Prohibiting Anticompetitive Mergers Act of 2022
This bill prohibits certain business mergers, modifies the procedures for reviewing mergers, and establishes procedures for reversing certain mergers.
Specifically, the bill prohibits mergers that (1) are valued at more than $5 billion in total assets, (2) result in the acquiring entity having a market share of greater than 33% (or a share of a labor market as an employer of greater than 25%), or (3) result in market concentration levels that exceed specified thresholds.
The bill also expands the authority of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) to review pending mergers, including whether a merger is likely to harm the competitive process and the effect of a merger on relevant labor markets.
Finally, the bill authorizes the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ to retroactively unwind mergers that are prohibited under the bill or that meet certain other anticompetitive criteria such as a merger that results in a greater than 50% share of a relevant market.
[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7101 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 7101
To prohibit certain anticompetitive mergers, to amend the Clayton Act
to permit the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice to
reject proposed acquisitions, to implement procedures for retrospective
reviews and breaking up anticompetitive consummated acquisitions, and
for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 16, 2022
Mr. Jones (for himself, Ms. Bush, Mr. Pocan, Mr. Espaillat, Mr. Garcia
of Illinois, Mr. Levin of Michigan, Ms. Norton, Ms. Ocasio-Cortez, Ms.
Porter, Ms. Pressley, Mr. Takano, and Ms. Tlaib) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary,
and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period
to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the
committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To prohibit certain anticompetitive mergers, to amend the Clayton Act
to permit the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice to
reject proposed acquisitions, to implement procedures for retrospective
reviews and breaking up anticompetitive consummated acquisitions, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Prohibiting Anticompetitive Mergers
Act of 2022''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) the Constitution of the United States prohibits
political or economic oligarchies, which are incompatible with
a republican form of government;
(2) the antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act (15
U.S.C. 1 et seq.), the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.), and
the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.), were
enacted to prohibit political and economic oligarchies, to
protect fair, open, and competitive markets, and to prevent
corporations from abusing their power to stifle competition and
improperly influence democratic processes;
(3) Federal courts have misinterpreted the antitrust laws
to the detriment of consumers, workers, society, and the United
States political economy, including by enhancing the misguided
and narrowly defined ``consumer welfare standard,'' as
described by the Supreme of the United States in Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), and its progeny;
(4) concentrated economic power creates concentrated
political power, allowing giant corporations to invest growing
sums of money into influencing government to tilt laws and
rules in their favor;
(5) over the last 4 decades, powerful corporations have
unconstitutionally amassed too much influence over the United
States economy, stifling competition in United States markets
and harming workers, consumers, customer choice, sellers, small
and minority-owned businesses (including farms and ranches),
local, rural, and low-income communities, communities of color,
privacy, quality, entrepreneurship, and innovation;
(6) in 1975, 109 companies pocketed half of all profits
generated by firms in the United States whereas in 2015, the
top 30 firms did so;
(7) startup rates fell by more than half over the last 4
decades in industries that saw an increase in concentration;
(8) dominant corporations, which often underinvest in their
operations and infrastructure, expose consumers in the United
States to the risks of concentrated and brittle supply chains,
such as shortages of essential goods and increased prices;
(9) market concentration in essential markets, including
those for medical equipment, food, and retail, can pose serious
national-security risks during crisis events such as the COVID-
19 pandemic;
(10) market concentration is associated with lower wages,
and evidence shows that in more concentrated markets, giant
corporations are less likely to pass on productivity gains to
workers in the form of higher wages and more likely to engage
in antiworker labor practices, which disproportionately harm
female workers and workers of color;
(11) corporate consolidation has especially harmed rural
communities, low-income communities, and communities of color,
as demonstrated by the impact of the recent Sprint and T-Mobile
merger on low-income customers who purchase prepaid plans;
(12) Federal agencies other than the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice may have particular
expertise with respect to the competitive effects of an
acquisition and should play a stronger role in antitrust
enforcement;
(13) State attorneys general may have critical local
knowledge or regional concerns about the competitive effects of
an acquisition and should play a stronger role in antitrust
enforcement;
(14) section 7A of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18a)
(referred to in this section as ``section 7A'') was enacted to
allow the antitrust agencies to review acquisitions before
consummation;
(15) the recent explosion of filings under section 7A has
overwhelmed the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice, a phenomenon exacerbated by strict statutory deadlines
for the review process and an onerous judicial process to
obtain injunctions to block acquisitions likely to lessen
competition;
(16) the antitrust agencies should be empowered to reject
acquisitions that they review under section 7A, and those
decisions should be treated as reviewable agency actions;
(17) the use of structural and behavioral remedies to
protect competition and prevent monopolistic behavior has
proven ineffective across various industries;
(18) the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice have the authority under existing law to conduct
retrospective reviews of any consummated acquisition at any
time, regardless of whether the acquisition was nonreportable
or the government opposed the acquisition before its
consummation;
(19) because some data about the competitive effects of an
acquisition will necessarily emerge after consummation, it is
critical that the Federal Trade Commission and the Department
of Justice conduct retrospective reviews of acquisitions in
order to remedy anticompetitive acquisitions, including through
unwinding;
(20) an acquisition may have competitive effects in markets
beyond the lines of commerce of the transaction, particularly
when a party has an extensive business ecosystem; and
(21) excessive market concentration must be remedied to
restore and protect competition in the United States and ensure
the United States economy and democracy benefit workers,
consumers, customer choice, sellers, small and minority-owned
businesses (including farms and ranches), local, rural, and
low-income communities, communities of color, privacy, quality,
entrepreneurship, and innovation.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are to--
(1) ban the most anticompetitive acquisitions;
(2) restore and protect the competitive process;
(3) amend section 7A to empower the antitrust agencies to
reject acquisitions before consummation through agency action;
(4) reduce the burdens of contemporary merger litigation
placed on Federal and State officials;
(5) establish a greater role for Federal agencies and State
attorneys general in the merger-review process;
(6) establish procedures for retrospective reviews;
(7) break up acquisitions consummated during the 21st
century that have lessened competition and harmed the
competitive process;
(8) ensure that the structure of the United States economy
is competitive and fair in order to safeguard the nation
against economic and political oligarchies; and
(9) uphold the mandate in the Constitution of the United
States to promote a flourishing democracy by promoting
meaningful competition throughout all segments of the United
States economy.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
The first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12) is amended by
striking subsections (a) and (b) and inserting the following:
``SEC. 1. DEFINITIONS; SHORT TITLE.
``(a) Definitions.--In this Act:
``(1) Acquisition.--The term `acquisition' means--
``(A) any merger;
``(B) any direct or indirect acquisition of the
whole or any part of the assets, stock, or other share
capital or the use of such stock by the voting or
granting of proxies or otherwise; or
``(C) any tender offer, joint venture, deal, or
other similar transaction subject to section 7 or 7A.
``(2) Antitrust agency.--The term `antitrust agency'
means--
``(A) the Federal Trade Commission; or
``(B) the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice.
``(3) Antitrust laws.--The term `antitrust laws' means--
``(A) the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.);
``(B) the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C.
41 et seq.);
``(C) this Act; and
``(D) any other similar Federal or State law
designed or intended to prohibit, restrict, or regulate
actions having the purpose or effect of monopolization,
restraint of trade, or lessening competition (including
through merger or acquisition).
``(4) Critical trading partner.--The term `critical trading
partner' means a person that has the ability to restrict,
impede, or foreclose access to its inputs, customers, partners,
goods, services, technology, platform, facilities, or tools in
a way that harms the competitive process or limits the ability
of the customers or suppliers of the person to carry out
business effectively.
``(5) Disqualifying behavior.--The term `disqualifying
behavior' means--
``(A) violating an order issued by an antitrust
agency;
``(B) entering into any nonprosecution agreement or
deferred prosecution agreement with the Department of
Justice;
``(C) paying a fine, penalty, or settlement
(including class-action settlements) exceeding
$1,000,000 to an antitrust agency, a State or county,
or private party if the underlying dispute is based on
a violation of antitrust law;
``(D) being convicted of any felony by a State
court or court of the United States; or
``(E) being found liable for violating any
antitrust law by a State court or court of the United
States.
``(6) Dominant firm.--The term `dominant firm' means a
person that--
``(A) has annual revenues exceeding $5,000,000,000
(as adjusted and published for each fiscal year
beginning after September 30, 2022, in the same manner
as provided in section 8(a)(5) to reflect the
percentage change in the gross national product for
such fiscal year compared to the gross national product
for the year ending September 30, 2021);
``(B) is a financial institution, an equity fund,
or a registered investment adviser under section 203 of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-3),
if the party or the ultimate parent entity of such
party has greater than $10,000,000,000 (as so adjusted
and published) in capitalization, commitments, or
assets under management; or
``(C) has greater than 20 percent of any relevant
market.
``(7) Failing-firm defense.--The term `failing-firm
defense' means a defense that an acquisition is unlikely to be
anticompetitive because--
``(A) the party being acquired is in danger of
immediate insolvency;
``(B) the party being acquired is not able to
reorganize successfully under chapter 11 of title 11,
United States Code;
``(C) the party being acquired has made
unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable
alternative offers that would keep the assets of the
party in the relevant markets and pose a less severe
danger to competition than does the proposed
acquisition; and
``(D) the acquiring party is the only available
purchaser.
``(8) Labor market.--The term `labor market' includes--
``(A) commuting zones, as defined by the Department
of Agriculture;
``(B) the 6-digit Standard Occupational
Classification codes for a particular job
classification; and
``(C) other definitions as the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice may promulgate
by regulation.
``(9) Nonreportable acquisition.--The term `nonreportable
acquisition' means any acquisition for which the parties are
not required to file notification under section 7A.
``(10) Party.--The term `party' means, for a given
acquisition, a person required to file notification under
section 7A.
``(11) Person.--The term `person' has the meaning given the
term in section 8 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 7).
``(12) Platform.--The term `platform' means any person's
website, online or mobile application, operating system,
digital assistant, online advertising exchange, or online
service that--
``(A) operates or provides the main interface
between different users or market participants, such as
individuals, advertisers, or providers of content,
services, and goods; and
``(B) allows for exchanges of at least some goods,
services, or content that the person does not own.
``(13) Platform conflict of interest.--The term `platform
conflict of interest' means the conflict of interest that
arises when a person owns or controls a platform while
simultaneously--
``(A) owning or controlling a line of business that
competes against third parties on that platform, if the
person has the ability and incentive to, or does,
advantage its own business on the platform over third-
party competitors on the platform or disadvantage the
business of third-party competitors on the platform; or
``(B) representing both buyers and sellers for
transactions or business on the platform.
``(14) Prohibited merger.--The term `prohibited merger'
means an acquisition--
``(A) in which--
``(i) the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index would
be greater than 1,800 in any relevant market;
and
``(ii) the increase in the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index would be more than 100 in such
relevant market;
``(B) in which the acquiring person would have a
market share of greater than 33 percent of any relevant
market (excluding labor markets) or greater than 25
percent of any labor market as an employer; or
``(C) that would result in the acquiring person
holding an aggregate total amount of the voting
securities and assets of the acquired person in excess
of $5,000,000,000 (as so adjusted and published).
``(15) Relevant agency.--The term `relevant agency' means
the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration,
the Minority Business Development Agency of the Department of
Commerce, the National Labor Relations Board, any Federal
agency required to review an acquisition under Federal law, or
any Federal agency with substantial regulatory authority over a
party involved in an acquisition (including persons or
financial institutions involved with financing the acquisition)
as identified by the parties, the Federal Trade Commission, or
the Assistant Attorney General.
``(16) Relevant market.--The term `relevant market'--
``(A) means any line of commerce, product market,
service market, or labor market implicated by an
acquisition; and
``(B) includes a geographic area if geography
limits the willingness or ability--
``(i) of some customers to substitute some
products;
``(ii) of some suppliers to serve some
customers; or
``(iii) of some workers to provide labor.
``(17) State attorney general.--The term `State attorney
general' has the meaning given the term in section 4G.
``(18) Ultimate parent entity.--The term `ultimate parent
entity' has the meaning given the term in section 801.1 of
title 16, Code of Federal Regulations.
``(b) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the `Clayton Act'.''.
SEC. 4. BANNING ALL PROHIBITED MERGERS AND STRENGTHENING ANTITRUST
AGENCY ENFORCEMENT.
(a) Banning All Prohibited Mergers.--Section 7 of the Clayton Act
(15 U.S.C. 18) is amended--
(1) in the first and second undesignated paragraphs, by
striking ``lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly'' each place the term appears and inserting ``harm the
competitive process, or create or help maintain a monopoly, a
monopsony, market power, or unfair methods of competition'';
(2) in the first, second, and third undesignated paragraph,
by inserting ``(including labor)'' after ``any activity
affecting commerce'' each place the term appears; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``Any prohibited merger shall be unlawful under this
section.
``Neither quantitative evidence nor a definition of a
relevant market or market share shall be required to establish
a violation under this section.
``Harms to the competitive process include the harms
described in section 7A.''.
(b) Strengthening Antitrust Agency Enforcement.--
(1) Mandatory hsr filings.--Section 7A(a) of the Clayton
Act (15 U.S.C. 18a(a)) is amended--
(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by
inserting ``, subject to subsection (b),'' before ``the
waiting'';
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' at the
end;
(C) in paragraph (2)(B)(ii)(III), by striking the
period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
(D) by inserting after paragraph (2)(B)(ii)(III)
the following:
``(3)(A) as a result of such acquisition, the acquiring
person would hold an aggregate total amount of the voting
securities and assets of the acquired person of $50,000,000 (as
so adjusted and published) or more; and
``(B) the acquiring person, or the person whose voting
securities or assets are being acquired--
``(i) has annual revenues in excess of
$5,000,000,000 (as so adjusted and published); or
``(ii) is a financial institution, an equity fund,
or a registered investment adviser under section 203 of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-3),
if the person or the ultimate parent entity of the
person has greater than $10,000,000,000 (as so adjusted
and published) in capitalization, commitments, or
assets under management.''.
(2) Empowering the antitrust agencies to reject
acquisitions.--Section 7A of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18a) is
amended--
(A) in subsection (b)--
(i) in paragraph (1)(B)--
(I) by striking ``thirtieth'' and
inserting ``120th''; and
(II) by striking ``fifteenth'' and
inserting ``60th''; and
(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the
Assistant'' and all that follows through the
period at the end and inserting ``on
demonstration of an emergency may, in
individual cases, terminate the waiting period
specified in paragraph (1) and allow any person
to proceed with any acquisition subject to this
section, upon a vote of the Federal Trade
Commission or approval of the Assistant
Attorney General, and promptly shall cause to
be published in the Federal Register a notice
that details the justification of such
decision. The waiting period may not be
terminated under this paragraph without the
approval of all relevant agencies and States
that have received materials pursuant to
subsection (l).'';
(B) in subsection (e), by adding at the end the
following:
``(3) No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, any
voting securities or assets of another person under subsection
(a) unless--
``(A)(i) the waiting period expires or is
terminated; and
``(ii) the Federal Trade Commission or the
Assistant Attorney General has not rejected the
acquisition; or
``(B) an appropriate court issues a final,
nonappealable order reversing the decision of the
Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney
General to reject the acquisition.
``(4)(A) Not later than 15 days after the date on which the
Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant Attorney General
receive a notification filed under subsection (a), the Federal
Trade Commission and the Assistant Attorney General shall
determine whether the Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant
Attorney General shall review the acquisition, which shall be
publicly announced.
``(B) If no decision is made under subparagraph (A) before
the expiration of the 15-day period, the Federal Trade
Commission shall review the acquisition, which shall be
publicly announced.
``(5) Not later than 120 days after the date on which the
Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant Attorney General
receive a notification filed under subsection (a), the Federal
Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General shall
determine whether to reject the acquisition.
``(6)(A) The Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant
Attorney General shall provide--
``(i) an opportunity for public comment during the
60-day period beginning on the date on which a public
announcement is made under paragraph (4); and
``(ii) the public with--
``(I) notice of a notification filed under
subsection (a); and
``(II) a summary of all documentary
material and information described in
subsection (d).
``(B) The Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant
Attorney General shall consider any public comments submitted
under this paragraph before making a determination under
paragraph (5).
``(7)(A) Harms to the competitive process may include,
without limitation, harms to workers (including significant
layoffs or harms to existing collective bargaining agreements,
retirees, worker benefits and compensation, or labor
conditions), consumers (including patients, renters, and
students), customer choice, sellers, small or minority-owned
businesses (including farms and ranches), local, rural, or low-
income communities, communities of color, privacy, quality
(including health and safety), entrepreneurship, or innovation.
``(B) When evaluating whether an acquisition is likely to
harm the competitive process, the Federal Trade Commission or
the Assistant Attorney General shall consider--
``(i) effects in any relevant market (including
labor markets), cross-market effects or impacts on the
lines of commerce of the parties beyond any relevant
markets, impacts throughout the supply chains or
business ecosystems of the parties, and impacts on
small or minority-owned businesses (including farms and
ranches), local, rural, or low-income communities, and
communities of color; and
``(ii) the history of--
``(I) express collusion in any relevant
market;
``(II) acquisitions by a party in any
relevant market during the preceding 5-year
period; and
``(III) any anticompetitive effects that
followed previous acquisitions of the parties,
including--
``(aa) increased prices for
consumers;
``(bb) reduced wages for workers;
``(cc) reductions in safety for
consumers or workers;
``(dd) increased injuries or deaths
for consumers or workers;
``(ee) bankruptcy or financial
distress of acquired companies;
``(ff) significant worker layoffs;
and
``(gg) reduced investments in
research and development.
``(C) The Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant
Attorney General may determine that the acquisition is likely
to harm the competitive process if the history described in
subparagraph (B)(ii) is significant or extensive.
``(D) When evaluating an acquisition for which any party
(or its ultimate parent entity) is a dominant firm, the Federal
Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General may
determine that the acquisition is likely to harm the
competitive process if--
``(i) another party offers overlapping, competing,
or functionally equivalent services or products;
``(ii) another party is a nascent competitor or
maverick;
``(iii) another party is a critical trading partner
in the supply chains or business ecosystems of the
parties; or
``(iv) the acquisition would create a platform
conflict of interest.
``(8)(A) The decision of the Federal Trade Commission or
the Assistant Attorney General not to reject an acquisition
under subsection (a) shall--
``(i) be made publicly available by the date on
which the waiting period expires or is terminated;
``(ii) include a summary of the review process and
identify the factors considered in making the decision
not to reject the acquisition, which shall include (as
relevant or applicable) the possible harms listed in
paragraph (7);
``(iii) have no precedential value for any future
decisions regarding whether to reject an acquisition by
the same or different persons;
``(iv) shall not preclude the Federal Trade
Commission, the Assistant Attorney General, or a State
attorney general from investigating the acquisition,
seeking to unwind the acquisition, or seeking to impose
remedies on the parties to the acquisition at a later
date; and
``(v) shall have no bearing on the legality of the
acquisition if the acquisition is challenged through
judicial proceedings.
``(B) During the waiting period (or any extension thereof),
neither the Federal Trade Commission nor the Assistant Attorney
General may enter into any settlement agreement (including
commitments to structural or behavioral remedies) with the
parties to an acquisition under subsection (a) when deciding
whether to reject the acquisition.
``(C) If the Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant
Attorney General declines to reject an acquisition under
subsection (a) by the end of the waiting period, the Federal
Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General,
respectively, may issue an order requiring the parties to hold
their assets separate for a period not to exceed 60 days.
``(9)(A) The Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant
Attorney General shall reject an acquisition described in
subsection (a) if--
``(i) the acquisition is a prohibited merger;
``(ii) the acquisition is likely to harm the
competitive process or create or help maintain a
monopoly, a monopsony, market power, or unfair methods
of competition, as determined by the Federal Trade
Commission or the Assistant Attorney General,
respectively;
``(iii) a party to the acquisition (or its ultimate
parent entity)--
``(I) is a dominant firm; and
``(II) has consummated 2 or more
acquisitions in any relevant market during the
preceding 5-year period;
``(iv) a relevant agency objects to the acquisition
on the basis of a substantive justification as
described in subsection (l);
``(v) during the waiting period or during the 10-
year period ending on the date on which notification
under subsection (a) is filed, a party to the
acquisition engaged in any disqualifying behavior; or
``(vi) the Federal Trade Commission or the
Assistant Attorney General, respectively, determines
that--
``(I) all information and documentary
materials have not been supplied; or
``(II) the supplied information is not
adequately responsive.
``(B) The decision of the Federal Trade Commission or the
Assistant Attorney General to reject an acquisition under
subsection (a) shall--
``(i) be made publicly available before the date on
which the waiting period expires or is terminated;
``(ii) identify which of the 5 categories of
rejection was or were the basis of the decision and
include, as applicable--
``(I) a statement explaining why the
acquisition is a prohibited merger;
``(II) a substantive justification for the
decision, including--
``(aa) an explanation of how the
acquisition is likely to harm the
competitive process or create or help
maintain a monopoly, a monopsony,
market power, or unfair methods of
competition, including (as applicable
or relevant) an analysis of how the
acquisition would likely harm workers
(including significant layoffs or harms
to existing collective bargaining
agreements, retirees, worker benefits
and compensation, or labor conditions),
consumers (including patients, renters,
and students), customer choice,
sellers, small or minority-owned
businesses (including farms and
ranches), local, rural, or low-income
communities, communities of color,
privacy, quality (including health and
safety), entrepreneurship, or
innovation;
``(bb) an explanation of why, in
light of the factors described in item
(aa), the acquisition was rejected; and
``(cc) a response to public
comments that addresses major
counterarguments to the justification
for the decision to reject;
``(III) a statement explaining which party
is a dominant firm and identifying 2 or more
consummated acquisitions by the party in a
relevant market during the preceding 5-year
period;
``(IV) the substantive justification
received from an objecting relevant agency in
accordance with subsection (l);
``(V) a statement identifying any
disqualifying behavior of a party during the
waiting period or during the 10-year period
ending on the date on which notification is
filed under subsection (a); or
``(VI) an explanation of how the
information and documentary materials submitted
by the parties were not adequately responsive;
and
``(iii) have no precedential value for any future
decisions regarding whether to reject an acquisition by
the same or different persons.
``(10)(A) Any party to an acquisition rejected by the
Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General
under this section may bring an action under this paragraph in
the appropriate district court of the United States to
challenge the decision of the Federal Trade Commission or the
Assistant Attorney General to reject the acquisition, and no
other person or entity shall have a cause of action under this
paragraph.
``(B) A decision of the Federal Trade Commission or the
Assistant Attorney General to reject an acquisition under this
section shall be considered a matter of discretion, and the
reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside the decision
only if the decision's findings and conclusions are found to be
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with this section.
``(C) The parties to a rejected acquisition may not file
suit to challenge the decision more than 60 days after the
decision is made public.
``(D) In judicial proceedings challenging a decision to
reject an acquisition, a court shall give deference to any
definition of a relevant market or market share alleged by the
Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General and
may not offset any anticompetitive harms alleged by the Federal
Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General with any
procompetitive benefits.
``(11) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to
preclude the Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney
General from reviewing or investigating a nonreportable
acquisition before or after its consummation.''; and
(C) by striking subsection (f).
(3) Enhanced hsr filing requirements.--Section 7A(d) of the
Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18a(d)) is amended--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' at the
end;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph
(5); and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
``(2) shall require that the notification required under
subsection (a) include, in addition to the information
described in paragraph (1)--
``(A) basic information on the acquiring person and
the person whose voting securities or assets are being
acquired, including--
``(i) the names of each executive officer
and board member of each person;
``(ii) the annual revenues of each person
for each year of the 5-year period ending on
the date on which the notification will be
filed;
``(iii) all lines of business, assets, and
investments of each person;
``(iv) all data assets of each person;
``(v) all intellectual-property assets of
each person, including patents, copyrights, and
trademarks;
``(vi) all trade secrets, as defined in
section 1839 of title 18, United States Code,
of each person;
``(vii) contact information for the 10
largest customers of each person (as
applicable); and
``(viii) contact information for the 10
largest suppliers of each person (as
applicable);
``(B) the stated justification for the acquisition,
including--
``(i) what, if any, nonpublic information
was used to inform a decision to enter the
acquisition;
``(ii) what, if any, publicly available
information was processed using artificial
intelligence, algorithms, or other automated
data processing systems to inform a decision to
enter the acquisition; and
``(iii) if relevant, how the failing-firm
defense applies, including a list of good-faith
efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers
and reasons the offers were unsuccessful;
``(C) any proposed plans to benefit workers,
consumers, customer choice, sellers, small or minority-
owned businesses (including farms and ranches), local,
rural, or low-income communities, communities of color,
privacy, quality, entrepreneurship, and innovation,
including plans to--
``(i) use new expertise, resources, and
additional revenues to reduce prices;
``(ii) increase quality;
``(iii) increase privacy;
``(iv) increase worker pay, benefits, and
conditions;
``(v) invest in local, rural, or low-income
communities or communities of color; and
``(vi) invest in research and development;
``(D) the projected impact of the acquisition on
the competitive process, workers (including significant
layoffs or harms to existing collective bargaining
agreements, retirees, worker benefits and compensation,
or labor conditions), consumers (including patients,
renters, and students), customer choice, sellers, small
and minority-owned businesses (including farms and
ranches), local, rural, and low-income communities,
communities of color, privacy, quality (including
health and safety), entrepreneurship, and innovation;
``(E) a list of all other significant competitors
(including entrants or potential entrants) and
competing products;
``(F) estimated market shares in the relevant
markets of the acquisition for each person and any
significant competitors identified in subparagraph (E)
for the current year and each of the previous 2 years;
``(G) a list of every merger, acquisition, sale of
assets, or divestiture consummated by each party during
the preceding 10-year period, whether or not the party
was required to file a notification under subsection
(a);
``(H) a list of each person or financial
institution that provided or will provide financing for
the acquisition (including debt, equity, and all other
sources) and the amount provided;
``(I) an affirmation from each party that it has
not engaged in any disqualifying behavior during the
10-year period ending on the date on which the
notification will be filed;
``(J) a list of States that would be impacted by
the acquisition;
``(K) a list of Federal agencies with substantial
regulatory authority over each party (or the persons or
financial institutions involved with financing the
acquisition); and
``(L) whether any party (or its ultimate parent
entity) is a dominant firm;
``(3) shall evaluate the stated justification for the
acquisition to determine if the justification comports with the
information provided under paragraph (2);
``(4) shall determine if the acquisition or combination of
data assets described in paragraph (2) would violate the
antitrust laws, including if the acquisition or combination of
data assets is likely to harm the competitive process or create
or help maintain a monopoly, a monopsony, market power, or
unfair methods of competition; and''.
(4) Increased waiting period.--Section 7A(e) of the Clayton
Act (15 U.S.C. 18a(e)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``30'' each place the term appears
and inserting ``120''; and
(B) by striking ``15'' each place the term appears
and inserting ``60''.
(5) HSR sharing.--Section 7A of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.
18a) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(l) HSR Sharing.--
``(1) Submission to states.--Not later than 7 days after
the date on which information or documentary material relevant
to a proposed acquisition is filed with the Federal Trade
Commission and Assistant Attorney General under this section,
the Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant Attorney General
shall submit to each State attorney general of any State
identified by the parties under subsection (d), and to any
State attorney general of a State that the Federal Trade
Commission or the Assistant Attorney General determines would
be impacted by the acquisition--
``(A) notification of the proposed acquisition; and
``(B) a copy of all documents submitted in relation
to the acquisition.
``(2) Sharing with agencies.--For each acquisition filed
under subsection (a), the Federal Trade Commission or the
Assistant Attorney General shall--
``(A) send notice of the proposed acquisition to
any Federal agency--
``(i) required to review the acquisition
under Federal law;
``(ii) determined to have substantial
regulatory authority over a party involved in
the acquisition; or
``(iii) identified by the parties under
subsection (d);
``(B) provide to each Federal agency notified under
subparagraph (A) a copy of all documents submitted in
relation to the acquisition not later than 30 days
after the date on which the waiting period described in
subsection (b)(1) begins; and
``(C) reject the acquisition if--
``(i) any Federal agency with substantial
regulatory authority objects to the acquisition
on the basis that the acquisition would harm
the competitive process or materially harm the
interests of the United States as a customer,
trading partner, or stakeholder;
``(ii) the Office of Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration objects to the
acquisition on the basis that the acquisition
would materially harm small businesses
(including farms and ranches);
``(iii) the Minority Business Development
Agency of the Department of Commerce objects to
the acquisition on the basis that the
acquisition would materially harm minority-
owned businesses (including farms and ranches);
or
``(iv) the National Labor Relations Board
objects to the acquisition on the basis that--
``(I) the acquisition would help
create or maintain a monopsony or
unfair labor practice (including the
refusal of the parties to preserve,
expand, or effectuate collective
bargaining agreements covering workers
impacted by the acquisition, as
applicable); or
``(II) the acquisition would
materially harm workers (including
significant layoffs or harms to
existing collective bargaining
agreements, retirees, worker benefits
and compensation, or labor conditions).
``(3) Substantive justifications for objections.--If a
relevant agency objects to an acquisition under paragraph (3),
the relevant agency shall submit to the Federal Trade
Commission or the Assistant Attorney General, as applicable, a
substantive justification for the objection before the date on
which the waiting period expires or is terminated.
``(m) Certification.--
``(1) Individuals.--
``(A) Prohibition.--No individual who certifies a
notification filed under subsection (a) on behalf of an
entity may, within the notification or during the
waiting period, knowingly--
``(i) falsify, conceal, or cover up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
``(ii) make any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or
``(iii) make or use any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or entry.
``(B) Penalty.--Any individual who violates
subparagraph (A) shall be fined not more than
$10,000,000, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or
both.
``(2) CEO liability.--A chief executive officer of an
entity shall be deemed liable for any violation of paragraph
(1) committed by an officer or employee of the entity if the
chief executive officer knew or should have known of the
violation.
``(3) Entity.--An entity described in paragraph (1) shall
be fined, for each violation, not more than 5 percent of the
revenues that the ultimate parent entity of the entity earned
during the 1-year period ending on the date on which the
notification is filed.''.
(6) Additional ftc enforcement.--Section 5(a)(2) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(2)) is amended by
striking ``, except banks'' and all that follows through ``said
Act,''.
(c) Rulemaking.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment
of this Act, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice
shall promulgate regulations to further define harms to the competitive
process, including harms to workers, consumers, customer choice,
sellers, small and minority-owned businesses, local, rural, and low-
income communities, communities of color, privacy, quality,
entrepreneurship, and innovation.
SEC. 5. ADDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT BY STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL.
(a) In General.--
(1) Civil action.--No later than 60 days after the end of
the waiting period, a State attorney general of a State that
would be impacted by an acquisition filed under section 7A of
the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18a) may bring an action under this
paragraph in the appropriate district court of the United
States to obtain an injunction enjoining the consummation of
the acquisition.
(2) Injunction.--The court shall grant the injunction
described in paragraph (1) if the State attorney general
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that under
section 7A of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18a)--
(A) the acquisition is a prohibited merger;
(B) the acquisition is likely to harm the
competitive process or create or help maintain a
monopoly, a monopsony, market power, or unfair methods
of competition; or
(C) during the waiting period or during the 10-year
period ending on the date on which notification under
subsection (a) is filed, a party to the acquisition
engaged in any disqualifying behavior.
(3) Harms to the competitive process.--The State attorney
general may use any direct or indirect evidence to demonstrate
that an acquisition is likely to harm the competitive process,
including, but not limited to, the harms described in section
7A of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18a).
(4) Balancing prohibited.--The court may not offset any
anticompetitive harms demonstrated under paragraph (2) or (3)
with any procompetitive benefits.
(5) Deference.--The court shall give deference to any
definition of a relevant market or market share alleged by the
State attorney general.
(6) Stay of proceedings.--The court shall stay all judicial
proceedings under this section regarding an acquisition filed
under section 7A of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18a) until the
end of the waiting period. The stay shall be lifted at the end
of the waiting period if the Federal Trade Commission or the
Assistant Attorney General declines to reject the acquisition.
(7) Dismissal.--The court shall dismiss with prejudice any
claims filed under paragraph (1) if the Federal Trade
Commission or the Assistant Attorney General rejects the
acquisition.
(8) Temporary injunction.--The court shall issue an
injunction temporarily enjoining the consummation of the
acquisition during the judicial proceedings under this section.
(b) Nonreportable Acquisitions.--A State attorney general of a
State that would be impacted by a prospective nonreportable acquisition
may bring an action (which shall be subject to the procedures described
in paragraph (a)) under this paragraph in the appropriate district
court of the United States to obtain an injunction enjoining the
consummation of the acquisition.
SEC. 6. BREAKING UP PROHIBITED MERGERS; PROCESS FOR RETROSPECTIVE
REVIEWS.
Section 7A of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18a) is amended by adding
at the end the following:
``(n) Retrospective Review.--
``(1) Retrospective review of consummated acquisitions.--
``(A) Review.--
``(i) In general.--The Federal Trade
Commission and the Assistant Attorney General
may retrospectively review any consummated
acquisition, including nonreportable
acquisitions.
``(ii) Coordination.--
``(I) In general.--The Federal
Trade Commission and the Assistant
Attorney General may coordinate the
review of a consummated acquisition
with any State attorney general if the
State was impacted by the acquisition
or any Federal agency deemed to have
substantial regulatory authority over
the parties to the acquisition
(including persons or financial
institutions involved with financing
the acquisition).
``(II) Compulsory process.--The
Federal Trade Commission, the Assistant
Attorney General, and any coordinating
State attorney general or Federal
agency may use their respective
compulsory processes to conduct the
reviews.
``(B) Remedy.--Upon reviewing an acquisition
described in subparagraph (A), the Federal Trade
Commission or the Assistant Attorney General shall
order a remedy to restore competition or otherwise
address the anticompetitive impacts of the acquisition
(which shall include unwinding the acquisition or
requiring that the acquiring person make divestitures,
which, to the extent practicable, shall be specified,
standalone business units or lines), if the Federal
Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General,
respectively, acting in coordination with any State
attorney general or Federal agency (as applicable),
determines that--
``(i) the acquisition resulted in a post-
acquisition market share of greater than 50
percent of any relevant market (including labor
markets);
``(ii) the acquisition resulted in a
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index greater than 2,500
in any relevant market and increased the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by more than 200 in
such relevant market;
``(iii) the acquisition has brought
material harm to the competitive process;
``(iv) if applicable, the acquiring person
has failed to satisfy the stated justification
of the acquisition or the acquisition did not
result in the benefits described in the stated
justification submitted under subsection
(d)(2); or
``(v)(I) the acquisition is a consummated
nonreportable acquisition; and
``(II)(aa) the acquisition is a prohibited
merger; or
``(bb) after the date of enactment of this
subparagraph, the acquiring person or the
acquired person engaged in disqualifying
behavior during the 10-year period ending on
the date on which the nonreportable acquisition
was consummated.
``(2) Immediate retrospective review of prohibited
mergers.--
``(A) Review.--
``(i) In general.--Except as provided in
clause (ii), the Federal Trade Commission and
the Assistant Attorney General shall
immediately review every prohibited merger
consummated on or after January 1, 2000, for
which the parties were required to file a
notification under this section.
``(ii) Applicability.--For the purposes of
this subparagraph, prohibited mergers shall be
defined without adjustment to any dollar
amounts.
``(iii) Coordination.--
``(I) In general.--The Federal
Trade Commission and the Assistant
Attorney General may coordinate the
review of a prohibited merger with any
State attorney general if the State was
impacted by the prohibited merger or
any Federal agency deemed to have
substantial regulatory authority over
the parties to the prohibited merger
(including persons or financial
institutions involved with financing
the prohibited merger).
``(II) Compulsory process.--The
Federal Trade Commission, the Assistant
Attorney General, and any coordinating
State attorney general or Federal
agency may use their respective
compulsory processes to conduct the
reviews.
``(B) Remedy.--Upon reviewing a prohibited merger
described in subparagraph (A), the Federal Trade
Commission or the Assistant Attorney General shall
order a remedy to restore competition or otherwise
address the anticompetitive impacts of the acquisition
(which shall include unwinding the acquisition or
requiring that the acquiring person make divestitures,
which, to the extent practicable, shall be specified,
standalone business units or lines), if the Federal
Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General,
respectively, acting in coordination with any State
attorney general or Federal agency (as applicable),
determines that the prohibited merger--
``(i) resulted in a post-acquisition market
share of greater than 50 percent of any
relevant market (including labor markets);
``(ii) resulted in a Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index greater than 2,500 in any relevant market
and increased the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by
more than 200 in such relevant market; or
``(iii) brought material harm to the
competitive process.
``(C) Deadlines.--The Federal Trade Commission and
the Assistant Attorney General shall--
``(i) not later than 180 days after the
date of enactment of this subsection, establish
and implement a process to carry out the review
required under subparagraph (A); and
``(ii) not later than 4 years after the
date of enactment of this subsection--
``(I) complete the review required
under subparagraph (A); and
``(II) implement the remedies
required under subparagraph (B).
``(3) State attorneys general.--
``(A) Consummated acquisitions.--
``(i) Review.--A State attorney general of
a State impacted by a consummated acquisition
may review the acquisition in accordance with
paragraph (1), including by using compulsory
process.
``(ii) Civil action.--
``(I) In general.--Upon reviewing
an acquisition described in clause (i),
the State attorney general may bring an
action under this clause in the
appropriate district court of the
United States seeking a remedy to
restore competition or otherwise
address the anticompetitive impacts of
the acquisition (which shall include
unwinding the acquisition or requiring
that the acquiring person make
divestitures, which, to the greatest
extent practicable, shall be specified,
standalone business units or lines).
``(II) Court remedy.--The court
shall grant the remedy described in
subclause (I) if the State attorney
general demonstrates by a preponderance
of the evidence that the remedy would
have been proper under paragraph
(1)(B), unless the parties to the
acquisition demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that unwinding
would not have been proper under
paragraph (1)(B).
``(III) Balancing limited.--The
court may not offset a demonstrated
anticompetitive harm with a
procompetitive benefit unless the
benefit applies to the same population
impacted by the harm.
``(IV) Deference.--The court shall
give deference to any definition of a
relevant market or market share alleged
by the State attorney general.
``(B) Prohibited mergers.--
``(i) Review.--A State attorney general of
a State impacted by a prohibited merger may
review the prohibited merger in accordance with
paragraph (2), including by using compulsory
process.
``(ii) Civil action.--
``(I) In general.--Upon reviewing a
prohibited merger described in clause
(i), the State attorney general may
bring an action under this clause in
the appropriate district court of the
United States seeking a remedy to
restore competition or otherwise
address the anticompetitive impacts of
the prohibited merger (which shall
include unwinding the prohibited merger
or requiring that the acquiring person
make divestitures, which, to the
greatest extent practicable, shall be
specified, standalone business units or
lines).
``(II) Court remedy.--The court
shall grant the remedy described in
subclause (I) if the State attorney
general demonstrates by a preponderance
of the evidence that imposing the
remedy would have been proper under
paragraph (2)(B), unless the parties to
the prohibited merger demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that
imposing the remedy would not have been
proper under paragraph (2)(B).
``(III) Balancing limited.--The
court may not offset a demonstrated
anticompetitive harm with a
procompetitive benefit unless the
benefit applies to the same population
impacted by the harm.
``(IV) Deference.--The court shall
give deference to any definition of a
relevant market or market share alleged
by the State attorney general.
``(4) Dominant firms.--In addition to any other harms to
the competitive process that may be determined or established,
the Federal Trade Commission, the Assistant Attorney General,
or a State attorney general may also determine or establish
that a prohibited merger has brought material harm to the
competitive process if--
``(A) any party (or its ultimate parent entity) was
a dominant firm; and
``(B)(i) another party was a nascent competitor or
maverick;
``(ii) another party was a critical trading partner
in the supply chains or business ecosystems of the
parties; or
``(iii) the acquisition created a platform conflict
of interest.
``(5) Judicial review.--
``(A) In general.--Any party to an acquisition
reviewed by the Federal Trade Commission or the
Assistant Attorney General under paragraph (1) or (2)
may bring an action under this paragraph in the
appropriate district court of the United States to
challenge a decision of the Federal Trade Commission or
the Assistant Attorney General made under this
subsection to order a remedy, and no other person or
entity shall have a cause of action under this
paragraph.
``(B) Standards of review.--A decision by the
Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney
General to order a remedy under this section shall be
considered a matter of discretion, and the reviewing
court shall hold unlawful and set aside the decision
only if the decision's findings and conclusions are
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with this
section.
``(C) Balancing limited.--The court may not offset
an anticompetitive harm alleged by the Federal Trade
Commission or the Assistant Attorney General with a
procompetitive benefit unless the benefit applies to
the same population impacted by the harm.
``(D) Deference.--The court shall give deference to
any definition of a relevant market or market share
alleged by the Federal Trade Commission or the
Assistant Attorney General.
``(6) Public findings and decisions.--All findings and
decisions (including decisions to initiate a retrospective
review and decisions whether or not to order a remedy)
described in this subsection shall be made publicly available.
Any decision to order a remedy shall include a substantive
justification.
``(7) Additional processes.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of enactment of this subsection, the Federal Trade
Commission and the Assistant Attorney General shall--
``(A) establish procedures for the stakeholders of
a consummated acquisition to submit complaints
regarding any adverse impacts of the acquisition to the
Federal Trade Commission, the Assistant Attorney
General, and their respective State attorneys general;
and
``(B) establish guidelines for when complaints
received under subparagraph (i) will trigger a
mandatory retrospective review under paragraph (1).''.
SEC. 7. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.
(a) District Courts.--
(1) In general.--The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the validity of any decision made by the Federal
Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General under the
amendments made by sections 4 and 6 of this Act.
(2) Actions brought by state attorneys general.--
(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), if a
State attorney general brings an action under section 5
or subsection (n) of section 7A of the Clayton Act, as
added by section 6 of this Act, the district court of
the United States for the judicial district in which
the capital of the State is located shall have
exclusive jurisdiction.
(B) In the event that multiple State attorneys
general bring actions regarding the same acquisition,
those actions shall be consolidated in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia or a
district court with jurisdiction under this section.
(b) Court of Appeals.--The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
appeals from all decisions under subsection (a).
(c) Supreme Court.--The Supreme Court of the United States shall
not have appellate jurisdiction of any appeal from a decision under
subsection (a) or (b).
(d) Exclusive Remedies.--The causes of action authorized by this
Act and amendments made by this Act shall be the exclusive remedies
available to any person injured or adversely affected by a decision of
the Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General of the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice made under this Act or
under the amendments made by this Act.
SEC. 8. FUNDING.
(a) Authorizations of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal year 2023 and each fiscal year thereafter--
(1) $1,000,000,000 for the Federal Trade Commission; and
(2) $1,000,000,000 for the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice.
(b) Fines and Penalties.--The Federal Trade Commission and the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice may use any funds from
fines, penalties, and settlements not returned to consumers for their
respective future operations.
(c) Additional Appropriations.--To the extent there are
insufficient funds from fines, penalties, settlements, and fees
received by the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice for the costs of their respective programs,
projects, and activities, there are appropriated, out of monies in the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for fiscal year 2023 and each
fiscal year thereafter such sums as are necessary for the costs of such
programs, projects, and activities.
SEC. 9. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this Act, or an amendment made by this Act, may be
construed to limit--
(1) any authority of the Federal Trade Commission, the
Assistant Attorney General, any State attorney general, or any
Federal agency under the antitrust laws or any other provision
of law; or
(2) the application of any law.
SEC. 10. SEVERABILITY.
(a) In General.--If any provision of this Act, an amendment made by
this Act, or the application of such provision or amendment to any
person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of
this Act and of the amendments made by this Act, and the application of
the remaining provisions of this Act and amendments to any person or
circumstance shall not be affected.
(b) Exclusive Jurisdiction.--
(1) District court.--The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
any action challenging the constitutionality or lawfulness of
any provision of this Act, any amendment made by this Act, or
any regulation promulgated under this Act or an amendment made
by this Act.
(2) Court of appeals.--The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of appeals from all decisions under paragraph (1).
(3) Supreme court.--The Supreme Court of the United States
shall not have appellate jurisdiction of any appeal from a
decision under paragraph (1) or (2).
(c) Decisions by Antitrust Agencies.--Except as provided in this
Act, no Federal, State, or Territorial court shall have jurisdiction or
power to consider the validity of decisions made by the Federal Trade
Commission or the Assistant Attorney General under this Act, or under
the amendments made by this Act, or to stay, restrain, enjoin, or set
aside, in whole or in part, any provision of this Act authorizing such
decisions made by the Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant
Attorney General or making effective any such decisions made by the
Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General, or any
provision of any such decisions made by the Federal Trade Commission or
the Assistant Attorney General, or to restrain or enjoin the
enforcement of any such decisions made by the Federal Trade Commission
or the Assistant Attorney General.
(d) Actions by State Attorney Generals.--Except as provided in this
Act, no Federal, State, or Territorial court shall have jurisdiction or
power to review actions brought by a State attorney general under this
Act, or under an amendment made by this Act, or to stay, restrain,
enjoin, or set aside, in whole or in part, any provision of this Act
authorizing such actions brought by a State attorney general under this
Act, or to restrain or enjoin the enforcement of any related judicial
decisions.
<all>
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce.
Referred to the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law.
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