H.Res. 1365 — Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that an independent commission is the best vehicle for ensuring that Congressional redistricting conducted by a State is done in a manner that respects the principles of transparency, effective and diverse public participation, and accountability.

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H. Res. 1365 Introduced in House (IH)]







110th CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. RES. 1365

     Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that an 
     independent commission is the best vehicle for ensuring that 
 Congressional redistricting conducted by a State is done in a manner 
  that respects the principles of transparency, effective and diverse 
               public participation, and accountability.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 22, 2008

     Mr. Tanner (for himself and Mr. Wamp) submitted the following 
    resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
     Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that an 
     independent commission is the best vehicle for ensuring that 
 Congressional redistricting conducted by a State is done in a manner 
  that respects the principles of transparency, effective and diverse 
               public participation, and accountability.

Whereas the House of Representatives was designed by the framers of the 
        Constitution as the only institution of the Federal Government whose 
        members are directly elected by the people, and the House should 
        represent the true will of the public;
Whereas under article I, section 4 of the Constitution, Congress has the power 
        to enact laws governing the time, place, and manner of elections for 
        Members of the House of Representatives;
Whereas article I, section 4 also conveys to Congress the authority to make or 
        alter regulations with respect to the manner that States must follow in 
        carrying out congressional redistricting after an apportionment of 
        Members of the House of Representatives;
Whereas redistricting is conducted in each State by either the State legislature 
        or a commission, and normally occurs every 10 years following the 
        regular Census;
Whereas in the early 1960s, when many State legislative and congressional 
        districts were grossly mal-apportioned, the Supreme Court imposed a 
        standard of ``one person, one vote'' on nearly all districting, 
        requiring that equal or nearly equal numbers of people receive equal 
        numbers of representatives;
Whereas gerrymandering is used both by partisans seeking to gain additional 
        seats and by incumbents of all parties seeking to shore up their 
        districts and minimize the risk of electoral defeat, and has several 
        adverse effects on the democratic process, including a decline in the 
        number of competitive seats throughout the nation, reducing 
        accountability and threatening to further the ideological polarization 
        of our elected officials by enabling the election of partisans who need 
        not appeal to moderate voters, as well as a reduction in voter interest 
        and turnout in noncompetitive districts;
Whereas technical advancement has allowed for the precise drawing of 
        Congressional districts for the purpose of partisan advantage or 
        incumbent retention;
Whereas it is important to reduce the partisan pressures than are inherent in 
        the redistricting process when conducted by State legislatures;
Whereas transparency and public participation are crucial components in an 
        accountable redistricting process;
Whereas numerous good government organizations and advocates have recommended 
        the use of independent commissions for the redistricting process to draw 
        fair and competitive Congressional districts, which would decrease 
        partisanship and increase accountability;
Whereas 12 States presently conduct their redistricting efforts by some form of 
        independent commission;
Whereas conducting redistricting once each decade, following the census, with a 
        strict time line for completion and appropriate flexibility to 
        accommodate the occasional need for technical corrections due to late-
        discovered data errors or other rare exogenous events, encourages 
        stability in the political system and the accountability of 
        representatives to constituencies established for a 10-year period, 
        while multiple or mid-cycle redistricting worsens the retributive 
        aspects of politics and carries the potential for increased partisan 
        bias;
Whereas almost half of the states already have some provision in law to limit 
        redistricting to once after each census;
Whereas under the ``one person, one vote'' requirement of the United States 
        Constitution, any jurisdiction electing district-based representatives 
        effectively must redistrict after each decennial census;
Whereas the legitimacy of democratic institutions rests largely on transparency 
        and participation, and mistrust of institutions and government 
        structures can taint subsequent political outcomes;
Whereas limiting redistricting to once immediately after each decennial census 
        limits any possibility of partisan opportunism after the post-census 
        redistricting unless a court finds that the post-census plan is itself 
        invalid, and ensures the stability of the electoral process and the 
        democratic process;
Whereas limiting redistricting to once after every decennial census thus makes 
        sense especially when partisan gain is a threat, and could help 
        constrain partisan opportunism in cases where political actors 
        redistrict; and
Whereas the use of an independent commission would vest power in a body composed 
        of qualified individuals competent to apply the preferred redistricting 
        standards objectively and would be particularly well-suited to follow 
        the procedural principles of transparency, effective, and diverse public 
        participation and accountability: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives 
that--
            (1) an independent redistricting commission is the best 
        vehicle for ensuring that Congressional redistricting conducted 
        by a State is done in a manner that respects the principles of 
        transparency, effective and diverse public participation, and 
        accountability, so long as the redistricting is conducted in 
        accordance with a plan developed by such a commission using 
        criteria and procedures that will discourage gerrymandering and 
        promote competition, to the extent that such criteria and 
        procedures are consistent with the applicable requirements of 
        the Constitution of the United States and the Voting Rights Act 
        of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973 et seq.); and
            (2) a State should not be redistricted until after the next 
        apportionment of Representatives, unless a court requires the 
        State to conduct such subsequent redistricting to comply with 
        the Constitution or to enforce the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
        (42 U.S.C. 1973 et seq.).
                                 <all>
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that an independent commission is the best vehicle for ensuring that Congressional redistricting conducted by a State is done in a manner that respects the principles of transparency, effective and diverse public participation, and accountability.

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