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[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8824 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 8824
To require the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to strengthen
United States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian
malign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 25, 2024
Mr. Keating (for himself, Mr. Foster, and Mr. Huizenga) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to strengthen
United States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian
malign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``The U.S.-European Nuclear Energy
Cooperation Act of 2024''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation initiated
a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which has severely threatened
energy security in the United States, Europe, and around the
world.
(2) The security of Ukraine's energy grid has been vital to
Ukraine's success in its defense of its territory and ensuring
the Ukrainian government can effectively provide goods and
services to Ukrainian citizens.
(3) Ukraine has operated four nuclear power plants with 15
reactors, primarily Russian-designed water-water energetic
reactor (VVER) reactors, and remains dependent on nuclear power
for its energy security.
(4) Russia, in its war of aggression against Ukraine, has
systematically targeted Ukraine's energy infrastructure through
heavy shelling and targeted attacks, particularly in the winter
months when innocent Ukrainian civilians are most vulnerable.
(5) Since March 2022, Russian forces have illegally
occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station, the largest
nuclear power plant in Europe, and Russian forces have
surrounded the station with landmines, further threatening
regional security.
(6) Russian-designed VVER reactors have been built across
Europe, including in Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine.
(7) Russia uses its nuclear power plant designs and fuel
services to spread malign influence and threaten United States
and European energy security.
(8) As of 2021, Russia owned about 20 percent of the total
uranium conversion infrastructure worldwide and in 2020, had
the largest uranium enrichment capacity at close to 46 percent.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) in countries seeking or developing a nuclear power
industry, the Department of State should prioritize the
utilization of products and services from the United States,
and then prioritize products and services from Europe and other
allied or partner countries, including Canada, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea when not directly
competing with the United States; and
(2) the United States and its allies must focus on
cooperation, including capacity building and early-stage
project support, to expand the nuclear industry in Europe in a
way that maintains nonproliferation, security, and safety
standards and aligns with international obligations and
treaties while combating Russian and Chinese malign influence.
SEC. 4. STRATEGY.
(a) Strategy Required.--The Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Energy and the heads of other relevant Federal
departments and agencies, shall develop a strategy to strengthen United
States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian malign
influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall
include, at a minimum, the following elements:
(1) An overview and assessment of the Secretary of State's
efforts to broaden participation by United States nuclear
industry entities in Europe and promote the accessibility and
competitiveness of United States, European, and partner
technologies and services against Russian and Chinese
technologies in Europe.
(2) An overview of different nuclear reactor types that are
currently deployed or under regulatory review in Europe,
including large light-water reactors, small modular light-water
reactors, and non-light-water reactors, and--
(A) what role, if any, each reactor type could have
in reducing Russia's influence over European energy
supply by 2030, 2035, 2040, 2045, and 2050;
(B) challenges that each reactor type may face with
rapid deployment, including costs, market barriers to
first-of-a-kind designs, supply chain constraints, and
regulatory requirements;
(C) the impacts of each reactor type on maintaining
strong nonproliferation standards, including the
minimization of weapons-usable nuclear material; and
(D) opportunities for the use of United States,
European, and partner technologies and services in the
deployment or potential deployment of each reactor
type.
(3) An overview of different fuel cycles that are currently
deployed or under consideration in Europe, including use of low
enriched uranium, including high assay low enriched uranium,
and spent fuel reprocessing, along with an analysis of the
implications of each fuel cycle on--
(A) reducing and eliminating Russia's market share
in Europe for uranium, conversion, enrichment, and
reactor fuel between now and 2030;
(B) achieving long-term energy security free of
Russian influence; and
(C) maintaining strong nonproliferation standards,
including the minimization of weapons-usable material
as well as high nuclear safety and security standards.
(4) An overview of nuclear reactor designs and fuel cycle
infrastructure that the United States Government is currently
funding the development of, and--
(A) the potential, if any, that each of these
technologies have to decrease or eliminate Russia's
market share in the United States and Europe for
nuclear power reactors, uranium mining and milling,
conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, deconversion,
and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing in the short,
medium, and long term;
(B) the impact of these technologies on the
minimization of weapons-usable nuclear material,
including the use of highly enriched uranium or
plutonium fuels; and
(C) an assessment of the use cases for each of
these designs and fuel cycles.
(5) An overview of the United States Government's
diplomatic engagements regarding the nuclear energy sector in
Europe.
(6) A list of countries in Europe with active nuclear power
programs, and--
(A) an analysis of each country's nuclear energy
policy;
(B) an overview of existing areas of cooperation
with regards to nuclear energy between each country
and--
(i) the United States;
(ii) other European and friendly countries;
and
(iii) adversarial countries including China
and Russia; and
(C) an overview of potential areas for future
cooperation between each country and the United States
with regards to nuclear energy.
(7) An overview of Russian and Chinese influence in the
European nuclear energy sector.
(8) An overview of how the United States Government is
working with allies and partners to counter Russian malign
influence within the European energy sector to include steps
taken to counter Russian influence in the mining and milling,
conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication processes as well
as in reactor construction.
(9) An overview of how the United States Government
balances the urgent strategic need for collaboration with
allies and partners on countering Russia's influence on nuclear
energy in Europe, with commercial competitiveness issues that
may arise between United States companies and companies in
Europe, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
(10) An assessment of Rosatom's role in Russia's energy
sector, to include an overview of strengths and vulnerabilities
of the conglomerate.
(c) Submission.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees the strategy required by
subsection (a).
(d) Form.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex, so
long as such annex is provided separately from the unclassified
strategy.
SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated $30,000,000 for each of
fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to support critically needed engagement
in Europe consistent with the strategy required by section 4(a) on
countering Russian malign influence and with a particular focus on
responsible nuclear power program capacity building, early stage
nuclear power project support, and countering Russian disinformation
campaigns.
SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the
House of the Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
of the Senate.
(2) High assay low enriched uranium.--The term ``high assay
low enriched uranium'' means uranium enriched so that the
concentration of the fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235) is
between 5 percent and 20 percent of the mass of uranium.
(3) Low enriched uranium.--The term ``low enriched
uranium'' means fuel in which the weight percent of U-235 in
the uranium is less than 20 percent.
<all>
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
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