Protection against United Nations Taxation Act of 2006, the PUNT Act of 2006, or the Helms-Biden Reauthorization Act of 2006 - Requires the withholding of 20% of U.S. contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations (U.N.) and other applicable international organizations until the President certifies that neither the United Nations (or U.N. agencies) nor any other international organization has authority under U.S. law to impose, or has imposed or proposed, taxes or fees on the U.S. government, states, or U.S. corporations or nationals.
States that such provision shall not apply to: (1) fees for publications or other fees that are not tantamount to a tax on U.S. citizens; (2) the World Intellectual Property Organization; or (3) staff assessment costs of the United Nations and its agencies.
[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3633 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
109th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 3633
To require the withholding of United States contributions to the United
Nations until the President certifies that the United Nations is not
engaged in global taxation schemes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
July 11, 2006
Mr. Inhofe (for himself, Mr. Nelson of Nebraska, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Warner,
Mr. Graham, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Bunning, Mr.
Crapo, Mr. Craig, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Ensign, Mr. Coburn, Mr. Shelby, Mr.
Thomas, Mr. DeMint, Mr. Chambliss, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Vitter, Mr.
Isakson, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Thune, Mr. Bond, Mr. Smith, Mr. Cochran, Mr.
Gregg, Mr. Burns, Mr. Talent, Mr. Burr, Mr. Allen, and Mrs. Dole)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require the withholding of United States contributions to the United
Nations until the President certifies that the United Nations is not
engaged in global taxation schemes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Protection against United Nations
Taxation Act of 2006,'' the ``PUNT Act of 2006,'' or as the ``Helms-
Biden Reauthorization Act of 2006''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Congress has previously taken action in opposition to
United Nations taxation schemes in section 921 of the United
Nations Reform Act of 1999 (chapter 2 of title IX of the
Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act,
Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as enacted into law by section
1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113 and contained in appendix G of
that Act; 113 Stat. 1501A-478) (commonly referred to as
``Helms-Biden'')).
(2) The 2005 United Nations' Human Development Report,
released September 7, 2005, envisages ``raising additional
revenue through international taxation mechanisms''.
(3) The 2005 United Nations' Human Development Report
states, ``Several governments are assessing the implications of
an international tax on aviation fuel. Even set at a low level,
such a tax could raise $9-$10 billion a year.''
(4) The 2005 United Nations' Human Development Report
states, ``Another proposal calls for a flat-rate tax on airline
passenger tickets,'' with several countries having ``reached an
agreement in principle to introduce a national air ticketing
tax to finance development spending''.
(5) The 2005 United Nations' Human Development Report
states, ``Other countries have advocated a tax on currency
transactions. Indeed, Belgium has already passed legislation on
the adoption of a currency tax.''
(6) It has been estimated that a ``Tobin tax,'' named after
Dr. James Tobin who first proposed it, would raise
$13,000,000,000,000 from a small levy on international currency
transactions.
(7) The 2005 United Nations' Human Development Report
states, ``Advocates for the use of international levies to
mobilize financing for development claim that the approach
would produce important benefits for the MDGs [Millennium
Development Goals] and beyond.''
(8) The 2005 United Nations' Human Development Report
highlights the fact that, in a 2004 report, the Government of
France argues that new international taxes and fees are a good
idea.
(9) The 2005 United Nations' Human Development Report
recognizes that ``the United States, in particular, is opposed
to the approach'' of employing international taxation
mechanisms.
(10) United Nations officials have made numerous and
repeated proposals to provide financing for the United Nations
outside the scrutiny of Member States of the United Nations,
including borrowing from international financial institutions,
assuming control of bonds issued by Member States, and imposing
taxes on an extensive range of transactions, goods, and
services.
(11) The 1994 United Nations' Human Development Report
stated that ``[i]t is appropriate that the proceeds of an
international tax be devoted to international purposes and be
placed at the disposal of international institutions''.
(12) On January 14, 1996, United Nations General Secretary
Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that an international tax would
mean that ``[he would] not be under the daily financial will of
the Member States''.
(13) The United Nations and its organizations are replete
with mismanagement, waste, corruption, and inefficiency which
cost American taxpayers millions of dollars each year.
(14) The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty.
(15) The United Nations does not have the attributes of
sovereignty and is not a sovereign power.
(16) The United Nations has no legal authority to impose
taxes on United States citizens.
(17) On August 30, 2005, the United States Representative
to the United Nations wrote to colleagues at the United Nations
to caution against international spending targets ``which bear
no relation to countries' needs or ability to use aid
effectively'' and to warn against ``ignor[ing] the need for an
enabling environment at the national level for aid to be
effective in promoting development''.
(18) The Report of the United Nations Commission on the
Private Sector and Development estimates that developing
countries have $9,400,000,000,000 in private financial assets
that cannot be fully mobilized because of corruption and
inadequate legal protection for property and contracts.
(19) On August 30, 2005, the United States Representative
to the United Nations observed, ``Prosperity requires
institutions at the national level that generate wealth and
enable countries to participate in the global economy.''
(20) As a matter of prioritization, foreign national and
international corruption and legal protection for property and
contracts must be addressed before additional spending of
American taxpayer dollars on foreign aid exacerbates these
problems.
(21) On August 30, 2005, the United States Representative
to the United Nations observed, ``Development is about putting
into place a complex set of policies and institutions that will
generate economic growth and sustain it over the long haul to
the benefit of all countries.''
(22) On August 30, 2005, the United States Representative
to the United Nations observed, ``A global partnership is
predicated on the acceptance by developing countries of their
national responsibility to undertake specific reforms to
improve their economic governance and respect for human rights
and the rule of law.''
(23) On August 30, 2005, the United States Representative
to the United Nations stated clearly and firmly that ``the
United States is unable to agree'' to ``new open-ended donor
financial commitments''.
(24) On August 30, 2005, the United States Representative
to the United Nations stated clearly and firmly that ``the U.S.
does not accept global aid targets or global taxes''.
(25) Any activity by United Nations officials, personnel,
agents, or contractors to develop, advocate, or promote
international taxes or fees, except as noted in section
3(b)(4), is unacceptable and must be thoroughly investigated.
(26) On August 30, 2005, the United States Representative
to the United Nations cautioned against ``global governance''
and objected to ``assert[ing] a primacy for the United Nations
in international economic governance without respecting the
roles and mandates of other institutions''.
(27) On March 21, 2005, United Nations Secretary-General
Kofi Annan addressed the General Assembly to present a report
entitled, ``In Larger Freedom'' that advocates, ``Global
development assistance must be more than doubled over the next
few years. . . . Each developed country that has not already
done so should establish a timetable to achieve the 0.7 percent
target of gross national income for official development
assistance no later than 2015, starting with significant
increases no later than 2006, and reaching 0.5 percent by 2009.
The increase should be front-loaded through an International
Finance Facility, and other innovative sources of financing
should be considered for the longer term.''
(28) The term ``innovative sources of financing'' involves
developing, advocating, endorsing, publicizing, promoting, and
collecting international taxes and fees.
(29) According to the ``In Larger Freedom'' report, the
United Nations proposes to create an international revenue
service named the International Finance Facility.
(30) This proposed international revenue service would
extract long-term binding financial commitments from developed
nations and collect this money.
(31) This proposed international revenue service would also
issue debt on the global market for bonds issued by
supranational institutions and agencies and transfer wealth to
developing nations.
(32) The January 2003 proposal of the United Kingdom for an
International Financing Facility, which the United Nations has
endorsed, states, ``There have been other proposals for new and
innovative ways to raise funds to meet these goals, including a
Tobin tax, arms tax and an issue of IMF special drawing rights
(SDRs).''
(33) On Friday, June 10, 2005, at the United Nations in New
York, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), in cooperation with
the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs
(Financing for Development Office), organized a panel
discussion entitled, ``Promoting innovative sources of
financing for development: What role for parliaments?''.
(34) The United Nations panel of June 10, 2005, laid the
lobbying groundwork for global taxes and fees, stating ``The
panel aimed at providing the United Nations with a first direct
impression of the political support that currently exists at
the parliamentary level or that may be mobilized in future for
innovative sources of development financing.''
(35) The United Nations panel of June 10, 2005, concluded
that ``most proposed new sources of financing will eventually
require a legislative framework either to regulate existing
financing mechanisms or to create brand new ones''.
(36) The United Nations panel of June 10, 2005, stated,
``[T]he role of parliaments is essential to mobilize the
required political support for the various innovative
mechanisms on the table.''
(37) The United Nations panel of June 10, 2005, lobbied to
maximize new international taxes, ``The seven parliamentarians
on the panel agreed that no single innovative proposal alone
would suffice to fill the financing gap left open by
traditional sources (estimated between 50 and 100 billion
dollars a year). It was important therefore that a number of
proposals be advanced at the same time.''
(38) The United Nations panel of June 10, 2005, explained
the rationale behind the first, most promising way to levy new
international revenues from the likes of United States
nationals, stating, ``Among these, the IFF was likely to be a
favourite because it did not require universality, could
mobilize considerable sums, created a more predictable and
stable flow, and could easily be scrutinized by contributing
countries' parliaments. Because the IFF can be implemented in
the short term, it constitutes the most rapid response. . . .
The first IFF, to raise $4 billion . . . will be launched this
year.''
(39) The United Nations panel of June 10, 2005, lobbied to
find the most efficient way to transfer wealth out of the
United States, stating, ``On remittances, the impression of the
panel was that it should not be too difficult to find some
creative solution to reduce the average 20 percent transaction
fee, and thus increase the overall flow.''
(40) The United Nations panel of June 10, 2005, lobbied to
make life easier for illegal immigrants, stating, ``A more
intractable problem, however, has to do with facilitating money
transfers for illegal migrants who fear exposure to the
authorities. The situation has become particularly difficult in
the United States, the largest remittance-sending country,
following the tightening of security measures since the
September 11th attacks.''
(41) The United Nations panel of June 10, 2005, confronted
the challenges of international taxation and offered some
glimmer of hope, ``When it comes to discussions about
international taxation, some of the parliamentarians on the
panel felt strongly that this would for several years to come
be a political non-starter in too many legislatures (although
the Canadian House of Commons did adopt a motion on an
international currency transaction tax that expressed support
for such a tax `in concert with the international community').
The reasons adduced for this negative assessment were the
classic ones: international taxes can distort investment and
trade flows, can undermine national sovereignty, may be
impossible to universalize, and may even tamper with a
country's defence capacities (in the case of taxes on arms
sales).''
(42) In order to tax with the greatest of ease, the United
Nations panel of June 10, 2005, advocated the following: ``For
other panelists, however, at least some new fiscal levies could
be instituted without seeking a universal consensus. The best
example of this is given by flight departure taxes; these can
be implemented at the country level and can generate a fairly
predictable and rich stream.''
(43) On August 28, 2005, Asia-Europe Dialogue & Partner
offered their Declaration on Innovative Sources of Financing
for Development, ``At the initiative of President Luiz Inacio
Lula da Silva, of Brazil, we gathered in New York, on 20th
September 2004, to . . . increase financing for development. .
. . [T]he international discussions of innovative sources of
funding have gained momentum. The issue has become a regular
feature in UN discussions on financing for development and has
been in the agenda of multilateral financial institutions and
other important international fora.''
(44) The United Nations General Assembly agenda item dated
on October 15, 2004, and titled ``Follow-up to and
implementation of the outcome of the International Conference
on Financing for Development'' states the determination of the
General Assembly ``to continue to implement and build further
on the commitments made and agreements reached at the
International Conference on Financing for Development and to
strengthen the coordinated and coherent engagement of all
relevant stakeholders in the financing for development
process''.
(45) The World Federalist Movement Web page on Global
Economic Governance states that organization's position on
global levies or taxes, noting the United Nations' calls for
major efforts to mobilize additional financial resources and
stating that a treaty or convention for collection of revenues
for funding is in the works: ``For multilateral institutions to
be effective and independent they must have stable and adequate
funding. There is a fundamental need for new financial
mechanisms to provide for a strengthened and democratized
multilateral system. Since the U.N. conference on Financing for
Development in 2002, more intergovernmental attention has been
given to the possibility of innovative sources of finance such
as environmental charge, currency transaction taxation,
taxation of arms trade, International Financial Facility as
proposed by the British government, and remittance's benefits
as well as voluntary contributions through credit cards and
lotteries.
``Several reports have been written on the feasibility of
some of these innovative sources of finance by Member-States
and U.N. bodies. In the note by the U.N. Secretary-General on
innovative sources of financing for development, he calls for
`major efforts by developing countries and the international
community to mobilize additional financial resource'. Brazil,
France, Chile and Spain have taken the lead in a campaign for
Action against Hunger and Poverty emphasizing the need for
innovative finance mechanisms if the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) are to be accomplished.
``Whereas the current intergovernmental debate about
innovative sources of finance is placed within the framework of
financing development and more specifically the MDGs, WFM
believes that the debate should be seen in a broader
perspective to also include the element of independent funding
of multilateral organizations.
``At present the most powerful countries provide the vast
majority of funding for international organizations and possess
an immense and unbalanced control over the political decisions
of these organizations. To reverse this trend, WFM calls for a
mixture of state and independent funding of international
organizations to ensure fair and democratic decision-making
processes exempt from power politics. WFM thus believes that
independent funding for multilateral organizations would
address the challenges and obstacles for achieving democratic
global governance.
``WFM specifically consider the global taxation of
transnational currency transactions to be the most important
source of independent funding and advocates a global
implementation of the Tobin tax. Eventually, in cooperation
with other NGOs and legal experts, WFM hopes to draft a treaty
or convention for collection of revenues for funding the
multilateral system that can be proposed and carried forth in
intergovernmental processes.''
(46) The International Financial Institutions in Latin
America state on their Web page the following: ``Another study
on innovative sources of financing for development,
commissioned by the U.N. from WIDER (The World Institute for
Development Economics Research), was published in August 2004.
Undertaken by Professor Anthony B. Atkinson of Nuffield
College, Oxford University, the study examines some of the same
potential sources for additional aid as well as considering how
international taxes might be administered by national
authorities.
``In addition to the Tobin tax, it considers a global
environmental levy, a carbon-use tax, applied at a rate of
US4.8 cents a US gallon (E 0.01 per litre). This tax `levied
only on high-income countries could indeed raise some US$60
billion a year.'.''
(47) On August 17, 2004, the United Nations General
Assembly distributed a document entitled, ``Innovative Sources
of Financing for Development'', which stated the following:
``The General Assembly, in its resolution 58/230 of
23 December 2003, decided to consider at its fifty-
ninth session possible innovative sources of financing
for development, and requested the Secretary-General to
submit the result of the analysis on this issue as
called for in paragraph 44 of the Monterrey Consensus
of the International Conference on Financing for
Development. In the Consensus, heads of State and
Government recognized the value of exploring innovative
sources of finance provided that those sources did not
unduly burden developing countries, and agreed to
study, in the appropriate forums, the results of the
analysis requested from the Secretary-General on
possible innovative sources of finance.
``In this connection, it should be recalled that
the General Assembly, in the context of the five-year
review of the implementation of the outcome of the
World Summit for Social Development, adopted resolution
S-24/2 of 1 July 2000, on further initiatives for
social development, in which it called for a rigorous
analysis of the advantages, disadvantages and other
implications of proposals for developing new and
innovative sources of funding, both public and private,
for dedication to social development and poverty
eradication programmes.
``In response to the decisions of the Assembly, the
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United
Nations Secretariat commissioned the World Institute
for Development Economics Research of the United
Nations University (UNUWIDER) to undertake, during the
period from 2003 to 2004, a study of new and innovative
sources of development finance. The purpose of the
study was not to devise new financing mechanisms for
development but to consider some of the better-known
existing proposals, focusing on their design and policy
implications. An international expert on fiscal issues,
Professor Anthony B. Atkinson, Warden of Nuffield
College, Oxford University, led the project, which
engaged a number of academics to prepare separate
papers on a selection of innovative financing
proposals. The UNU-WIDER study, entitled New Sources of
Development Finance, will be published by Oxford
University Press in 2004.
``An edited version of a policy-focused summary,
entitled `New Sources of Development Finance: Funding
the Millennium Development Goals', prepared by
Professor Atkinson in his capacity as director of the
UNU-WIDER study, is contained in the annex to the
present note. It presents the analytical framework,
short summaries of the seven proposed sources of
funding (i.e., global environmental taxes, tax on
currency transactions, creation of new special drawing
rights, an international finance facility, increased
private donations for development, a global lottery and
global premium bond, and increased remittances from
emigrants), an overview of the key findings, and some
conclusions.''.
(48) The foreword to the United Nations University book
entitled ``New Sources of Development Finance'' observes that,
``Proposals for any form of global taxation meet immediate
opposition from powerful elements in the US Congress. On the
other hand, there is widespread appreciation of the need for
new resource flows... .''
(49) The foreword to the book also explains that earmarking
of taxes for particular uses can be an effective tactic for the
implementation of new taxes, stating that ``[w]e can learn from
the analysis of the ear-marking of taxes...''.
(50) The foreword to the book also clearly explains the
lobbying goal of the book, stating, ``The ultimate aim is to
help break the present impasse in external finance for
developing countries, and we believe this study will make an
important contribution to the debate.''
(51) One contributor to New Sources of Development Finance
suggests that taxes be collected by national governments and
then provided for international purposes, perhaps through ``an
international agency''. Another contributor suggests the
establishment of a ``World Tax Authority'' under the United
Nations system.
(52) In June 2001, Ruben P. Mendez, formerly of the United
Nations Development Programme, presented a paper entitled ``The
Case for Global Taxes: An Overview'' to the United Nations ad
hoc Expert Group Meeting on Innovation in Mobilizing Global
Resources for Development.
(53) In ``The Case for Global Taxes'' Mr. Mendez claims
that as a percentage of gross national product, official
development assistance from the United States to foreign
nations ``runs at about 0.22 per cent, or less than one-third
of the universally accepted norm of 0.7 per cent'' and explains
that the public transfer of resources from the United States to
foreign nations could be brought to 22 to 28 percent, or one
hundred times what it is now, through a formal system of
international taxation of the United States.
(54) According to Jeffrey D. Sachs, a Special Advisor to
United Nations Secretary-General Annan on the Millennium
Development Goals, the rate of United States assistance remains
at 0.15 percent and, therefore, ``We are short by $65 billion
each year.''
(55) In his 2001 United Nations paper, Mr. Mendez states,
``Permits to pollute, in fact, are a form of corrective, or
`Pigovian', taxation and could presage the acceptance of global
taxation per se in view of the interest of the big industrial
polluting nations in this approach.''
(56) The 2001 United Nations paper continues, ``In the
international economy, however, the global commons are
generally used free of charge. It is therefore only logical to
have a system of global taxes, or user charges. The global
commons may be defined as those physical attributes of the
universe that fall outside national jurisdiction or ownership.
In addition to the traditional, tangible kinds of geographical
space and features, e.g., land, bodies of water, ocean depths,
air, natural resources and ecosystems, they include impalpable
but nevertheless important physical facts such as the different
levels of outer space, the orbits of geostationary satellites,
and the electromagnetic spectrum.''
(57) The 2001 United Nations paper reflects, ``Nobel
Memorial Prize-winning economist James Tobin of Yale has
proposed taxing foreign exchange transactions. . . . Professor
Tobin has noted that it could also be a `terrific fund raiser'
that `could cover everything'--a potential that has not been
lost on people concerned with international fund raising, who
have now latched on to the `Tobin tax' bandwagon.''
(58) Journalist Steven Solomon, a former staff reporter at
Forbes Magazine, estimates that the Tobin tax ``might net some
$13 trillion a year''.
(59) The 2001 United Nations paper alternately advocates
the creation of a foreign currency exchange to replace the role
banks currently play and to levy user charges.
(60) The 2001 United Nations paper also advocates an ad
valorem tax on international trade, which the paper claims is
justified, arguing, ``trade uses the global commons, and 95
percent consists of goods transported by ocean freight. It
would be a form of user fee. An alternative would be a tax on
ocean freight.''
(61) The 2001 United Nations paper also advocates,
``Military expenditures and arms transfers could also be
taxed.''
(62) The 2001 United Nations paper also advocates, ``Taxes
could also be on specific traded commodities, for instance,
internationally traded oil, other exhaustible materials . . .
or manufactured goods.''
(63) The 2001 United Nations paper also advocates ``serious
attempts to compensate [developing countries] for the
opportunity costs of conservation or to promote the generation
of positive externalities whose returns these countries are
unable to capture''.
(64) The 2001 United Nations paper also advocates taxing,
overflight, stating, ``Like the high seas, international air
space provides a passage for international transport. Since it
lies outside national jurisdiction, is used by aircraft of
various nations and is congestible, there is logic behind
having the international public sector assert global ownership
and charge user fees. One way this could be accomplished is
through a surcharge on international air tickets, a proposal
suggested by former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
but not repeated since an outcry by a group of US
congressmen.''
(65) The 2001 United Nations paper also advocates, ``In
addition to taxing and tapping foreign exchange transactions,
discussed at the beginning of this section, there are two
measures of a monetary nature, with considerable possibilities
for fund raising, that are worth revisiting: Special drawing
rights (SDRs) and IMF gold holdings.''
(66) The 2001 United Nations paper also advocates, ``The
`Bhagwati tax' is one of many which have an economic and
ethical rationale but must be appraised in terms of political
and national juridical considerations. Although not presented
initially within a public economics framework, it can be seen
as a way for the developed countries to compensate generators
of positive externalities--the countries of origin of the
highly trained emigrants, who benefit the receiving countries
and do not produce returns that can be captured by their home
countries. Such taxes have existed for some time, such as the
exit taxes of the Russian Federation and the former USSR,
although Bhagwati's point is that it is the beneficiaries,
including the recipient countries, which should pay the
taxes.''
(67) In the 2001 United Nations paper, Mendez declared
that, ``The concept of automaticity in international public
financing [mandatory international taxation] was first
discussed in an official international forum in 1977, at the
United Nations Conference on Desertification (UNCOD) in
Nairobi. It was developed and incorporated in concrete
proposals in subsequent studies and reports, in 1978 and 1980,
by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the
Secretary-General to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
and the General Assembly on financing the UNCOD Plan of
Action.7 These proposals were first analysed in an
international public finance framework in my 1992 book on the
subject. . . .''
(68) The global tax proposals have thus been developed from
1977 to the present, calling into question the validity of the
Helms-Biden certification required under section 921 of the
United Nations Reform Act of 1999 (chapter 2 of title IX of the
Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act,
Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as enacted into law by section
1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113 and contained in appendix G of
that Act; 113 Stat. 1501A-478) (commonly referred to as
``Helms-Biden'')).
(69) The 2001 United Nations paper concludes simply that
``the dawn of global taxation appears to be at hand''.
(70) The handling by the United Nations of the global tax
issue is discussed in the book, ``World Democratic
Federalism,'' by Myron J. Frankman, who says that one factor
behind the ``hostile reaction'' of the United States Congress
``to activity by the UN aimed at the promotion of any global
taxes was the publication by the United Nations Development
Program of a 1996 book titled, `The Tobin Tax'''.
(71) The United Nations and international organizations
have developed, advocated, endorsed, promoted, and publicized
proposals concerning the imposition of taxes and fees on United
States nationals in order to raise revenue for the United
Nations and international organizations.
SEC. 3. PAYMENT OF CERTAIN CONTRIBUTIONS CONTINGENT UPON CERTIFICATION
OF NO UNITED NATIONS TAXATION SCHEMES.
(a) Withholding of Portion of Assessed Contributions.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, until the President submits
the certification required under subsection (b) for a fiscal year, the
United States shall withhold during such year 20 percent of assessed
contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations and other
applicable international organizations.
(b) Certification.--
(1) Certification required.--The certification referred to
in subsection (a) is an annual certification made by the
President to Congress that the following conditions have been
met:
(A) No united nations legal taxation authority.--
Except as provided in paragraph (2), neither the United
Nations nor any of its specialized or affiliated
agencies nor any other international organization has
the authority under United States law to impose taxes
or fees on the United States Government or on the
several States or on United States corporate citizens
or on United States nationals.
(B) No taxes or fees.--Except as provided in
paragraph (2), a tax or fee has not been imposed on the
United States Government or on the several States or on
United States corporate citizens or on United States
nationals by the United Nations or any of its
specialized or affiliated agencies or any other
international organization.
(C) No taxation proposals.--Except as provided in
paragraph (2), neither the United Nations nor any of
its specialized or affiliated agencies nor any other
international organization has developed, advocated,
endorsed, promoted, or publicized any proposal
concerning the imposition of a tax or fee on any United
States national or any income earned in the United
States in order to raise revenue for the United
Nations, any foreign government, or any international
organization.
(2) Exception.--The conditions in subparagraphs (A) through
(C) of paragraph (1) do not apply to--
(A) fees for publications or other kinds of fees
that are not tantamount to a tax on United States
citizens;
(B) the World Intellectual Property Organization;
or
(C) the staff assessment costs of the United
Nations and its specialized or affiliated agencies.
SEC. 4. SAVINGS CLAUSE.
(a) Enforcement of Restrictions.--
(1) In house of representatives.--It shall not be in order
in the House of Representatives to consider any bill, joint
resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report suspending,
waiving, or repealing the requirement in section 3(a).
(2) In senate.--It shall not be in order in the Senate to
consider any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or
conference report suspending, waiving, or repealing the
requirement in section 3(a).
(b) Waiver of Rule in Senate.--Subsection (a) may be waived or
suspended in the Senate only by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of
the Members, duly chosen and sworn.
(c) Appeals.--
(1) Procedure.--Appeals in the Senate from the decisions of
the Chair relating to any provision of this section shall be
limited to 1 hour, to be equally divided between, and
controlled by, the mover and the manager of the bill,
resolution, amendment, or conference report, as the case may
be.
(2) Sustainability of appeal.--An affirmative vote of
three-fifths of the Members, duly chosen and sworn, shall be
required in the Senate to sustain an appeal of the ruling of
the Chair on a point of order raised under this section.
<all>
Introduced in Senate
Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR S7333-7334)
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
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