Securing Global Telecommunications Act

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4741 Introduced in House (IH)]

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118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 4741

 To require the development of a strategy to promote the use of secure 
  telecommunications infrastructure worldwide, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 19, 2023

  Ms. Manning (for herself and Mrs. Kim of California) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To require the development of a strategy to promote the use of secure 
  telecommunications infrastructure worldwide, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Securing Global Telecommunications 
Act''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress as follows:
            (1) The United States Government should promote and take 
        steps to ensure American leadership in strategic technology 
        industries, including telecommunications infrastructure and 
        other information and communications technologies.
            (2) The expansive presence of companies linked to the 
        Chinese Communist Party, such as Huawei, in global mobile 
        networks and the national security implications thereof, such 
        as the ability of the People's Republic of China to exfiltrate 
        the information flowing through those networks and shut off 
        countries' internet access, demonstrates the importance of the 
        United States remaining at the technological frontier and the 
        dire consequences of falling behind.
            (3) The significant cost of countering Huawei's market 
        leadership in telecommunications infrastructure around the 
        world underscores the urgency of supporting the competitiveness 
        of United States companies in next-generation information and 
        communication technology.
            (4) To remain a leader at the International 
        Telecommunication Union (ITU) and preserve the ITU's technical 
        integrity, the United States must work with emerging economies 
        and developing nations to bolster global telecommunications 
        security and protect American national security interests.
            (5) Multilateral cooperation with like-minded partners and 
        allies is critical to carry out the significant effort of 
        financing and promoting secure networks around the world and to 
        achieve market leadership of trusted vendors in this sector.

SEC. 3. STRATEGY FOR SECURING GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

    (a) Strategy Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and 
submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives and Energy and Commerce and the Committees on Foreign 
Relations and Commerce, Science, and Transportation and of the Senate a 
strategy, to be known as the ``Strategy to Secure Global 
Telecommunications Infrastructure'' (referred to in this Act as the 
``Strategy''), to promote the use of secure telecommunication 
infrastructure in countries other than the United States.
    (b) Consultation Required.--The Secretary of State shall consult 
with the President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the 
Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, the Director of the Trade and Development Agency, the 
Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Assistant 
Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, in developing 
the Strategy, which shall consist of an approach led by the Department 
of State using the policy tools, and informed by the technical 
expertise, of the other Federal entities so consulted to achieve the 
goal described in subsection (a).
    (c) Elements.--The Strategy shall also include sections on each of 
the following:
            (1) Mobile networks, including a description of efforts by 
        countries other than the United States to--
                    (A) promote trusted Open RAN technologies while 
                protecting against any security risks posed by 
                untrusted vendors in Open RAN networks;
                    (B) use financing mechanisms to assist ``rip-and-
                replace'' projects and to incentivize countries to 
                choose trusted equipment vendors;
                    (C) bolster multilateral cooperation, especially 
                with developing countries and emerging economies, to 
                promote the deployment of trusted wireless networks 
                worldwide; and
                    (D) collaborate with trusted private sector 
                companies to counter Chinese market leadership in the 
                telecom equipment industry.
            (2) Data centers, including a description of efforts to--
                    (A) utilize financing mechanisms to incentivize 
                countries other than the United States to choose 
                trusted data center providers; and
                    (B) bolster multilateral cooperation, especially 
                with developing countries and emerging economies, to 
                promote the deployment of trusted data centers 
                worldwide.
            (3) Sixth (and future) generation technologies (6G), 
        including a description of efforts to--
                    (A) deepen cooperation with like-minded countries 
                to promote United States and allied market leadership 
                in 6G networks and technologies; and
                    (B) increase buy-in from developing countries and 
                emerging countries on trusted technologies.
            (4) Low-Earth orbit satellites, aerostats, and 
        stratospheric balloons, including a description of efforts to 
        work with trusted private sector companies to retain the 
        ability to quickly provide internet connection in response to 
        emergency situations.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON MALIGN INFLUENCE AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
              TELECOMMUNICATION UNION.

    (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the 
Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce of the House of 
Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation the Senate a report on Russian and Chinese 
strategies and efforts--
            (1) to expand the mandate of the International 
        Telecommunication Union (ITU) to cover internet governance 
        policy; and
            (2) to advance other actions favorable to authoritarian 
        interests and/or hostile to fair, industry-led processes.
    (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall also 
identify efforts by China and Russia--
            (1) to increase the ITU's jurisdiction over internet 
        governance and to propose internet governance standards at the 
        ITU;
            (2) to leverage their private sector actors to advance 
        their national interests through the ITU, including--
                    (A) encouraging Chinese and Russian companies to 
                leverage their market power to pressure other member 
                countries to deliver favorable decisions on ITU 
                elections; and
                    (B) China's efforts to leverage Huawei's role as 
                the primary telecommunications equipment and services 
                provider for many developing countries to compel such 
                countries to deliver favorable decisions on standards 
                proposals, election victories, candidate selection, and 
                other levers of power at the ITU; and
            (3) to use the influence of Chinese and Russian nationals 
        serving in the ITU to advantage the companies, standards 
        decisions, and candidates that advance the CCP and Kremlin's 
        interests.
    (c) Form.--The report required by this section shall be submitted 
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 5. REPORT ON MULTILATERAL COORDINATION.

    Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the President of the 
Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Administrator for the 
United States Agency on International Development, the Chief Executive 
Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, the Chair of the 
Federal Communications Commission, and the Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce for Communications and Information, shall develop and submit 
to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce and of the 
House of Representatives and the Committees Foreign Relations and on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation and of the Senate a report that 
identifies opportunities for greater collaboration with allies and 
partners to promote secure information and communications technology 
infrastructure in countries other than the United States, including 
through--
            (1) joint financing efforts to help trusted vendors win 
        bids to build out information and communications technology 
        (ICT) infrastructure;
            (2) incorporating ICT focuses into allies' and partners' 
        international development finance initiatives; and
            (3) diplomatic coordination to emphasize the importance of 
        secure telecommunications infrastructure to countries using 
        untrusted providers.
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