United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2013 - Directs the President to use U.S. influence at the United Nations (U.N.) on a wide variety of issues, including to shift the funding mechanism for the regular budget of the U.N. from an assessed to a voluntary basis.
Withholds up to 50% of nonvoluntary U.S. contributions to the regular budget of the U.N. unless the Secretary of State certifies to Congress that 80% of the total regular budget of the U.N. is apportioned on a voluntary basis.
Requires the annual congressional budget justification to include a detailed itemized request in support of the U.S. contribution to the regular budget of the U.N.
Sets forth requirements for the Secretary of State with respect to oversight of U.S. contributions to the U.N. and their use by U.N. entities.
Prohibits the obligation or expenditure of a U.S. contribution to any U.N. entity unless the entity has provided the Secretary with a transparency certification and is in compliance with it.
Prohibits the use of funds made available: (1) for international organizations for any purpose other than an assessed U.S. contribution to a U.N. entity or other international organization; (2) for international organizations and programs for any purpose other than a voluntary U.S. contribution to a U.N. entity or other international organization; and (3) for international peacekeeping activities for any purpose other than a U.S. contribution to U.N. peacekeeping activities, to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), or to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
Directs the Secretary to withhold from the regular budget of the U.N. an amount equal to the amount of U.S. overpayments to the U.N.
States that it is U.S. policy to oppose any proposals on expansion of the U.N. Security Council that would: (1) diminish U.S. influence on the Security Council, or (2) include veto rights for new Security Council members.
Expresses the sense of Congress that any U.N. definition of terrorism should not be used to undermine peaceful, pro-freedom, pro-democracy movements against authoritarian rule.
Directs the Secretary to use U.S. influence at the U.N. to ensure: (1) Taiwan's participation in relevant U.N. entities, and (2) that no representative of a country designated as a Tier 3 country under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 shall preside as chair or president of any U.N. entity.
Directs the Secretary to withhold U.S. contributions from any U.N. entity that recognizes a Palestinian state or upgrades the status of the Palestinian observer mission at the U.N., the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian Authority (PA), or any other Palestinian administrative organization or governing entity before achievement of a final peace agreement with Israel.
Provides that until the Secretary makes a specified certification to Congress: (1) the Secretary shall withhold from a U.S. contribution to a regular budget of the U.N. an amount equal to the amount that would be allocated for the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), (2) the Secretary shall not make a voluntary contribution to UNHRC, and (3) the United States shall not run for a UNHRC seat.
Directs the Secretary to withhold from a U.S. contribution to a regular budget of the U.N. an amount equal to the amount that would be allocated for: (1) the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Palestinian territories occupied since 1967; and (2) any other U.N. Special Procedures used to display bias against the United States or Israel or to provide support for any member state which is subject to U.N. Security Council sanctions, under a Security Council-mandated human rights investigation, has repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism, or is a country of particular concern for religious freedom.
States that it is U.S. policy to oppose any legitimization of the Goldstone Report and to lead a diplomatic campaign supporting its revocation. Directs the Secretary to withhold from the U.S. contribution to the regular budget of the U.N. an amount that is equal to the percentage of such contribution that would be or has been expended by the U.N. for any part of the Goldstone Report process.
Prohibits funds from being used for U.S. participation in any part of the Durban III process.
Withholds U.S. contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or to any successor or related entity unless the Secretary makes specified certifications to Congress.
Prohibits any U.S. contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from being used to support Technical Cooperation program assistance to any country, including North Korea, that: (1) has repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism; or (2) is in breach of, or under investigation for breach of, obligations regarding its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or any relevant U.N. Security Council resolution.
Directs the Secretary to withhold from the U.S. voluntary contribution to the IAEA an amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA in 2007-2008 on Technical Cooperation program assistance to such countries.
Directs the President to use U.S. influence at the IAEA to make Iran and Syria ineligible to receive any nuclear material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any member state.
Sets forth U.S. policy regarding reform of U.N. peacekeeping operations.
Directs the President to use U.S. influence at the U.N. to oppose the creation of new, or expansion of existing, U.N. peacekeeping operations until the Secretary certifies to Congress that specified peacekeeping reforms have been adopted by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the General Assembly.
[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3155 Introduced in House (IH)]
113th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 3155
To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United
Nations system, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
September 19, 2013
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen introduced the following bill; which was referred to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United
Nations system, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``United Nations
Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2013''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on a
voluntary basis.
Sec. 103. Budget justification for United States contributions to the
regular budget of the United Nations.
Sec. 104. Report on United Nations reform.
TITLE II--TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Sec. 201. Findings.
Sec. 202. Definitions.
Sec. 203. Oversight of United States contributions to the United
Nations System.
Sec. 204. Transparency for United States contributions.
Sec. 205. Integrity for United States contributions.
Sec. 206. Refund of monies owed by the United Nations to the United
States.
Sec. 207. Annual reports on United States contributions to the United
Nations.
Sec. 208. Report on United Nations procurement practices.
TITLE III--UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS
Sec. 301. Annual publication.
Sec. 302. Annual financial disclosure.
Sec. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the Security Council.
Sec. 304. Access to reports and audits.
Sec. 305. Waiver of immunity.
Sec. 306. Terrorism and the United Nations.
Sec. 307. Report on United Nations personnel.
Sec. 308. United Nations treaty bodies.
Sec. 309. Equality at the United Nations.
Sec. 310. Anti-Semitism and the United Nations.
Sec. 311. Regional group inclusion of Israel.
Sec. 312. United States policy on Taiwan's participation in United
Nations entities.
Sec. 313. United States policy on Tier 3 human rights violators.
TITLE IV--STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS
Sec. 401. Findings.
Sec. 402. Statement of policy.
Sec. 403. Implementation.
TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
Sec. 501. Findings.
Sec. 502. Human rights council membership and funding.
TITLE VI--GOLDSTONE REPORT
Sec. 601. Findings.
Sec. 602. Statement of policy.
Sec. 603. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer
dollars.
TITLE VII--DURBAN PROCESS
Sec. 701. Findings.
Sec. 702. Sense of Congress; statement of policy.
Sec. 703. Non-participation in the durban process.
Sec. 704. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer
dollars.
TITLE VIII--UNRWA
Sec. 801. Findings.
Sec. 802. United States contributions to UNRWA.
Sec. 803. Sense of Congress.
TITLE IX--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Sec. 901. Technical cooperation program.
Sec. 902. United States policy at the IAEA.
Sec. 903. Sense of Congress regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan
of the IAEA.
TITLE X--PEACEKEEPING
Sec. 1001. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 1002. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping
operations.
Sec. 1003. Certification.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means an individual
who is employed in the general services, professional staff, or
senior management of the United Nations, including consultants,
contractors, and subcontractors.
(2) General assembly.--The term ``General Assembly'' means
the General Assembly of the United Nations.
(3) Member state.--The term ``Member State'' means a Member
State of the United Nations. Such term is synonymous with the
term ``country''.
(4) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of State.
(5) Secretary general.--The term ``Secretary General''
means the Secretary General of the United Nations.
(6) Security council.--The term ``Security Council'' means
the Security Council of the United Nations.
(7) UN.--The term ``UN'' means the United Nations.
(8) United nations entity.--The term ``United Nations
Entity'' means any United Nations agency, commission,
conference, council, court, department, forum, fund, institute,
office, organization, partnership, program, subsidiary body,
tribunal, trust, university or academic body, related
organization or subsidiary body, wherever located, that flies
the United Nations flag or is authorized to use the United
Nations logo, including those United Nations affiliated
agencies and bodies identified as recipients of United States
contributions under section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public
Law 109-364), but not including the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, the International
Development Association, the International Finance Corporation,
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the World
Trade Organization.
(9) United nations system.--The term ``United Nations
System'' means the aggregation of all United Nations Entities,
as defined in paragraph (8).
(10) United states contribution.--The term ``United States
Contribution'' means an assessed or voluntary contribution,
whether financial, in-kind, or otherwise, from the United
States Federal Government to a United Nations Entity, including
contributions passed through other entities for ultimate use by
a United Nations Entity. United States Contributions include
those contributions identified pursuant to section
1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364).
(11) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committees on Foreign Affairs,
Appropriations, and Oversight and Government Reform of
the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committees on Foreign Relations,
Appropriations, and Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate.
TITLE I--FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SEC. 101. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States pays billions of dollars into the
United Nations system every year (almost $7,700,000,000 in
2010, according to the White House Office of Management and
Budget), significantly more than any other nation.
(2) Under current rules and contribution levels, it is
possible to assemble the two-thirds majority needed for
important United Nations budget votes with a group of countries
that, taken together, pay less than 1 percent of the total
United Nations regular budget.
(3) The disconnect between contribution levels and
management control creates significant perverse incentives in
terms of United Nations spending, transparency, and
accountability.
(4) The United Nations system suffers from unacceptably
high levels of waste, fraud, and abuse, which seriously impair
its ability to fulfill the lofty ideals of its founding.
(5) Amidst the continuing financial, corruption, and sexual
abuse scandals of the past several years, American public
disapproval of United Nations has reached all-time highs. A
2013 Gallup poll revealed that 50 percent of Americans believe
that the United Nations is doing a poor job, a negative
assessment shared by a majority of respondents from both
political parties.
(6) Significant improvements in United Nations transparency
and accountability are necessary for improving public
perceptions of American support for United Nations operations.
(7) Because of their need to justify future contributions
from donors, voluntarily funded organizations have more
incentive to be responsive and efficient in their operations
than organizations funded by compulsory contributions that are
not tied to performance.
(8) Catherine Bertini, the former United Nations Under-
Secretary General for Management and director of the World Food
Program (WFP), has stated that ``Voluntary funding creates an
entirely different atmosphere at WFP than at the UN. At WFP,
every staff member knows that we have to be as efficient,
accountable, transparent, and results-oriented as possible. If
we are not, donor governments can take their funding elsewhere
in a very competitive world among UN agencies, NGOs, and
bilateral governments.''.
(9) Article XVII of the Charter of the United Nations,
which states that ``[t]he expenses of the Organization shall be
borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly'',
leaves to the discretion of the General Assembly the basis of
apportionment, which could be done on the basis of voluntary
pledges by Member States.
(10) Unlike United States assessed contributions to the
United Nations regular budget, which are statutorily capped at
22 percent of the total, there is no cap on voluntary
contributions.
(11) The United States, which contributes generously to
international organizations whose activities it recognizes as
credible, worthwhile, and efficient, contributes more than 22
percent of the budget of certain voluntarily funded United
Nations Specialized Agencies.
(12) John Bolton, Former United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, has stated that ``Moving
to voluntary funding would end the UN practice of charging
member states for the expenses of the UN and its activities.
Member states would instead determine for themselves how much
to provide to the UN and, importantly, the specific tasks and
activities that those contributions would support. The shift
toward a voluntary payment system would impose a stronger
market incentive for UN programs and activities to meet their
goals and justify continued funding.''.
SEC. 102. APPORTIONMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REGULAR BUDGET ON A
VOLUNTARY BASIS.
(a) United States Policy.--
(1) In general.--It is the policy of the United States to
seek to shift the funding mechanism for the regular budget of
the United Nations from an assessed to a voluntary basis.
(2) Action at united nations.--The President shall direct
the United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United
States at the United Nations to shift the funding mechanism for
the regular budget of the United Nations to a voluntary basis,
and to make it a priority to build support for such a
transformational change among Member States, particularly key
United Nations donors.
(b) Certification of Predominantly Voluntary UN Regular Budget
Finding.--A certification described in this section is a certification
by the Secretary of State to the Appropriate Congressional Committees
that at least 80 percent of the total regular budget (not including
extra-budgetary contributions) of the United Nations is apportioned on
a voluntary basis. Each such certification shall be effective for a
period of not more than 1 year, and shall be promptly revoked by the
Secretary, with notice to the appropriate congressional committees, if
the underlying circumstances change so as not to warrant such
certification.
(c) Withholding of Nonvoluntary Contributions.--
(1) In general.--Beginning 2 years after the effective date
of this Act and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
funds may be obligated or expended for a United States assessed
contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations in an
amount greater than 50 percent of the United States share of
assessed contributions for the regular budget of the United
Nations unless there is in effect a certification by the
Secretary, as described in subsection (b).
(2) Allowance.--For a period of 1 year after appropriation,
funds appropriated for use as a United States contribution to
the regular budget of the United Nations but withheld from
obligation and expenditure pursuant to paragraph (1) may be
obligated and expended for that purpose upon the certification
described in subsection (b). After 1 year, in the absence of
such certification, those funds shall revert to the United
States Treasury.
SEC. 103. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
REGULAR BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) Detailed Itemization.--The annual congressional budget
justification shall include a detailed itemized request in support of
the contribution of the United States to the regular budget of the
United Nations.
(b) Contents of Detailed Itemization.--The detailed itemization
required under subsection (a) shall--
(1) contain information relating to the amounts requested
in support of each of the various sections and titles of the
regular budget of the United Nations; and
(2) compare the amounts requested for the current year with
the actual or estimated amounts contributed by the United
States in previous fiscal years for the same sections and
titles.
(c) Adjustments and Notification.--If the United Nations proposes
an adjustment to its regular assessed budget, the Secretary of State
shall, at the time such adjustment is presented to the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), notify and
consult with the appropriate congressional committees.
SEC. 104. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United
Nations reform.
(b) Contents.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
describe--
(1) progress toward the goal of shifting the funding for
the United Nations Regular Budget to a voluntary basis as
identified in section 102, and a detailed description of
efforts and activities by United States diplomats and officials
toward that end;
(2) progress toward each of the policy goals identified in
the prior sections of this title, and a detailed, goal-specific
description of efforts and activities by United States
diplomats and officials toward those ends;
(3) the status of the implementation of management reforms
within the United Nations and its specialized agencies;
(4) the number of outputs, reports, or other mandates
generated by General Assembly resolutions that have been
eliminated;
(5) the progress of the General Assembly to modernize and
streamline the committee structure and its specific
recommendations on oversight and committee outputs, consistent
with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General entitled
``In larger freedom: towards development, security and human
rights for all'';
(6) the status of the review by the General Assembly of all
mandates older than 5 years and how resources have been
redirected to new challenges, consistent with such March 2005
report of the Secretary General;
(7) the continued utility and relevance of the Economic and
Financial Committee and the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural
Committee, in light of the duplicative agendas of those
committees and the Economic and Social Council; and
(8) whether the United Nations or any of its specialized
agencies has contracted with any party included on the Lists of
Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement
Programs.
TITLE II--TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS
SEC. 201. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) As underscored by continuing revelations of waste,
fraud, and abuse, oversight and accountability mechanisms
within the United Nations system remain significantly
deficient, despite decades of reform attempts, including those
initiated by Secretaries General of the United Nations.
(2) Notwithstanding the personal intentions of any
Secretary General of the United Nations to promote
institutional transparency and accountability within the United
Nations System, the Secretary General lacks the power to impose
far reaching management reforms without the concurrence of the
General Assembly.
(3) Groupings of Member States whose voting power in the
General Assembly significantly outpaces their proportional
contributions to the United Nations system have repeatedly and
successfully defeated, delayed, and diluted various reform
proposals that would have enabled more detailed oversight and
scrutiny of United Nations system operations and expenditures.
(4) To an unacceptable degree, major donor states,
including the United States, lack access to reasonably
detailed, reliable information that would allow them to
determine how their contributions have been spent by various
United Nations system entities, further contributing to the
lack of accountability within the United Nations system.
SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Transparency certification.--The term ``Transparency
Certification'' means an annual, written affirmation by the
head or authorized designee of a United Nations Entity,
provided to the Department of State, that the Entity will
cooperate with the Department of State and Congress, including
by providing the Department of State and Congress with full,
complete, and unfettered access to Oversight Information as
defined in this title.
(2) Oversight information.--The term ``Oversight
Information'' includes--
(A) internally and externally commissioned audits,
investigatory reports, program reviews, performance
reports, and evaluations;
(B) financial statements, records, and billing
systems;
(C) program budgets and program budget
implications, including revised estimates and reports
produced by or provided to the Secretary General and
the Secretary General's agents on budget related
matters;
(D) operational plans, budgets, and budgetary
analyses for peacekeeping operations;
(E) analyses and reports regarding the scale of
assessments;
(F) databases and other data systems containing
financial or programmatic information;
(G) documents or other records alleging or
involving improper use of resources, misconduct,
mismanagement, or other violations of rules and
regulations applicable to the United Nations Entity;
and
(H) other documentation relevant to the oversight
work of Congress with respect to United States
contributions to the United Nations system.
(3) Accountability certification.--The term
``Accountability Certification'' means an annual, written
affirmation by the head or authorized designee of a United
Nations Entity provided to the Secretary of State that the
Entity--
(A) provides the public with full, complete, and
unfettered access to all relevant documentation
relating to operations and activities, including budget
and procurement activities;
(B) implements and upholds policies and procedures
to protect whistleblowers;
(C) implements and upholds policies and procedures
to require the filing of individual annual financial
disclosure forms by each of its employees at the P-5
level and above and to require that such forms be made
available to the Office of Internal Oversight Services,
to Member States, and to the public;
(D) has established an effective ethics office;
(E) has established a fully independent,
autonomous, and effective internal oversight body;
(F) has adopted and implemented, and is in full
compliance with, International Public Sector Accounting
Standards; and
(G) has established a cap on its administrative
overhead costs.
SEC. 203. OVERSIGHT OF UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED
NATIONS SYSTEM.
(a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to enhance oversight
of United States contributions to the United Nations System and the use
of those contributions by United Nations Entities, in an effort to
eliminate and deter waste, fraud, and abuse in the use of those
contributions, and thereby to contribute to the development of greater
transparency, accountability, and internal controls throughout the
United Nations System.
(b) Implementation.--
(1) In general.--The Department of State shall collect and
maintain current records regarding Transparency Certifications
and Accountability Certifications by all United Nations
Entities that receive United States contributions and submit
that information for inclusion in the report required under
section 207.
(2) Notification.--The Department of State shall keep the
appropriate congressional committees fully and promptly
informed of how United Nations Entities are spending United
States contributions.
(3) Referrals.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall
promptly report to the Attorney General and to the
appropriate congressional committees when the Secretary
of State has reasonable grounds to believe a Federal
criminal law has been violated by a United Nations
Entity or one of its employees, contractors, or
representatives.
(B) Notification.--The Secretary of State shall
promptly report, when appropriate, to the appropriate
congressional committees, and to the Secretary General
or to the head of the appropriate United Nations
Entity, cases in which the Secretary of State
reasonably believes that mismanagement, misfeasance, or
malfeasance is likely to have taken place within a
United Nations Entity and disciplinary proceedings are
likely justified.
(4) Confirmation of transparency by united nations
entities.--
(A) Prompt notice by department of state.--Whenever
information or assistance requested from a United
Nations Entity by the Department of State pursuant to a
Transparency Certification is, in the opinion of the
Secretary of State, unreasonably refused or not
provided in a timely manner, the Secretary of State
shall notify the appropriate congressional committees,
the head of that particular United Nations Entity, and
the Secretary General of the circumstances in writing,
without delay.
(B) Notice of compliance.--If and when the
information or assistance being sought by the
Department of State in connection with a notification
pursuant to subparagraph (A) is provided to the
satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of State shall so notify in writing to the appropriate
congressional committees and the head of that
particular United Nations Entity.
(C) Noncompliance.--If the information or
assistance being sought by the Department of State in
connection with a notification pursuant to subparagraph
(A) is not provided within 90 days of that
notification, then the United Nations Entity that is
the subject of the notification is deemed to be
noncompliant with its Transparency Certification.
(D) Restoration of compliance.--After the situation
has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of State shall promptly provide
prompt, written notification of that fact and of the
restoration of compliance, along with a description of
the basis for the Secretary of State's decision, to the
appropriate congressional committees, the head of that
United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any
office or agency of the Federal Government that has
provided that United Nations Entity with any United
States contribution during the prior 2 years.
(5) Confirmation of accountability by united nations
entities.--
(A) Prompt notice by secretary of state.--Whenever
a United Nations Entity that has provided an
Accountability Certification is, in the opinion of the
Secretary of State, not in full compliance with any or
all of the provisions of that certification, the
Secretary of State shall notify the appropriate
congressional committees, the head of that particular
United Nations Entity, and the Secretary General of the
circumstances in writing, without delay.
(B) Notice of compliance.--If and when the United
Nations Entity resumes full compliance with its
Accountability Certification following the provision of
the notification pursuant to subparagraph (A), the
Secretary of State shall so notify in writing the
appropriate congressional committees and the head of
that United Nations Entity.
(C) Noncompliance.--If the United Nations Entity
named in the notification in subparagraph (A) does not
resume full compliance with its Accountability
Certification to the satisfaction of the Secretary of
State within 90 days of that notification, then the
United Nations Entity that is the subject of the
notification is deemed to be noncompliant with its
Accountability Certification, and the Secretary of
State shall provide prompt, written notification of
that fact to the appropriate congressional committees,
the head of that United Nations Entity, the Secretary
General, and any office or agency of the Federal
Government that has provided that United Nations Entity
with any United States Contribution during the prior 2
years.
(D) Restoration of compliance.--After the situation
has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of State shall promptly provide
prompt, written notification of that fact and of the
restoration of compliance, along with a description of
the basis for the Secretary of State's decision, to the
appropriate congressional committees, the head of that
United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any
office or agency of the Federal Government that has
provided that United Nations Entity with any United
States contribution during the prior 2 years.
(6) Reporting.--
(A) Reporting.--In the report submitted by the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget to
Congress pursuant to section 207, the Secretary of
State shall submit for inclusion a section that, among
other things, includes a list and detailed description
of the circumstances surrounding any notification of
compliance issued pursuant to paragraph (4)(C) or
(5)(C) during the covered timeframe, and whether and
when the Secretary has reversed such finding of
noncompliance.
(B) Prohibited disclosures.--Nothing in this
subsection shall be construed to authorize the public
disclosure of information that is--
(i) specifically prohibited from disclosure
by any other provision of law;
(ii) specifically required by Executive
order to be protected from disclosure in the
interest of national defense or national
security or in the conduct of foreign affairs;
or
(iii) a part of an ongoing criminal
investigation.
(C) Privacy protections.--The Secretary of State
shall exempt from public disclosure information
received from a United Nations Entity that the
Secretary of State believes--
(i) constitutes a trade secret or
privileged and confidential personal financial
information;
(ii) constitutes confidential personal
medical information;
(iii) accuses a particular person of a
crime;
(iv) would, if publicly disclosed,
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy; and
(v) would compromise an ongoing law
enforcement investigation or judicial trial in
the United States.
SEC. 204. TRANSPARENCY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.
(a) Funding Prerequisites.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no funds made available for use as a United States Contribution to
any United Nations Entity may be obligated or expended if--
(1) the intended United Nations Entity recipient has not
provided to the Secretary of State within the preceding year a
Transparency Certification as defined in section 202(1);
(2) the intended United Nations Entity recipient is
noncompliant with its Transparency Certification as described
in section 203(b)(4)(C);
(3) the intended United Nations Entity recipient has not
provided to the Secretary of State within the preceding year an
Accountability Certification as defined in section 202(3); or
(4) the intended United Nations Entity is noncompliant with
its Accountability Certification as described in section
203(b)(5)(C).
(b) Treatment of Funds Withheld for Noncompliance.--At the
conclusion of each fiscal year, any funds that had been appropriated
for use as a United States Contribution to a United Nations Entity
during that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended because
of the restrictions of subsection (a), shall be returned to the United
States Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for any other
use. Any such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be considered
arrears to be repaid to any United Nations Entity.
(c) Presidential Waiver.--The President may waive the limitations
of this subsection with respect to a particular United States
Contribution to a particular United Nations Entity within a single
fiscal year if the President determines that failure to do so would
pose an extraordinary threat to the national security of the United
States and provides notification and explanation of that determination
to the appropriate congressional committees.
SEC. 205. INTEGRITY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.
(a) Limitation.--(1) No funds made available for use under the
heading ``Contributions to International Organizations'' may be used
for any purpose other than an assessed United States contribution to a
United Nations Entity or other international organization.
(2) No funds made available for use under the heading
``International Organizations and Programs'' may be used for any
purpose other than a voluntary United States contribution to a United
Nations Entity or other international organization.
(3) No funds made available for use under the heading
``Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities'' may be used
for any purpose other than a United States contribution to United
Nations peacekeeping activities, to the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia, or to the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda.
(b) Treatment of Funds Withheld for Noncompliance.--At the
conclusion of each fiscal year, any funds that had been appropriated
for use as a United States contribution to a United Nations Entity
during that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended because
of the restrictions of subsection (a), shall be returned to the United
States Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for any other
use. Any such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be considered
arrears to be repaid to any United Nations Entity.
SEC. 206. REFUND OF MONIES OWED BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE UNITED
STATES.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) United States taxpayer funds overpaid to United Nations
Entities and payable back to the United States sometimes remain
in the hands of the United Nations because the United States
has not requested the return of those funds.
(2) Such funds have been paid into, among other United
Nations Entities, the United Nations Tax Equalization Fund
(TEF), which was established under the provisions of United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 973 (1955), and which is
used to reimburse United Nations staff members subject to
United States income taxes for the cost of those taxes.
(3) In recent years, the TEF has taken in considerably more
money than it has paid out, with the United States apparently
overpaying into the TEF by $52,200,000 in the 2008-2009
timeframe alone.
(4) According to the United Nations Financial Report and
Audited Financial Statements released on July 29, 2010, ``As of
31 December 2009, an amount of $179.0 million was payable to
the United States of America pending instructions as to its
disposition.''.
(5) That balance was allowed to accrue notwithstanding
United Nations Financial Regulation 4.12, which states that any
such surpluses ``shall be credited against the assessed
contributions due from that Member State the following year.''.
(6) Allowing the United Nations to regularly overcharge the
United States and to retain those overpayments, or to spend
them on wholly unrelated activities, is a disservice to
American taxpayers and a subversion of the Congressional budget
process.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to annually instruct the United Nations to return to
the United States any surplus assessed contributions or other
overpayments by the United States to any United Nations Entity;
and
(2) to use the voice and vote of the United States to press
the United Nations to reform its TEF assessment procedures to
reduce the repeated discrepancies between TEF income and
expenditures.
(c) Certification and Withholding.--For each and every fiscal year
subsequent to the effective date of this Act, until the Secretary of
State submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
certification that the United Nations has returned to the United States
any surplus assessed contributions or other overpayments by the United
States to any United Nations Entity, the Secretary of State shall
withhold from the regular budget of the United Nations an amount equal
to the amount of the funds that the United Nations has yet to return to
the United States.
SEC. 207. ANNUAL REPORTS ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED
NATIONS.
(a) Annual Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually for two years thereafter, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit to
Congress a report listing all assessed and voluntary contributions of
the United States Government for the preceding fiscal year to the
United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related
bodies.
(b) Contents.--Each report required under subsection (a) shall set
forth, for the fiscal year covered by such report, the following:
(1) The total amount of all assessed and voluntary
contributions of the United States Government to the United
Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related
bodies.
(2) The approximate percentage of United States Government
contributions to each United Nations affiliated agency or body
in such fiscal year when compared with all contributions to
such agency or body from any source in such fiscal year.
(3) For each such contribution--
(A) the amount of such contribution;
(B) a description of such contribution (including
whether assessed or voluntary);
(C) the department or agency of the United States
Government responsible for such contribution;
(D) the purpose of such contribution; and
(E) the United Nations or United Nations affiliated
agency or related body receiving such contribution.
SEC. 208. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PROCUREMENT PRACTICES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United
Nations procurement reform.
(b) Contents.--The reports required under subsection (a) shall
describe--
(1) progress toward the goal of donor countries
establishing a threshold number for procurement purposes, of
which 50 percent of the procurement for donor programs over
$1,000,000,000 shall utilize donor vendors;
(2) the status of the amount and percentage of procurement
at the United Nations through United States vendors; and
(3) the status of examinations and investigations if
companies on the Excluded Parties List System are receiving
contracts through the United Nations, and the values of such
contracts.
TITLE III--UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS
SEC. 301. ANNUAL PUBLICATION.
The President shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure the
United Nations publishes annually, including on a publicly searchable
internet Web site, a list of all United Nations subsidiary bodies and
their functions, budgets, staff, and contributions, both voluntary and
assessed, sorted by donor.
SEC. 302. ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE.
The President shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to implement a
system for the required filing of individual annual financial
disclosure forms by each employee of the United Nations and its
specialized agencies, programs, and funds at the P-5 level and above,
which shall be made available to the Office of Internal Oversight
Services, to Member States, and to the public.
SEC. 303. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
It is the policy of the United States to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose any
proposals on expansion of the Security Council if such expansion
would--
(1) diminish the influence of the United States on the
Security Council; or
(2) include veto rights for any new members of the Security
Council.
SEC. 304. ACCESS TO REPORTS AND AUDITS.
The President shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that
Member States may, upon request, have access to all reports and audits
completed by the Board of External Auditors.
SEC. 305. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY.
The President shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that the
Secretary General exercises the right and duty of the Secretary General
under section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations to waive the immunity of any United Nations official
in any case in which such immunity would impede the course of justice.
In exercising such waiver, the Secretary General is urged to interpret
the interests of the United Nations as favoring the investigation or
prosecution of a United Nations official who is credibly under
investigation for having committed a serious criminal offense or who is
credibly charged with a serious criminal offense.
SEC. 306. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) In General.--The President shall direct the United States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote,
and influence of the United States at the United Nations to work toward
adoption by the General Assembly of--
(1) a definition of terrorism that--
(A) builds upon the recommendations of the December
2004 report of the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges, and Change;
(B) includes as an essential component of such
definition any action that is intended to cause death
or serious bodily harm to civilians with the purpose of
intimidating a population or compelling a government or
an international organization to do, or abstain from
doing, any act; and
(C) does not propose a legal or moral equivalence
between an action described in subparagraph (B) and
measures taken by a government or international
organization in self-defense against an action
described in such subparagraph; and
(2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism that includes
the definition described in paragraph (1).
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) authoritarian regimes often inaccurately label
peaceful, pro-freedom, pro-democracy movements as terrorist
movements in order to undermine the legitimacy of those
movements; and
(2) any United Nations definition of terrorism should not
be used to undermine a peaceful, pro-freedom, pro-democracy
movement against authoritarian rule.
SEC. 307. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.
(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report--
(1) concerning the progress of the General Assembly to
modernize human resource practices, consistent with the March
2005 report of the Secretary General entitled ``In larger
freedom: towards development, security and human rights for
all''; and
(2) containing the information described in subsection (b).
(b) Contents.--The report shall include--
(1) a comprehensive evaluation of human resources reforms
at the United Nations, including an evaluation of--
(A) tenure;
(B) performance reviews;
(C) the promotion system;
(D) a merit-based hiring system and enhanced
regulations concerning termination of employment of
employees; and
(E) the implementation of a code of conduct and
ethics training;
(2) the implementation of a system of procedures for filing
complaints and protective measures for work-place harassment,
including sexual harassment;
(3) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of
a rotation requirement for nonadministrative positions;
(4) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of
a prohibition preventing personnel and officials assigned to
the mission of a member state to the United Nations from
transferring to a position within the United Nations
Secretariat that is compensated at the P-5 level and above;
(5) policy recommendations relating to a reduction in
travel allowances and attendant oversight with respect to
accommodations and airline flights; and
(6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the Secretary
General relating to greater flexibility for the Secretary
General in staffing decisions to accommodate changing
priorities.
SEC. 308. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES.
The United States shall withhold from United States contributions
to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial
period amounts that are proportional to the percentage of such budget
that are expended with respect to a United Nations human rights treaty
monitoring body or committee that was established by--
(1) a convention (without any protocols) or an
international covenant (without any protocols) to which the
United States is not party; or
(2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if the United
States is a party to neither.
SEC. 309. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) Department of State Review and Report.--
(1) In general.--To avoid duplicative efforts and funding
with respect to Palestinian interests and to ensure balance in
the approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues, the Secretary
shall, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act--
(A) complete an audit of the functions of the
entities listed in paragraph (2); and
(B) submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report containing audit findings and
conclusions, and recommendations for the elimination of
such duplicative entities and efforts.
(2) Entities.--The entities referred to in paragraph (1)(A)
are the following:
(A) The United Nations Division for Palestinian
Rights.
(B) The Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.
(C) The United Nations Special Coordinator for the
Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative
to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Palestinian Authority.
(D) The NGO Network on the Question of Palestine.
(E) The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli
Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian
People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories.
(F) Any other entity the Secretary determines
results in duplicative efforts or funding or fails to
ensure balance in the approach to Israeli-Palestinian
issues.
(b) Implementation by Permanent Representative.--
(1) In general.--The President shall direct the United
States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
United Nations to seek the implementation of the
recommendations contained in the report required under
subsection (a)(1)(B).
(2) Withholding of funds.--Until such recommendations have
been implemented, the United States shall withhold from United
States contributions to the regular assessed budget of the
United Nations for a biennial period amounts that are
proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended
for such entities.
SEC. 310. ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.
The President shall direct the United States permanent
representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to make every
effort to--
(1) ensure the issuance and implementation of a directive
by the Secretary General or the Secretariat, as appropriate,
that--
(A) requires all employees of the United Nations
and its specialized agencies to officially and publicly
condemn anti-Semitic statements made at any session of
the United Nations or its specialized agencies, or at
any other session sponsored by the United Nations;
(B) requires employees of the United Nations and
its specialized agencies, programs, and funds to be
subject to punitive action, including immediate
dismissal, for making anti-Semitic statements or
references;
(C) proposes specific recommendations to the
General Assembly for the establishment of mechanisms to
hold accountable employees and officials of the United
Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and
funds, or Member States, that make such anti-Semitic
statements or references in any forum of the United
Nations or of its specialized agencies;
(D) continues to develop and implements education
awareness programs about the Holocaust and anti-
Semitism throughout the world, as part of an effort to
combat intolerance and hatred; and
(E) requires the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to develop
programming and other measures that address anti-
Semitism;
(2) secure the adoption of a resolution by the General
Assembly that establishes the mechanisms described in paragraph
(1)(C); and
(3) continue working toward further reduction of anti-
Semitic language and anti-Israel resolutions in the United
Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and funds.
SEC. 311. REGIONAL GROUP INCLUSION OF ISRAEL.
The President shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to expand the
Western European and Others Group (WEOG) in the United Nations in
Geneva to include Israel as a permanent member with full rights and
privileges.
SEC. 312. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TAIWAN'S PARTICIPATION IN UNITED
NATIONS ENTITIES.
The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure
meaningful participation for Taiwan in relevant United Nations Entities
in which Taiwan has expressed an interest in participating.
SEC. 313. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TIER 3 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS.
The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that no
representative of a country designated pursuant to section 110 of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) by the
Department of State as a Tier 3 country shall preside as Chair or
President of any United Nations Entity.
TITLE IV--STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS
SEC. 401. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In 1989, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
launched an effort to evade direct negotiations for peace with
the State of Israel by instead pursuing Palestinian membership
in international organizations, which could imply de facto
recognition of a Palestinian state by the United Nations.
(2) The Executive Branch, with significant support from
Members of Congress, successfully stopped the PLO's effort by
credibly threatening, as noted in a May 1, 1989, statement by
then-Secretary of State James A. Baker, ``that the United
States [would] make no further contributions, voluntary or
assessed, to any international organization which makes any
change in the P.L.O.'s present status as an observer
organization.''.
(3) The United States success in this case demonstrates
that withholding contributions and placing conditions on their
payment can result in real reforms, stop counterproductive
developments, and advance United States interests at the United
Nations.
(4) The Palestinian leadership has recently resumed its
effort to evade direct negotiations for peace with the State of
Israel by seeking recognition of a Palestinian state from
foreign governments and in international forums.
(5) Efforts to bypass negotiations and to unilaterally
declare a Palestinian state, or to appeal to the United Nations
or other international forums or to foreign governments for
recognition of a Palestinian state or membership or other
upgraded status for the Palestinian observer mission at those
forums, would violate the underlying principles of the Oslo
Accords, the Road Map, and other relevant Middle East peace
process efforts.
(6) On December 15, 2010, the House of Representatives
passed House Resolution 1765, in which, inter alia, the House
of Representatives:
(A) ``reaffirms its strong opposition to any
attempt to establish or seek recognition of a
Palestinian state outside of an agreement negotiated
between Israel and the Palestinians'';
(B) ``supports the Administration's opposition to a
unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state''; and
(C) ``calls upon the Administration to . . . lead a
diplomatic effort to persuade other nations to oppose a
unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state and to
oppose recognition of a Palestinian state by other
nations, within the United Nations, and in other
international forums prior to achievement of a final
agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.''.
(7) Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, United States Deputy
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, stated on July
26, 2011, ``Let there be no doubt: symbolic actions to isolate
Israel at the United Nations in September will not create an
independent Palestinian state . . . The United States will not
support unilateral campaigns at the United Nations in September
or any other time.''.
(8) On September 16, 2011, the Deputy National Security
Advisor for Strategic Communications stated that ``We would
veto actions through the Security Council and oppose action
through the Security Council associated with a unilateral
declaration of [Palestinian] statehood.''.
SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to oppose the recognition of
a Palestinian state by any United Nations Entity, or any upgrade,
including but not limited to full membership or non-member-state
observer status, in the status of the Palestinian observer mission at
the United Nations, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the
Palestinian Authority, or any other Palestinian administrative
organization or governing entity, at any United Nations Entity, prior
to the achievement of a final peace agreement negotiated between and
agreed to by Israel and the Palestinians.
SEC. 403. IMPLEMENTATION.
(a) In General.--The President shall direct the United States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote,
and influence of the United States at the United Nations to advance the
policy stated in section 402.
(b) Withholding of Funds.--The Secretary of State shall withhold
United States contributions from any United Nations Entity that
recognizes a Palestinian state or upgrades in any way, including full
membership or non-member-state observer status, the status of the
Palestinian observer mission at the United Nations, the Palestine
Liberation Organization, the Palestinian Authority, or any other
Palestinian administrative organization or governing entity, at that
United Nations Entity, prior to the achievement of complete and final
peace agreement negotiated between and agreed to by Israel and the
Palestinians. Funds appropriated for use as a United States
contribution to the United Nations but withheld from obligation and
expenditure pursuant to this section shall immediately revert to the
United States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid
to any United Nations Entity.
TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
SEC. 501. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since its establishment in 2006, the United Nations
Human Rights Council has failed to meaningfully promote the
protection of internationally recognized human rights, and has
proven to be even more problematic than the United Nations
Human Rights Commission that it was created to replace.
(2) The United Nations Human Rights Council suffers from
fundamental and severe structural flaws present since its
establishment by the United Nations General Assembly, such as
the fact that it draws its members from the General Assembly
without any substantive membership criteria, with the perverse
result that a number of the world's worst human rights abusers
are members of the council.
(3) For example, many members of the United Nations Human
Rights Council are rated ``Not Free'' or only ``Partly Free''
by Freedom House. Only a minority of members were rated
``Free''.
(4) The structure and composition of the United Nations
Human Rights Council have made it subject to gross political
manipulation, with the result that, during its almost seven
years of operation, the Council has passed over 46 resolutions
censuring the democratic, Jewish State of Israel, as compared
to only a handful censuring the dictatorships in Burma, North
Korea, and Syria, just one addressing the severe, ongoing human
rights abuses in Libya, Iran, and Belarus, and none addressing
the severe, ongoing human rights abuses in China, Cuba, Russia,
Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and elsewhere.
(5) The United Nations Human Rights Council's agenda
contains a permanent item for criticism of the democratic,
Jewish State of Israel, but no permanent items criticizing any
other state.
(6) The United Nations Human Rights Council has
established, or preserved the existence of, a number of
``Special Procedures'' mechanisms to address country-specific
situations or thematic issues. These mechanisms include a
number of ``special rapporteurs'' whose expenses and staff
support are paid for by contributions to the United Nations.
(7) The United Nations Human Rights Council has also
established an ``Advisory Committee'' whose expenses and staff
support are paid for by contributions to the United Nations.
(8) Some of these special rapporteurs and members of the
Advisory Committee have displayed consistent bias against the
United States, Israel, and the Jewish people, while providing
support to human rights abusers.
(9) Richard Falk, the United Nations ``Special Rapporteur
on the situation of human rights in Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967'', has compared Israel's treatment of the
Palestinians to the Holocaust, questioned the veracity of the
events of September 11, 2001, and posted a cartoon on his blog
depicting Americans and Jews as bloodthirsty dogs.
(10) Jean Ziegler, a member of the United Nations Human
Rights Council Advisory Committee and former United Nations
``Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food'', has accused former
President George W. Bush and former Israeli Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon of committing ``state terrorism'', has called for
an investigation of Israel by the International Criminal Court
for ``war crimes'' following Israel's war against Hezbollah in
2006, has visited Cuba and praised the Cuban regime's provision
of food to the Cuban people, and has stated that Zimbabwean
dictator Robert Mugabe ``has history and morality with him''.
Ziegler was also involved in the establishment of the ``Al-
Gaddafi International Prize for Human Rights'', a prize
established by, funded by, and named after Libyan dictator
Muammar al-Gaddafi, and awarded in the past to Fidel Castro,
Hugo Chavez, Louis Farrakhan, and Roger Garaudy, who has denied
the Holocaust, questioned the veracity of the events of
September 11, 2001, and supported Iranian leader Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad's call for Israel to be ``wiped off the map''.
(11) Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, a member of the United
Nations Human Rights Council Advisory Committee who has
previously served as President of the United Nations General
Assembly and as foreign minister for the Sandinista regime in
Nicaragua, has implicitly accused the United States of
terrorism, has called former President Ronald Reagan a
``butcher'', has called for a international boycott of Israel,
has stated that the Palestinians were being ``crucified'' by
Israel, has called Israel's defensive Operation Cast Lead in
the Gaza Strip a ``monstrosity'' and ``genocide'', has urged
the United Nations to use the term apartheid in discussing
Israeli treatment of Palestinians, has embraced Iranian leader
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after Ahmadinejad delivered an anti-
American, anti-Israel address to the United Nations General
Assembly, has stated that charges of genocide against Sudanese
dictator Omar Hassan al Bashir are ``racist'', and has declared
Fidel Castro ``World Hero of Solidarity'', stating that Castro
``embod[ied] virtues and values worth emulation by all of us''.
(12) Halima Warzazi, a member of the United Nations Human
Rights Council Advisory Committee, has compared Israel to Nazi
Germany, and used her previous membership in a United Nations
apparatus to shield Saddam Hussein from censure for gassing
Iraqi Kurds in Halabja.
(13) The ongoing five-year review of the United Nations
Human Rights Council concluded on June 17, 2011, and failed to
make any significant reforms to its fundamental and severe
structural flaws, including its absence of substantive
membership criteria, or to remove the permanent agenda item on
Israel.
(14) On June 17, 2011, John F. Sammis, United States Deputy
Representative to the Economic and Social Council, stated that
``The Geneva process [of the five-year review] failed to yield
even minimally positive results, forcing us to dissociate from
the outcome . . . the final resolution [for the five-year
review] also fails to address the core problems that still
plague the Human Rights Council . . . The United States has
therefore voted `no' on the resolution . . . the Council's
effectiveness and legitimacy will always be compromised so long
as one country in all the world is unfairly and uniquely
singled out while others, including chronic human rights
abusers, escape scrutiny . . . The resolution before us today
does nothing to address the Council's failures nor move it any
closer to the founding values of the UN Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.''.
(15) United States membership in the Human Rights Council
has not led to reform of its fundamental flaws diminished the
Council's virulently anti-Israel behavior. The Council has
passed twenty-seven resolutions criticizing Israel since the
United States joined in 2009.
SEC. 502. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP AND FUNDING.
(a) In General.--For each and every fiscal year subsequent to the
effective date of this Act, until the Secretary of State submits to
Congress a certification that the requirements described in subsection
(b) have been satisfied--
(1) the Secretary of State shall withhold from a United
States contribution each fiscal year to a regular budget of the
United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of
such contribution that the Secretary determines would be
allocated by the United Nations to support the United Nations
Human Rights Council;
(2) the Secretary of State shall not make a voluntary
contribution to the United Nations Human Rights Council; and
(3) the United States shall not run for a seat on the
United Nations Human Rights Council.
(b) Certification.--The annual certification referred to in
subsection (a) is a certification made by the Secretary to Congress
that--
(1) the United Nations Human Rights Council's mandate from
the United Nations General Assembly explicitly and effectively
prohibits candidacy for Human Rights Council membership of a
United Nations Member State--
(A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
and
(B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation
for human rights abuses;
(2) the United Nations Human Rights Council does not
include a United Nations Member State--
(A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
(B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation
for human rights abuses;
(C) which the Secretary of State has determined,
for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act,
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or
other provision of law, is a government that has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism; or
(D) which the President has designated as a country
of particular concern for religious freedom under
section 402(b) of the International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998; and
(3) the United Nations Human Rights Council's agenda or
programme of work does not include a permanent item with regard
to the State of Israel.
(c) Special Procedures.--The Secretary of State shall withhold from
a United States contribution each year to a regular budget of the
United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of such
contribution that the Secretary determines would be allocated by the
United Nations to support the United Nations ``Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in Palestinian territories occupied since
1967'', and any other United Nations Human Rights Council ``Special
Procedures'' used to display bias against the United States or the
State of Israel or to provide support for the government of any United
Nations Member State--
(1) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
(2) under a Security Council-mandated investigation for
human rights abuses;
(3) which the Secretary of State has determined, for
purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, or other provision of law, is a government that has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism; or
(4) which the President has designated as a country of
particular concern for religious freedom under section 402(b)
of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.
(d) Reversion of Funds.--Funds appropriated for use as a United
States contribution to the United Nations but withheld from obligation
and expenditure pursuant to this section shall immediately revert to
the United States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be
repaid to any United Nations Entity.
TITLE VI--GOLDSTONE REPORT
SEC. 601. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) On January 12, 2009, the United Nations Human Rights
Council passed Resolution A/HRC/S-9/L.1, which authorized a
``fact-finding mission'' regarding Israel's conduct of
Operation Cast Lead against violent militants in the Gaza Strip
between December 27, 2008, and January 18, 2009.
(2) The resolution pre-judged the outcome of its
investigation by one-sidedly mandating the ``fact-finding
mission'' to ``investigate all violations of international
human rights law and International Humanitarian Law by . . .
Israel, against the Palestinian people . . . particularly in
the occupied Gaza Strip, due to the current aggression''.
(3) The mandate of the ``fact-finding mission'' makes no
mention of the relentless rocket and mortar attacks, which
numbered in the thousands and spanned a period of eight years,
by Hamas and other violent militant groups in Gaza against
civilian targets in Israel, that necessitated Israel's
defensive measures.
(4) The ``fact-finding mission'' included a member who,
before joining the mission, had already declared Israel guilty
of committing atrocities in Operation Cast Lead by signing a
public letter on January 11, 2009, published in the Sunday
Times, that called Israel's actions ``war crimes''.
(5) The mission's flawed and biased mandate gave serious
concern to many United Nations Human Rights Council Member
States which refused to support it, including Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Cameroon, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland.
(6) The mission's flawed and biased mandate was never
broadened or revised by any plenary meeting of the United
Nations Human Rights Council, and troubled many distinguished
individuals who refused invitations to head the mission.
(7) On September 15, 2009, the ``United Nations Fact
Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict'' released its report,
which is commonly referred to as the ``Goldstone Report''.
(8) The Goldstone Report repeatedly made sweeping and
unsubstantiated determinations that the Israeli military had
deliberately attacked civilians during Operation Cast Lead.
(9) The authors of the Goldstone Report admit that ``we did
not deal with the issues . . . regarding the problems of
conducting military operations in civilian areas and second-
guessing decisions made by soldiers and their commanding
officers in the fog of war.''.
(10) In the October 16, 2009, edition of the Jewish Daily
Forward, Richard Goldstone, the head of the ``United Nations
Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict'', is quoted as
saying, with respect to the mission's evidence-collection
methods, ``If this was a court of law, there would have been
nothing proven''.
(11) The Goldstone Report, in effect, denied the State of
Israel the right to self-defense, and never noted the fact that
Israel had the right to defend its citizens from the repeated
violent attacks committed against civilian targets in southern
Israel by Hamas and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations
operating from Gaza.
(12) The Goldstone Report largely ignored the culpability
of the Government of Iran and the Government of Syria, both of
whom sponsor Hamas and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
(13) The Goldstone Report usually considered public
statements made by Israeli officials not to be credible, while
frequently giving uncritical credence to statements taken from
what it called the ``Gaza authorities'', i.e., the Gaza
leadership of Hamas.
(14) Notwithstanding a great body of evidence that Hamas
and other violent Islamist groups committed war crimes by using
civilians and civilian institutions, such as mosques, schools,
and hospitals, as shields, the Goldstone Report repeatedly
downplayed or cast doubt upon that claim.
(15) In one notable instance, the Goldstone Report stated
that it did not consider the admission of a Hamas official that
Hamas often ``created a human shield of women, children, the
elderly and the mujahideen, against [the Israeli military]''
specifically to ``constitute evidence that Hamas forced
Palestinian civilians to shield military objectives against
attack''.
(16) Hamas was able to significantly shape the findings of
the investigation mission's Goldstone Report by selecting and
prescreening some of the witnesses and intimidating others, as
the Goldstone Report acknowledges when it notes that ``those
interviewed in Gaza appeared reluctant to speak about the
presence of or conduct of hostilities by the Palestinian armed
groups . . . from a fear of reprisals''.
(17) Even though Israel is a vibrant democracy with a
vigorous and free press, the Goldstone Report erroneously
asserts that ``actions of the Israeli government . . . have
contributed significantly to a political climate in which
dissent with the government and its actions . . . is not
tolerated''.
(18) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United
Nations Human Rights Council endorse its recommendations,
implement them, review their implementation, and refer the
report to the United Nations Security Council, the Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court, and the United Nations
General Assembly for further action.
(19) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United
Nations Security Council--
(A) require the Government of Israel to launch
further investigations of its conduct during Operation
Cast Lead and report back to the Security Council
within 6 months;
(B) simultaneously appoint an ``independent
committee of experts'' to monitor and report on any
domestic legal or other proceedings undertaken by the
Government of Israel within that 6-month period; and
(C) refer the case to the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court after that 6-month period.
(20) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United
Nations General Assembly consider further action on the report
and establish an escrow fund, to be funded entirely by the
State of Israel, to ``pay adequate compensation to Palestinians
who have suffered loss and damage'' during Operation Cast Lead.
(21) The Goldstone Report ignored the issue of compensation
to Israelis who have been killed or wounded, or suffered other
loss and damage, as a result of years of past and continuing
rocket and mortar attacks by Hamas and other violent militant
groups in Gaza against civilian targets in southern Israel.
(22) The Goldstone Report recommended ``that States Parties
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 start criminal investigations
[of Operation Cast Lead] in national courts, using universal
jurisdiction'' and that ``following investigation, alleged
perpetrators should be arrested and prosecuted''.
(23) The concept of ``universal jurisdiction'' has
frequently been used in attempts to detain, charge, and
prosecute Israeli and United States officials and former
officials in connection with unfounded allegations of war
crimes and has often unfairly impeded the travel of those
individuals.
(24) On September 20, 2009, United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay wrote, ``I lend
my full support to Justice Goldstone's report and its
recommendations''.
(25) The State of Israel, like many other free democracies,
has an independent judicial system with a robust investigatory
capacity and has already launched numerous investigations, many
of which remain ongoing, of Operation Cast Lead and individual
incidents therein.
(26) Several nations have indicated that they intend to
further pursue consideration of the Goldstone Report and
implementation of its recommendations by the United Nations
Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the
United Nations Human Rights Council, and other multilateral
fora.
(27) On September 30, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton described the underlying mandate for the Goldstone
Report as ``one-sided''.
(28) On September 17, 2009, Ambassador Susan Rice, United
States Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
expressed the United States ``very serious concern with the
mandate'' underlying the Goldstone Report and noted that the
United States views the mandate ``as unbalanced, one-sided and
basically unacceptable''.
(29) Israeli President Shimon Peres has called the
Goldstone Report a ``blood libel''.
(30) The Goldstone Report reflects the longstanding,
historic bias at the United Nations against the democratic,
Jewish State of Israel.
(31) The Goldstone Report is being exploited by Israel's
enemies to excuse the actions of violent militant groups and
their state sponsors, and to justify isolation of and punitive
measures against the democratic, Jewish State of Israel.
(32) On November 3, 2009, the House of Representatives
overwhelmingly adopted House Resolution 867, which stated that
the House of Representatives:
(A) ``considers the [Goldstone Report] to be
irredeemably biased and unworthy of further
consideration or legitimacy'';
(B) ``supports the Administration's efforts to
combat anti-Israel bias at the United Nations, its
characterization of the [Goldstone Report] as
`unbalanced, one-sided and basically unacceptable', and
its opposition to the resolution on the report'';
(C) ``calls on the President and the Secretary of
State to continue to strongly and unequivocally oppose
any endorsement of the [Goldstone Report] in
multilateral fora, including through leading opposition
to any United Nations General Assembly resolution and
through vetoing, if necessary, any United Nations
Security Council resolution that endorses the contents
of this report, seeks to act upon the recommendations
contained in this report, or calls on any other
international body to take further action regarding
this report'';
(D) ``calls on the President and the Secretary of
State to strongly and unequivocally oppose any further
consideration of the `Report of the United Nations Fact
Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict' and any other
measures stemming from this report in multilateral
fora''; and
(E) ``reaffirms its support for the democratic,
Jewish State of Israel, for Israel's security and right
to self-defense, and, specifically, for Israel's right
to defend its citizens from violent militant groups and
their state sponsors''.
(33) On October 16, 2009, the United Nations Human Rights
Council voted 25-6 (with 11 Member States abstaining and 5 not
voting, and with the United States voting against) to adopt
resolution A-HRC-S-12-1, which endorsed the Goldstone Report
and condemned Israel, without mentioning Hamas, other such
violent militant groups, or their state sponsors. The United
States voted against the resolution.
(34) On November 5, 2009, the United Nations General
Assembly voted 114-18 (with 44 Member States abstaining, and
with the United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/
RES/64/10, which, among other things:
(A) endorsed the United Nations Human Rights
Council's resolution A-HRC-S-12-1, which endorsed the
Goldstone Report and condemned Israel, without
mentioning Hamas, other such violent militant groups,
or their state sponsors;
(B) requested that the Secretary General of the
United Nations transmit the Goldstone Report to the
United Nations Security Council;
(C) expressed its ``appreciation'' to the ``United
Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict'' for
its ``comprehensive report'';
(D) expressed grave concern regarding ``reports
regarding serious human rights violations'' during
Operation Cast Lead, including the findings in the
Goldstone Report; and
(E) recommended ``that the Government of
Switzerland, in its capacity as depositary of the
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, undertake as soon as
possible the steps necessary to reconvene a Conference
of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva
Convention on measures to enforce the Convention'' in
the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and ``East Jerusalem''.
(35) On February 26, 2010, the United Nations General
Assembly voted 98-7 (with 31 Member States abstaining, and with
the United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/RES/64/
254, which built on the determinations of A/RES/64/10.
(36) On March 24, 2010, the United Nations Human Rights
Council voted 29-6 (with 11 Member States abstaining and one
not voting, and with the United States voting against) to adopt
resolution A/HRC/13/L.30, which, among other things--
(A) called upon ``all concerned parties, including
United Nations bodies, to ensure their implementation
of the recommendations contained in the [Goldstone
Report]'';
(B) requested that the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights submit a ``progress
report on the implementation of the present resolution
to the [Human Rights] Council at its fourteenth
session'' in May and June 2010; and
(C) decided to ``follow up on the implementation of
the present resolution at [the] fifteenth session'' of
the Human Rights Council in September 2010.
(37) On March 25, 2011, the United Nations Human Rights
Council voted 27-3 (with 16 Member States abstaining, and with
the United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/HRC/16/
L.31, which, among other things--
(A) called upon ``all concerned parties, including
United Nations bodies, to ensure the full and immediate
implementation of the recommendations contained in the
[Goldstone Report]'';
(B) recommended that the United Nations General
Assembly again consider the Goldstone Report at its
sixty-sixth session, and urged the General Assembly to
submit the report to the United Nations Security
Council ``for its consideration and appropriate
action,'' including referral to the prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court;
(C) requested that the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights submit a ``progress
report on the implementation of the present resolution
to the Human Rights Council at its eighteenth session
of September 2011''; and
(D) decided to ``follow up on the implementation of
the present resolution at [the] nineteenth session [of
the Human Rights Council] of March 2012''.
(38) On April 1, 2011, Richard Goldstone, the head of the
``United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict''
that authored the Goldstone Report, wrote an op-ed in the
Washington Post that renounced the Goldstone Report's claim
that the Israeli military deliberately attacked civilians
during Operation Cast Lead. Goldstone wrote that the Israeli
military's investigations with respect to incidents in
Operation Cast Lead ``indicate that civilians were not
intentionally targeted as a matter of policy''.
(39) Efforts to delegitimize the democratic State of Israel
and deny it the right to defend its citizens and its existence
can be used to delegitimize other democracies and deny them the
same right.
SEC. 602. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) consider the Goldstone Report irredeemably biased and
unworthy of further consideration or legitimacy;
(2) strongly and unequivocally oppose any consideration,
legitimization, or endorsement of the Goldstone Report, or any
other measures stemming from this report, in multilateral fora;
(3) lead a high-level diplomatic campaign in support of the
revocation and repudiation, by the United Nations General
Assembly, of the Goldstone Report and any United Nations
resolutions stemming from the report, including--
(A) United Nations General Assembly resolutions A/
RES/64/10 and A/RES/64/254; and
(B) United Nations Human Rights Council resolutions
A-HRC-S-12-1, A/HRC/13/L.30, and A/HRC/16/L.31; and
(4) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other
responsible countries not to endorse, support, or legitimize
the Goldstone Report or any other measures stemming from the
report.
SEC. 603. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER
DOLLARS.
(a) Withholding of Funds.--The Secretary of State shall withhold
from the United States contribution to the regular budget of the United
Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of such contribution
that the Secretary determines would be or has been expended by the
United Nations for any part of the Goldstone Report or its preparatory
or follow-on activities.
(b) Refund of United States Taxpayer Dollars.--Funds appropriated
for use as a United States contribution to the regular budget of the
United Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to
subsection (a) shall immediately revert to the United States Treasury
and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations
Entity.
TITLE VII--DURBAN PROCESS
SEC. 701. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States is opposed to racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance, and has
long been a party to the Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination.
(2) Expensive and politically skewed international
conferences can disserve and undermine the worthy goals that
they are ostensibly convened to support.
(3) The goals of the 2001 United Nations World Conference
Against Racism--held in Durban, South Africa, and commonly
referred to as ``Durban I''--were undermined by hateful, anti-
Jewish rhetoric, and anti-Israel political agendas, prompting
both Israel and the United States to withdraw their delegations
from the Conference.
(4) The official government declaration adopted by Durban
I, the ``Durban Declaration and Program of Action'', focused on
the ``plight of the Palestinian people under foreign
occupation'', and thereby singled out one regional conflict for
discussion and implicitly launched a false accusation against
Israel of intolerance towards the Palestinians.
(5) On September 3, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell
explained the withdrawal of the United States delegation from
Durban I by stating that ``you do not combat racism by
conferences that produce declarations containing hateful
language, some of which is a throwback to the `days of Zionism'
equals racism; or supports the idea that we have made too much
of the Holocaust; or suggests that apartheid exists in Israel;
or that singles out only one country in the world--Israel--for
censure and abuse''.
(6) The late United States Representative Tom Lantos, who
participated as a member of the United States delegation to the
Durban Conference, supported that delegation's withdrawal and
wrote in 2002 that the conference ``provided the world with a
glimpse into the abyss of international hate, discrimination
and, indeed, racism''.
(7) On December 19, 2006, the United Nations General
Assembly approved a resolution initiating preparations for a
Durban Review Conference (commonly referred to as ``Durban
II''), which was held between April 20 and 24, 2009, in Geneva,
Switzerland.
(8) The chair of the preparatory committee for Durban II
was Libya, and the co-chairs included Iran and Cuba.
(9) Throughout the preparatory process for Durban II,
member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
urged that the conference again focus criticism on Israel and
single out the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for discussion, and
also urged that the conference advocate global speech codes
that would impose restrictions contrary to fundamental freedoms
recognized in the provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
(10) In testimony before the House of Representatives on
April 2, 2008, then-Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organizations Kristen Silverberg stated that the
United States had decided against participating in preparatory
activities for Durban II because ``[there is] absolutely no
case to be made for participating in something that is going to
be a repeat of Durban I. We don't have any confidence that this
will be any better than Durban I''.
(11) On September 23, 2008, the House of Representatives
passed House Resolution 1361, which, among other things, called
on the President to ``urge other heads of state to condition
participation in the 2009 [Durban II] Conference on concrete
action by the United Nations and United Nations Member States
to ensure that it is not a forum to demonize any group, or
incite anti-Semitism, hatred, or violence against members of
any group or to call into question the existence of any state''
and urged all United Nations Member States ``not to support a
2009 Durban Review Conference process that fails to adhere to
established human rights standards and to reject an agenda that
incites hatred against any group in the guise of criticism of a
particular government or that seeks to forge a global blasphemy
code''.
(12) The present United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Dr. Navanethem Pillay, who served as Secretary General
of Durban II, has repeatedly sought to downplay the level of
hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel political agendas
present at Durban I, describing it as merely ``the virulent
anti-Semitic behavior of a few non-governmental organizations
on the sidelines'' and praising the biased 2001 Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action as ``[t]he legacy of this
Conference'', has repeatedly sought to downplay the level of
hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel political agendas
present at Durban II and its preparatory activities, and has
repeatedly praised and urged the full implementation of the
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action.
(13) High Commissioner Pillay has repeatedly and publicly
criticized nations, including the United States, which
announced that they would not participate in Durban II, but has
almost never publicly criticized governments who succeeded in
using the conference and its preparatory activities to single
out Israel for criticism and to attempt to restrict fundamental
freedoms.
(14) A United Nations press release on September 8, 2008,
regarding an address by High Commissioner Pillay, disturbingly
dismissed objections raised by non-governmental organizations
to Durban II as ``ferocious, and often distorted, criticism by
certain lobby groups focused on single issues''.
(15) During February of 2009, the United States actively
participated in intergovernmental consultations on Durban II's
``draft outcome document'' and engaged in high-level diplomatic
efforts to dramatically reverse the path of Durban II by
directing it towards meaningful efforts to combat intolerance
and bigotry and directing it away from efforts to undermine the
cause of fighting discrimination through singling out Israel
for implicit criticism and calling for restrictions on
fundamental freedoms.
(16) On February 27, 2009, a State Department spokesman
stated that, despite United States efforts to redirect the path
of Durban II, ``the document being negotiated has gone from bad
to worse, and the current text of the draft outcome document is
not salvageable . . . A conference based on this text would be
a missed opportunity to speak clearly about the persistent
problem of racism'' and therefore, the United States would not
participate in further consultations and negotiations regarding
the ``draft outcome document'', and would not participate in
Durban II itself unless the ``draft outcome document'' was
radically shortened and revised to eliminate objectionable
material.
(17) On April 17, 2009, the third and final session of the
preparatory committee for Durban II proposed a final ``draft
outcome document'' that contained a number of provisions
advocating restrictions on freedom of expression, and that also
implicitly singled out and criticized Israel for racism by
reaffirming, in its very first paragraph, the 2001 Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action.
(18) On April 18, 2009, a State Department spokesman
announced that ``the United States will not join the [Durban
II] conference'', noting that ``The current document . . .
still contains language that reaffirms in toto the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA) from 2001, which the
United States has long said it is unable to support . . . The
United States also has serious concerns with relatively new
additions to the text regarding `incitement', that run counter
to the U.S. commitment to unfettered free speech.''.
(19) On April 19, 2009, the President stated at a press
conference that ``I would love to be involved in a useful
conference that addressed continuing issues of racism and
discrimination around the globe . . . we expressed in the run-
up to this conference our concerns that if you incorporated--if
you adopted all the language from 2001, that's just not
something we could sign up for . . . our participation would
have involved putting our imprimatur on something that we just
don't believe . . . Hopefully . . . we can partner with other
countries on to actually reduce discrimination around the
globe. But this wasn't an opportunity to do it.''.
(20) Canada, Israel, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands,
Poland, Australia, and New Zealand also did not participate in
Durban II, and the Czech Republic walked out of the Conference
during its proceedings, never to return.
(21) Libya was the chair of the Main Committee of Durban
II, and vice presidents of Durban II included Libya, Iran, and
Cuba.
(22) Speaking at Durban II on April 20, 2009, Iranian
leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called the democratic State of
Israel ``totally racist'' and ``the most cruel and repressive
racist regime'', and called for Israel's destruction, stating
that ``Efforts must be made to put an end to the abuse by
Zionists . . . Governments must be encouraged and supported in
their fights aimed at eradicating this barbaric racism''.
(23) In his speech at Durban II, Ahmadinejad also
propagated anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, saying that
``Those who control huge economic resources and interests in
the world . . . mobilize all the resources, including their
economic and political influence and world media, to render
support in vain to the Zionist regime''.
(24) Disgusted by Ahmadinejad's biased and incendiary
statements, delegates from about two dozen nations walked out
of the assembly hall in protest, but most delegations remained,
and a large number of delegations and observers repeatedly
applauded Ahmadinejad's remarks.
(25) On April 21, 2009, governments participating in Durban
II adopted by consensus an ``outcome document'' that contained
a number of provisions advocating restrictions on freedom of
expression, and that also implicitly singled out and criticized
Israel for racism by reaffirming, in its very first paragraph,
the 2001 Durban Declaration and Program of Action.
(26) Throughout Durban II, many speakers singled out Israel
for criticism or called for restrictions on fundamental
freedoms, including representatives of Iran, Libya, Cuba,
Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
Indonesia, Qatar, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,
Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Tunisia, Bangladesh,
Switzerland, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the
Arab League, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and a
number of other organizations and countries.
(27) During Durban II, several speakers who sought to draw
attention to genuine instances of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia, related intolerance, and human
rights violations by the governments of Iran, Libya, and China
were repeatedly interrupted by the delegations from those
governments and instructed by the conference's chair to not
refer specifically to those governments.
(28) On December 18, 2009, the United Nations General
Assembly approved Resolution A/RES/64/148, which urged the
``full and effective implementation of the Durban Declaration
and Programme of Action'' and called for a ``one-day plenary
event to commemorate the ten-year anniversary [of Durban I]
during the high-level segment of the General Assembly to be
devoted to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and
related intolerance during its sixty-fifth session, in 2011''.
The United States, joined by 12 other nations, voted against
this resolution.
(29) On December 24, 2010, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/65/240, authorizing the
holding of a ``one-day high-level meeting of the General
Assembly to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption
of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, at the level
of Heads of State and Government, on the second day of the
general debate of the sixty-sixth session'' in September of
2011. The resolution also states that the meeting (commonly
referred to as ``Durban III'') will adopt a ``political
declaration aimed at mobilizing political will at the national,
regional, and international levels for the full and effective
implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action and its follow-up processes.''. The resolution also
requests that the United Nations Secretary General ``establish
a programme of outreach, with the involvement of Member States
and United Nations funds and programmes as well as civil
society, including non-governmental organizations, to
appropriately commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption
of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action.'' The
resolution also requests that ``the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Department
of Public Information of the Secretariat . . . launch a public
information campaign for the commemoration of the tenth
anniversary of the adoption of the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action''. The United States, joined by 21 other
nations, voted against this resolution.
(30) The Government of Canada announced that it would not
participate in the Durban III meeting. Canadian Minister of
Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney
stated that ``Our government has lost faith in the entire
tainted Durban process. Canada will not participate in this
charade any longer. We will not lend our country's good name to
a commemoration of what has widely been characterized as a
hatefest . . . Canada is clearly committed to the fight against
racism, but the Durban process commemorates an agenda that
actually promotes racism rather than combats it.''.
(31) The Government of Israel announced that it would not
participate in the Durban III meeting, stating that ``Israel is
part of the international struggle against racism. The Jewish
people was itself a victim of racism throughout history. Israel
regrets that a resolution on an important subject--elimination
of racism--has been diverted and politicized by the automatic
majority at the UN, by linking it to the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action (2001) that many states would prefer to
forget. The Durban Conference of 2001, with its antisemitic
undertones and displays of hatred for Israel and the Jewish
World, left us with scars that will not heal quickly . . .
Under the present circumstances, as long as the [Durban III]
meeting is defined as part of the infamous''Durban process``,
Israel will not participate . . .''.
(32) On June 2, 2011, the United States publicly announced
that it would not participate in the Durban III meeting. The
Department of State's deputy spokesman stated that the ``Durban
process includes displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism, and
we don't want to see that commemorated. In our conversations
about this commemoration, we've not seen the kind of progress
that we think is indicative. We remain unconvinced that the
conference is moving in a new direction.''.
(33) The Governments of Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, and the United Kingdom also
did not participate in the Durban III meeting.
(34) On September 22, 2011, at the Durban III meeting, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/66/3,
a ``political declaration'' which ``[r]eaffirm[ed] that the
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action . . . and the
outcome document of [Durban II] . . . are a comprehensive
United Nations framework and solid foundation for combating
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related
intolerance'', ``[r]ecall[ed] that the aim of [Durban III] is
to mobilize political will at the national, regional and
international levels and reaffirm our political commitment to
the full and effective implementation of the Durban Declaration
and Programme of Action and the outcome document of [Durban
II], and their follow-up processes, at all these levels'', and
``welcome[d] the continued engagement of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights to incorporate the
implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action into the United Nations system''.
(35) On September 22, 2011, the White House Press Secretary
stated that ``Since its inception . . . the Durban process has
included ugly displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism . . .
Last December, the United States voted against the resolution
establishing [Durban III] because we did not want to see the
hateful and anti-Semitic displays of the 2001 Durban Conference
commemorated. Over the last few months, we did not participate
in negotiations on [Durban III's] Political Declaration
document and, like many other countries, we were not present
when the Declaration was adopted. We are also deeply
disappointed that the rules established for credentialing non-
governmental organizations to participate were used by some
delegations to silence voices critical of the Durban
process.''.
(36) Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and their preparatory
and follow-on activities, have made little or no demonstrable
contribution to combating racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia, and related intolerance.
(37) To date, several million dollars from the United
Nations regular budget has been expended on Durban I, Durban
II, Durban III, and their preparatory and follow-on activities.
(38) The United States is the largest contributor to the
United Nations system, and is assessed for a full 22 percent of
the United Nations regular budget, which is funded by assessed
contributions from Member States.
(39) Funding for Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and their
preparatory and follow-on activities through the United Nations
regular budget has resulted in United States taxpayer dollars
being used for those purposes.
(40) Congress, through its adoption of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-161) withheld from the
United States assessed contribution for fiscal year 2008 to the
United Nations regular budget an amount equivalent to the
United States share of the United Nations Human Rights Council
budget, including its share of the Council-administered
preparatory process for Durban II.
SEC. 702. SENSE OF CONGRESS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Durban I, Durban II, and Durban III conferences,
and their preparatory and follow-on activities, were subverted
by members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and
irredeemably distorted into a forum for anti-Israel, anti-
Semitic, and anti-freedom activity;
(2) by walking out of the Durban I conference, and by not
participating in the Durban II conference, and announcing that
it would not participate in the Durban III meeting, the United
States Government upheld and reaffirmed the fundamental
commitment of the United States to combating racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance;
(3) the Governments of Canada, Israel, Italy, Germany, the
Netherlands, Poland, Australia, New Zealand, and the Czech
Republic should be commended for their decision to not
participate or cease participation in the Durban II conference;
(4) the Governments of Australia, Austria, Bulgaria,
Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Israel, Italy,
Latvia, the Netherlands, Italy, New Zealand, Poland, and the
United Kingdom should be commended for their decision to not
participate in Durban III; and
(5) the Administration should expeditiously and
unequivocally announce that it will not participate in,
support, or legitimize any part of the Durban process.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to--
(1) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other
responsible countries--
(A) not to participate in, support, legitimize, or
fund any part of the Durban process, and
(B) to withhold from their respective contributions
to the regularly assessed biennial budget of the United
Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of
such respective contributions that they determine would
be or has been allocated by the United Nations for any
part of the Durban III meeting or its preparatory or
follow-on activities, or for any other part of the
Durban process; and
(2) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to explore
credible, alternative forums for combating racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance.
SEC. 703. NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE DURBAN PROCESS.
None of the funds made available in any provision of law may be
used for United States participation in any part of the Durban process.
SEC. 704. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER
DOLLARS.
(a) Withholding of Funds for the Durban Process.--The Secretary of
State shall withhold from the United States contribution to the regular
budget of the United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage
of such contribution that the Secretary determines would be or has been
expended by the United Nations for any part of the Durban I or Durban
II conferences, the Durban III meeting, their preparatory or follow-on
activities, or any other part of the Durban process, including--
(1) the ``public information campaign for the commemoration
of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action'' requested by United
Nations General Assembly Resolution A.RES/65/240;
(2) the Intergovernmental Working Group on the Effective
Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action;
(3) the ``group of independent eminent experts on the
implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action''; and
(4) the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of
Complementary Standards.
(b) Withholding of Funds for Other Biased and Compromised
Activities.--Until the Secretary of State submits to the appropriate
congressional committees a certification, on a case-by-case basis, that
the requirements described in subsection (d) have been satisfied, the
United States shall withhold from the United States contribution to the
regular budget of the United Nations an amount that is equal to the
percentage of such contribution that the Secretary determines has been
allocated by the United Nations for any conference, meeting, or other
multilateral forum, or the preparatory or follow-on activities of any
conference, meeting, or other multilateral forum, that is organized
under the aegis or jurisdiction of the United Nations or of any United
Nations Entity.
(c) Refund of United States Taxpayer Dollars.--
(1) In general.--Funds appropriated for use as a United
States contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations
but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to
subsection (a) shall immediately revert to the United States
Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to
any United Nations Entity.
(2) Allowance.--Funds appropriated for use as a United
States contribution to the regularly assessed biennial budget
of the United Nations but withheld from obligation and
expenditure pursuant to subsection (b) may be obligated and
expended for that purpose upon the certification described in
subsection (d). Such funds shall revert to the United States
Treasury if no such certification is made by the date that is
one year after such appropriation, and shall not be considered
arrears to be repaid to any United Nations Entity.
(d) Certification.--The certification referred to in subsection (b)
is a certification made by the Secretary of State to the appropriate
congressional committees concerning the following:
(1) The specified conference, meeting, or other
multilateral forum did not reaffirm, call for the
implementation of, or otherwise support the Durban Declaration
and Programme of Action (2001) or the outcome document of the
Durban II conference (2009) or the Durban III meeting (2011).
(2) The specified conference or forum was not used to
single out the United States or the State of Israel for unfair
or unbalanced criticism.
(3) The specified conference or forum was not used to
propagate racism, racial discrimination, anti-Semitism, denial
of the Holocaust, incitement to violence or genocide,
xenophobia, or related intolerance.
(4) The specified conference or forum was not used to
advocate for restrictions on the freedoms of speech,
expression, religion, the press, assembly, or petition, or for
restrictions on other fundamental human rights and freedoms.
(5) The leadership of the specified conference or forum
does not include a Member State, or a representative from a
Member State--
(A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
(B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation
for human rights abuses; or
(C) the government of which the Secretary of State
has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in
effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act,
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or
other provision of law, is a government that has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism.
TITLE VIII--UNRWA
SEC. 801. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302 (1949)
created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) with the temporary,
strictly humanitarian mandate to ``carry out . . . direct
relief and works programmes'' for Palestinian refugees.
(2) UNRWA has acknowledged that it is the ``only UN agency
that reports directly to the UN General Assembly, and whose
beneficiary population stems from one nation-group'', and is
responsible solely for Palestinian refugees, while the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible
for other refugees across the world.
(3) UNHCR's definition of a refugee is, in accordance with
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, any
person who ``owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country . . .''.
(4) UNRWA's much broader definition of a ``Palestine
refugee'' is any person, and his descendants, whose ``normal
place of residence was [the former British Mandate of]
Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who
lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948
conflict.''.
(5) UNRWA's overly inclusive definition of a ``Palestine
refugee'' has resulted in an increase in UNRWA's reported
number of ``Palestine refugees'' from under 1,000,000 in 1950
to over 5,000,000 today, encompassing multiple generations of
descendants of the original Palestinian refugees.
(6) Hundreds of thousands of ``Palestine refugees'' are
citizens of recognized states, including Jordan.
(7) UNRWA, unlike UNHCR, does not offer refugees the option
of resettlement and reintegration into their country of refuge
or a third country. Efforts by UN officials in the 1950s to
offer resettlement and reintegration as an option for
Palestinian refugees were dropped under fierce opposition from
Arab governments, and have not been taken up since.
(8) Through its overly inclusive definition of a
``Palestine refugee'' and its refusal to offer refugees the
option of resettlement and reintegration, UNRWA contributes to
the perpetuation of the suffering of Palestinian refugees, who
have been exploited by Arab governments and Palestinian
militant groups for over six decades as a political tool with
which to assail Israel.
(9) Almost all of UNRWA's almost 30,000 staff are
Palestinian refugees themselves, presenting a clear conflict of
interest.
(10) UNRWA's total annual budget, including its core
programs, emergency activities and special projects, exceeds
almost $1,000,000,000.
(11) The United States has long been the largest single
contributing country to UNRWA.
(12) From 1950 to 2010, the United States has contributed
almost $3,900,000,000 to UNRWA, including an average of over
$210,000,000 per year between fiscal years 2007 and 2010.
(13) Section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2221(c)) states that ``No contributions by the
United States shall be made to the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East except on
the condition that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
take all possible measures to assure that no part of the United
States contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any
refugee who is receiving military training as a member of the
so-called Palestine Liberation Army or any other guerrilla type
organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.''.
(14) Then-Deputy Secretary of State Jacob J. Lew testified
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 13, 2009,
that ``We have the highest level of scrutiny in terms of
UNRWA''.
(15) However, in contravention of United States law, UNRWA
does not ask its personnel or aid recipients if they are
members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
(16) Even though the United States remains the largest
single contributing country to UNRWA, until 2010, UNRWA did not
make available its list of staff for screening through United
States watch lists, including that of the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, refused a United
States request to do so in 2005, and still does not do so for
its list of aid recipients.
(17) UNRWA claims that it has fulfilled its obligations
under section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by
screening personnel through the United Nations Consolidated
List pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution
1267, but the names on that list are largely members of Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban, not of Palestinian Foreign Terrorist
Organizations such as Hamas, Fatah's al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades,
or Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
(18) Former UNRWA commissioner-general Peter Hansen, stated
in 2004 that ``I am sure that there are Hamas members on the
UNRWA payroll and I don't see that as a crime.''.
(19) A number of UNRWA personnel have been discovered to be
affiliated with Foreign Terrorist Organizations, including,
inter alia--
(A) Issa Batran (now deceased), a commander of
Hamas's al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and senior rocket-
maker who taught at an UNRWA school in Gaza;
(B) Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi (now
deceased), who reportedly carried out a homicide
bombing that killed seven Americans and one Jordanian
at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Afghanistan on
December 30, 2009, reportedly worked as a physician at
an UNRWA clinic in Amman, Jordan, and had longstanding
ties to violent Islamist extremism;
(C) Said Siam (now deceased), a longtime Hamas
official who eventually served as Hamas's Interior
Minister in Gaza, and who taught at an UNRWA school in
Gaza;
(D) Awad al-Qiq (now deceased), a rocket-builder
for Palestinian Islamic Jihad who served as headmaster
of an UNRWA school in Gaza;
(E) Nahd Atallah, an UNRWA staff member in Gaza,
who was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to 15 years'
imprisonment by an Israeli military court of using his
UN travel document to bypass Israeli checkpoints in
Gaza in order to transport armed Palestinian militants;
and
(F) an UNRWA teacher who reportedly praised
homicide bombers and permitted Hamas leader Ahmed
Yassin (now deceased) to speak to an assembly of
students at an UNRWA school. UNRWA did not terminate
the teacher's employment, instead only giving him a
letter of censure.
(20) UNRWA staff unions, including the teachers' union, are
frequently controlled by members affiliated with Hamas.
(21) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a
2009 report that--
(A) ``UNRWA . . . obviously does not take `all
possible measures' in practice'' to assure that United
States contributions do not provide assistance to any
refugee with ties to Foreign Terrorist Organizations,
in accordance with section 301(c) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961;
(B) ``UNRWA makes no attempt to weed out
individuals who support extremist positions . . . UNRWA
has taken very few steps to detect and eliminate
terrorists from the ranks of its staff or its
beneficiaries, and no steps at all to prevent members
of terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, from joining
its staff.'';
(C) ``[I]t is rare for an area staff member . . .
to report or confirm that another staff member has
violated rules against political speech, let alone
exhibited ties to terrorism. Not surprisingly, external
allegations of improper speech or improper use of UNRWA
facilities are difficult to prove, as virtually no one
is willing to be a witness against gang members.''; and
(D) ``[T]here are no formal procedures for
deregistering or denying services to a properly
registered refugee, no matter what he or she does.''.
(22) The late Representative Tom Lantos, in a May 13, 2002,
letter, expressed his concern that--
(A) ``UNRWA is perpetuating, rather than
ameliorating, the situation of Palestinian refugees'';
(B) ``UNRWA officials have . . . failed to prevent
their camps from becoming centers of terrorist
activity''; and
(C) ``for too long, UNRWA has been part of the
problem, rather than the solution, in the Middle East .
. . UNRWA camps have fostered a culture of anger and
dependency that undermines both regional peace and the
well-being of the camps'' inhabitants.
(23) UNRWA has long held accounts at the Arab Bank and the
Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS), financial institutions that the
United States deems or believes to be complicit in money
laundering and terror financing.
(24) The Arab Bank is reportedly at the center of United
States investigations into how tens of millions of dollars have
flowed to Palestinian groups that allegedly used some of those
funds to pay off suicide bombers and their relatives, and is
also reportedly being sued in Federal court by American victims
of attacks in Israel, with attorneys for the victims accusing
the bank of facilitating Acts of International Terrorism.
(25) On May 11, 2004, the Department of the Treasury
designated CBS as a financial institution of ``primary money
laundering concern'' pursuant to section 311 of the USA Patriot
Act, stating that ``CBS had been used by terrorists and their
sympathizers and acted as a conduit for the laundering of
proceeds generated from the illicit sale of Iraqi oil'' and
that ``numerous transactions that may be indicative of
terrorist financing and money laundering have been transferred
through CBS, including two accounts at CBS that reference a
reputed financier for Usama bin Laden.''.
(26) On August 10, 2011, the Department of the Treasury
designated CBS, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, for serving
as an ``agent for designated Syrian and North Korean
proliferators''.
(27) CBS is controlled by the Government of Syria, a State
Sponsor of Terrorism.
(28) The curriculum of UNRWA schools, which use the
textbooks of their respective host governments or authorities,
has long contained materials that are anti-Israel, anti-
Semitic, and supportive of violent extremism.
(29) As far back as over forty years ago, former UNRWA
commissioner-general Laurence Michelmore admitted that UNRWA
schools were supporting a ``bitterly hostile attitude to
Israel.''.
(30) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a
January 2009 report that ``[T]eachers in UNRWA schools were
often afraid to remove posters glorifying `martyrs' (including
suicide bombers) for fear of retribution from armed supporters
of the martyrs.''.
(31) UNRWA officials have compromised UNRWA's strictly
humanitarian mandate by engaging in political agitation,
propaganda, and advocacy agitation against Israel and in favor
of Hamas, as reflected by the following, inter alia:
(A) UNRWA officials have repeatedly called for the
United States and other nations to deal directly with
Hamas and have repeatedly called for political
``reconciliation'' between Hamas and Fatah.
(B) UNRWA officials have repeatedly castigated
Israel for her actions to defend innocent civilians
from rocket and mortar attacks from violent extremist
groups in Gaza and from other Acts of International
Terrorism, and has repeatedly blamed Israel, not Hamas
and other violent extremist groups, for present
restrictions on access to Gaza.
(C) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay
noted in a 2009 report that: ``Although it occasionally
issued mild, pro forma criticisms of Palestinian
attacks (most of which were clearly war crimes),
[UNRWA] put more effort into criticizing Israeli
counterterrorism efforts (which were condemned using
language associated with war crimes, though any such
crimes were far from proved) . . . UNRWA never seems to
acknowledge that Israel, since its 2005 withdrawal from
Gaza, has launched strikes on the territory largely in
order to halt rocket attacks and other assaults.''.
(D) Lindsay also noted that ``UNRWA--through its
leaders and press spokespersons--is constantly involved
in political speech . . . These one-sided speeches on
political matters do not further the goals of a
humanitarian and supposedly nonpolitical agency.''.
(E) UNRWA Commissioner-General Filippo Grandi
described as a ``massacre'' Israel's May 31, 2010,
naval operation, and use of self-defense measures, to
seize the Mavi Marmara ship in order to enforce its
naval blockade of the Gaza Strip.
(F) Former UNRWA commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd
stated in a 2009 meeting with Congressional staff that
``We [UNRWA] are not just humanitarian.''.
(G) In January of 2009, UNRWA spokesman Christopher
Gunness called for an investigation as to whether
Israel had committed ``a war crime''.
(H) On December 30, 2008, former UNRWA
commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd stated that only
Israel was responsible for the start of the most recent
conflict in Gaza.
(I) On May 25, 2008, in an interview with Press TV,
which is controlled by the Government of Iran, former
UNRWA commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd reportedly
claimed that Hamas was free from corruption and ``more
popular than ever''.
(J) On October 5, 2007, former UNRWA commissioner-
general Karen AbuZayd blamed Israel for violent
extremist groups in Gaza launching rockets and mortars
against Israeli civilian targets, stating that
residents of Gaza ``have absorbed--and continue to
experience--military incursions in which civilian
lives, livelihoods, and property have been destroyed,
and to which they have responded with the continuous
firing of Qassam rockets into Israel.''.
(K) On March 8, 2007, former UNRWA commissioner-
general Karen AbuZayd, comparing the 1948 Arab-Israeli
War with more recent conflicts between Israel and
Palestinian militant groups, stated that ``[T]here is a
striking historical continuity in the systematic
approach to use overwhelming and disproportionate force
in the name of security; to separate and exclude
Palestinians from the mainstream; to eject them from
their land; and to occupy Palestinian land.''.
(L) On January 19, 2005, former UNRWA commissioner-
general Peter Hansen stated that ``My job [is] to
represent the refugees.''.
(M) In 2002, former UNRWA commissioner-general
Peter Hansen falsely accused Israel of carrying out a
``massacre'' in UNRWA's Jenin refugee camp after
Israeli forces entered the camp, a base of operations
for Palestinian militant groups, to carry out defensive
operations to halt repeated homicide bombings in
Israel.
(N) In 1964, UNRWA allowed its staff to attend the
conference in Jerusalem where the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) was established.
(32) Despite UNRWA's contravention of United States law and
activities that compromise its strictly humanitarian mandate,
UNRWA continues to receive United States contributions,
including $233,300,000 in fiscal year 2012.
(33) The bilateral ``Framework for Cooperation'' that the
United States concluded with UNRWA for 2012 actually
``commends'' UNRWA and does not commit UNRWA to vetting its aid
recipients through United States watch lists.
(34) Assistance from the United States and other
responsible nations allows UNRWA to claim that criticisms of
the agency's behavior are unfounded. UNRWA spokesman
Christopher Gunness has dismissed concerns by stating that ``If
these baseless allegations were even halfway true, do you
really think the U.S. and [European Commission] would give us
hundreds of millions of dollars per year?''.
(35) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a
2009 report that:
(A) ``The United States, despite funding nearly 75
percent of UNRWA's national budget and remaining its
largest single country donor, has mostly failed to make
UNRWA reflect U.S. foreign policy objectives . . .
Recent U.S. efforts to shape UNRWA appear to have been
ineffective . . .'';
(B) ``[T]he United States is not obligated to fund
agencies that refuse to check its rolls for individuals
their donors do not wish to support.'';
(C) ``A number of changes in UNRWA could benefit
the refugees, the Middle East, and the United States,
but those changes will not occur unless the United
States, ideally with support from UNRWA's other main
financial supporter, the European Union, compels the
agency to enact reforms.''; and
(D) ``If the [UNRWA commissioner-general's] power
is used in ways that are conflict with the donors''
political objectives, it is up to the donors to take
the necessary actions to ensure that their interests
are respected. When they have done so, UNRWA--given the
tight financial leash it has been on for most of its
existence--has tended to follow their dictates, even if
sometimes slowly.
(36) The Government of Canada has placed restrictions on
its contributions to UNRWA, demonstrating consequences for
UNRWA's malfeasance and setting an example for the United
States and other donor governments.
SEC. 802. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA.
Section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by
striking subsection (c) and inserting the following new subsection:
``(c)(1) Withholding.--Contributions by the United States to the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA), to any successor or related entity, or to the
regular budget of the United Nations for the support of UNRWA or a
successor entity (through staff positions provided by the United
Nations Secretariat, or otherwise), may be provided only during a
period for which a certification described in paragraph (2) is in
effect.
``(2) Certification.--A certification described in this paragraph
is a written determination by the Secretary of State, based on all
information available after diligent inquiry, and transmitted to the
appropriate congressional committees along with a detailed description
of the factual basis therefor, that--
``(A) no official, employee, consultant, contractor,
subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of UNRWA--
``(i) is a member of a Foreign Terrorist
Organization;
``(ii) has propagated, disseminated, or incited
anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric or
propaganda; or
``(iii) has used any UNRWA resources, including
publications or Web sites, to propagate or disseminate
political materials, including political rhetoric
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
``(B) no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic, other facility, or
other infrastructure or resource is being used by a Foreign
Terrorist Organization for operations, planning, training,
recruitment, fundraising, indoctrination, communications,
sanctuary, storage of weapons or other materials, or any other
purposes;
``(C) UNRWA is subject to comprehensive financial audits by
an internationally recognized third party independent auditing
firm and has implemented an effective system of vetting and
oversight to prevent the use, receipt, or diversion of any
UNRWA resources by any foreign terrorist organization or
members thereof;
``(D) no UNRWA-funded school or educational institution
uses textbooks or other educational materials that propagate or
disseminate anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic
rhetoric, propaganda or incitement;
``(E) no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans is a member of a
Foreign Terrorist Organization; and
``(F) UNRWA holds no accounts or other affiliations with
financial institutions that the United States deems or believes
to be complicit in money laundering and terror financing.
``(3) Definitions.--In this section:
``(A) Appropriate congressional committees.--The
term `appropriate congressional committees' means--
``(i) the Committees on Foreign Affairs,
Appropriations, and Oversight and Government
Reform of the House of Representatives; and
``(ii) the Committees on Foreign Relations,
Appropriations, and Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
``(B) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term
`Foreign Terrorist Organization' means an organization
designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the
Secretary of State in accordance with section 219(a) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
``(4) Effective Duration of Certification.--The
certification described in paragraph (2) shall be effective for
a period of 180 days from the date of transmission to the
appropriate congressional committees, or until the Secretary
receives information rendering that certification factually
inaccurate, whichever is earliest. In the event that a
certification becomes ineffective, the Secretary shall promptly
transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a
description of any information that precludes the renewal or
continuation of the certification.
``(5) Limitation.--During a period for which a
certification described in paragraph (2) is in effect, the
United States may not contribute to the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA) or a successor entity an annual amount--
``(A) greater than the highest annual contribution
to UNRWA made by a member country of the League of Arab
States;
``(B) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA
budget, exceeds the proportion of the total budget for
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) paid by the United States; or
``(C) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget
of UNRWA.''.
SEC. 803. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the President and the Secretary of State should lead a
high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other responsible
nations to withhold contributions to UNRWA, to any successor or
related entity, or to the regular budget of the United Nations
for the support of UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff
positions provided by the United Nations Secretariat, or
otherwise) until UNRWA has met the conditions listed in
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 301(c)(2) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by section 802 of this
Act);
(2) citizens of recognized states should be removed from
UNRWA's jurisdiction;
(3) UNRWA's definition of a ``Palestine refugee'' should be
changed to that used for a refugee by the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and
(4) in order to alleviate the suffering of Palestinian
refugees, responsibility for those refugees should be fully
transferred to the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees.
TITLE IX--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
SEC. 901. TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was
established in 1957 with the objectives of seeking to
``accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to
peace, health and prosperity throughout the world'' and to
``ensure . . . that assistance provided by it or at its request
or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way
as to further any military purpose.''.
(2) The United States, via assessed contributions, is the
largest financial contributor to the regular budget of the
IAEA.
(3) In 1959, the IAEA established what is now called the
Technical Cooperation Program, financed primarily through
voluntary contributions by member states to the Technical
Cooperation Fund, to provide nuclear technical cooperation (TC)
for peaceful purposes to countries worldwide.
(4) The United States is the largest financial contributor
to the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Fund.
(5) A March 2009 report by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) found that ``neither [the Department of State] nor
IAEA seeks to systematically limit TC assistance to countries
the United States has designated as state sponsors of
terrorism--Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria--even though under U.S.
law these countries are subject to sanctions.''.
(6) The GAO report also found that ``Together, [Cuba, Iran,
Sudan, and Syria] received more than $55 million in TC
assistance from 1997 through 2007.''. These four countries have
received continued assistance since 2007.
(7) The GAO report also found that ``proliferation concerns
about the [Technical Cooperation Program] have persisted
because of the assistance it has provided to certain countries
and because nuclear equipment, technology, and expertise can be
dual-use--capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but also
useful in contributing to nuclear weapons development.''.
(8) The GAO report also found that ``[The State Department]
reported in 2007 that three TC projects in [Iran] were directly
related to the Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr.''.
(9) The GAO report also found that ``The proliferation
concerns associated with the [Technical Cooperation Program]
are difficult for the United States to fully identify, assess,
and resolve . . . [because] there is no formal mechanism for
obtaining TC project information during the proposal
development phase . . . [l]imited [Department of] State
documentation on how proliferation concerns of TC proposals
were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in U.S. policies and
IAEA procedures [including monitoring proliferation risks]
related to TC program fellowships.''.
(10) The GAO report noted that ``IAEA officials told us
that the [technical cooperation program] does not attempt to
exclude countries on the basis of their status as United
States--designated state sponsors of terrorism or other
political considerations'' and that, according to the Deputy
Director General for the Technical Cooperation Program, ``there
are no good countries and there are no bad countries'' with
respect to provision of technical cooperation by the IAEA.
(11) The GAO report also found that ``given the limited
information available on TC projects and the dual-use nature of
some nuclear technologies and expertise, we do not believe [the
State Department] can assert with complete confidence that TC
assistance has not advanced [weapons of mass destruction]
programs in U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism''.
(12) The GAO report also found that ``we do not share [the
State Department's confidence in IAEA's internal safeguards to
prevent TC projects from contributing to weapons development .
. .]''.
(13) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et
seq.) prohibited any of the funds authorized to be appropriated
for ``International Organizations and Programs'' from being
made available for the United States proportionate share for
programs for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Liberation
Organization, inter alia.
(14) The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998 (Public Law 105-118)
prohibited any of the funds made available by such Act for the
IAEA from being made available for programs and projects of the
IAEA in Cuba.
(15) The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of
1998 (Public Law 105-277) required the United States to
withhold a proportionate share of funding to the IAEA for
projects in Cuba regarding the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and
the Pedro Pi Nuclear Research Center.
(16) The GAO report asked Congress ``to consider directing
[the State Department] to withhold a share of future annual
contributions to the [technical cooperation fund] that is
proportionate to the amount of funding provided from the fund
for U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism and other
countries of concern, noting that such a withholding is a
matter of fundamental principle and intended to foster a more
consistent United States policy toward such nations''.
(17) The IAEA has repeatedly reported that the Government
of Iran continues its work on heavy water-related projects and
its enrichment of uranium, in violation of United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747
(2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010).
(18) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006)
decided ``that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the
IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food,
agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes
[inter alia] . . . but that no such technical cooperation shall
be provided that relates to . . . proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities . . .''.
(19) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board
of Governors on February 25, 2011, that the Government of Iran
now has approximately 7,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium,
is running almost 5,000 of them, and has increased its
stockpile of low-enriched uranium to over 3,600 kilograms,
considered sufficient for further enrichment into enough high-
enriched uranium for more than one atomic bomb. The Government
of Iran has also reportedly produced a stockpile of over 40
kilograms of uranium enriched up to 20 percent U-235.
(20) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to
the IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of
February 25, 2011, about the ``outstanding issues related to
possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme''.
(21) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to
the IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of
February 25, 2011, that ``the [IAEA] remains concerned about
the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed
nuclear related activities involving military-related
organizations, including activities related to the development
of a nuclear payload for a missile.''.
(22) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to
the IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of
February 19, 2009, that ``Iran has not implemented the
Additional Protocol, which is a prerequisite for [the IAEA] to
provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the
IAEA's] request that Iran provide, as a transparency measure,
access to additional locations related, inter alia, to the
manufacturing of centrifuges, research and development on
uranium enrichment, and uranium mining and milling, as also
required by the Security Council.''.
(23) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to
the IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of
February 19, 2009, that ``as a result of the continued lack of
cooperation by Iran in connection with . . . issues which give
rise to concerns about possible military dimensions of Iran's
nuclear programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive progress
on these issues.''.
(24) Iran has refused to comply with resolutions adopted by
the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, November 26,
2003, March 15, 2004, June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August
11, 2005, September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, and July 31,
2006, regarding ``Iran's many failures and breaches of its
obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement'' and
continues to block IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities,
in violation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement.
(25) According to multiple news reports, Iran recently
denied access to its enrichment site at Natanz to IAEA
inspectors, and has also denied a request by the IAEA to place
one or more additional surveillance cameras at the enrichment
site at Natanz.
(26) In April of 2008, United States Government officials
publicly revealed that Syria was building at the Dair Alzour
site, with North Korea's assistance, a secret nuclear reactor
that was based on a North Korean model capable of producing
plutonium for nuclear weapons and that was weeks away from
becoming operational before an Israeli air strike reportedly
destroyed the reactor in September 2007.
(27) On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hayden, the former
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated that the
Syrian reactor at Dair Alzour could have produced enough
plutonium for 1 or 2 bombs within a year of becoming
operational.
(28) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board
of Governors on November 19, 2008 that the Syrian facility at
Dair Alzour bore features that resembled those of an undeclared
nuclear reactor, adding that ``Syria has not yet provided the
requested documentation in support of its declarations
concerning the nature or function of the destroyed building,
nor agreed to a visit to the three other locations which the
IAEA has requested to visit.''.
(29) The IAEA Director General publicly stated to the IAEA
Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, that ``the limited
information and access provided by Syria to date have not
enabled the Agency to determine the nature of the destroyed
facility'' at Dair Alzour site, that uranium particles have
been found in samples taken from a second site, the Miniature
Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and that the
particles found at both sites ``are of a type not included in
Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material.''.
(30) Commercial satellite photos published on February 23,
2011, indicate efforts by the Government of Syria to conceal
its activities at an additional site, Marj as Sultan, which may
be connected to the Dair Alzour facility.
(31) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board
of Governors on February 25, 2011, that ``Syria has not
cooperated with the [IAEA] since June 2008 in connection with
the unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and the
other three locations allegedly functionally related to it. As
a consequence, the [IAEA] has not been able to make progress
towards resolving the outstanding issues related to those
sites.''.
(b) Prohibition.--No funds from any United States assessed or
voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be used to support any
assistance provided by the IAEA through its Technical Cooperation
program to any country, including North Korea that--
(1) is a country the government of which has been
determined by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section
6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms
Export Control Act, or other provision of law, is a government
that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism;
(2) is in breach of or noncompliance with its obligations
regarding--
(A) its safeguards agreement with the IAEA;
(B) the Additional Protocol;
(C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
(D) any relevant United Nations Security Council
Resolution; or
(E) the Charter of the United Nations; or
(3) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance
with the obligations specified in paragraph (2).
(c) Withholding of Voluntary Contributions.--Not later than 30 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
shall withhold from the United States voluntary contribution to the
IAEA an amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA in the period
from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through its Technical Cooperation
Program to countries described in subsection (b).
(d) Withholding of Assessed Contributions.--If, not later than 30
days of the date of the enactment of this Act, the amount specified in
subsection (c) has not been withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all
assistance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program to the
countries described in subsection (b), an amount equal to that
specified in subsection (c) shall be withheld from the United States
assessed contribution to the IAEA.
(e) Waiver.--The provisions in subsections (c) and (d) may be
waived if--
(1) the IAEA has suspended all assistance provided through
its Technical Cooperation Program to the countries described in
subsection (b); or
(2) the President certifies that the countries described in
subsection (b) no longer pose a threat to the national
security, interests, and allies of the United States.
(f) United States Actions at IAEA.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice,
vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block the
allocation of funds for any assistance provided by the IAEA through its
Technical Cooperation Program to any country described in subsection
(b).
(g) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the implementation of this
section.
SEC. 902. UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE IAEA.
(a) Enforcement and Compliance.--
(1) Office of compliance.--
(A) Establishment.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the IAEA to establish
an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat of the IAEA.
(B) Operation.--The Office of Compliance shall--
(i) function as an independent body
composed of technical experts who shall work in
consultation with IAEA inspectors to assess
compliance by IAEA Member States and provide
recommendations to the IAEA Board of Governors
concerning penalties to be imposed on IAEA
Member States that fail to fulfill their
obligations under IAEA Board resolutions;
(ii) base its assessments and
recommendations on IAEA inspection reports; and
(iii) take into consideration information
provided by IAEA Board Members that are 1 of
the 5 nuclear weapons states as recognized by
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (21 U.S.T. 483) (commonly referred to
as the ``Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty'' or
the ``NPT'').
(C) Staffing.--The Office of Compliance shall be
staffed from existing personnel in the Department of
Safeguards of the IAEA or the Department of Nuclear
Safety and Security of the IAEA.
(2) Committee on safeguards and verification.--The
President shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that the
Committee on Safeguards and Verification established in 2005
shall develop and seek to put into force a workplan of concrete
measures that will--
(A) improve the ability of the IAEA to monitor and
enforce compliance by Member States of the IAEA with
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Statute of
the International Atomic Energy Agency; and
(B) enhance the ability of the IAEA, beyond the
verification mechanisms and authorities contained in
the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements
between the IAEA and Member States of the IAEA, to
detect with a high degree of confidence undeclared
nuclear activities by a Member State.
(3) Penalties with respect to the iaea.--
(A) In general.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States
at the IAEA to ensure that a Member State of the IAEA
that is under investigation for a breach of or
noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations has
its privileges suspended, including--
(i) limiting its ability to vote on its
case;
(ii) being prevented from receiving any
technical assistance; and
(iii) being prevented from hosting
meetings.
(B) Termination of penalties.--The penalties
specified under subparagraph (A) shall be terminated
when such investigation is concluded and such Member
State is no longer in such breach or noncompliance.
(4) Penalties with respect to the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty.--The President shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that a
Member State of the IAEA that is found to be in breach of, in
noncompliance with, or has withdrawn from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty shall return to the IAEA all nuclear
materials and technology received from the IAEA, any Member
State of the IAEA, or any Member State of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty.
(b) United States Contributions.--
(1) Voluntary contributions.--Voluntary contributions of
the United States to the IAEA should primarily be used to fund
activities relating to Nuclear Safety and Security or
activities relating to Nuclear Verification.
(2) Limitation on use of funds.--The President shall direct
the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA
to--
(A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspections
are prioritized for countries that have newly
established nuclear programs or are initiating nuclear
programs; and
(B) block the allocation of funds for any other
IAEA development, environmental, or nuclear science
assistance or activity to a country--
(i) the government of which the Secretary
of State has determined, for purposes of
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act, or other provision of law, is a
government that has repeatedly provided support
for acts of international terrorism and the
government of which the Secretary has
determined has not dismantled and surrendered
its weapons of mass destruction programs under
international verification;
(ii) that is under investigation for a
breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA
obligations or the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations; or
(iii) that is in violation of its IAEA
obligations or the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations.
(3) Detail of expenditures.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the
voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to
secure, as part of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA
to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by country
of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards inspections and
nuclear security activities.
(c) Membership.--
(1) In general.--The President shall direct the United
States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice,
vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block
the membership on the Board of Governors of the IAEA for a
Member State of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the
Additional Protocol and--
(A) is under investigation for a breach of or
noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or
(B) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations.
(2) Criteria.--The United States Permanent Representative
to the IAEA shall make every effort to modify the criteria for
Board membership to reflect the principles described in
paragraph (1).
(d) Small Quantities Protocol.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice,
vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to make every
effort to ensure that the IAEA changes the policy regarding the Small
Quantities Protocol in order to--
(1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities Protocol;
(2) require that any IAEA Member State that has previously
signed a Small Quantities Protocol to sign, ratify, and
implement the Additional Protocol, provide immediate access for
IAEA inspectors to its nuclear-related facilities, and agree to
the strongest inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and
(3) require that any IAEA Member State that does not comply
with paragraph (2) to be ineligible to receive nuclear
material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA
Member State and subject to the penalties described in
subsection (a)(3).
(e) Nuclear Program of Iran and Syria.--
(1) United states action.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the
voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to
make every effort to ensure the adoption of a resolution by the
IAEA Board of Governors that, in addition to the restrictions
already imposed, makes Iran and Syria ineligible to receive any
nuclear material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any
IAEA Member State and ineligible for any IAEA assistance not
related to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until the
IAEA Board of Governors determines that Iran or Syria, as the
case may be--
(A) is providing full access to IAEA inspectors to
its nuclear-related facilities;
(B) has fully implemented and is in compliance with
the Additional Protocol; and
(C) has permanently ceased and dismantled all
activities and programs related to nuclear-enrichment
and reprocessing.
(2) Penalties.--If an IAEA Member State is determined to
have violated the prohibition on assistance to Iran or Syria
described in paragraph (1) before the IAEA Board of Governors
determines that Iran or Syria, as the case may be, has
satisfied the conditions described in subparagraphs (A) through
(C) of such paragraph, such Member State shall be subject to
the penalties described in subsection (a)(3), shall be
ineligible to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment,
or assistance from any IAEA Member State, and shall be
ineligible to receive any IAEA assistance not related to
safeguards inspections or nuclear security until such time as
the IAEA Board of Governors makes such determination with
respect to Iran or Syria, as the case may be.
(f) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually for 2 years thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on the implementation of this section.
SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTION PLAN
OF THE IAEA.
It is the sense of Congress that the national security interests of
the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear Security Action Plan of
the IAEA and the Board of Governors should recommend, and the General
Conference should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear
Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.
TITLE X--PEACEKEEPING
SEC. 1001. REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) although United Nations peacekeeping operations have
contributed greatly toward the promotion of peace and stability
for over 6 decades and the majority of peacekeeping personnel
who have served under the United Nations flag have done so with
honor and courage, the record of United Nations peacekeeping
has been severely tarnished by operational failures and
unconscionable acts of misconduct;
(2) in response to such failures, successive Secretaries
General of the United Nations have launched numerous reform
efforts, including the high-level Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations, led by former Foreign Minister of Algeria Lakhdar
Brahimi, the 2005 report by the Special Advisor on the
Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, His Royal Highness
Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, and the 2009 New
Partnership Agenda, known as the ``New Horizon'' reports;
(3) despite the fact that the United Nations has had over a
decade to implement many of these reforms, nearly four years to
implement the reforms in the Zeid Report, and the fact that
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, his predecessor Kofi Annan, and
the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations repeatedly
have expressed their commitment ``to implementing fundamental,
systematic changes as a matter of urgency,'' a number of
critical reforms continue to be blocked or delayed by Members
States who arguably benefit from maintenance of the status quo;
(4) further, audits of procurement practices in the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, conducted by the Office
of Internal Oversight Services, and the now-defunct United
Nations Procurement Task Force have uncovered ``significant''
corruption schemes and criminal acts by United Nations
peacekeeping personnel; and
(5) if the reputation of and confidence in United Nations
peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fundamental and far-
reaching reforms, particularly in the areas of planning,
management, procurement, training, conduct, and discipline,
must be implemented without further delay.
SEC. 1002. POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS.
It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue reform of
United Nations peacekeeping operations in the following areas:
(1) Planning and management.--
(A) Global audit.--As the size, cost, and number of
United Nations peacekeeping operations have increased
substantially over the past decade, independent audits
of each such operation should be conducted annually,
with a view toward ``right-sizing'' operations and
ensuring that all operations are efficient and cost
effective.
(B) Procurement and transparency.--The logistics
established within the United Nations Department of
Field Support should be streamlined and strengthened to
ensure that all peacekeeping missions are resourced
appropriately, transparently, and in a timely fashion
while individual accountability for waste, fraud and
abuse within United Nations peacekeeping missions is
uniformly enforced.
(C) Review of mandates and closing operations.--In
conjunction with the audit described in subparagraph
(A), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations should conduct a comprehensive review of all
United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with a
view toward identifying objectives that are practical
and achievable, and report its findings to the Security
Council. In particular, the review should consider the
following:
(i) Except in extraordinary cases,
including genocide, the United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations should
not be tasked with activities that are
impractical or unachievable without the
cooperation of the Member State(s) hosting a
United Nations peacekeeping operation, or which
amount to de-facto Trusteeship outside of the
procedures established for such under Chapter
XII of the United Nations Charter, thereby
creating unrealistic expectations and
obfuscating the primary responsibility of the
Member States themselves in creating and
maintaining conditions for peace.
(ii) Long-standing operations that are
static and cannot fulfill their mandate should
be downsized or closed.
(iii) Where there is legitimate concern
that the withdrawal from a country of an
otherwise static United Nations peacekeeping
operation would result in the resumption of
major conflict, a burden-sharing arrangement
that reduces the level of assessed
contributions, similar to that currently
supporting the United Nations Peacekeeping
Force in Cyprus, should be explored and
instituted.
(D) Leadership.--As peacekeeping operations become
larger and increasingly complex, the Secretariat should
adopt a minimum standard of qualifications for senior
leaders and managers, with particular emphasis on
specific skills and experience, and current senior
leaders and managers who do not meet those standards
should be removed.
(E) Pre-deployment training.--Pre-deployment
training on interpretation of the mandate of the
operation, specifically in the areas of use of force,
civilian protection and field conditions, the Code of
Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and human rights should be
mandatory, and all personnel, regardless of category or
rank, should be required to sign an oath that each has
received and understands such training as a condition
of participation in the operation.
(F) Gratis military personnel.--The General
Assembly should seek to strengthen the capacity the
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
and ease the extraordinary burden currently placed upon
the limited number of headquarters staff by lifting
restrictions on the utilization of gratis military
personnel by the Department so that the Department may
accept secondments from Member States of military
personnel with expertise in mission planning,
logistics, and other operational specialties.
(2) Conduct and discipline.--
(A) Adoption of a uniform code of conduct.--A
single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of
a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel
serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations,
regardless of category or rank, including military
personnel, should be adopted and incorporated into
legal documents governing participation in such an
operation, including all contracts and Memorandums of
Understanding, promulgated and effectively enforced.
(B) Understanding the code of conduct.--All
personnel, regardless of category or rank, should
receive training on the Code of Conduct prior to
deployment with a peacekeeping operation, in addition
to periodic follow-on training. In particular--
(i) all personnel, regardless of category
or rank, should be provided with a personal
copy of the Code of Conduct that has been
translated into the national language of such
personnel, regardless of whether such language
is an official language of the United Nations;
(ii) all personnel, regardless of category
or rank, should sign an oath that each has
received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that
each pledges to abide by the Code of Conduct,
and that each understands the consequences of
violating the Code of Conduct, including
immediate termination of participation in and
permanent exclusion from all current and future
peacekeeping operations, as well as the
assumption of personal liability and victims
compensation, where appropriate, as a condition
of appointment to any such operation; and
(iii) peacekeeping operations should
continue and enhance educational outreach
programs to reach local communities where
peacekeeping personnel of such operations are
based, including explaining prohibited acts on
the part of United Nations peacekeeping
personnel and identifying the individual to
whom the local population may direct complaints
or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or
other acts of misconduct.
(C) Monitoring mechanisms.--Dedicated monitoring
mechanisms, such as the Conduct and Discipline Teams
already deployed to support United Nations peacekeeping
operations in Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Liberia, Lebanon,
Cote d'Ivoire, Western Sahara, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, should be present in each operation
to monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct, and
should report simultaneously to the Head of Mission,
the United Nations Department of Field Support, the
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
and the Associate Director of the Office of Internal
Oversight Services for Peacekeeping Operations
(established under section 1114(b)(9)).
(D) Investigations.--A permanent, professional, and
independent investigative body should be established
and introduced into United Nations peacekeeping
operations. In particular--
(i) the investigative body should include
professionals with experience in investigating
sex crimes and the illegal exploitation of
resources, as appropriate, as well as experts
who can provide guidance on standards of proof
and evidentiary requirements necessary for any
subsequent legal action;
(ii) provisions should be included in all
Memorandums of Understanding, including a Model
Memorandum of Understanding, that obligate
Member States that contribute troops to a
peacekeeping operation to designate a military
prosecutor who will participate in any
investigation into credible allegations of
misconduct brought against an individual of
such Member State, so that evidence is
collected and preserved in a manner consistent
with the military law of such Member State;
(iii) the investigative body should be
regionally based to ensure rapid deployment and
should be equipped with modern forensics
equipment for the purpose of positively
identifying perpetrators and, where necessary,
for determining paternity; and
(iv) the investigative body should report
directly to the Associate Director of the
Office of Internal Oversight Services for
Peacekeeping Operations, while providing copies
of any reports to the Department of Field
Support, the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, the Head of Mission, and the Member
State concerned.
(E) Follow-up.--The Conduct and Discipline Unit in
the headquarters of the United Nations Department of
Field Support should be appropriately staffed,
resourced, and tasked with--
(i) promulgating measures to prevent
misconduct;
(ii) receiving reports by field personnel
and coordinating the Department's response to
allegations of misconduct;
(iii) gathering follow-up information on
completed investigations, particularly by
focusing on disciplinary actions against the
individual concerned taken by the United
Nations or by the Member State that is
contributing troops to which such individual
belongs, and sharing such information with the
Security Council, the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mission,
and the community hosting the peacekeeping
operation; and
(iv) contributing pertinent data on conduct
and discipline to the database required
pursuant to subparagraph (H).
(F) Financial liability and victims assistance.--
Although peacekeeping operations should provide
immediate medical assistance to victims of sexual abuse
or exploitation, the responsibility for providing
longer-term treatment, care, or restitution lies solely
with the individual found guilty of the misconduct. In
particular:
(i) The United Nations should not assume
responsibility for providing long-term
treatment or compensation under the Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse Victim Assistance
Mechanism by utilizing assessed contributions
to United Nations peacekeeping operations,
thereby shielding individuals from personal
liability and reinforcing an atmosphere of
impunity.
(ii) If an individual responsible for
misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned,
redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide
assistance, responsibility for providing
assistance to a victim should be assigned to
the Member State that contributed the
contingent to which such individual belonged or
to the manager concerned.
(iii) In the case of misconduct by a member
of a military contingent, appropriate funds
shall be withheld from the troop contributing
country concerned.
(iv) In the case of misconduct by a
civilian employee or contractor of the United
Nations, appropriate wages shall be garnished
from such individual or fines shall be imposed
against such individual, consistent with
existing United Nations Staff Rules, and
retirement funds shall not be shielded from
liability.
(G) Managers and commanders.--The manner in which
managers and commanders handle cases of misconduct by
those serving under them should be included in their
individual performance evaluations, so that managers
and commanders who take decisive action to deter and
address misconduct are rewarded, while those who create
a permissive environment or impede investigations are
penalized or relieved of duty, as appropriate.
(H) Database.--A centralized database, including
personnel photos, fingerprints, and biometric data,
should be created and maintained within the United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the
Department of Field Support, and other relevant United
Nations bodies without further delay to track cases of
misconduct, including the outcome of investigations and
subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel who
have engaged in misconduct or other criminal
activities, regardless of category or rank, are
permanently barred from participation in future
peacekeeping operations.
(I) Cooperation of member states.--If a Member
State routinely refuses to cooperate with the
directives contained herein or acts to shield its
nationals from personal liability, that Member State
should be barred from contributing troops or personnel
to future peacekeeping operations.
(J) Welfare.--Peacekeeping operations should
continue to seek to maintain a minimum standard of
welfare for mission personnel to ameliorate conditions
of service, while adjustments are made to the
discretionary welfare payments currently provided to
Member States that contribute troops to offset the cost
of operation-provided recreational facilities, as
necessary and appropriate.
SEC. 1003. CERTIFICATION.
(a) New or Expanded Peacekeeping Operations Contingent Upon
Presidential Certification of Peacekeeping Operations Reforms.--
(1) No new or expanded peacekeeping operations.--
(A) Certification.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of State
certifies that the requirements described in paragraph
(2) have been satisfied, the President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
United States at the United Nations to oppose the
creation of new, or expansion of existing, United
Nations peacekeeping operations.
(B) Exception and notification.--The requirements
described under paragraph (2) may be waived with
respect to a particular peacekeeping operation if the
President determines that failure to deploy new or
additional peacekeepers in such situation will
significantly contribute to the widespread loss of
human life, genocide, or the endangerment of a vital
national security interest of the United States. If the
President makes such a determination, the President
shall, not later than 15 days before the exercise of
such waiver, notify the appropriate congressional
committees of such determination and resulting waiver.
(2) Certification of peacekeeping operations reforms.--The
certification referred to in paragraph (1) is a certification
made by the Secretary to the appropriate congressional
committees that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of
reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have been adopted
by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations or
the General Assembly, as appropriate:
(A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the
status of a binding rule and applies equally to all
personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping
operations, regardless of category or rank, has been
adopted by the General Assembly and duly incorporated
into all contracts and a Model Memorandum of
Understanding, and mechanisms have been established for
training such personnel concerning the requirements of
the Code and enforcement of the Code.
(B) All personnel, regardless of category or rank,
serving in a peacekeeping operation have been trained
concerning the requirements of the Code of Conduct and
each has been given a personal copy of the Code,
translated into the national language of such
personnel.
(C) All personnel, regardless of category or rank,
are required to sign an oath that each has received a
copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide
by the Code, and that each understands the consequences
of violating the Code, including immediate termination
of participation in and permanent exclusion from all
current and future peacekeeping operations, as well as
the assumption of personal liability for victims
compensation as a condition of the appointment to such
operation.
(D) All peacekeeping operations have designed and
implemented educational outreach programs to reach
local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such
operations are based to explain prohibited acts on the
part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to
identify the individual to whom the local population
may direct complaints or file allegations of
exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.
(E) The creation of a centralized database,
including personnel photos, fingerprints, and biometric
data, has been completed and is being maintained in the
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
that tracks cases of misconduct, including the outcomes
of investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to
ensure that personnel, regardless of category or rank,
who have engaged in misconduct or other criminal
activities are permanently barred from participation in
future peacekeeping operations.
(F) A Model Memorandum of Understanding between the
United Nations and each Member State that contributes
troops to a peacekeeping operation has been adopted by
the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations that specifically obligates each such Member
State to--
(i) uphold the uniform Code of Conduct
which shall apply equally to all personnel
serving in United Nations peacekeeping
operations, regardless of category or rank;
(ii) designate a competent legal authority,
preferably a prosecutor with expertise in the
area of sexual exploitation and abuse where
appropriate, to participate in any
investigation into an allegation of misconduct
brought against an individual of such Member
State;
(iii) refer to its competent national or
military authority for possible prosecution, if
warranted, any investigation of a violation of
the Code of Conduct or other criminal activity
by an individual of such Member State;
(iv) report to the Department of Field
Support and the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations on the outcome of any such
investigation;
(v) undertake to conduct on-site court
martial proceedings, where practical and
appropriate, relating to allegations of
misconduct alleged against an individual of
such Member State; and
(vi) assume responsibility for the
provision of appropriate assistance to a victim
of misconduct committed by an individual of
such Member State.
(G) A professional and independent investigative
and audit function has been established within the
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
and the Office of Internal Oversight Services to
monitor United Nations peacekeeping operations.
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Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
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