the ongoing
support of those programs by the Russian Federation.
``(D) Specification of the fiscal and other resources
necessary in each of the eight fiscal years after fiscal year
2003 to achieve those objectives.
``(E) Recommendations for any changes--
``(i) in the structure or organization of the
programs for carrying out those objectives; and
``(ii) in regulations or legislation that would
increase the efficiency and coordination of those
programs or would otherwise contribute to the
achievement of those objectives.
``(3) In developing the plan required by paragraph (1), the
President shall consult with--
``(A) the majority and minority leadership of the
appropriate committees of Congress; and
``(B) appropriate officials of the states of the former
Soviet Union.
``(4)(A) The President, after consultation with the majority and
minority leadership of the appropriate committees of Congress, shall
designate a senior official of the Executive Branch, and provide that
official with sufficient authority and staffing and other resources, to
coordinate the programs referred to in paragraph (2)(A).
``(B) The President shall designate that official not later than 12
months after the date of the enactment of this subsection.''.
(b) Report Required To Cover Both Plans.--Subsection (e) of section
1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002
(Public Law 107-107; 115 Stat. 1247), as redesignated by subsection
(a), is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Plan.--'' and
inserting ``Plans.--'';
(2) in paragraph (1)--
(A) by striking ``January 31, 2003,'' and inserting
``January 31, 2005,''; and
(B) by striking ``plan required by subsection (a)''
and inserting ``plans required by subsections (a) and
(d)(1)''; and
(3) in paragraph (2)--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``plan
required by subsection (a)'' and inserting ``plans
required by subsections (a) and (d)(1)''; and
(B) in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) by striking
``plan'' each place it appears and inserting ``plans''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of section 1205 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law
107-107; 115 Stat. 1247) is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 1205. PLANS FOR SECURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MATERIAL, AND
EXPERTISE OF, AND FOR COORDINATING CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS WITH, STATES
OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.''.
(d) Effective Date for First Report Covering Both Plans.--The
amendments made by subsection (b) shall apply with respect to the first
report due after January 31, 2004.
TITLE III--UNITED STATES-RUSSIA RELATIONS
SEC. 301. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORIES AND DATA EXCHANGES ON NUCLEAR
WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that inventories of nuclear weapons-
grade material and nuclear weapons should be tracked in order, among
other things--
(1) to make it more likely that the Russian Federation can
fully account for its entire inventory of nuclear weapons-grade
material and nuclear weapons; and
(2) to make it more likely that the sources of any such
material or weapons possessed or used by any foreign state or
terrorist organization can be identified.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
seek to establish jointly with the Russian Federation comprehensive
inventories and data exchanges of Russian Federation and United States
nuclear weapons-grade material and nuclear weapons, with particular
attention to tactical warheads and warheads that are no longer
operationally deployed.
(c) Assistance in Developing Comprehensive Inventories.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United States should
seek to work with the Russian Federation to develop comprehensive
inventories of Russian highly enriched uranium, weapons-grade
plutonium, and assembled warheads, with special attention to be focused
on tactical warheads and warheads that are no longer operationally
deployed.
(d) Data Exchanges.--As part of the development of inventories
under subsection (c), to the maximum extent practicable and without
jeopardizing United States national security interests, the United
States may exchange data with the Russian Federation on categories of
material and weapons described in subsection (c).
(e) Report.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until a comprehensive
inventory is created and the information collected from the inventory
is exchanged between the United States and the Russian Federation, the
President shall submit to Congress a report, in both classified and
unclassified form as necessary, describing the progress that has been
made toward creating an inventory and exchanging the information.
SEC. 302. ESTABLISHMENT OF DUMA-CONGRESS NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION
WORKING GROUP.
(a) Establishment of Working Group.--There is hereby established a
working group to be known as the ``Nuclear Threat Reduction Working
Group'' as an interparliamentary group of the United States and the
Russian Federation.
(b) Purpose of Working Group.--The purpose of the Working Group
established by subsection (a) shall be to explore means to enhance
cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation with
respect to nuclear nonproliferation and security, and such other issues
related to reducing nuclear weapons dangers as the delegations from the
two legislative bodies may consider appropriate.
(c) Membership.--(1) The majority leader of the Senate, after
consultation with the minority leader of the Senate, shall appoint 10
Senators to the Working Group established by subsection (a).
(2) The Speaker of the House of Representatives, after consultation
with the minority leader of the House of Representatives, shall appoint
30 Representatives to the Working Group.
SEC. 303. JOINT UNITED STATES/NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA ON THEATER-LEVEL BALLISTIC
MISSILE DEFENSES.
(a) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States that the
President should seek to ensure that the United States takes the lead
in arranging for the United States, in conjunction with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, to enter into appropriate cooperative
relationships with the Russian Federation with respect to the
development and deployment of theater-level ballistic missile defenses.
(b) Purpose of Cooperative Relationships.--It is the policy of the
United States--
(1) that the purpose of the cooperative relationships
described in subsection (a) is to increase transparency and
confidence with the Russian Federation;
(2) that United States defense and security cooperation
with the Russian Federation should contribute to defining a new
bilateral strategic framework that is not rooted in the concept
of ``mutual assured destruction''; and
(3) that that new bilateral strategic framework should be
based upon improving the security of the United States and the
Russian Federation by promoting transparency and confidence
between the two countries.
(c) Report to Congress.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress a
report (in unclassified or classified form as necessary) on the
feasibility of increasing cooperation with the Russian Federation on
the subject of theater-level ballistic missile defenses and on the
purposes and objectives set forth in subsection (b). The report shall
include--
(1) recommendations from the Department of Defense and
Missile Defense Agency;
(2) a threat assessment; and
(3) an assessment of possible benefits to missile defense
programs of the United States.
SEC. 304. ENCOURAGEMENT OF ENHANCED COLLABORATION TO ACHIEVE MORE
RELIABLE RUSSIAN EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) the innovative United States-Russian space-based remote
sensor research and development program known as the Russian-
American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) program addresses a
variety of defense concerns while promoting enhanced
transparency and confidence between the United States and the
Russian Federation; and
(2) an initial concept of co-orbiting United States and
Russian satellites for simultaneous stereo observations is
complete and should be continued.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to encourage joint efforts by the United States and the
Russian Federation to reduce the chances of a Russian nuclear
attack anywhere in the world as the result of misinformation or
miscalculation by developing the capabilities and increasing
the reliability of Russian ballistic missile early-warning
systems, including the Russian-American Observation Satellite
(RAMOS) program; and
(2) to encourage other United States-Russian programs to
ensure that the Russia Federation has reliable information,
including real-time data, regarding launches of ballistic
missiles anywhere in the world.
(c) Interim RAMOS Funding.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure
that, pending the execution of a new agreement between the United
States and the Russian Federation providing for the conduct of the
RAMOS program, sufficient amounts of funds appropriated for that
program are used in order to ensure the satisfactory continuation of
that program during fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
SEC. 305. TELLER-KURCHATOV ALLIANCE FOR PEACE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) Edward Teller of the United States and Igor Kurchatov
of the former Soviet Union were architects of the nuclear
weapons programs in their respective countries;
(2) these outstanding individuals both expressed a longing
for peace and opposition to war; and
(3) as the United States and the Russian Federation work
together to redirect the nations of the world towards the
peaceful use of nuclear energy, seeking to improve the quality
of life for all human beings, it is appropriate to establish an
alliance for peace in the names of Edward Teller and Igor
Kurchatov.
(b) Teller-Kurchatov Alliance for Peace.--(1) The Secretary of
Energy shall seek to enter into an agreement with the Minister of
Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation to carry out a cooperative
venture, to be known as the Teller-Kurchatov Alliance for Peace, to
develop and promote peaceful, safe, and environmentally sensitive uses
of nuclear energy.
(2) The cooperative venture referred to in paragraph (1) shall
involve the national security laboratories of the National Nuclear
Security Administration and the laboratories of the Ministry of Atomic
Energy and the Kurchatov Institute of the Russian Federation.
(3) The cooperative venture shall be directed by two co-chairs, one
each from the United States and the Russian Federation. The co-chair
from the United States shall serve for a term of two years and shall be
designated by the Administrator for Nuclear Security from among
officials of the three national security laboratories, with each
laboratory represented on a rotating basis.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.-- There is authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to the Department of Energy
a total of $5,000,000 to carry out the cooperative venture referred to
in subsection (b).
SEC. 306. NONPROLIFERATION FELLOWSHIPS.
(a) In General.--(1) From amounts made available to carry out this
section, the Administrator for Nuclear Security may carry out a program
under which the Administrator awards, to scientists employed at the
Kurchatov Institute of the Russian Federation and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, international exchange fellowships, to be known as
Teller-Kurchatov Fellowships, in the nuclear nonproliferation sciences.
(2) The purpose of the program shall be to provide opportunities
for advancement in the field of nuclear nonproliferation to scientists
who, as demonstrated by their academic or professional achievements,
show particular promise of making significant contributions in that
field.
(3) A fellowship awarded to a scientist under the program shall be
for study and training at (and, where appropriate, at an institution of
higher education in the vicinity of)--
(A) the Kurchatov Institute, in the case of a scientist
employed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and
(B) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in the case of
a scientist employed at the Kurchatov Institute.
(4) The duration of a fellowship under the program may not exceed
two years. The Administrator may provide for a longer duration in an
individual case to the extent warranted by extraordinary circumstances,
as determined by the Administrator.
(5) In a calendar year, the Administrator may not award more than--
(A) one fellowship to a scientist employed at the Kurchatov
Institute; and
(B) one fellowship to a scientist employed at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory.
(6) A fellowship under the program shall include--
(A) travel expenses;
(B) any tuition and fees at an institution of higher
education for study or training under the fellowship; and
(C) any other expenses that the Administrator considers
appropriate, such as room and board.
(b) Funding.--Amounts available to the Department of Energy for
defense nuclear nonproliferation activities shall be available for the
fellowships authorized by subsection (a).
(c) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) the term ``institution of higher education'' means a
college, university, or other educational institution that is
empowered by an appropriate authority, as determined by the
Administrator, to award degrees higher than the baccalaureate
level;
(2) the term ``nuclear nonproliferation sciences'' means
bodies of scientific knowledge relevant to developing or
advancing the means to prevent or impede the proliferation of
nuclear weaponry; and
(3) the term ``scientist'' means an individual who has a
degree from an institution of higher education in a science
that has practical application in the field of nuclear
nonproliferation.
TITLE IV--OTHER
SEC. 401. PROMOTION OF DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL SECURITY
AND SAFETY BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) cooperative programs to control potential threats from
any fissile and radiological materials, whatever and wherever
their sources, should be expanded to include additional states
and international organizations; and
(2) addressing issues of nuclear weapons and materials, as
well as the issue of radiological dispersal bombs, in new
forums around the world is crucial to the generation of
innovative mechanisms directed at addressing the threats.
(b) Sense of Congress Regarding Initiation of Dialogue Between the
IAEA and the OECD.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should seek to initiate discussions
between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for the
purpose of exploring issues of nuclear and radiological
security and safety, including the creation of new sources of
revenue (including debt reduction) for states to provide
nuclear security; and
(2) the discussions referred to in paragraph (1) should
also provide a forum to explore possible sources of funds in
support of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
(c) Report.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report
on--
(1) the efforts made by the United States to initiate the
discussions described in subsection (b);
(2) the results of those efforts; and
(3) any plans for further discussions and the purposes of
such discussions.
<all>
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
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