Black Sea Security Act of 2022
This bill requires the National Security Council to coordinate with specified federal agencies to provide an interagency report to Congress on U.S. efforts and policy options towards the Black Sea countries (i.e., Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia) and matters in the region, such as NATO engagement and Russia's aggression.
Based on the report's findings, the council shall direct an interagency strategy for the region to (1) increase military assistance and coordination with NATO and the European Union, (2) deepen economic ties, and (3) strengthen the security and democratic resilience of Black Sea countries.
[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 9511 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 9511
To provide for security in the Black Sea region, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
December 13, 2022
Mr. Keating (for himself, Mr. Turner, Mr. Sires, Mr. Swalwell, and Mr.
Carson) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To provide for security in the Black Sea region, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Black Sea Security Act of 2022''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Black Sea region is of critical importance to the
national security of six nations: Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey.
(2) The Black Sea region has been a zone of increasing
tension and conflict on the eastern border of the European
Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
following President Vladimir Putin's 2014 and 2022 invasions of
Ukraine and 2008 invasion of Georgia, which still has
territories illegally occupied by the Russian Federation.
(3) Since the illegal attempted annexation of Ukraine's
Crimea region in 2014, the Russian Federation has enhanced the
Black Sea Fleet to increase its presence in the region,
enhanced its air and coastal defenses, disregarded
international law regarding freedom of navigation to interrupt
in regular shipping routes, and threatened freedom of
navigation exercises in the Black Sea.
(4) Since its military interventions in the Black Sea
region starting in 2008, the Russian Federation has undertaken
persistent hybrid measures to further destabilize the region
through malign influence campaigns.
(5) Since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by the Russian
Federation, the unity among Black Sea countries has
strengthened, particularly among NATO member countries Romania,
Bulgaria, and Turkey.
(6) The Russian Federation is leveraging its illegal claim
over Black Sea waters and the territories of Black Sea region
states to execute military exercises to threaten the
territorial sovereignty of Ukraine and kill innocent civilians.
(7) Russia has a long history of using its position in the
Black Sea and Crimea to threaten NATO allies, including the HMS
Defender incident of June 2021, when a British ship was
harassed by Russian ships while undertaking a freedom of
navigation patrol in waters near the Crimean Peninsula.
(8) While NATO has conducted routine exercises in the
region, the United States presence in the Black Sea has
decreased since Russia's annexation of Crimea due to competing
security priorities among allies, a lack of available ships and
resources, and a lack of a clearly defined regional strategy.
(9) While, in February 2022, Turkey blocked the entry of
Russian warships into the Black Sea pursuant to the Convention
regarding the Regime of the Straits, signed at Montreux,
Switzerland July 20, 1936 (commonly known as the ``Montreux
Convention''), the Montreux Convention does not account for the
increase in size, weight, and capabilities of modern warships,
and Russia does not have the same limits on tonnage as non-
littoral states.
(10) Turkey has resisted attempts to change its
interpretation of the Montreux Convention to avoid weakening
their position in the region.
(11) While NATO has long recognized the strategic
importance of the Black Sea, Russia has sought to capitalize on
at times divergent priorities among NATO members in the region
to advance expansionist claims.
(12) On February 24, 2022, Russian Federation President
Vladimir Putin instigated an unprovoked, unjustified, and
unlawful war violating the territorial integrity of the
sovereign country of Ukraine and is using the Russian
Federation's military presence on the Black Sea to kill
innocent Ukrainian civilians.
(13) The Russian Federation's unprovoked war on Ukraine has
underscored the importance of the Black Sea region to United
States national security interests.
(14) The Russian Federation's unprovoked war has caused a
food security crisis as 20,000,000-30,000,000 tons of Ukrainian
grain remain unable to leave Ukraine in an efficient and secure
manner. The war has also impeded Ukraine's ability to produce
and transport next year's harvest.
(15) The Russian Federation's actions in and around the
Black Sea have also disrupted secure, reliable access to energy
resources throughout Europe. Notably, Gazprom suspended natural
gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria on April 27, 2022, after
the two countries refused to abide by a March 31, 2022, Russian
decree that all payments be made in rubles, in violation of the
terms of their contracts with Gazprom.
(16) The People's Republic of China (PRC)'s coercive
economic policies also threaten the economic stability of the
Black Sea region.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON BLACK SEA SECURITY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the interest of the United States to prevent
the spread of further armed conflict in Europe by recognizing
the Black Sea region as an arena of Russian aggression;
(2) the littoral members of the Black Sea are critical in
countering aggression by the Government of the Russian
Federation and maintaining the collective security of the NATO
alliance;
(3) the repeated, illegal, unprovoked, and violent attempts
of the Russian Federation to expand its territory and control
access to the Mediterranean through the Black Sea constitutes a
threat to the national security of the United States and the
NATO alliance;
(4) the United States condemns attempts by the Russian
Federation to change or alter boundaries in the Black Sea
region by any means contrary to international law;
(5) the United States and its allies should robustly
counter Russia's illegal territorial claims on the Crimean
Peninsula, along Ukraine's territorial waters in the Black Sea
and the Sea of Azov, in the Black Sea's international waters,
and in the territories it is illegally occupying in Ukraine;
(6) the United States should continue to work within NATO
and with NATO allies to develop a long-term strategy to enhance
security, establish a permanent, sustainable presence in the
eastern flank, and bolster the democratic resilience of its
allies and partners in the region;
(7) the United States should also work with the European
Union in coordinating a strategy to support democratic
initiatives and economic prosperity in the region, which
includes two European Union members and four aspirant nations;
(8) the United States should explore efforts to rebuild
trust and bilateral relations with Turkey, a key ally in the
Black Sea region and a bulwark against Iran;
(9) it is in the interest of the United States that NATO
adopt a robust strategy toward the Black Sea, including by
working with interested partner countries in the region to
advance common security objectives;
(10) the United States should work to foster dialogue among
countries within the Black Sea region to improve communication
and intelligence sharing and increase cyber defense
capabilities;
(11) countries with historic and economic ties to Russia
are looking to the United States and Europe to provide a
positive economic presence in the broader region as a
counterbalance to the Russian Federation's malign influence in
the region;
(12) it is in the interest of the United States to support
and bolster the economic ties between the United States and
Black Sea partners;
(13) the United States should support the initiative
undertaken by central and eastern European states to advance
the Three Seas Initiative Fund to strengthen transport, energy,
and digital infrastructure connectivity in the region between
the Adriatic Sea, Baltic Sea, and Black Sea;
(14) there are mutually beneficial opportunities for
increased investment and economic expansion, particularly on
energy, climate, and transport infrastructure initiatives,
between the United States and Black Sea states and the broader
region;
(15) improved economic ties between the United States and
the Black Sea states and the broader region can lead to a
strengthened strategic partnership;
(16) the United States must address the food security
challenges arising from closure of Ukraine's Black Sea ports,
as this global challenge will have critical national security
implications for the United States, our partners, and allies;
(17) Russia has a brutal history of using hunger as a
weapon and must be stopped; and
(18) countering the PRC's coercive economic pursuits
remains an important policy imperative in order to further
integrate the Black Sea countries into western economies and
improve regional stability.
SEC. 4. REPORT ON UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE BLACK SEA REGION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the National Security Council, in coordination
with the Department of State, Department of Defense, the Department of
the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the
United States Agency for International Development, the Trade and
Development Agency, the United States Export-Import Bank, the
Department of Agriculture, and the United States International
Development Finance Corporation, shall deliver to the appropriate
congressional committees an interagency report that outlines current
United States efforts and policy options toward Black Sea countries and
the broader region and addresses the matters addressed in section 3,
including NATO engagement in the region.
(b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) An overview of ongoing efforts by relevant United
States Government agencies toward the Black Sea region, both
through bilateral initiatives with Black Sea countries and any
regional initiatives toward the region, to provide military and
security assistance, economic support, and good governance
initiatives.
(2) A description of current efforts and policy options
that can be undertaken by the Department of State, the United
States International Development Finance Corporation, the
United States Export-Import Bank, the Trade and Development
Agency, the Department of Energy, the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of
Agriculture to promote economic growth, integration, and
quality infrastructure (including for energy integration and
independence) in the Black Sea littoral states and the broader
region.
(3) A breakdown of initiatives to provide the following
types of support, together with a breakdown of funding to
support these efforts:
(A) Military assistance, including infrastructure
in support of enhanced deployments and supply logistics
in the region.
(B) Economic assistance, including support for the
food security crisis.
(C) Countering Russian disinformation and
propaganda in the Black Sea region.
(D) Energy diversification and regional market
integration and supply to reduce dependence on energy
from the Russian Federation and promote clean energy
initiatives.
(E) Using economic statecraft tools, such as trade
and monetary policy, equity investments and debt
financing and political risk insurance, to increase the
United States bilateral trade and investment in the
region and opportunities for near-shoring production in
the broader region for the European market.
(F) Fostering greater regional cooperation.
(G) Increasing access to global capital markets and
enhancement of local and regional sources of capital
for critical infrastructure and other investments.
(H) A plan for helping United States allies in the
region to accelerate their transitions from legacy
Russian military equipment and promote NATO
interoperability.
(I) Strengthening rule-of-law and anti-corruption
efforts.
(J) Addressing the PRC's coercive economic actions.
(4) An assessment of NATO engagement in the region and
policy options to address the changed regional security
environment, including NATO's presence in the region and an
outline of NATO's planned and recent military exercises in the
region, in particular those under Headquarters Multinational
Division Southeast (in Romania) and the four new battle groups
in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia.
SEC. 5. UNITED STATES POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) actively deter the threat of further Russian escalation
in the Black Sea region and defend freedom of navigation in the
Black Sea to prevent the spread of further armed conflict in
Europe;
(2) advocate within NATO, among NATO allies, and within the
European Union to develop a long-term coordinated strategy to
enhance security, establish a permanent, sustainable presence
in the eastern flank, and bolster the democratic resilience of
United States allies and partners in the region;
(3) support and bolster the economic ties between the
United States and Black Sea partners, and mobilize the United
States International Development Finance Corporation, the
Export-Import Bank, the Trade and Development Agency, the
Department of State, the United States Agency for International
Development, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department
of Commerce to increase United States presence and investment
in Black Sea countries;
(4) provide economic alternatives to the PRC's coercive
economic options that destabilize and further erode economic
integration of the Black Sea littoral states;
(5) ensure that the United States continues to support
Black Sea countries to strengthen their democratic institutions
to prevent corruption and accelerate their advancement into the
Euroatlantic community; and
(6) encourage the initiative undertaken by central and
eastern European states to advance the Three Seas Initiative to
strengthen transport, energy, and digital infrastructure
connectivity in the region between the Adriatic Sea, Baltic
Sea, and Black Sea.
SEC. 6. BLACK SEA SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY.
(a) Black Sea Development and Security Strategy.--No later than 360
days after the enactment of this Act, drawing from the policy options
developed in the report in section 4, the National Security Council, in
coordination with the Department of State, the Department of Defense,
the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the
United States Agency for International Development, the United States
Export-Import Bank, the Trade and Development Agency the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Department of Agriculture, and
the Department of the Treasury, shall direct an interagency strategy,
based on the findings of the report under section 4, to increase
military assistance and coordination with NATO and the European Union,
deepen economic ties, strengthen economic and energy security and
enhance security assistance with Black Sea countries, and support
efforts to bolster their democratic resilience.
(b) Purpose and Objectives.--The initiative established under
subsection (a) shall have the following goals and objectives:
(1) Ensuring the efficient and effective delivery of
security assistance to the Black Sea states, prioritizing
assistance that will bolster defenses against hybrid warfare
and improve interoperability with NATO forces.
(2) Bolstering United States support for the region's
energy security and integration with Europe and reducing their
dependence on Russia while supporting energy diversification.
(3) Mitigating the impact of economic coercion by the
Russian Federation and the PRC on Black Sea states and
identifying new opportunities for foreign direct investment
from the United States and cooperating countries and the
enhancement of United States business ties.
(4) Increasing high-level engagement between the United
States and the Black Sea states, and reinforcing economic
growth, financing quality infrastructure, and reinforcing trade
with a focus on improving high-level economic cooperation.
(5) Increasing coordination with the European Union and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization to maximize effectiveness
and minimize duplication.
(c) Activities.--
(1) Security.--The strategy established under subsection
(a) shall include the following elements related to security:
(A) A plan to increase interagency coordination
toward the Black Sea region.
(B) A strategy for--
(i) the United States to increase NATO's
presence and capabilities in the Black Sea
region, including land and air forces; or
(ii) a United States-led initiative with
NATO member countries to increase coordination,
presence, and regional engagement among Black
Sea countries.
(C) A strategy to increase military assistance
toward Black Sea countries, particularly Ukraine,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia.
(D) Prioritization of intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance systems to monitor Russian
operations in the Black Sea region, as well as
upgrading from air policing to air defense missions.
(E) An assessment of the value of establishing a
joint, multinational three-star headquarters on the
Black Sea, responsible for planning, readiness,
exercises, and coordination of all military activity in
the greater Black Sea region.
(F) An overview of Foreign Military Financing,
International Military Education and Training, and
other United States security assistance to the region.
(G) A plan for communicating the changes to NATO
posture to the public in allied and partner countries,
as well as in the Russian Federation and Belarus.
(H) A plan for combating Russian disinformation and
propaganda in the Black Sea region, utilizing the
resources of the United States Government, including
the Global Engagement Center.
(I) A plan to promote greater freedom of
navigation, working primarily with Turkey, Ukraine,
Romania, and Bulgaria to allow for greater security and
economic Black Sea access.
(2) Economic prosperity.--The strategy established under
subsection (a) shall include the following elements related to
economic prosperity:
(A) A strategy to foster dialogue between experts
from the United States and from the Black Sea states on
economic expansion, foreign direct investment,
strengthening rule of law initiatives, and mitigating
economic coercion by Russia and the PRC.
(B) A strategy for the United States International
Development Finance Corporation and all Federal
departments and agencies that contribute to United
States economic statecraft to identify new
opportunities for private investment in Black Sea
states.
(C) An evaluation undertaken by United States
International Development Finance Corporation to
establish regional offices in Georgia, Ukraine, or
Romania.
(D) Assessments on energy diversification. The
assessment should focus on the immediate need to
replace energy supplies from Russia, and recognize the
long-term importance of broader energy diversification,
including clean energy initiatives.
(E) Assessments of potential food security
solutions.
(3) Democratic resilience.--The strategy established under
subsection (a) shall include the following elements related to
democratic resilience:
(A) A strategy to increase independent media and
United States-supported media initiatives to combat
foreign malign influence in the Black Sea region.
(B) Greater mobilization of initiatives spearheaded
by the Global Engagement Center and the United States
Agency for International Development to counter Russian
propaganda and disinformation in the Black Sea region.
(4) Regional connectivity.--The strategy established under
subsection (a) shall promote regional connectivity by sending
high-level representatives of the Department of State or other
agency partners to--
(A) the Black Sea region not less frequently than
twice a year; and
(B) major regional fora on infrastructure and
energy security, including the Three Seas Initiative
Summit.
(d) Identification of Necessary Programs and Resources.--No later
than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
interagency shall identify any necessary program, policy, or budgetary
resources required, by agency, to support implementation of the Black
Sea Security Strategy for fiscal years 2024, 2025, and 2026.
SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives.
(2) Black sea states.--The term ``Black Sea states'' means
Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia.
(3) Three seas initiative investment fund countries.--The
term ``Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund countries'' means
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Austria, Croatia, Romania, and
Bulgaria.
<all>
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Llama 3.2 · runs locally in your browser
Ask anything about this bill. The AI reads the full text to answer.
Enter to send · Shift+Enter for new line