Gray Zone Defense Assessment Act
This bill directs the President and Department of State to report to Congress on U.S. capabilities to respond to gray zone campaigns. Gray zone campaigns are coercive activities a nation uses to achieve its objectives, not including diplomacy or armed conflict.
[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 9096 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 9096
To assess the capacity of the United States to effectively marshal
disparate elements of national power to counter adversary political
warfare campaigns, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
September 30, 2022
Mr. Chabot (for himself and Mr. Bera) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To assess the capacity of the United States to effectively marshal
disparate elements of national power to counter adversary political
warfare campaigns, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Gray Zone Defense
Assessment Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5. Evaluation of national capacities for conducting gray zone
operations.
Sec. 6. Report on Department of State capacity to respond to gray zone
aggression.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) In 1948, George F. Kennan observed that, ``In broadest
definition, political warfare is the employment of all the
means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its
national objectives.''.
(2) Today, this coercive activity is referred to by many
names within the United States Government and the academic
community, most notably ``gray zone'' operations.
(3) Although increasingly employed as a means of political
warfare, the full contours of gray zone operations remain
ambiguous. However, central features of gray zone operations
include that they are ultimately directed by state actors,
consist of efforts not associated with routine statecraft, and
are intended to advance a country's objectives at the expense
of a rival, without crossing a threshold that results in
kinetic military conflict. They include such operations and
tactics as the following:
(A) Information warfare, including conducting
disinformation campaigns or the spreading of
propaganda.
(B) Encouraging internal strife within target
countries.
(C) Coordinated efforts to unduly influence
democratic elections or related political activities.
(D) Economic coercion.
(E) Cyber operations, below the threshold of
conflict, aimed at coercion, espionage, or otherwise
undermining a target.
(F) Support of domestic or foreign proxy forces.
(G) Coercive investment and bribery for political
aims.
(H) Industrial policy designed to monopolize a
strategic industry or to destroy such an industry in
other nations, especially when coordinated with other
gray zone operations.
(I) Military, paramilitary, or similar provocations
and operations short of war.
(J) Government financing or sponsorship of
activities described in subparagraphs (A) through (I).
(4) Various gray zone operations are frequently linked
together into a coordinated campaign, that may also include
tools of routine diplomacy, and that is designed to achieve a
state's political or military objective.
(5) Gray zone campaigns are attractive to state actors for
several reasons, including reduced costs compared to the
deployment of conventional forces, thereby allowing states to
pursue their objectives with limited resources.
(6) The People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation,
the Islamic Republic of Iran, and other countries actively
advance their own strategic objectives and challenge United
States interests through the extensive use of gray zone
operations.
(7) Unwelcome escalation by adversarial powers--especially
over the last decade--from routine statecraft into gray zone
competition is a defining feature of the recent reemergence of
great-power competition and requires an appropriate United
States response.
(8) The United States has not sufficiently deterred or
responded to gray zone campaigns, thereby risking undermining
United States national interests, diminishing United States
influence and credibility, and encouraging rivals to further
employ such tactics.
(9) Successfully responding to adversary gray zone
campaigns relies upon the full integration of instruments of
national power across multiple domains and the ability to
deploy such capacities in a coordinated, real-time campaign.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) gray zone competition is a central and enduring aspect
of great-power competition, and the United States should
elevate the effective response to adversary gray zone campaigns
as a central feature of its approach to great-power
competition;
(2) an effective, whole-of-government approach is essential
to meeting the gray zone challenges posed by competitors of the
United States; and
(3) since gray zone activity takes place below the
threshold of kinetic military conflict and since narrative
formation is frequently a critical aspect of gray zone
campaigns, the Department of State should take a preeminent
role in coordinating, within applicable interagency processes,
the disparate means of national power as the United States
seeks to respond to adversary gray zone campaigns.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) seek effective responses, particularly at the
Department of State, to adversary gray zone campaigns and to
recognize the paramount importance of such responses to the
national interests of the United States;
(2) continue upholding the international rule of law and
the rules-based international order, which is a core national
security interest of the United States; and
(3) call on United States allies and partners to employ
sufficient national resources to equitably contribute to the
response to gray zone challenges.
SEC. 5. EVALUATION OF NATIONAL CAPACITIES FOR CONDUCTING GRAY ZONE
OPERATIONS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall conduct a review and submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the processes
and capabilities by which the United States responds to gray zone
campaigns and recommendations to enhance such processes and
capabilities.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) an assessment of the capability and capacity of the
United States interagency to--
(A) identify adversary activity as a gray zone
campaign, including the adversary's intent,
capabilities, interactive effects, and impact on United
States interests;
(B) devise effective theories of deterrence; and
(C) coordinate instruments of United States
national power to consistently and effectively respond
to adversarial gray zone campaigns against the United
States or allies and partners;
(2) a description of the process for determining the
threshold at which adversary gray zone activities or campaigns
targeting the United States, allies, or partners threaten
United States interests, including the methods and mechanisms
for--
(A) determining which such activities or campaigns
warrant a United States response;
(B) calibrating such response;
(C) communicating such thresholds to adversaries;
and
(D) establishing and regularly reviewing protocols
with allies and partners to respond to such activities
or campaigns; and
(3) recommendations for further enhancing the ability of
the United States to deter and respond to adversarial gray zone
campaigns, including--
(A) institutional reforms to enhance United States
interagency coordination in response to adversarial
gray zone campaigns and, as necessary, additional
statutory authorities required to implement those
reforms;
(B) additional resources, authorities, or
institutional capacities necessary for United States
agencies to counter gray zone threats; and
(C) budget estimates for the implementations of the
recommendations made pursuant to this paragraph.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in a classified form and shall contain an unclassified summary.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House
of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
SEC. 6. REPORT ON DEPARTMENT OF STATE CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO GRAY ZONE
AGGRESSION.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate a report discussing the capacity of the
Department of State to contribute to coordinated United States
responses to adversary gray zone campaigns and the Department's
understanding of the gray zone threat environment.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall also
include the following:
(1) The capabilities, offices, and entities particularly
suited to countering adversary gray zone operations and a
description of the roles each can play.
(2) An evaluation of the adequacy and utility of
established Department of State definitions for understanding
adversary gray zone activity.
(3) Recommendations, including proposed necessary
investments and the rationale and expected costs of such
investments, for further enhancing the capacity of the
Department of State to effectively respond to adversary gray
zone operations.
(4) An identification of 25 priority countries at the front
lines of adversary gray zone aggression and a discussion,
developed in consultation with relevant embassy country teams,
of the matters described in paragraphs (1) through (3) with
respect to each such country.
(5) A list of activities that are currently being
undertaken to respond to adversary gray zone campaigns
conducted against such priority countries.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in a classified form and shall contain an unclassified summary.
<all>
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
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