United Nations Management, Personnel, and Policy Reform Act of 2005 - Expresses the sense of Congress and sets forth congressional findings concerning the United Nations' need to: (1) institute effective management techniques and procurement procedures; (2) develop a uniformly professional international civil service; (3) improve budgeting procedures; (4) improve peacekeeping forces; (5) reorient and streamline human rights mechanisms; and (6) strengthen the independence of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, protect whistleblowers, and create a mechanism to oversee auditing and to track management and personnel reforms.
Requires the President to report annually to the appropriate congressional committees on U.N. reforms. Authorizes the President to withhold 50% of U.S. annual contributions if the United Nations is not making sufficient progress in implementing such reforms.
[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1383 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
109th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1383
To seek urgent and essential institutional reform at the United
Nations.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
July 12, 2005
Mr. Coleman (for himself and Mr. Lugar) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To seek urgent and essential institutional reform at the United
Nations.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``United Nations Management,
Personnel, and Policy Reform Act of 2005''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) An effective United Nations is in the interests of the
United States.
(2) The United States Government must, in the interests of
the United States, lead the United Nations toward greater
relevance and capability.
(3) Member States of the United Nations are showing
receptivity to needed reforms as a result of the urgency of new
challenges facing the organization and investigations into past
failures of the United Nations, including the Oil-for-Food
Programme scandal and problems with United Nations peacekeeping
and security operations.
(4) The United Nations must transform and reinvigorate
itself in order to better prevent and end conflicts and build
stable societies, anticipate and respond to gross human rights
violations (including genocide), prevent catastrophic terrorism
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
facilitate economic development and poverty reduction.
(5) In order to address the demand that the mission of the
United Nations shift from convener of meetings on these
critical challenges to a coordinator of international action,
from talk shop to a place of action, the United Nations must
undertake institutional reforms that ensure the effectiveness,
integrity, transparency, and accountability of the United
Nations system.
(6) It is incumbent upon the United Nations to enact
significant reform measures if it is to restore the public
trust and confidence necessary for it to achieve the laudable
goals set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.
(7) A successful United States effort to further reform the
United Nations will require bipartisanship and the joint
involvement of the executive and legislative branches of the
United States Government so that there is a unified United
States position toward the United Nations.
(8) A February 2004 General Accounting Office (GAO) report
entitled ``United Nations: Reforms Progressing, but
Comprehensive Assessments Needed to Measure Impact'' finds that
the United Nations has made some progress on a number of reform
measures but still needs more accountable leadership and
improvements in key management practices.
(9) The United Nations has issued three separate reports
addressing necessary reforms:
(A) A report issued in December 2004 by the
Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change (on which Brent Scowcroft of the
United States served) entitled ``A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility''.
(B) An analysis of the work of the High Level Panel
in the report issued in March 2005 by United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan entitled ``In Larger
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights
for All''.
(C) A draft outcome document report issued in June
2005 by United Nations General Assembly President Jean
Ping of Gabon in preparation for the September 2005
General Assembly World Summit.
(10) The June 2005 United States Institute of Peace report
prepared by the Task Force on the United Nations chaired by
former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority
Leader George Mitchell, entitled ``American Interests and UN
Reform'', provides excellent recommendations for management and
policy reform and should serve as a model for future bipartisan
policy studies.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED FOR UNITED NATIONS REFORM.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United Nations must develop the tools and institute
the management techniques and procurement procedures at the
United Nations that modern governments and effective chief
executive officers utilize to run efficient organizations;
(2) the United Nations must develop a uniformly
professional international civil service through transparent
recruitment, strong management oversight, and high professional
and ethical standards enforced through performance review
procedures and financial disclosure requirements;
(3) the United Nations must establish budgeting procedures
that are transparent and priority driven and performance based,
and contributions from the United States and other Member
States must be well managed so that the United Nations can meet
the critical challenges ahead;
(4) the United Nations must improve the capacity of United
Nations peacekeeping forces to perform dangerous missions by
adopting measures that ensure discipline and personal integrity
and by ensuring that United Nations troops are provided the
training and authority necessary to produce successful
outcomes;
(5) the United Nations must become an effective force for
human rights improvement worldwide by reorienting and
streamlining its human rights mechanisms so that the United
Nations is willing and able to take action to improve the
conduct of governments that abuse their people; and
(6) the United Nations must strengthen the independence of
the Office of Internal Oversight Services and its capacity to
uncover waste, fraud, and abuse, and the United Nations must
also protect whistleblowers and create a mechanism to oversee
and strengthen auditing of the organization and to track
management and personnel reforms at the United Nations.
SEC. 4. MANAGEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) No single official is tasked with managing the daily
operations of the United Nations.
(2) The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
found that the Government of Iraq manipulated the United
Nations Oil-for-Food Programme in numerous ways, and that the
United Nations' management of the Programme was plagued with
corruption, conflicts of interest, and negligent oversight. The
Subcommittee further found that the Programme suffered from
extensive smuggling of Iraqi oil and other products, conflicts
of interest in procurement and contracting by United Nations
agents, billions of dollars in illegal revenue generated by the
Hussein regime through kickbacks, and the diversion of
humanitarian commodities away from their rightful recipients,
the Iraqi people.
(3) The findings of numerous investigations, including that
of the Independent Inquiry into the Iraq Oil-for-Food Programme
headed by Paul Volcker, have made it clear that current systems
for overseeing procurement and contracting, monitoring
management performance, and preventing fraud and corruption at
the United Nations are ineffective and must be strengthened.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should use its voice and vote at the United Nations to pursue
meaningful management reform that includes actions by the United
Nations--
(1) to empower the Secretary-General to replace top
officials in the United Nations Secretariat and recruit only
the most highly qualified individuals to fill those positions,
with priority given to proven professional excellence over
geographic diversity;
(2) to conduct an updated assessment, approved by the
General Assembly, of the United Nations procurement system,
with the objective of establishing a comprehensive procurement
system that incorporates standards commensurate with those used
by modern governments and effective private sector companies;
(3) to adopt procurement policies that embody high
standards such as those contained in section 104(a) of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. 78dd-2(a)),
which prohibit persons from making or receiving payments,
offering or receiving gifts, or exchanging other promises to
secure an improper advantage in winning competitive bids;
(4) to name within the United Nations Secretariat a single
senior official position to be in charge of daily operations
and to perform the role of chief operating officer;
(5) to establish a Management Performance Board to ensure
that senior officials are held accountable for their actions
and the results their units achieve;
(6) to provide representatives of each Member State on a
timely basis, as requested, all relevant information regarding
the expenditure of funds and the management and oversight of
United Nations programs;
(7) to ensure that the Security Council establishes a
Sanctions Management Office with the responsibility for
assisting and informing Security Council members on all aspects
of the management, monitoring, and oversight of sanctions
programs;
(8) to revise the United Nations General Assembly committee
structure to eliminate duplication and to reflect the
substantive priorities of the United Nations;
(9) to end the practice of secret voting on the United
Nations Economic and Social Council;
(10) to create an Office of Ethics, which shall be
responsible for--
(A) revising, overseeing, and enforcing a code of
ethics for all United Nations employees;
(B) providing education and annual training;
(C) monitoring and serving as a repository for
financial disclosure documents; and
(D) encouraging a culture of avoidance of actual or
perceived conflicts of interest.
SEC. 5. UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The personnel system of the United Nations has
accumulated a heavy load of staff who lack the skills or the
motivation to perform their duties or whose duties are no
longer necessary.
(2) Some United Nations staff remain in the same job for
years or decades and often resist being transferred,
particularly if a transfer would mean leaving New York City or
other desirable locations.
(3) The Office of Human Resources Management of the United
Nations does not utilize basic standard management practices,
and the existing performance appraisal system is ineffective.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should use its voice and vote at the United Nations to pursue
meaningful personnel reform that includes actions by the United
Nations--
(1) to create a modern personnel system for evaluating
performance, providing promotional opportunities for deserving
employees, separating unneeded and underperforming employees,
and recruiting only highly qualified employees;
(2) to empower a reformed Office of Human Resources
Management that employs techniques of modern personnel
policies;
(3) to institute a one-time severance program designed
expressly to remove unneeded staff;
(4) to require annual financial disclosure reports to
identify possible or apparent conflicts of interest from any
United Nations employee, consultant, or independent expert
whose duties and responsibilities include contracting or
procurement, managing loans, grants, or programs, or evaluating
or auditing any United Nations project, program, or entity; and
(5) to affirm the authority and responsibility of the
Secretary-General--
(A) to waive immunity in criminal cases involving
United Nations personnel unless the Legal Advisor to
the Secretary-General determines that justice is
unlikely to be served in the country at issue; and
(B) to seek reimbursement of legal fees in such
cases only if the accused is cleared by appropriate
legal processes.
SEC. 6. UNITED NATIONS BUDGET.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) There is no systematic and consistent procedure to
prioritize the goals of the United Nations and to allocate
resources to the highest priority programs and offices.
(2) The United Nations does not systematically monitor and
evaluate program performance to determine the relevance of
programs for purposes of eliminating obsolete programs and
shifting resources to priority programs.
(3) The United Nations must foster a cost-conscious culture
that could better allocate resources to high-priority
undertakings.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should use its voice and vote at the United Nations to pursue
meaningful budget reform that includes actions by the United Nations--
(1) to evaluate existing programs and activities with the
goal of terminating those that are no longer serving their
original purpose or do not meet priority goals;
(2) to establish sunset provisions for all new programs
mandated by the General Assembly;
(3) to identify operational programs that can be made more
effective through voluntary rather than assessed contributions;
(4) to enforce the ``5.6 rule'', which requires the
Secretariat to identify low-priority activities in the budget
proposal, and to establish an additional requirement
requiring--
(A) the identification of the lowest priority
activities equivalent in cost to 15 percent of the
budget request; or
(B) if no such identification is made, the
mandatory implementation of an across-the-board
reduction of the budget equal to that amount;
(5) to pursue a mechanism that would provide larger
contributors greater influence in votes on budgetary matters
without disenfranchising smaller contributors;
(6) to base the biennial budget of the United Nations on
performance-based budgeting and program evaluation;
(7) to require itemization by program, project, and
activity of the annual budget for assessed contributions;
(8) to establish effective controls to prevent conflicts of
interest in the awarding of contracts;
(9) to establish procedures and policies to ensure
effective and comprehensive oversight and monitoring of
performance of United Nations contracts;
(10) to ensure that the United Nations Office of Internal
Oversight receives its budget resources through appropriations
by the United Nations General Assembly and is not dependent
upon any other bureau, division, department, or specialized
agency of the United Nations for approving and providing such
funding; and
(11) to promote a culture of cost-consciousness at the
United Nations and reduce costs through such measures as--
(A) increasing the efficiency of the public
information function of the United Nations through use
of the Internet and the consolidation of worldwide
information centers;
(B) expanding outsourcing and automation of
translation services; and
(C) reducing the frequency of conferences and
international meetings.
SEC. 7. INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United Nations Secretariat does not conduct
periodic, comprehensive assessments of the status, impact, and
need for United Nations reforms.
(2) The United Nations has not established sufficiently
systematic procedures for the receipt, retention, and treatment
of confidential submissions from United Nations employees
concerned about unethical practices, fraud, accounting
discrepancies, or mismanagement.
(3) The United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme overtaxed the
fragile oversight and accountability mechanisms of the United
Nations, revealing significant flaws that urgently need to be
addressed if confidence in the United Nations is to be
restored.
(4) The Oil-for-Food scandal has also created an
opportunity for reform by conclusively demonstrating to all
Member States the need for a significant strengthening of the
United Nations oversight system.
(5) The United Nations would benefit from the establishment
of an independent oversight board that has the authority and
expertise to uncover weaknesses in the internal auditing and
oversight procedures of the United Nations and to recommend
ways in which they can be strengthened.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should use its voice and vote at the United Nations to pursue
independent oversight of United Nations operations and reform that
includes actions by the United Nations--
(1) to strengthen whistleblower policies to the level of
the highest emerging standards for national and international
law, such as those provided for in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), and the Inspector General Act of
1978 (5 U.S.C. App.);
(2) to provide both the resources and the authority to the
Office of Internal Oversight Services to carry out appropriate
oversight of every activity that is managed by United Nations
personnel, whether that activity is funded by the assessments
of the United Nations General Assembly or by voluntary
contributions;
(3) to create an Independent Oversight Board that--
(A) is responsible for reviewing and providing
advice on the audit plans of the Office of Internal
Oversight Services and recommending the annual budget
of the Office;
(B) receives operational and budgetary funding
through the General Assembly and is not dependent upon
funding from any bureau, division, department, or
specialized agency of the United Nations;
(C) has the authority to audit all operations of
the United Nations, including the operations of the
Office of Internal Oversight Services and the Board of
External Auditors;
(D) is responsible for providing annual reports to
the Secretary-General, the Security Council, and the
General Assembly on its activities, observations, and
recommendations related to audit operations, including
information on audits and investigations conducted by
the Office of Internal Oversight and the Board of
External Auditors; and
(E) determines and submits to the General Assembly
the budgets for the Office of Internal Oversight and
the Board of External Auditors independently of the
regular United Nations budget process; and
(4) to increase the independence of the Office of Internal
Oversight Services, including by--
(A) designating the Office as an independent entity
within the United Nations;
(B) ensuring the independence of the Office from
any budgetary or organizational authority of any United
Nations entity other than the Independent Oversight
Board;
(C) providing the operational and budgetary funding
for the Office through the General Assembly and
ensuring that the Office is not dependent upon funding
from any bureau, division, department, or specialized
agency of the United Nations;
(D) providing the Office the authority to initiate
and conduct investigations of any bureau, division,
department, specialized agency, official (including the
Secretary General), employee, contractor, or consultant
of the United Nations or any of its specialized
agencies; and
(E) requiring the Office to provide periodic
reports to the Internal Oversight Board on the audits,
investigations, and other activities of the Office.
SEC. 8. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Between 1990 and 2005, the United Nations Security
Council, with the support of the United States, initiated more
than 40 peacekeeping operations.
(2) As of late March 2005, there were nearly 70,000
international military and police forces serving in 17 United
Nations peacekeeping missions, and the approved peacekeeping
budget of the United Nations stood at nearly $4,000,000,000.
(3) In many cases, peacekeeping has evolved into a complex
mission to help remake societies emerging from conflicts where
progress is uneven and outcomes are uncertain.
(4) Current United Nations peacekeeping efforts are
bedeviled by both limited capacity and operational challenges.
(5) United Nations peacekeeping operations have contributed
greatly toward the promotion of peace and stability for the
past 57 years and the majority of peacekeeping personnel who
have served under the United Nations flag have done so with
honor and courage. Recently, however, the record of United
Nations peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by operational
failures and unconscionable acts of misconduct.
(6) If the reputation of and confidence in United Nations
peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fundamental and far-
reaching reforms, particularly in the areas of planning,
management, training, conduct, and discipline, must be
implemented without delay.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should use its voice and vote at the United Nations to pursue
meaningful peacekeeping reform that includes actions by the United
Nations--
(1) to strengthen and increase the efficiency of the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations;
(2) to develop doctrine and strategy for multidimensional
peace operations that thoroughly integrates the security
dimension with associated economic and political development
requirements;
(3) to create a Peacebuilding Commission, a Peacebuilding
Support Office, and a voluntary Peacebuilding Support Fund; and
(4) to reform its peacekeeping operations in the areas of
planning, management, conduct, and discipline, including--
(A) conducting a global audit and comprehensive
review of peacekeeping mandates with a view toward
right-sizing or even ending peacekeeping missions;
(B) adopting a minimum standard of qualifications
for senior leaders and managers of peacekeeping
operations;
(C) adopting a uniform code of conduct that applies
equally to all personnel regardless of rank and an
enforcement system that provides for temporary
suspension of personnel pending the outcome of
investigations and the punishment of those proven
guilty;
(D) establishing a permanent, professional, and
independent investigative body under the Office of
Internal Oversight Services dedicated to United Nations
peacekeeping;
(E) establishing a centralized database to track
cases of misconduct; and
(F) creating monitoring mechanisms, such as
personnel conduct units, to be present within each
mission to monitor compliance and report to the head of
mission, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and
the Office of Internal Oversight Services.
SEC. 9. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In 2005, 6 of the 53 countries sitting on the United
Nations Human Rights Commission were listed by Freedom House as
the world's ``worst of the worst'' abusers of human rights.
(2) The Human Rights Commission has been ineffective in
monitoring, promoting, and enforcing internationally recognized
human rights standards in Member States.
(3) The international community has not been able to rely
on the human rights mechanisms of the United Nations to
anticipate, avert, or end genocide and mass killing.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should use its voice and vote at the United Nations to pursue
meaningful reform of international human rights institutions that
includes actions by the United Nations--
(1) to abolish the United Nations Human Rights Commission;
(2) to create a Human Rights Council, composed of Member
States that commit themselves to upholding the values embodied
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that has a
mandate to focus its work on abuse of human rights in Member
States;
(3) to increase substantially the capacity of the Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, including by providing
increased funding;
(4) to strengthen the United Nations Democracy Caucus;
(5) to establish a Democracy Fund at the United Nations, to
be administered by the United Nations Democracy Caucus, which
shall consider and recommend proposals for funding;
(6) to provide to the Security Council regular reporting by
the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Advisor
for the Prevention of Genocide;
(7) to make ineligible for membership in any United Nations
human rights body a Member State that fails to uphold the
values embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and systematically violates the human rights of its own
citizens;
(8) to make ineligible for membership on any United Nations
human rights body a Member State that is--
(A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
or
(B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation
for human rights abuses; and
(9) to provide the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights increased resources and greater
influence in field operations activities involving multiple
United Nations activities, such as operations in Darfur, Sudan,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
SEC. 10. UNITED NATIONS POLICY REFORM AND SPECIFIC COUNTRY ISSUES.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States should use its
voice and vote at the United Nations to pursue policy reforms and
address specific country issues that include actions by the United
Nations--
(1) to adopt a definition of terrorism that builds upon the
recommendations of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change and negotiate a comprehensive
convention on terrorism;
(2) to recommend to the Western Europe and Others (WEOG)
members that Israel be provided permanent membership in the
regional grouping throughout the United Nations system;
(3) to ensure that the United Nations Relief Works Agency
establishes mechanisms to refrain from hiring on its staff
members of terrorist organizations, including Hamas; and
(4) to ensure that the Secretary-General undertakes a
review of the role of nongovernmental organizations in the
United Nations system, and to encourage the General Assembly,
based on such review, to establish an updated United Nations
policy on the participation, cooperation, and coordination of
nongovernmental organizations in United Nations operations.
SEC. 11. REPORTS ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.
(a) In General.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the
extent to which the United Nations has made significant and measurable
progress toward meeting the reform requirements described in this Act.
(b) Determination Regarding Implementation of Reforms.--Each report
submitted under subsection (a) shall include a determination by the
President whether the United Nations is making sufficient progress to
implement the reforms described in this Act.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee
on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate
and the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 12. WITHHOLDING OF UNITED NATIONS CONTRIBUTIONS.
(a) In General.--The President is authorized to withhold 50 percent
of United States contributions to the United Nations in a year if the
President has determined in the most recent report submitted under
section 11 that the United Nations is not making sufficient progress to
implement the reforms described in this Act.
(b) Availability of Funds.--Funds withheld under this section are
authorized to remain available until expended.
<all>
Introduced in Senate
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR S8210-8211)
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