NIE on Iranian Proxy Forces Act
This bill requires the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to produce an assessment of Iran's support for proxy military forces in the Middle East. It also directs the President to report to Congress a strategy to prevent Iran from expanding its power in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
Specifically, the ODNI shall report to Congress a National Intelligence Estimate (a type of intelligence community assessment) about Iran's support for proxy forces and the increased risks that this support poses to Israel and U.S. regional interests. The estimate shall address certain specific issues, including a description of Iran-affiliated forces operating in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon and an analysis of the missile and rocket production capabilities of such forces.
[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7850 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
116th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 7850
To require a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian proxy forces,
and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
July 29, 2020
Mr. Schneider (for himself, Mr. Zeldin, Mrs. Murphy of Florida, Mrs.
Brooks of Indiana, Mr. Correa, Mrs. Walorski, Mr. Gottheimer, Mr.
Suozzi, Mr. Yoho, and Mr. Rooney of Florida) introduced the following
bill; which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for
a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the
committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian proxy forces,
and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``NIE on Iranian Proxy Forces Act''.
SEC. 2. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Hizballah is Iran's oldest and most successful proxy
force.
(2) Hizballah has trained militia groups in Iraq.
(3) Hizballah is active in Syria and its fighters have
helped President Bashar Al-Assad maintain regime control.
(4) Hizballah fighters are returning to Lebanon more
battle-tested and more capable than ever before.
(5) In 2006, Hizballah's rocket and missile arsenal in
Lebanon was approximately 15,000; however, by 2020, this figure
has grown ten-fold to more than 150,000.
(6) With the assistance of Iran, Hizballah's weapons
arsenal has not only increased in quantity, but also quality,
including technologically advanced weapons and more accurate
missiles.
(7) Iran is reportedly building missile production
facilities in Lebanon to enable an indigenous rocket-producing
capability for Hizballah.
(8) Iran is actively pursuing its regional interests and
challenging United States interests and United States allies
through the use of proxy forces in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
(b) National Intelligence Estimate.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall
produce a National Intelligence Estimate--
(1) on Iranian support of proxy and other partner and
militia forces in the Middle East region; and
(2) assessing the increased threat posed to Israel, other
United States regional allies, and other specified interests of
the United States as a result of such support.
(c) Matters To Be Included.--The National Intelligence Estimate
required under subsection (b) shall include, at a minimum, information
relating to the following matters with respect to both the strategic
and tactical implications for the United States and its allies:
(1) A description of Iranian and Iranian-controlled
personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating in Iraq,
Syria, and Lebanon, including the number and geographic
distribution of such personnel.
(2) A description of arms and related material transferred
by Iran to such Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel since
January 2011, including the number and type of such arms and
related material and whether such transfer was by land, sea, or
air, as well as financial and additional technological
capabilities.
(3) An identification of financial institutions,
businesses, and other persons that provide material support,
including financial support, to such Iranian and Iranian-
controlled personnel.
(4) An assessment of the operational and doctrinal lessons
learned and relationships forged by such Iranian and Iranian-
controlled personnel based on recent battle experiences in Iraq
and Syria, and on the performance of these groups in the
aftermath of the killing of Qassem Soleimani and Abu-Mahdi al-
Muhandis.
(5) A description of any rocket and missile production and
modification facilities in Lebanon and Syria for such Iranian
and Iranian-controlled personnel, and whether--
(A) such facilities involve precision-guided
munitions;
(B) such facilities were assessed to be built at
the direction of Hizballah leadership, Iranian
leadership, or both Hizballah and Iranian leadership;
and
(C) such facilities are connected to the Iranian
``landbridge'' project.
(6) An analysis of the foreign and domestic supply chains
that significantly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid
Hizballah's acquisition or development of missile production
facilities, including the geographic distribution of such
foreign and domestic supply chains.
(7) An assessment of the provision of goods, services, or
technology transferred by Iran or its affiliates to Hizballah
to indigenously manufacture or otherwise produce missiles.
(8) The number of arms or related material transferred by
Iran or its affiliates to such Iranian and Iranian-controlled
personnel in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon and an identification of
the Iranian or Iranian-controlled personnel to which the arms
or related material were transferred.
(9) An identification of foreign persons that are, based on
credible information, facilitating the transfer of significant
financial support or arms or related material to such Iranian
and Iranian-controlled personnel.
(10) A description of the threat posed to Israel and other
United States partners in the Middle East by the transfer of
arms or related material or other support offered to such
Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel.
(11) An assessment of the military capabilities of United
States partners in the region to address and offset the
transfers described in paragraph (10).
(d) Submission to Congress.--Upon completion of the National
Intelligence Estimate required under subsection (b), the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services,
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed
Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a copy
of such estimate.
(e) Arms or Related Material Defined.--The term ``arms or related
material'' means--
(1) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons
or materials or components of such weapons;
(2) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or materials or
components of such weapons;
(3) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced
conventional weapons, as well as unmanned aerial threats such
as drones, rockets, and mortars;
(4) defense articles or defense services, as those terms
are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively, of section
47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794);
(5) defense information, as that term is defined in section
644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403); or
(6) items designated by the President for purposes of the
United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
SEC. 3. STRATEGY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after completion of the
National Intelligence Estimate required under section 2(b), the
President shall transmit to Congress a strategy to prevent Iran from
expanding its influence and power in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
(b) Matters To Be Included.--Such strategy shall include plans to--
(1) limit Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel,
including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran's Revolutionary
Guard Corps forces, operating in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon; and
(2) interdict the sale, supply, or transfer of weapons from
Iran to such Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel operating
in such countries.
<all>
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Referred to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
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