No official summary available for this bill.
[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 5491 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 5491
To mobilize United States strategic, economic, and diplomatic tools to
confront the challenges posed by the People's Republic of China and to
set a positive agenda for United States economic and diplomatic efforts
abroad, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
December 11, 2024
Mr. Cardin introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To mobilize United States strategic, economic, and diplomatic tools to
confront the challenges posed by the People's Republic of China and to
set a positive agenda for United States economic and diplomatic efforts
abroad, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Realizing Economic
and Strategic Objectives while Leading with Values and Engagement Act
of 2024'' or the ``RESOLVE Act of 2024''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Consultation and engagement with Congress.
TITLE I--INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE
Subtitle A--Combatting the PRC's Economic Coercion
Sec. 101. Definitions.
PART I--Economic Coercion Determinations
Sec. 105. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 106. Targeted country determination.
Sec. 107. Sunset.
PART II--Response
Sec. 111. Economic defense response teams.
Sec. 112. Economic Defense Response Fund.
Sec. 113. Existing authorities that may be used to respond to economic
coercion.
Sec. 114. Sunset.
PART III--Resilience
Sec. 115. Office of the Chief Economist.
Sec. 116. Economic support to allies and partners.
PART IV--Coordination With Allies and Partners
Sec. 119. Coordination with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development members on engagement from the
People's Republic of China.
PART V--Implementation
Sec. 121. Report on strategy and implementation.
PART VI--Other Matters
Sec. 124. Developing economic tools to deter aggression against Taiwan.
Sec. 125. Intellectual property violators list.
Sec. 126. Report on subsidies provided by the Government of the
People's Republic of China.
Subtitle B--Economic Engagement With Allies and Partners
PART I--Investing in Economic Engagement in the Global South
Sec. 131. Investing in talent in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands,
sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.
Sec. 132. Enhancing United States-Africa trade and investment for
prosperity.
Sec. 133. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in
Africa.
Sec. 134. Support for Bangladesh democracy and labor rights programs.
Sec. 135. Support for anti-corruption programs and other programs to
address impunity and justice in Sri Lanka.
PART II--Aligning With Partners on Economic Tools
Sec. 141. Assistance to advance foreign investment screening of United
States allies and partners to protect
national interests.
Sec. 142. Assistance to counter corrupt practices in foreign countries.
Sec. 143. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners.
Sec. 144. Pilot program to audit barriers to commerce in developing
partner countries.
Sec. 145. Strategy for promoting supply chain diversification.
Sec. 146. Authorization to assist United States companies with global
supply chain diversification and
management.
Sec. 147. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private
sector finance.
PART III--Countering Efforts to Undermine International Economic
Organizations
Sec. 151. International Monetary Fund new arrangements to borrow.
Sec. 152. Participation of Taiwan in Inter-American Development Bank.
Sec. 153. Increased United States cooperation with Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation.
Sec. 154. Opposition of the United States to an increase in the weight
of the Chinese renminbi in the Special
Drawing Rights basket of the International
Monetary Fund.
Subtitle C--Global Infrastructure and Energy Development
Sec. 161. Department of State Infrastructure Coordination Task Force.
Sec. 162. Authorization of Partnership for Global Infrastructure and
Investment.
Sec. 163. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network.
Sec. 164. Strategic Ports Initiative.
Sec. 165. Next-generation shipping.
Sec. 166. Global Strategic Infrastructure Investment Fund.
Sec. 167. Modifications of requirements to become a Millennium
Challenge Corporation candidate country.
Sec. 168. Africa energy security and diversification.
Sec. 169. Enhancing resilient critical infrastructure in the Pacific
Islands.
Sec. 170. Oceania Restoration and Hazards Removal Program.
Sec. 171. Coordination with other Federal agencies and cooperation and
participation of nongovernmental entities.
Sec. 172. Findings related to the People's Republic of China's
industrial pollution.
Sec. 173. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the Belt
and Road Initiative and Global Development
Initiative.
Sec. 174. International cooperation to secure critical mineral supply
chains.
Subtitle D--Digital Technology and Connectivity
Sec. 176. Office of the Special Envoy For Critical and Emerging
Technology.
Sec. 177. Realigning the Regional Technology Officer Program.
Sec. 178. Annual semiconductor industry monitoring report on the
People's Republic of China.
Sec. 179. Combatting AI-enabled disinformation.
Sec. 179A. International collaboration on research and development.
Sec. 179B. Oversight of the United States-European Union Trade and
Technology Council.
Sec. 179C. Digital connectivity in the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 179D. Cyber and digital security cooperation with respect to
developing countries.
Subtitle E--Countering PRC Malign Influence
Sec. 181. Sense of Congress distinguishing the PRC Government from the
Chinese people.
Sec. 182. Authorization of appropriations for countering the People's
Republic of China Influence Fund.
Sec. 183. Global Engagement Center.
Sec. 184. Amendment to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act
of 1961.
Sec. 185. Countering malign information operations in the Americas.
Sec. 186. Global Peace Operations Initiative.
Sec. 187. Expansion of sanctions under the Fentanyl Sanctions Act.
Sec. 188. Imposition of sanctions with respect to agencies or
instrumentalities of foreign states.
Sec. 189. Imposition of sanctions with respect to military and
intelligence facilities of the People's
Republic of China in Cuba.
Sec. 190. Strategic stability dialogue and arms control.
Sec. 191. Track 1.5 dialogues with the People's Republic of China on
nuclear matters.
Sec. 192. Oversight of life sciences dual use research of concern.
Subtitle F--Strengthening United States Public Diplomacy
Sec. 196. Authorization of appropriations to promote United States
education, exchange, cultural, and the
Fulbright-Hays Program.
Sec. 197. Public diplomacy training.
Sec. 198. Public diplomacy efforts.
Sec. 199. Supporting independent media and countering foreign
information operations.
Sec. 199A. Support for local media.
TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES, PARTNERSHIPS, AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters
PART I--Promoting United States Leadership on Matters Related to the
Indo-Pacific
Sec. 201. Sense of Congress condemning the PRC's support for Russia's
war on Ukraine.
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners
in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad.
Sec. 204. Statement of policy on enhancing United States-Taiwan
partnership.
Sec. 205. Expanding expertise on Taiwan matters.
Sec. 206. United States-South Korea alliance.
Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on United States-Japan-Republic of Korea
cooperation.
Sec. 208. Sense of Congress on the need for the Senate to give its
advice and consent to the ratification of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea.
Sec. 209. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in
international waterways and airspace of the
Indo-Pacific and on artificial land
features in the South China Sea.
Sec. 209A. Sense of Congress regarding universal implementation of
United Nations sanctions on North Korea.
Sec. 209B. Establishing a Senior Official for the Compacts of Free
Association at the Department of State.
PART II--Enhancing Diplomatic Engagement in the Global South
Sec. 211. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic engagement
with Pacific Island countries.
Sec. 212. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 213. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 214. Strengthening diplomatic efforts in Africa.
Sec. 215. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the
Caribbean regarding accountability, human
rights, and the risks of pervasive
surveillance technologies.
Subtitle B--International Organizations
Sec. 221. Safeguarding the integrity of the United Nations system.
Sec. 222. United States membership in United Nations specialized
agencies and related organizations.
Sec. 223. Establishment of Office on Multilateral Strategy and
Personnel.
Sec. 224. Authorization of appropriations to promote United States
citizen employment at the United Nations
and international organizations.
Sec. 225. United States leadership and representation in standards-
setting bodies.
Subtitle C--South China and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024
Sec. 231. Short title.
Sec. 232. Sanctions with respect to PRC persons responsible for the
PRC's activities in the South China Sea and
the East China Sea.
Sec. 233. Sense of Congress regarding portrayals of the South China Sea
or the East China Sea as part of China.
Sec. 234. Sense of Congress on 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration's
tribunal ruling on arbitration case between
Philippines and People's Republic of China.
TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES
Subtitle A--Promoting Human Rights in People's Republic of China
PART I--Promoting Human Rights for Citizens of the People's Republic of
China and for United States Citizens in China
Sec. 301. Protecting human rights in the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 302. Report on corrupt activities of senior officials of
Government of the People's Republic of
China.
Sec. 303. China exit bans.
PART II--Matters Related to Hong Kong
Sec. 305. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy,
human rights, and civilian security in Hong
Kong.
Sec. 306. Development and deployment of internet freedom and
circumvention tools for the people of Hong
Kong.
PART III--Matters Related to Xinjiang
Sec. 311. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic
minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur
autonomous region.
Sec. 312. Sense of Congress calling on organization of Islamic
cooperation members to take action on
atrocities in Xinjiang.
Sec. 313. Reauthorization of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act.
Sec. 314. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape,
coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or
involuntary contraceptive implantation in
the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region.
PART IV--Matters Related to Tibet
Sec. 317. Policy with respect to Tibet.
Sec. 318. United States policy and international engagement on the or
reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and
religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.
Subtitle B--Promoting Human Rights Globally
Sec. 321. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council
that commit human rights abuses.
Sec. 322. Protecting human rights defenders at the United Nations and
other multilateral bodies.
Sec. 323. Inclusion of surveillance technology abuse in human rights
report.
Sec. 324. Strengthening public reporting on corruption.
Sec. 325. Authorization of funding for public reporting on corruption
and corrupt practices.
TITLE IV--MODERNIZING THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO MEET THE CHINA
CHALLENGE
Sec. 401. Establishing an Assistant Secretary of State for Indo-Pacific
Affairs.
Sec. 402. Enhancing strategic competition at the Department of State.
Sec. 403. Department of State professional development and rotational
program related to strategic competition.
Sec. 404. Refocusing international security efforts for strategic
competition.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 501. Savings provisions.
Sec. 502. Rule of Construction on Maintaining One China Policy.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives.
(2) Joint declaration.--The term ``Joint Declaration''
means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.
(3) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of
China.
(4) Strategic infrastructure.--The term ``strategic
infrastructure'' means infrastructure where a primary driver of
United States national interest in such infrastructure is--
(A) to advance United States national security or
economic security interest or those of the country in
which the infrastructure is located; or
(B) to deny the People's Republic of China of
ownership or control over such infrastructure.
SEC. 3. CONSULTATION AND ENGAGEMENT WITH CONGRESS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the strategic competition between the United States and
the PRC will require the United States to marshal sustained and
political will to protect its vital interests, promote its
values, and advance its economic and national security
objectives for decades to come; and
(2) sustained prioritization of the challenge posed by the
PRC requires the participation of the whole United States
Government, including--
(A) the President to lead and direct the entire
executive branch to treat the PRC as the greatest
geopolitical and economic challenge for United States
foreign policy;
(B) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and
(C) frequent, sustained, and meaningful
collaboration and consultation between the executive
branch and Congress.
(b) Engagement With Congress.--Consistent with section 15(b) of the
State Department Basic Authorities Act (22 U.S.C. 2680(b)), the
Department of State shall keep the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives fully and currently informed with respect to all
activities and responsibilities carried out in relation to the
provisions of this Act, including by regularly consulting with the
appropriate committees of Congress in the development and
implementation of each of the strategies called for by the provisions
of this Act.
TITLE I--INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE
Subtitle A--Combatting the PRC's Economic Coercion
SEC. 101. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
(1) PRC economic coercion.--The term ``PRC economic
coercion'' means actions, practices, or threats by the People's
Republic of China (PRC) to unreasonably restrict, obstruct, or
manipulate commerce or economic relations with, foreign aid to,
debt of, or investment in, any United States ally or partner in
a capricious, pretextual, or non-transparent manner for the
purpose of threatening or causing economic harm to the United
States allies or partners for the purpose of influencing,
constraining or limiting such countries decision-making.
(2) Target country.--The term ``targeted country'' is a
country or entity determined by the Secretary to have been the
subject of unusually adverse or acute PRC economic coercion.
(3) Targeted good or service.--The term ``targeted good or
service'' is a good or service subject to export or import by a
targeted country that is significantly or adversely affected by
PRC economic coercion.
PART I--ECONOMIC COERCION DETERMINATIONS
SEC. 105. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the PRC is increasingly using economic coercion to
pressure, punish, and influence the United States and United
States allies and partners;
(2) economic coercion causes economic harm to United States
allies and partners, threatens their economic security and
attempts to constrain their ability to undertake sovereign
political actions;
(3) economic coercion is often characterized by--
(A) arbitrary, abusive, or discriminatory actions
that seek to interfere with sovereign actions, or
violate international rules;
(B) capricious, pretextual, or non-transparent
actions taken without due process afforded; or
(C) intimidation or threats of punitive actions;
(4) existing mechanisms for trade dispute resolution and
international arbitration may not apply to claims related to
economic coercion, and are often inadequate for responding to
economic coercion in a timely and effective manner as the PRC
exploits plausible lengthy resolution processes to evade
accountability;
(5) the United States should provide meaningful economic
and political support to foreign partners at their request and
consistent with United States interests, when they are the
target of PRC economic coercion that causes significant
economic and political harm;
(6) responding to economic coercion will be most effective
when the United States provides relief to affected foreign
partners in coordination with allies and like-minded countries;
and
(7) such coordination will further demonstrate broad
resolve against economic coercion.
SEC. 106. TARGETED COUNTRY DETERMINATION.
(a) Secretary of State Determination.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State may determine that
a country is a targeted country and may exercise the
authorities described in section 111(b) and 112 with respect to
that country.
(2) Delegation and consultation with cabinet members.--To
inform any determination under paragraph (1) or exercise of
authority described in section 111(b) and 112, the Secretary
may delegate the authorities under this section to an
appropriate Senate-confirmed official at the Department of
State, who should consult with other Federal agencies, as
appropriate.
(3) Notification and transmittal to congress.--In making
any determination, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate
committees of Congress not later than 10 days before issuing a
determination under paragraph (1) or exercising authorities
described in section 111(b) and submit such determination and a
justification to the appropriate committees of Congress in an
unclassified form, which may include a classified annex.
(b) Expiration and Extension of Determination.--
(1) Expiration of initial determination.--Any determination
made by the Secretary under subsection (a) shall expire 180
days after the date of such determination, unless the
Department submits a notification to the appropriate committees
of Congress pursuant to paragraph (2) that PRC economic
coercion against the targeted country is ongoing and requires
an additional response.
(2) Extension of determination; congressional
notification.--
(A) In general.--The Department may extend any
determination under subsection (a) for a period of one
year by submitting a congressional notification to the
appropriate committees of Congress for their review not
later than 30 days in advance of an extension taking
effect.
(B) Elements.--Any notifications submitted to the
appropriate committees of Congress pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall include--
(i) a description of the status of the PRC
economic coercion that led to the initial
determination made under subsection (a);
(ii) an assessment of the targeted
country's political and economic vulnerability
to such PRC economic coercion;
(iii) a description of the exercise of the
authorities and activities described in section
111(b) or section 112 to date;
(iv) a plan for the continued exercise of
authorities under section 111(b) or section
112;
(v) a description of the actions taken by
the PRC against a targeted country in response
to support provided to the targeted country by
the United States or United States allies and
partners;
(vi) coordination conducted with and
support provided by United States allies and
partners to assist the targeted country; and
(vii) a justification for why an extension
is in the national interests of the United
States.
(C) Classification.--A notification under this
subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form but
may include a classified annex.
(3) Revocation.--The Secretary may at any time revoke a
determination made under subsection (a) or the extension of
such determination made under paragraph (2).
SEC. 107. SUNSET.
The authorities under this part shall expire 8 years after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
PART II--RESPONSE
SEC. 111. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish, in
coordination with other relevant Federal departments and agencies as
appropriate, a program for the creation of economic defense response
teams that can provide rapid, targeted technical assistance and high-
level diplomatic support to the targeted country. Such assistance and
support may include the following activities:
(1) Developing and implementing bilateral or multilateral
contingency plans to lessen the political and economic impact
of PRC economic coercion, including by surging technical
assistance, diplomatic support and economic assistance, as
needed, to the targeted country.
(2) Encouraging senior Department of State officials to
engage with United States allies and partners, the United
States private sector and other relevant interlocutors in
support of the targeted country, as appropriate.
(3) In coordination with the targeted country, developing
plans and strategies for reducing vulnerabilities and improving
resilience.
(4) Deploying positive public messaging campaigns to
reinforce the policy independence and resilience of the
targeted country and to condemn PRC economic coercion.
(b) Activation of Response Teams.--Activation of an economic
defense response team to support a targeted country may involve the
following elements and others as the circumstances require:
(1) Identification and designation of relevant personnel to
the task force, including economists, data analysts, trade
experts, legal experts and foreign policy and foreign
assistance personnel within the United States Government with
expertise relevant to the activities described in subsection
(a).
(2) Negotiation of memoranda of understanding or
contracting mechanisms, where appropriate, with other Federal
departments and agencies and the United States private sector,
as needed, to ensure access to the technical assistance
identified under subsection (a)(1) and expertise identified
under paragraph (1).
(3) Clear direction to United States diplomatic missions on
the rapid and effective activation of such teams, and the
establishment of appropriate liaison relationships, as
appropriate, with local public and private sector officials and
entities.
SEC. 112. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE FUND.
(a) In General.--There is hereby established an ``Economic Defense
Response Fund'' within the Department of State (in this section
referred to as the ``Fund'') to provide support, including the
provision of assistance or the provision of loans to facilitate the
purchase or redirection of targeted goods, in particular goods of a
strategic, time-sensitive, or perishable nature, in the targeted
country.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated not less than $25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025
through 2029 for the establishment and operation of the Fund. The Fund
shall be solely administered by the Secretary of State or the
Secretary's designee, in consultation with the heads of other
Departments and agencies, as appropriate.
(c) Use of Loans.--The Economic Defense Response Fund may be used
to support loan programs to underwrite purchases by third parties to
redirect targeted goods or services.
SEC. 113. EXISTING AUTHORITIES THAT MAY BE USED TO RESPOND TO ECONOMIC
COERCION.
The Secretary of State should use the following authorities to
respond to economic coercion against a targeted country, as
appropriate:
(1) Requesting appropriations for foreign aid to the
targeted country.
(2) Requesting the necessary authority and appropriations
for sovereign loan guarantees to the targeted country.
(3) The waiver of policy requirements (other than policy
requirements mandated by an Act of Congress) to facilitate the
provision of financing to the targeted country.
(4) Requesting appropriations for loan loss reserves to
facilitate the provision of financing to support United States
exports to the targeted country.
(5) Providing technical assistance and legal expertise to
support a targeted country's response to and redress of an act
or acts of PRC economic coercion.
(6) Other authorities that could benefit the targeted
country and that require coordination and consultation with the
relevant Federal departments and agencies.
SEC. 114. SUNSET.
The authorities under this part shall expire 8 years after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
PART III--RESILIENCE
SEC. 115. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST.
(a) In General.--There is established at the Department of State an
Office of the Chief Economist.
(b) Duties.--The Office will be led by the Chief Economist of the
Department of State, at the Senior Executive Service or equivalent
level, and shall be responsible for--
(1) conducting economic research, collecting and analyzing
data, and preparing reports and assessments and policy
recommendations to senior Department leadership on
international economic trends, opportunities, and challenges
and unanticipated global developments with economic impacts;
and
(2) providing economic analysis to inform policy making,
including related to--
(A) international trade and trade policy;
(B) international macroeconomics and finance;
(C) economic development;
(D) competition and industrial strategy;
(E) economic sanctions development and
implementation, and sanctions evasion; and
(F) capacity building;
(3) coordinating with allies and partners, other relevant
agencies, departments, and stakeholders on international
economic matters;
(4) identifying countries vulnerable to PRC economic
coercion, and analyzing commodities, products, services, and
other economic linkages of each such country that may be
vulnerable targets for PRC economic coercion, including
examining risk factors such as--
(A) perishability;
(B) strategic or political value, or to regional or
global supply chains;
(C) proportion of the total export value for the
exporting country of the product being exported to a
country engaged in economic coercion;
(D) potential exposure of the product to arbitrary
or excessive regulatory, phytosanitary, or other safety
or inspection requirements; and
(E) reliance of a country on the import of such
commodities, product, or services; and
(5) analyzing and monitoring economic linkages to identify
goods and commodities with respect to which United States
allies and partners may be vulnerable to economic coercion that
is informed by--
(A) current market data;
(B) information, including United States
intelligence, on economic coercion strategies;
(C) relevant data from before, during and after
past instances of economic coercion; and
(D) any other relevant information needed to
support economic analysis and policy recommendations,
including access to information technology systems
which integrate and synthesize economic and related
data.
(c) Personnel.--In addition to a qualified professional Chief
Economist, the Secretary of State is authorized to employ sufficient
full-time equivalent individuals to fully execute the Office of the
Chief Economist, including--
(1) a Deputy Chief Economist, who must be a qualified
professional economist;
(2) at least four qualified professional economists at the
GS-15 level;
(3) a Chief Data Officer;
(4) a Chief of Staff;
(5) research economists;
(6) career members of the foreign service, including
program support staff; and
(7) temporary staff, including fellows.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for
the Office for personnel costs, project and data services, and limited
travel funds.
SEC. 116. ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO ALLIES AND PARTNERS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Growth,
Energy, and the Environment, using the economic analysis as described
in section 115, shall coordinate with other relevant Federal
departments and agencies, as appropriate, to develop and implement a
strategy to provide proactive support to partners and allies at risk of
becoming target countries for PRC economic coercion. Such support may
include the following activities:
(1) Data and information sharing on economic risks and
vulnerabilities, including specific sectors.
(2) Technical support to establish proactive action plan
and contingency plans to reduce the partner country's
vulnerability to coercive economic practices and limit the
damage of economic coercion.
(3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral contingency
plans for responding to the threat or use of PRC economic
coercion.
(4) Providing technical assistance to partner countries in
screening foreign sovereign investment in physical and digital
infrastructure, and foreign investment in other strategic
sectors that may increase the partner country's vulnerability
to PRC economic coercion.
(5) Funding non-governmental entities to support public
conferences and reports on the use of economic coercion and
options for response efforts.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--Of the $25,000,000 authorized
in section 112(b), $5,000,000 may be allocated to the Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs to resource, staff, and implement the
strategy in subsection (a).
PART IV--COORDINATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS
SEC. 119. COORDINATION WITH ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT MEMBERS ON ENGAGEMENT FROM THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
The Secretary of State shall coordinate with willing Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development member countries--
(1) to study the effects of coercive economic practices
associated with the PRC, such as those through the Belt and
Road Initiative, the Digital Silk Road, and the Global
Development Initiative, which may include the extent to which
such practices--
(A) are predatory or usurious;
(B) are inconsistent with internally accepted
banking and accounting practices;
(C) result in low quality infrastructure that does
not meet international standards;
(D) incorporate conditions intended to limit
transparency, including lending with conditional
restrictions on debt reporting, inconsistent with the
borrower's obligations to the International Monetary
Fund; and
(E) provide the PRC with undue influence over the
borrower in the event of the borrower's default;
(2) to create a shared set of metrics to enable evaluation
of whether the PRC is engaging in the practices referred to in
paragraph (1) on particular initiatives or projects, and
promote transparency with respect to those actions, including a
joint analysis of--
(A) the PRC's distortive economic practices, such
as subsidies provided by the PRC as it pertains to
state-owned enterprises and other forms of market-
distorting state intervention in the PRC's economy; and
(B) the potential negative global spillovers from
such practices;
(3) to establish--
(A) a program or plan of action for future
dialogues on the PRC's unfair economic practices; and
(B) a clear understanding of common concerns and
priorities among member countries with respect to such
practices; and
(4) to issue joint informational reports that contain the
results of the data gathering efforts described in this
section.
PART V--IMPLEMENTATION
SEC. 121. REPORT ON STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION.
(a) Strategy and Implementation.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on
activities under this subtitle.
(2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1)
shall include the following elements:
(A) A description of the establishment of the
program authorized by section 111(a) describing the
development of the program, the major elements of the
program, the personnel and institutions involved, and
specifics on how the program incorporates the elements
described in section 111(a).
(B) A description of the development and
implementation of the strategy described in section
116, including--
(i) the development and use of data and
analytical tools by the Office of the Chief
Economist in assessing potential interventions
that could be pursued to address identified
vulnerabilities to economic coercion in advance
of such coercion or in preparation for such
coercion;
(ii) a strategy for public engagement
before, during and after instances of economic
coercion to build resilience, domestic and
international support to counter such coercion;
and
(iii) how the Secretary of State will work
with interagency stakeholders to implement the
strategy required under section 116, and the
potential contributions of other Federal
departments and agencies to programs,
initiatives, and activities that complement the
Economic Defense Response Fund authorized in
section 112.
(b) Economic Defense Response Team Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the
activation of an economic defense response team pursuant to
section 111(b), and annually thereafter for so long as such
team is active, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report describing the
operations of the team with respect to the targeted country and
an assessment of its effectiveness in countering the negative
impact to the targeted country of PRC economic coercion.
(2) Classification.--the report required under paragraph
(1) shall be unclassified but may include a classified annex.
PART VI--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 124. DEVELOPING ECONOMIC TOOLS TO DETER AGGRESSION AGAINST TAIWAN.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States must be prepared to take immediate action to sanction any
military or non-military entities owned, controlled, or acting at the
direction of the Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party
that are supporting actions by the Government of the PRC or the Chinese
Communist Party to--
(1) overthrow or dismantle the governing institutions in
Taiwan;
(2) occupy any territory controlled or administered by
Taiwan; or
(3) take significant action against Taiwan, or territory
controlled or administered by Taiwan, including conducting a
naval blockade, seizing Taiwan's outlying islands, or
perpetrating a significant cyberattack on Taiwan.
(b) Task Force.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Office of the Sanctions Coordinator of the
Department of State and the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the
Department of the Treasury shall establish an interagency task force to
identify military or non-military entities that could be sanctioned
immediately following any action taken by the PRC that demonstrates an
attempt to achieve or has the significant effect of achieving the
physical or political control of Taiwan, including by--
(1) overthrowing or dismantling the governing institutions
in Taiwan;
(2) occupying any territory controlled or administered by
Taiwan as of the date of the enactment of this Act; or
(3) taking significant action against Taiwan, or territory
controlled or administered by Taiwan, including--
(A) the creation of a naval blockade of Taiwan;
(B) the seizure of the outlying islands of Taiwan;
or
(C) the initiation of a significant cyberattack
that threatens civilian or military infrastructure of
Taiwan.
(c) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days following the establishment
of the task force required under subsection (b), the task force shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy for
identifying targets that--
(1) assesses how existing sanctions programs could be used
following any action taken by the PRC that demonstrates an
attempt to achieve, or has the significant effect of achieving,
the physical or political control of Taiwan as described in
subsection (b);
(2) develops or proposes, as appropriate, new sanctions
authorities that might be required to impose sanctions on
targets identified under this section;
(3) analyzes the potential economic consequences to the
United States, and to allies and partners of the United States,
of various types of such sanctions and to assess measures that
could be taken to mitigate such consequences, including through
the use of licenses, exemptions, carve-outs, and other
approaches;
(4) includes coordination with allies and partners to--
(A) leverage sanctions and other economic tools to
deter or respond to aggression against Taiwan;
(B) identify and resolve potential impediments to
coordinating sanctions-related efforts; and
(C) identify industries, sectors, or goods and
services where the United States and allies and
partners can take coordinated action through sanctions,
or other economic tools that will have a significant
negative impact on the economy of the PRC;
(5) assesses the resource gaps and needs at the Department
of State and the Department of the Treasury, and other Federal
departments and agencies, as appropriate, to most effectively
use sanctions and other economic tools to respond to the threat
posed by the PRC;
(6) recommends how best to target sanctions and other
economic tools against individuals, entities, and economic
sectors in the PRC, taking into account the role of such
targets in supporting Government of the PRC or Chinese
Communist Party policies and activities that pose a threat to
the national security or foreign policy interests of the United
States, the negative economic implications for the PRC,
including its ability to achieve its objectives with respect to
Taiwan, and the potential impact of such sanctions on the
stability of the global financial system, including with regard
to--
(A) state-owned enterprises;
(B) government officials;
(C) financial institutions associated with the
government; and
(D) PRC companies not formally designated by the
Government of the PRC as state-owned enterprises;
(7) identifies any foreign military or non-military
entities that would likely be used by the PRC in any action
taken that demonstrates an attempt to achieve any, or has the
significant effect of achieving, the physical or political
control of Taiwan, as described in subsection (b), including
entities in--
(A) shipping;
(B) logistics;
(C) energy, including oil and gas;
(D) aviation;
(E) ground transportation; and
(F) technology;
(8) describes policies, to be applied in the event of any
PRC coercive action, including an invasion by the PRC that
fringes upon the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan by
preventing access to international waterways, airspace, or
telecommunications networks, to--
(A) restrict the access of the People's Liberation
Army to oil, natural gas, munitions, and other supplies
needed to conduct military operations against Taiwan,
United States facilities in the Indo-Pacific and Indian
Oceans, and allies and partners of the United States in
the region;
(B) diminish the capacity of the industrial base of
the PRC to manufacture and deliver defense articles to
replace those lost in operations of the People's
Liberation Army against Taiwan, the United States, and
allies and partners of the United States; and
(C) inhibit the ability of the PRC to evade United
States and multilateral sanctions through third
parties, including through secondary sanctions; and
(9) identifies tactics used by the Government of the PRC to
influence the public in the United States and Taiwan through
propaganda and disinformation campaigns, including such
campaigns focused on delegitimizing Taiwan or legitimizing a
forceful action by the PRC against Taiwan.
(d) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
submission of the strategy required under subsection (c), the
President shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report on potential sources of leverage against the
PRC and recommendations to reduce United States
vulnerabilities. The report shall--
(A) identify goods and services from the United
States that are relied on by the PRC such that reliance
presents a strategic opportunity and source of leverage
against the PRC, including during a conflict;
(B) identify procurement practices of the United
States Government, and critical sectors within the
United States economy, that are reliant on trade with
the PRC and other inputs from the PRC (including drugs
and active pharmaceutical ingredients, critical
minerals, and metallurgical inputs) such that those
sectors present a strategic vulnerability and source of
leverage that the Chinese Communist Party or the PRC
could exploit, including during a conflict; and
(C) includes recommendations to Congress on steps
that can be taken to reduce the sources of leverage
described in subparagraph (B), including through--
(i) provision of economic incentives and
making other trade and contracting reforms to
support United States industry in critical
sectors and to indigenize production of
critical resources; and
(ii) policies to facilitate ``near- or
friend-shoring'', or otherwise developing
strategies to facilitate that process with
allies and partners of the United States, in
other sectors for which domestic reshoring
would prove infeasible for any reason.
(2) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 125. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.
(a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter
for 8 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of
other Federal departments and agencies as the President determines
appropriate, shall create a list (referred to in this section as the
``intellectual property violators list'') that identifies--
(1) all state-owned enterprises incorporated in the PRC
that have benefitted from--
(A) a significant act or series of acts of
intellectual property theft that caused significant
harm to an economic sector of the United States or a
company, partnership or entity incorporated or
organized in the United States or group or association
of such entities; or
(B) an act or government policy of involuntary or
coerced technology transfer of intellectual property
owned by an entity identified company incorporated in
the United States; and
(2) any foreign person with operational control of an
entity described in paragraph (1), including senior corporate
officers and principal shareholders of the entity.
(b) Rules for Identification.--To determine whether there is a
credible basis for determining that an entity should be included on the
intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the departments and agencies specified in subsection
(a) shall consider--
(1) any final adjudication by a court of competent
authority in the United States that the entity has violated
relevant United States laws intended to protect intellectual
property rights; or
(2) substantial and credible information received from any
entity described in subsection (c) or other interested persons.
(c) Consultation.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary of
State, in coordination with the departments and agencies specified in
subsection (a), may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with--
(1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
(2) entities in the private sector, including trade
associations;
(3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise;
and
(4) allies and partners of the United States.
(d) Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 8 years,
the Secretary of State shall publish in the Federal Register a
report that--
(A) lists the entities identified pursuant to
subsection (a)(1) and the corporate officers of such
entities identified pursuant to subsection (a)(2);
(B) describes the circumstances surrounding acts or
policies described in subsection (a)(1), including any
role of the Government of the PRC;
(C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the
economic advantage derived by the entities identified
pursuant to subsection (a)(1); and
(D) assesses whether each entity described in
subsection (a)(1) is using or has used stolen
intellectual property in commercial activity within the
sovereign jurisdiction of the United States.
(2) Classified report.--Concurrent with publication of the
reports required under paragraph (1), the Secretary of State
shall submit to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate
and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of
Representatives a classified version of the report that
includes greater detail and intelligence about the information
specified in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of paragraph (1).
(e) Requirement To Protect Confidential Business Information.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State and the head of any
other Federal agency involved in the production of the
intellectual property violators list shall protect from
disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private
sector party and marked as confidential business information,
unless the party submitting the information--
(A) had notice, at the time of submission, that
such information would be disclosed by the Secretary;
(B) subsequently consents to the disclosure of such
information; or
(C) is an entity listed on the intellectual
property violators list.
(2) Inclusion in classified version of report.--If
confidential business information is provided by a private
sector party in connection with the production of the
intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State
shall include such information in the classified version of the
report under subsection (d)(2).
(3) Treatment as trade secrets.--Proprietary information
submitted by a private sector party (except an entity listed on
the intellectual property violators list) under this section--
(A) shall be considered to be trade secrets and
commercial or financial information exempt under
subsection (b)(4) of section 552 of title 5, United
States Code, from being made available to the public
under subsection (a) of that section; and
(B) shall be exempt from disclosure without the
express approval of the party.
SEC. 126. REPORT ON SUBSIDIES PROVIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 10 years, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade
Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report that identifies--
(1) patterns of direct and indirect subsidies provided by
the central, provincial, or local governments of the PRC to
state-owned enterprises and private entities under the
direction or control of the Government of the PRC operating in
economic sectors deemed by the Government of the PRC to be
strategic sectors, including by identifying such sectors in
major policy initiatives or by inclusion in the Chinese
Communist Party's five-year plans;
(2) discriminatory, non-market treatment favoring state-
owned and private enterprises in the PRC and disadvantaging
foreign market participants;
(3) any impacts that the activities outlined in paragraphs
(1) and (2) have on United States national security and
economic competitiveness; and
(4) any coordination with foreign allies and partners to
address the impacts of the activities outlined in paragraphs
(1) and (2).
(b) Elements of Report.--In compiling the report under subsection
(a), the Secretary of State shall consider--
(1) regulatory and other policies enacted or promoted by
the central government of the PRC that--
(A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in the PRC
that disadvantage foreign market participants;
(B) shield centrally administered, state-owned
enterprises from competition; or
(C) otherwise suppress market-based competition;
(2) financial subsidies, including subsidized loans or
below-market lending terms, from or promoted by the central,
provincial, or local governments of the PRC or state-owned
enterprises in the PRC that materially benefit enterprises in
the PRC over foreign market participants in contravention of
generally accepted market principles;
(3) any subsidy that meets the definition of subsidy under
article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures referred to in section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12));
(4) any impacts that the activities outlined in paragraphs
(1), (2), and (3) have on United States national security and
economic competitiveness; and
(5) any coordination with foreign allies and partners to
address the impacts of the activities outlined in paragraphs
(1), (2), and (3).
(c) Form of Report.--Each report required by subsection (a) may be
submitted in classified form.
(d) Consultation.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the United
States Trade Representative, may, as necessary and appropriate, consult
with--
(1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
(2) the private sector; and
(3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.
Subtitle B--Economic Engagement With Allies and Partners
PART I--INVESTING IN ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH
SEC. 131. INVESTING IN TALENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC ISLANDS,
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Latin america and the caribbean.--In this section, the
term ``Latin America and the Caribbean'' does not include Cuba,
Nicaragua, or Venezuela.
(2) Pacific islands.--The term ``Pacific Islands'' means
the nations of Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati,
Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands,
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
(3) Southeast asia.--The term ``Southeast Asia'' means the
nations of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR,
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
Vietnam, and Timor-Leste.
(4) Sub-saharan africa.--The term ``sub-Saharan Africa''
means a country or successor political entity defined in
section 107 of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19
U.S.C. 3706).
(b) Establishment of Centers of Excellence.--The Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development and, as appropriate, the heads of
other relevant Federal departments and agencies, is authorized to enter
into public-private partnerships and establish centers of excellence
located in countries in Southeast Asia, Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan
Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean to build and enhance the
technical capacity of officials, emerging leaders, and other qualified
persons from countries in those regions.
(c) Priority Areas for Technical Assistance and Capacity
Building.--The centers of excellence established under subsection (b)
shall provide technical assistance and capacity building in areas, such
as the following:
(1) Domestic resource mobilization.
(2) Regulatory management.
(3) Procurement processes, including tendering, bidding,
and contract negotiation.
(4) Budget management and oversight.
(5) Management of key economic sectors, including energy,
digital economy, and infrastructure.
(6) Project appraisal.
(7) Sovereign financial management.
(d) Terms and Conditions.--The program authorized under this
section shall--
(1) leverage existing United States programs and activities
in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, Sub-Saharan Africa,
and Latin America, which may include assistance provided
under--
(A) future leaders initiatives, such as the Young
Southeast Asia Leaders Initiative and the Young Pacific
Leaders Program;
(B) the United States Agency for International
Development's American Schools and Hospitals Abroad
(USAID/AHSA) initiative;
(C) the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C.
7701 et seq.);
(D) U.S.-Support for Economic Growth in Asia (US-
SEGA);
(E) programs related to the Asia-Pacific Economic
Community (APEC);
(F) the Young African Leaders Initiative;
(G) the Young Leaders of the Americas Initiative;
and
(H) other relevant education or scholarship
programs;
(2) be supported by instructors that--
(A)(i) currently serve in relevant areas of the
United States Government with a rank of not less than
14 on the GS scale; or
(ii) possess at least ten years of experience
relevant to the areas of instruction identified in
subsection (c);
(B) meet high professional standards within their
fields; and
(C)(i) are contracted by any center of excellence
established pursuant to subsection (b); or
(ii) are deployed or detailed directly from a
Federal Government agency;
(3) seek to attract participants who--
(A)(i) are currently senior or mid-career officials
in key technical ministries of participating countries
in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan
Africa, or Latin America and the Caribbean;
(ii) have demonstrated leadership potential and
direct responsibility for crafting or implementing
policies relevant to the areas of instruction described
under subsection (c); or
(iii) demonstrate an intent to return to government
service after completing the program outlined in this
section; or
(B) are currently employed in utilities, publicly
or privately owned companies, or other non-government
entities with responsibility for implementing policy
and regulation or supporting government functions in
the areas of instruction described under subsection
(c); and
(4) require financial or in-kind contributions from
participating governments, commensurate with the gross domestic
product of the countries.
(e) Authorization To Enter Agreements and Non-Binding
Instruments.--To fulfill the terms and conditions specified by
subsection (d), the Secretary of State is authorized to enter
agreements and non-binding instruments with participating governments
to determine what financial or in-kind contributions will be made by
the United States and what financial or in-kind contributions will be
made by the participating government with respect to the activities
described in this section.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $45,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to
carry out this section.
SEC. 132. ENHANCING UNITED STATES-AFRICA TRADE AND INVESTMENT FOR
PROSPERITY.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
increase United States investment in Africa and to promote and
facilitate trade between the United States and Africa, focused on key
countries and sectors, that supports mutual economic growth and
development outcomes, long-term development of markets, and the
strategic interests of the United States.
(b) Office To Coordinate Policy.--
(1) Establishment.--The President shall establish an
office, to be known as the ``Prosper Africa Office,'' and
assign it to a bureau within the United States Agency for
International Development to coordinate the activities of the
United States Government related to increasing trade and
investment between the United States and Africa, which should
include representation from relevant agencies as designated by
the President.
(2) Duties.--The office established pursuant to paragraph
(1) shall--
(A) identify priority countries or sectors as
appropriate for United States foreign investment in
countries in Africa and sectors and countries that
support United States economic growth and promotes
trade based on the analysis required under subsection
(c);
(B) coordinate activities and implementing
mechanisms, including at United States embassies in
Africa, to carry out the policy set forth in subsection
(a), including by--
(i) providing program support and guidance
to implement the policy in subsection (a);
(ii) providing information and analysis to
United States companies and investors in
countries and sectors identified in
subparagraph (A); and
(iii) serving, as needed, as an information
clearinghouse for the United States Government
for businesses, investors, and civic
organizations, and others in the United States
seeking information related to investing in
Africa, and connecting them with teams at
United States embassies overseas; and
(C) identify barriers to trade and investment in
priority countries and sectors, and identify concrete
actions to address them, including strengthening
programs and activities aimed at improving the enabling
environment in those countries.
(3) Organization.--
(A) In general.--The office established under
paragraph (1) shall be led by an Executive Director who
shall be designated by the Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development, and who
shall--
(i) coordinate interagency efforts related
to paragraph (2);
(ii) identify, not later than 90 days after
the release of the analysis required under
subsection (c), a list of priority countries
for the purposes of carrying out this section;
(iii) plan, coordinate, and oversee the
policies, activities, and programs of United
States Government agencies, in the United
States and in overseas missions, involved in
promoting or facilitating trade and investment
activities between the United States and Africa
and development and coordination of relevant
activities meant to improve the enabling
environment;
(iv) identify and provide information about
investment opportunities, market information,
and United States Government programs to
support trade and investment activities in
priority countries and sectors identified
pursuant to paragraph (2)(A); and
(v) not less than 4 times per year, convene
a committee consisting of the directors from
each agency designated under subparagraph (B)
to provide strategic guidance and coordination
for the policy, programs, and activities of the
office.
(B) Designation of agencies.--The President shall
designate Federal departments and agencies to
participate in support of the policy set forth in
subsection (a), and direct the head of each designated
agency to--
(i) designate an employee to serve as a
focal point for the agency's respective
activities related to subsection (a), who shall
coordinate the relevant activities of the
agency and liaise with the Executive Director
designated pursuant to subparagraph (A); and
(ii) designate an employee to serve at
United States embassies in priority countries
identified pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A).
(4) Staffing.--In order to carry out this section--
(A) the Executive Director shall have the
authority, as appropriate, to hire employees and
contractors in a manner that is consistent with
existing hiring authorities of USAID to support the
execution of efforts described in paragraph (3)(A), and
shall be supported, as appropriate, by staff detailed
from any Federal department or agency designated
pursuant to paragraph (3)(B); and
(B) the Chief of Mission in relevant Sub-Saharan
and North Africa countries--
(i) shall take an active and direct
leadership role in promoting, supporting, and
facilitating activities pursuant to this
section;
(ii) shall designate a Foreign Service
Officer, Foreign Commercial Service Officer, or
other direct hire person under Chief of Mission
authority to lead an interagency team to
support activities pursuant to this section,
who shall--
(I) conduct assessments of market
conditions and business operating
environments;
(II) identify investment
opportunities;
(III) foster relationships and
communications between United States
investors and businesses and African
businesses and individuals within their
country of responsibility; and
(IV) carry out other duties as
necessary; and
(iii) is authorized to hire locally
employed staff with relevant experience to
support the activities of the office
established pursuant to this subsection.
(c) Market and Sector Analysis.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 4 years thereafter until
2031, the Executive Director shall commission and publish a
study every 4 years of the investment environment in Africa
that incorporates the following elements:
(A) An analysis of which markets are the most
promising for private investment.
(B) An analysis of African markets that identifies
which industries and sectors United States firms have
an advantage in comparison to other sources of foreign
direct investment.
(C) An analysis of perceived and actual barriers to
United States private investment, including--
(i) significant legal and regulatory
constraints to foreign investment and business
operating environments;
(ii) reputational risks;
(iii) investor information gaps; and
(iv) access to and affordability of
capital, labor markets, currency volatility,
and infrastructure.
(2) Authority.--To produce the study required under
paragraph (1), the Executive Director is authorized to engage
the services of a qualified United States private sector
consultant or subject matter expert.
(3) Submission and publication.--The Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development shall submit
each study required under paragraph (1) to the appropriate
committees of Congress and shall make the study publicly
available.
(4) Determination of priority countries.--The Executive
Director shall determine the priority countries and sectors for
purposes of subsection (b)(2)(A)(i) based on the findings of
the report required under this subsection.
(d) Small and Medium Enterprises.--The office shall, to the extent
practicable, promote and facilitate investments in small and medium
enterprises, including by establishing and supporting relationships
between United States Government institutions, philanthropic
institutions, and private lenders to mobilize blended finance for small
and medium enterprises in Africa.
(e) Support for Diaspora Investment.--The office shall seek to
support and facilitate investments in Africa by United States citizens
and residents who identify as members of the African diaspora.
(f) President's Advisory Council on Africa Diaspora Engagement in
the United States.--
(1) In general.--The Executive Director shall consult with
the President's Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement
in the United States (referred to in this subsection as the
``Council'') established by Executive Order 14089 on issues
relating to increasing, developing, and sustaining investments
in Africa by United States members of the African diaspora.
(2) Membership.--The Executive Director shall consult with
the Chairman and Ranking Member of the appropriate committees
of Congress in developing recommendations to the President of
not less than 3 persons for appointment to the Council who have
significant relevant experience in the fields of trade, private
investment, economics, international development, or other
relevant fields.
(3) Duties.--The Council shall publish an annual report on
investment in Africa by United States members of the African
diaspora and barriers to increased investment by the diaspora.
(4) Diaspora business forums.--The Executive Director shall
organize public meetings throughout the United States with
members of the African diaspora community that--
(A) provide a forum for communication, education,
and information about investment opportunities; and
(B) as appropriate, may be coordinated with local
civic, community, and business organizations.
(g) Business-Enabling Environment.--The Executive Director, in
coordination with the respective Chiefs of Mission at designated United
States embassies, shall seek to strengthen the business-enabling
environment in Africa by--
(1) identifying barriers to United States investment on a
country-by-country basis;
(2) identifying existing development and technical
assistance programs that can serve to eliminate the barriers
identified under paragraph (1);
(3) ensuring Country Development Cooperation Strategies and
Regional Development Cooperation Strategies incorporate
programs and activities focused on addressing specific barriers
to private sector investment identified under paragraph (1);
and
(4) providing policy advice and technical assistance to
select African countries to develop and improve regulatory and
legal structures, taxation and customs regimes, policy
frameworks, and other relevant structures and practices to
improve the operating environments for businesses and eliminate
other barriers to competition.
SEC. 133. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN
AFRICA.
The Comptroller General of the United States shall--
(1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial
Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at
United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and
(2) develop and submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress an assessment of whether human resource capacity in
such embassies is adequate to meet the goals of the various
trade and economic programs and initiatives in Africa,
including the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C.
3701 et seq.) and Prosper Africa.
SEC. 134. SUPPORT FOR BANGLADESH DEMOCRACY AND LABOR RIGHTS PROGRAMS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State is authorized to provide
assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act to support and develop
programs in Bangladesh that promote or expand--
(1) freedom of expression, including in the media, by--
(A) supporting media personnel who are victims of
arbitrary arrests and legal harassment about educating
them about their rights and resources under Bangladeshi
law; and
(B) education and training for media personnel on
how to promote democratic values in a restrictive
environment;
(2) access to labor rights, including--
(A) strengthened legal and policy frameworks to
protect workers seeking redress for gender-based
violence; and
(B) strengthened legal and policy frameworks for
migrant workers; and
(3) improved working conditions, including in Bangladesh's
Ready Made Garment (RMG) sector.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2027 for
the Secretary of State to carry out this section, which upon
appropriation shall remain available until expended.
SEC. 135. SUPPORT FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMS AND OTHER PROGRAMS TO
ADDRESS IMPUNITY AND JUSTICE IN SRI LANKA.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) democracy, respect for human rights, justice and
reconciliation, and economic prosperity in Sri Lanka are
critical for the Sri Lankan people and to safeguard United
States interests in the Indo-Pacific;
(2) numerous factors contributed to Sri Lanka's economic
crisis, including government corruption, financial
mismanagement, and disproportionate military expenditures at
the expense of other public policy priorities; and
(3) despite being a recipient of 16 International Monetary
Fund loans, the Government of Sri Lanka has failed to address
their governance and economic issues given their predatory
lending, inability to tackle corruption, government impunity
for atrocities and justice for victims of atrocities, and other
abuses of human rights.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to--
(1) support the peaceful, democratic, and economic
aspirations of the people of Sri Lanka; and
(2) call on the Government of Sri Lanka to address the
recommendations of the International Monetary Fund of the need
to address corruption and to hold officials accountable for
past behaviors in order to address the dire governance and
economic concerns in Sri Lanka.
(c) Authorization.--The Secretary of State is authorized to provide
assistance to support and develop programs in Sri Lanka to address
public sector corruption, support accountability for those responsible
for atrocities, and promote justice for victims of atrocities.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2027 for
the Secretary of State to carry out this section, which shall remain
available until expended.
PART II--ALIGNING WITH PARTNERS ON ECONOMIC TOOLS
SEC. 141. ASSISTANCE TO ADVANCE FOREIGN INVESTMENT SCREENING OF UNITED
STATES ALLIES AND PARTNERS TO PROTECT NATIONAL INTERESTS.
(a) Technical Assistance to Foreign Partners.--The Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and, as
appropriate, the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as the
President determines appropriate, shall offer to provide technical
assistance to the governments of countries that are allies and partners
of the United States in establishing or improving legislative and
regulatory frameworks to screen foreign investment for national
security risks that are, to the extent possible, similar to the
frameworks set forth in section 721 of the Defense Production Act of
1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565).
(b) Engagement With Foreign Partners.--In carrying out subsection
(a), the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury and, as appropriate, the heads of other Federal departments
and agencies, shall actively encourage the government of each country
that is an ally or partner of the United States--
(1) to establish transparent protocols for screening
foreign investment that protect the national security interests
of such country; and
(2) to make decisions on the basis of the potential
national security risk of such investments.
(c) Diplomatic Engagement.--In providing the technical assistance
described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall--
(1) consult closely with the intended recipient of such
assistance to reach a mutual understanding regarding the scope
and nature of the country's particular national security needs
with respect to investment screening and the appropriate
response to meet those needs, and take all reasonable care to
ensure any screening process is transparent and national
security-focused;
(2) encourage governments of countries receiving technical
assistance to establish or improve the regulatory and
legislative frameworks to screen foreign investment as
described in subsection (b) to meet the security identified
pursuant to paragraph (1); and
(3) prioritize the conduct of diplomatic engagement with
government officials, including legislators, from countries
whose cooperation in foreign investment screening is deemed by
the Secretary to be critical to the interests of the United
States.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State for fiscal year 2025
$10,000,000 to carry out this section, which may be administered either
by the Department of State or the United States Agency for
International Development.
SEC. 142. ASSISTANCE TO COUNTER CORRUPT PRACTICES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other
Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall offer to provide
technical assistance to help establish and implement regulatory and
legislative frameworks to combat the bribery of foreign public
officials consistent with the principles of the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, adopted by the Negotiating Conference of the Council of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development on November
21, 1997, to the government of any country--
(1) that is an ally or partner of the United States;
(2) that has demonstrated a will to responsibly combat
corrupt practices in such country; and
(3) for which technical assistance will likely achieve
measurable results within five years.
SEC. 143. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
heads of other participating Federal agencies, shall establish and
develop a program to facilitate and encourage regular dialogues between
United States Government regulatory and technical agencies and their
counterpart organizations in allied and partner countries, both
bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions and
organizations--
(1) to promote best practices in regulatory formation and
implementation;
(2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory outcomes
based on scientific, technical, and other relevant principles;
(3) to seek better harmonization and alignment of
regulations and regulatory practices;
(4) to build consensus around industry and technical
standards in emerging sectors that will drive future global
economic growth and commerce; and
(5) to promote United States standards regarding
environmental, labor, and other relevant protections in
regulatory formation and implementation, in keeping with the
values of free, open, and democratic societies, including the
rule of law.
(b) Prioritization of Activities.--In facilitating expert exchanges
under subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize--
(1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with countries
where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards,
or communication and dialogue between technical agencies is
achievable and best advances the economic and national security
interests of the United States;
(2) multilateral coordination and collaboration where
greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or
dialogue on other relevant regulatory matters is achievable and
best advances the economic and national security interests of
the United States, including with the members of--
(A) the European Union;
(B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;
(C) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN);
(D) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD);
(E) the Pacific Alliance; and
(F) multilateral development banks; and
(3) regulatory practices and standards-setting bodies
focused on key economic sectors and emerging technologies.
(c) Participation by Nongovernmental Entities.--With regard to the
program described in subsection (a), the Secretary of State may
facilitate, including through the use of amounts authorized for such
purposes pursuant to subsection (d), the participation of relevant
organizations and individuals with relevant expertise, as appropriate
and to the extent that such participation advances the goals of such
program.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $2,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to
carry out this section.
SEC. 144. PILOT PROGRAM TO AUDIT BARRIERS TO COMMERCE IN DEVELOPING
PARTNER COUNTRIES.
(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall establish a pilot program--
(1) to identify and evaluate barriers to commerce in
developing countries that are allies and partners of the United
States; and
(2) to provide assistance to promote economic development
and commerce to those countries.
(b) Purposes.--Under the pilot program established under subsection
(a), the Secretary shall, in partnership with the countries selected
under subsection (c)(1)--
(1) identify barriers in those countries to enhancing
international commerce with the goal of setting priorities for
the efficient use of United States trade-related assistance;
(2) focus United States trade-related assistance on
building self-sustaining institutional capacity for expanding
commerce with those countries, consistent with their
international obligations and commitments; and
(3) further the national interests of the United States
by--
(A) expanding prosperity through the elimination of
foreign barriers to commercial exchange;
(B) assisting such countries to identify and reduce
barriers through the provision of foreign assistance to
increase--
(i) international commerce; and
(ii) foreign investment;
(C) assisting each such country in undertaking
reforms that will promote economic development, and
promote conditions favorable for business and
commercial development and job growth in the country;
and
(D) assisting private sector entities in those
countries to engage in reform efforts and enhance
productive global supply chain partnerships with the
United States and allies and partners of the United
States.
(c) Selection of Countries.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall select countries for
participation in the pilot program established under subsection
(a) from among countries--
(A) that are developing countries and allies and
partners of the United States;
(B) the governments of which have clearly
demonstrated a willingness to make appropriate legal,
policy, and regulatory reforms that are proven to
stimulate economic growth and job creation, consistent
with international trade rules and practices; and
(C) that meet such additional criteria as may be
established by the Secretary, in consultation with, as
appropriate, the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development and any other
agency.
(2) Considerations for additional criteria.--In
establishing additional criteria under paragraph (1)(C), the
Secretary and the Administrator shall--
(A) identify and address structural weaknesses,
systemic flaws, or other impediments within countries
that may be considered for participation in the pilot
program under subsection (a) that impact the
effectiveness of United States assistance to and make
recommendations for addressing those weaknesses, flaws,
and impediments;
(B) set priorities for commercial development
assistance building to focus resources on countries
where the provision of such assistance can deliver the
best value in identifying and eliminating barriers to
trade and investment, including by fostering adherence
to international trade obligations;
(C) developing appropriate performance measures and
establishing annual targets to monitor and assess
progress toward those targets, including measures to be
used to terminate the provision of assistance
determined to be ineffective; and
(D) ensure representation from across multiple
geographic regions.
(3) Number and deadline for selections.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 270 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
thereafter for 3 years, the Secretary, with the
concurrence of the Administrator, shall select
countries under paragraph (1) for participation in the
pilot program under subsection (a).
(B) Number.--The Secretary shall select for
participation in the pilot program under subsection
(a)--
(i) not fewer than 5 countries during the
one-year period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this Act; and
(ii) not fewer than 15 countries during the
5-year period beginning on such date of
enactment.
(4) Prioritization based on recommendations from chiefs of
mission.--In selecting countries under paragraph (1) for
participation in the pilot program under subsection (a), the
Secretary shall prioritize--
(A) countries recommended by chiefs of mission and
other agencies present at the missions, such as the
United States Agency for International Development--
(i) that will be able to substantially
benefit from expanded commercial development
assistance; and
(ii) the governments of which have
demonstrated the political will to effectively
and sustainably implement such assistance; or
(B) groups of countries, including groups of
geographically contiguous countries, including as
recommended by chiefs of mission, that meet the
criteria under subparagraph (A) and as a result of
expanded United States commercial development
assistance, will contribute to greater intra-regional
commerce or regional economic integration.
(d) Plans of Action.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary, in consultation with the
Administrator, as appropriate, shall lead in engaging relevant
officials of each country selected under subsection (c)(1) to
participate in the pilot program under subsection (a) with
respect to the development of a plan of action to identify and
evaluate barriers to economic and commercial development that
then informs United States assistance.
(2) Analysis required.--The development of a plan of action
under paragraph (1) shall include a comprehensive analysis of
relevant legal, policy, and regulatory constraints to economic
and job growth in that country.
(3) Elements.--A plan of action developed under paragraph
(1) for a country shall include the following:
(A) Priorities for reform agreed to by the
government of that country and the United States.
(B) Clearly defined policy responses, including
regulatory and legal reforms, as necessary, to achieve
improvement in the business and commercial environment
in the country.
(C) Identification of the anticipated costs to
establish and implement the plan.
(D) Identification of appropriate sequencing and
phasing of implementation of the plan to create
cumulative benefits, as appropriate.
(E) Identification of best practices and standards.
(F) Considerations with respect to how to make the
policy reform investments under the plan long-lasting.
(G) Appropriate consultation with affected
stakeholders in that country and in the United States.
(e) Termination.--The pilot program established under subsection
(a) shall terminate on the date that is 8 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 145. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION.
(a) Strategy.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as determined by the
Secretary, shall develop, implement, and submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a strategy to increase supply chain resiliency
and security by promoting and strengthening efforts to incentivize the
relocation of supply chains from the PRC.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
(1) be informed by consultations with the governments of
allies and partners of the United States;
(2) provide a description of how supply chain
diversification can be pursued in a complementary fashion to
strengthen the national interests of the United States;
(3) include an assessment of--
(A) the status and effectiveness of current efforts
by governments, multilateral development banks, and the
private sector to attract investment by private
entities who are seeking to diversify from reliance on
the PRC;
(B) major challenges hindering those efforts; and
(C) how the United States can strengthen the
effectiveness of those efforts;
(4) identify United States allies and partners with
comparative advantages for sourcing and manufacturing critical
goods and countries with the greatest opportunities and
alignment with United States values;
(5) identify how activities by the United States Agency for
International Development, the United States Trade and
Development Administration, and the United States International
Development Finance Corporation can effectively be leveraged to
strengthen and promote supply chain diversification, including
nearshoring to Latin America and the Caribbean as appropriate;
(6) advance diplomatic initiatives to secure specific
national commitments by governments in Latin America and the
Caribbean to undertake efforts to create favorable conditions
for nearshoring in the region, including commitments--
(A) to develop formalized national strategies to
attract United States investment;
(B) to address corruption and rule of law concerns;
(C) to modernize digital and physical
infrastructure;
(D) to lower trade barriers;
(E) to improve ease of doing business; and
(F) to finance and incentivize nearshoring
initiatives;
(7) advance diplomatic initiatives towards mutual
recognition of standards and regulations, expedite customs
operations, and facilitate economic integration and the World
Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement; and
(8) develop and implement programs to finance, incentivize,
or otherwise promote supply chain diversification in accordance
with the assessments and identifications made pursuant to
paragraphs (3), (4), and (5), including, at minimum, programs--
(A) to develop physical and digital infrastructure;
(B) to promote transparency in procurement
processes;
(C) to provide technical assistance in implementing
national nearshoring strategies;
(D) to mobilize private investment; and
(E) to secure commitments by private sector
entities to relocate supply chains from the PRC.
(c) Coordination With Multilateral Development Banks.--In
implementing the strategy required under subsection (a), the Secretary
of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as
determined by the Secretary, should, as appropriate, coordinate with
the United States Executive Director to the World Bank Group and the
United States executive directors to regional development banks.
SEC. 146. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH GLOBAL
SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.
(a) Authorization To Contract Services.--The Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish
a program to facilitate contracting by the Department of State for the
professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee-for-
service basis, to assist interested United States persons, including
business entities, with supply chain management issues related to the
PRC, including--
(1) exiting from the market of the PRC or relocating
certain production facilities to locations outside the PRC;
(2) diversifying sources of inputs and other efforts to
diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;
(3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in
the course of activities described in paragraphs (1) and (2);
and
(4) identifying alternative markets for production or
sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market
intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners
as appropriate, and other services.
(b) Chief of Mission Oversight.--An individual hired to perform
services described in subsection (a) shall--
(1) be under the authority of the United States chief of
mission in the country in which the individual is hired, in
accordance with existing United States laws;
(2) coordinate with officers of the Department of State and
the Department of Commerce; and
(3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant
local partners in other countries as needed to provide those
services.
(c) Prioritization of Micro-, Small-, and Medium-Sized
Enterprises.--In carrying out the program authorized under subsection
(a), the Secretary shall prioritize the provision of services described
in that subsection to assist micro-, small-, and medium-sized
enterprises with supply chain management issues described in that
subsection.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State $15,000,000 for each of fiscal
years 2025 through 2029 for the purposes of carrying out this section.
(e) Prohibition on Access to Assistance by the PRC.--
(1) In general.--None of the funds appropriated pursuant to
the authorization of appropriations under subsection (d) may be
provided to an entity--
(A) under the foreign ownership, control, or
influence of the Government of the PRC or the Chinese
Communist Party;
(B) determined to have beneficial ownership from
foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction,
direction, or influence of the PRC; or
(C) that, at the time any of such funds would be
provided, has a contract in effect, or has had a
contract in effect in the preceding year, with--
(i) the Government of the PRC;
(ii) the Chinese Communist Party;
(iii) the Chinese military;
(iv) an entity majority-owned, majority-
controlled, or majority-financed by the
Government of the PRC, the Chinese Communist
Party, or the Chinese military; or
(v) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of
an entity specified in any of clauses (i)
through (iv).
(2) Foreign ownership, control, or influence defined.--In
this subsection, the term ``foreign ownership, control, or
influence'' has the meaning given that term in the National
Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22-M),
or a successor document, part 117 of title 32, Code of Federal
Regulations (or a successor regulation).
SEC. 147. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON PROMOTING PRIVATE
SECTOR FINANCE.
(a) In General.--The President should work with transatlantic
partners to enhance coordination that fosters private sector-led
development and provides market-based alternatives to state-directed
financing in emerging markets, particularly as related to the PRC's
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative
(GDI), including by supporting efforts, including--
(1) the 2023 MOU between the Development Finance
Corporation and the European Investment Bank;
(2) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and
Asia;
(3) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative
Investment Fund;
(4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged
$65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes
transparency standards;
(5) the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and
Investment; and
(6) cooperation with multilateral development banks and
international financial institutions, including the World Bank,
International Finance Corporation, Asian Development Bank,
Inter-American Development Bank, and other regional
multilateral development banks.
(b) Cooperation at the United Nations.--The United States should
coordinate efforts with the European Union and European countries to
address the Government of the PRC's use of the United Nations to
advance and legitimize BRI as a global good, including the
proliferation of memoranda of understanding between the PRC and United
Nations funds and programs on BRI implementation.
(c) Standards.--The United States and the European Union should
coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation
with the OECD and the Paris Club to provide alternatives to BRI
projects for the development of critical infrastructure, including by
enabling developing countries to negotiate more favorable terms that
meet international performance and transparency standards.
PART III--COUNTERING EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATIONS
SEC. 151. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND NEW ARRANGEMENTS TO BORROW.
Section 17(a)(6) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C.
286e-2(a)(6)) is amended by striking ``December 31, 2025'' and
inserting ``December 31, 2030''.
SEC. 152. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States fully supports Taiwan's participation
in, and contribution to, international organizations and
underscores the importance of the relationship between Taiwan
and the United States;
(2) diversifying the Inter-American Development Bank's
donor base and increasing ally engagement in the Western
Hemisphere reinforces United States national interests;
(3) Taiwan's significant contribution to the development
and economies of Latin America and the Caribbean demonstrate
that Taiwan's membership in the Inter-American Development Bank
as a non-borrowing member would benefit the Bank and the entire
Latin American and Caribbean region; and
(4) non-borrowing membership in the Inter-American
Development Bank would allow Taiwan to substantially leverage
and channel the immense resources Taiwan already provides to
Latin America and the Caribbean to reach a larger number of
beneficiaries.
(b) Plan for the Participation of Taiwan in the Inter-American
Development Bank.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury, as appropriate, is authorized--
(1) to initiate a United States plan to endorse non-
borrowing membership in the Inter-American Development Bank for
Taiwan, including by advancing amendments, as necessary, to the
Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank,
done at Washington April 8, 1959 (10 UST 3029); and
(2) to instruct the United States Governor of the Bank to
work with the Board of Governors of the Bank to admit Taiwan as
a non-borrowing member of the Bank, including by advancing
amendments, as necessary, to that Agreement.
SEC. 153. INCREASED UNITED STATES COOPERATION WITH ASIA-PACIFIC
ECONOMIC COOPERATION.
The Secretary of State should pursue the following objectives at
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum:
(1) Improving efficiency in supply chains, particularly
semiconductor supply chains.
(2) Encouraging continued public-private dialogues with
policymakers and promoting a common set of technology
standards.
(3) Promoting the development and use of policy
recommendations for governments--
(A) to adopt clean energy standards; and
(B) to support research and development of clean
energy, both renewable and non-renewable.
(4) Advancing cooperation that reduces barriers to cross-
border investment and creates opportunities for United States
small- and medium-sized enterprises to access APEC emerging and
growing markets.
(5) Improving cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific region and
developing tools for governments to combat cyber threats,
including ransomware, disinformation, and cyber hacks.
(6) Increasing coordination in prohibiting and preventing
the facilitation of trade in goods produced using forced labor.
(7) Confronting issues such as intellectual property theft
and counterfeit goods.
(8) Enhancing sufficient and sustainable food security by
promoting the development of advanced agricultural technologies
and farming practices.
(9) Expanding the economic opportunities for women to fully
and meaningfully engage in a business environment that promotes
women's economic participation.
SEC. 154. OPPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES TO AN INCREASE IN THE WEIGHT
OF THE CHINESE RENMINBI IN THE SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS
BASKET OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the
United States Governor of, and the United States Executive Director at,
the International Monetary Fund (in this section referred to as the
``Fund'') to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any
increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the basket of
currencies used to determine the value of Special Drawing Rights,
unless the Secretary of the Treasury has submitted to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services
of the House of Representatives a written report that includes an
assessment that--
(1) in the 12 months preceding submission of the report--
(A) the PRC does not appear, based on publicly
available data, to have been in violation of its
obligations under Article VIII of the Articles of
Agreement of the Fund;
(B) the Secretary of the Treasury has not
determined under section 3004 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (22 U.S.C. 5304) that the
PRC has manipulated the rate of exchange between its
currency and the United States dollar for purposes of
preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or
gaining unfair competitive advantage in international
trade; and
(C) the President, through the Secretary of the
Treasury, has not taken an action against the PRC
pursuant to section 701 of the Trade Facilitation and
Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (19 U.S.C. 4421) for
failing to adopt appropriate policies following
enhanced bilateral engagement conducted pursuant to
that section;
(2) the renminbi is freely usable (within the meaning of
Article XXX(f) of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund); and
(3) the PRC provides financing assurances and debt
treatments consistent with debt sustainability analyses of the
Fund for countries participating in the Common Framework for
Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative
(commonly known as the ``Common Framework'') and debt
treatments outside the Common Framework.
(b) Waiver.--The Secretary of the Treasury may waive any of the
conditions described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a)
upon certifying to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives
that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States.
(c) Sunset.--Subsection (a) shall have no force or effect on or
after the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
Subtitle C--Global Infrastructure and Energy Development
SEC. 161. DEPARTMENT OF STATE INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION TASK FORCE.
(a) Establishment.--There is established at the Department of State
a task force, to be known as the ``Infrastructure Coordination Task
Force'', which shall be led by an appropriate Senate-confirmed official
at the Department of State. If the leader of the Task Force is not the
Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the
Environment, then the leader of the task force shall coordinate with
such Under Secretary on matters related to the task force.
(b) Duties.--The Infrastructure Coordination Task Force shall--
(1) coordinate international infrastructure policies and
projects supported by the United States Government, with
participation by the relevant Federal departments and agencies;
(2) engage international partners such as the Group of
Seven (G7), multilateral development banks, international
financial institutions, the United States private sector,
multinational corporations and banks, nongovernmental
organizations, and other partners in industrialized countries;
(3) advance United States objectives through initiatives
such as the Blue Dot Network, Infrastructure Transaction
Assistance Network, the Transaction Advisory Fund, and the
Strategic Ports Initiative; and
(4) produce strategic guidance that identifies
international infrastructure projects.
SEC. 162. AUTHORIZATION OF PARTNERSHIP FOR GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND
INVESTMENT.
(a) Establishment.--There shall be an office at the Department of
State to support the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and
Investment, or a successor entity (hereafter, ``the Office''). The
Office shall be led by a ``Coordinator for Global Infrastructure and
Investment'' (hereafter, ``the Coordinator'') who shall be an official
serving in a position to which the individual was appointed by the
President, with the advice and consent of the United States Senate.
(b) Authority.--The Coordinator shall have the authority to convene
the interagency on matters relating to its policy remit. The Office is
authorized to deploy United States public and private sector capital
and expertise for the purpose of mobilizing foreign public and private
sector capital and expertise--
(1) to help identify and meet the strategic infrastructure
needs of countries that are allies and partners of the United
States; and
(2) to provide allies and partners of the United States
with mutually beneficial strategic infrastructure investment
solutions that are alternatives to exploitative, coercive, or
harmful foreign infrastructure investments.
(c) Prioritization.--In evaluating proposals for strategic
infrastructure projects funded through the Partnership for Global
Infrastructure and Investment, the Secretary of State, in consultation
with other departments and agencies as appropriate, should prioritize--
(1) projects that have the highest strategic value to the
United States; and
(2) projects related to--
(A) strategic transport infrastructure, including
ports, airports, intermodal transfer facilities,
railroads, and highways;
(B) energy infrastructure, technology, and supply
chains, critical minerals, and related areas that align
with the energy needs of partner countries and with the
objective of maximizing such countries' energy access,
energy security, energy transition and modernization,
and resilience needs.
(C) secure information and communications
technology systems, networks, and infrastructure to
strengthen the potential for economic growth and
promote an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure
Internet; and
(D) global health security, including through
infrastructure projects that increase the availability,
accessibility, and affordability of health care in
partner countries.
(d) Standards.--In carrying out the purposes described in
subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall adhere to standards for
sustainable, transparent, and quality infrastructure investment and
ensure interventions include opportunities to advance economic growth
priorities in relevant sectors in the partner country and support good
governance and the rule of law.
(e) Projects in High-Income Countries.--Support provided by the
United States under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and
Investment shall not be provided in countries with high-income
economies (as those terms are defined by the World Bank) unless the
Secretary certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that
such support--
(1) is necessary to attempt to preempt or counter efforts
by a strategic competitor of the United States to secure
significant political or economic leverage or acquire national
security-sensitive technologies or infrastructure in a country
that is an ally or partner of the United States; and
(2) includes cost-sharing arrangements with partner
countries to ensure effective burden-sharing and long-term
sustainability, including through the involvement of private
sector investments.
(f) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period
of two years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Administrator for the United States Agency for International
Development and the heads of other Federal departments and
agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report to the
appropriate committees of Congress that--
(A) identifies all current infrastructure projects
supported by the Partnership for Global Infrastructure
and Investment;
(B) describes how the Partnership for Global
Infrastructure and Investment supported each project;
(C) explains the rationale of the United States and
partner country interests served by the United States
providing support to such projects, including as it
relates to the priorities described in subsection (c);
(D) describes how the Partnership for Global
Infrastructure and Investment cooperates with other
entities in the United States Government that support
infrastructure, including de-confliction of efforts;
and
(E) to the extent possible, describes the estimated
timeline for completion of the projects supported by
the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and
Investment.
(2) Form of report.--The report required under paragraph
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 163. INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSACTION AND ASSISTANCE NETWORK.
(a) Authority.--There is established an initiative, to be known as
the ``Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network'', under which
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development and the heads of
other relevant Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall carry out
programs to advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and
quality infrastructure globally in countries that are eligible for
foreign assistance, by--
(1) strengthening the capacities of United States allies
and partners to improve infrastructure project evaluation
processes, regulatory and procurement environments, and
infrastructure project preparation;
(2) providing transaction advisory services and project
preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure;
and
(3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance
for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure
that utilizes United States-manufactured goods and services,
and catalyzing investment led by the private sector.
(b) Transaction Advisory Fund.--As part of the Infrastructure
Transaction and Assistance Network described under subsection (a), the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development, and in
consultation, as appropriate, with other Federal departments and
agencies, shall provide support, including through the Transaction
Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost the capacity of
partner countries globally to evaluate contracts in line with
international standards, including through providing services such as--
(1) legal services, including with the objectives of--
(A) minimizing opportunities for corrupt practices;
and
(B) ensuring agreements are transparent, clear, and
enforceable;
(2) project preparation and feasibility studies;
(3) debt sustainability analyses;
(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
(5) other services relevant to advancing the development of
sustainable, transparent, and quality infrastructure.
(c) Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund.--
(1) In general.--As part of the ``Infrastructure
Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under subsection
(a), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support,
including through the Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure
Fund, for technical assistance, project preparation,
development, and execution, and other infrastructure project
support in the countries of the Indo-Pacific region.
(2) Joint infrastructure projects.--Funds authorized for
the Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used
in coordination with the Department of Defense, the
International Development Finance Corporation, the Export-
Import Bank of the United States, the United States Trade and
Development Agency, like-minded donor partners, and
multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support joint
infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region.
(3) Strategic infrastructure projects.--Funds authorized
for the Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be
used to support strategic infrastructure projects.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029, $50,000,000
for the Transaction Advisory Fund and $100,000,000 for the Indo-Pacific
Strategic Infrastructure Fund.
SEC. 164. STRATEGIC PORTS INITIATIVE.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, the Chief Executive Officer of United States International
Development Finance Corporation, the Trade and Development Agency, and
other relevant Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall
carry out a program entitled the ``Strategic Ports Initiative'' for the
following purposes:
(1) To provide training and technical assistance to partner
country officials and institutions, and others, as appropriate,
responsible for building, managing, and securing seaports,
airports, and related infrastructure abroad.
(2) To identify ports and airports vulnerable to ownership
or other forms of control by strategic competitors, including
the PRC, and make recommendations for United States Government
action.
(3) To contribute to United States Government diplomatic
engagements and other efforts with partner countries and
economies, and relevant and trusted private sector entities
with respect to ownership or control of seaports and airports
by strategic competitors, including the PRC.
(4) To generate priority countries and projects for United
States assistance and investment, including through
coordination with the Infrastructure Coordination Task Force
established pursuant to section 161.
(5) To ensure that all Department of State initiatives,
activities, and funding related to seaports and airports align
with the national security interests of the United States and
account for the vulnerabilities, technical constraints, and
other national security implications of seaport and airport
infrastructure to construction, ownership, operation, or other
forms of direct and indirect control by strategic competitors,
including the PRC.
(6) To ensure, to the greatest extent practicable, that
projects supported by the United States use local labor and
professional capacities, in contrast to infrastructure projects
carried out by the PRC.
(7) To assist in identifying and promoting alternatives for
port logistics data management systems currently offered by
strategic competitors, including the PRC.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029, $6,000,000 to
carry out the purposes of the Strategic Ports Initiative.
SEC. 165. NEXT-GENERATION SHIPPING.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State is authorized to carry out
the following activities to support the development of next-generation
shipping corridors or green shipping corridors:
(1) Conduct analysis to determine United States priorities
for cooperation with partner countries on next-generation
shipping corridors or green shipping corridors.
(2) Support research and development initiatives and
technical assistance, as appropriate, in the following areas:
(A) Next-generation port design, engineering, and
architecture.
(B) Hydrogen fuel production and hydrogen fuel
storage and utilization capacities at ports.
(C) Commercial-scale high-speed electric vehicle
trucking fleet charging infrastructure.
(D) Logistics and shipping corridor planning.
(E) Hydrogen pipelines.
(F) Liquid hydrogen power vessels, and other next-
generation marine propulsion systems, design and
manufacturing, including both new vessels and retrofit
and refurbishment of existing vessels.
(3) Support private sector investment in next-generation
shipping infrastructure in partner countries with strong or
emerging commercial ties with the United States that--
(A) are strategically or centrally located markets
in international commerce; or
(B) face growing or concerning financial
entanglements with malign foreign governments.
(b) Parameters.--In carrying out activities authorized under
subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall ensure that all activities
align with the national security interests of the United States and the
purposes of the Strategic Ports Initiative authorized pursuant to
section 164.
(c) International Maritime Organization.--The United States shall
use its voice, vote, and influence in the International Maritime
Organization to-
(1) counter any attempts by the PRC or other strategic
competitors to advance or advocate for policies, regulations,
or technical standards that unfairly benefit particular
countries and their domestic industries and products to the
detriment of free and fair markets;
(2) advocate for the adoption of next-generation shipping
industry technologies and infrastructure standards, policies,
regulations and cooperation initiatives that advance United
States national and economic security interests;
(3) participate in the International Maritime
Organization's global technical cooperation projects to support
growing the capacity of parties to develop and modernize global
shipping industries technologies and infrastructure; and
(4) represent the interests of United States stakeholders
impacted by International Maritime Organization initiatives.
(d) Limitation.--Prior to providing funding for activities to
support the establishment and development of next-generation shipping
corridors or green shipping corridors, the Department of State shall
obtain commitments from participating countries in the following areas:
(1) Prohibiting exclusivity or preferences for specific
international shipping routes, including exclusive access for
specific vessels, fleets, or maritime shipping companies of the
PRC.
(2) Preventing the sale, lease, or operational control of
port operations, or any subsidiary operations, including
security, communications and information technology, or energy
suppliers to entities owned or controlled by the PRC.
(3) Prohibiting the use of, or contracts with
communications, survey, and logistics management providers
owned or controlled by the PRC.
(4) Maintaining transparent and accountable security
operations that are not contracted to entities owned or
controlled by the PRC.
(5) Ensuring that ports do not serve as ports of call for
PRC military or research vessels.
(6) Ensuring that ports are operated in a transparent and
accountable manner, consistent with domestic and applicable
international law.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $120,000,000 over the next three fiscal years to carry out
activities under this section.
SEC. 166. GLOBAL STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT FUND.
(a) Strategic Infrastructure Investment Fund.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established in the Treasury of
the United States a fund to be known as the ``Global Strategic
Infrastructure Fund'' (in this section referred to as the
``Fund'') for the Secretary of State to provide for assistance,
including through contributions for strategic infrastructure
projects globally as authorized under this section.
(2) Appropriations.--In addition to amounts otherwise
available for such purposes, there is appropriated to the Fund
established in subsection (a)(1), out of amounts in the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated--
(A) for fiscal year 2025, $400,000,000, to remain
available until expended;
(B) for fiscal year 2026, $400,000,000, to remain
available until expended;
(C) for fiscal year 2027, $400,000,000, to remain
available until expended;
(D) for fiscal year 2028, $400,000,000, to remain
available until expended; and
(E) for fiscal year 2029, $400,000,000, to remain
available until expended.
(3) Transfer authority.--Amounts in the Fund shall be
transferred and merged with accounts within the Department of
State, the United States Agency for International Development,
the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the United States
International Development Finance Corporation, the Millennium
Challenge Corporation, and the United States Trade and
Development Agency, as appropriate, to be used for such
purposes.
(4) Consultation.--The Secretary of State shall consult
with the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development on the allocations of the Fund.
(5) Loans and loan guarantees.--Amounts transferred from
the Fund to the Export-Import Bank and the United States
International Development Finance Corporation, among other
purposes, may be made available for the costs of direct loans
and loan guarantees, including the cost of modifying such loans
and loan guarantees, as defined in section 502 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 661a).
(b) Prioritization.--In evaluating proposals for strategic
infrastructure projects funded pursuant to subsection (a), the
Secretary of State shall prioritize--
(1) projects that have the highest strategic value to the
United States; and
(2) projects related to--
(A) strategic transport infrastructure, including
ports, airports, railroads, and highways;
(B) energy infrastructure, technology, and supply
chains, critical minerals, and related areas that align
with the officially conveyed energy needs of partner
countries and with the objective of maximizing such
countries' energy access, energy security, energy
transition, and resilience needs;
(C) secure information and communications
technology networks and infrastructure to strengthen
the potential for economic growth and to promote an
open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet; and
(D) global health security, including through
infrastructure projects that increase the availability,
accessibility, and affordability of health care in
partner countries.
(c) Standards.--In evaluating proposals for strategic
infrastructure projects funded pursuant to subsection (a), the
Secretary of State shall adhere to standards for sustainable,
transparent, and quality infrastructure investment and ensure projects
include opportunities to advance economic growth priorities in the
partner country and support good governance and the rule of law.
(d) Projects in High Income Countries.--Support provided under the
Fund shall not be provided in countries with high-income economies (as
those terms are defined by the World Bank) unless the President
certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such
support--
(1) is necessary to preempt or counter efforts by a
strategic competitor of the United States to secure significant
political or economic leverage or acquire national security-
sensitive technologies or infrastructure in a country that is
an ally or partner of the United States; and
(2) includes cost-sharing arrangements with partner
countries to ensure effective burden-sharing and long-term
sustainability.
SEC. 167. MODIFICATIONS OF REQUIREMENTS TO BECOME A MILLENNIUM
CHALLENGE CORPORATION CANDIDATE COUNTRY.
(a) Candidate Country Qualifications.--Section 606 of the
Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7705) is amended to read as
follows:
``SEC. 606. CANDIDATE COUNTRIES.
``(a) In General.--A country shall be a candidate country for
purposes of eligibility to receive assistance under section 605 if--
``(1) the per capita income of the country in a fiscal year
is equal to or less than the World Bank threshold for
initiating the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development graduation process for the fiscal year; and
``(2) subject to subsection (b), the country is not
ineligible to receive United States economic assistance under
part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et
seq.) by reason of the application of any provision of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any other provision of law.
``(b) Rule of Construction.--For the purposes of determining
whether a country is eligible, pursuant to subsection (a)(2), to
receive assistance under section 605, the exercise by the President,
the Secretary of State, or any other officer or employee of the United
States Government of any waiver or suspension of any provision of law
referred to in subsection (a)(2), and notification to the appropriate
congressional committees in accordance with such provision of law,
shall be construed as satisfying the requirements under subsection (a).
``(c) Determination by the Board.--The Board shall determine
whether a country is a candidate country for purposes of this
section.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Amendment to report identifying candidate countries.--
Section 608(a)(1) of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22
U.S.C. 7707(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``section
606(a)(1)(B)'' and inserting ``section 606(a)(2)''.
(2) Amendment to millennium challenge compact authority.--
Section 609(b)(2) of such Act ( 22 U.S.C. 7708(b)(2)) is
amended--
(A) by amending the paragraph heading to read as
follows: ``Country contributions''; and
(B) by striking ``with respect to a lower middle
income country described in section 606(b),''.
(3) Amendment to authorization to provide assistance for
candidate countries.--Section 616(b)(1) of such Act ( 22 U.S.C.
7715(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``subsection (a) or (b) of
section 606'' and inserting ``section 606(a)''.
(c) Modification to Factors in Determining Eligibility.--Section
607(c)(2) of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C.
7706(c)(2)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by
striking ``consider'' and inserting ``prioritize need and impact by
considering''.
SEC. 168. AFRICA ENERGY SECURITY AND DIVERSIFICATION.
Section 3 of the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-121;
22 U.S.C. 2293 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following new
paragraphs:
``(10) advance United States foreign policy and development
goals by assisting African countries to reduce their dependence
on countries that use energy dependence for political
influence, such as the Russian Federation or the People's
Republic of China, which have used energy and financial
resources to influence other countries;
``(11) promote the energy security and domestic energy
resource mobilization of allies and partners of the United
States in Africa by--
``(A) encouraging the development of accessible,
transparent, and competitive energy markets that
provide diversified sources and reliable and affordable
power, including civil nuclear energy;
``(B) promoting domestic energy resource
mobilization, advancing regulatory reforms in the
energy sector, and supporting grid modernization and
energy storage deployment efforts; and
``(C) facilitating the efforts of partner countries
to meet their goals and commitments related to energy
resource production and consumption;
``(12) encourage United States public and private sector
investment in African energy infrastructure projects to bridge
the gap between energy security requirements and commercial
demand in a way that is consistent with the region's capacity
and the goals and commitments of partner countries; and
``(13) help facilitate the trade and cooperation on energy
production, advance energy technology development and
deployment, and provide technical assistance to build
capacities on regulatory improvements and greater expertise on
global markets in a way that benefits the energy security of
allies and partners of the United States, including in
Africa.''.
SEC. 169. ENHANCING RESILIENT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE PACIFIC
ISLANDS.
(a) Program.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in coordination
with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and
agencies, as appropriate, shall develop and implement a
strategy for the expansion, improvement, and protection of
resilient critical infrastructure in the Pacific Islands.
(2) Elements.--The strategy and related programming under
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) consider the--
(i) current and forecasted gaps in
functionality of, and threats to, critical
infrastructure in the Pacific Islands,
including--
(I) for disaster preparedness and
response, transport connectivity,
operability of health systems,
information and communications
technology, food security, coastal zone
management, marine and water resource
management, and energy security and
access to electricity; and
(II) to the extent practicable, the
rates, severity and drivers of
deterioration, structural deficiencies,
and most pressing threats to public
safety from aging, at-risk, and failing
infrastructure;
(ii) United States national security risks
posed by weak, outdated, at-risk, and failing
critical infrastructure in the Pacific Islands,
with particular consideration for the
interconnectedness of supply chains,
interconnected transportation networks,
technology, communications, and financial
systems; and
(iii) the policy-enabling environment for
public and private sector investment in
critical infrastructure in the Pacific Islands,
including through local resource mobilization,
early stage project preparation, development
finance, and foreign direct investment;
(B) seek to enhance the ability of Pacific
Islanders, including governments at the national and
local levels, civil society leaders, and private sector
partners, to attract and effectively manage public and
private investment in critical infrastructure while
resisting predatory lending and resource extraction
deals by malign actors;
(C) identify priorities for critical infrastructure
improvement, reinforcement, re-engineering, or
replacement based on the significance of such
infrastructure to ensuring public health, safety, and
economic growth;
(D) support investment and improvement in natural
resource management and conservation;
(E) include recommendations for policy and
governance reforms in the Pacific Islands, as necessary
and appropriate, to strengthen critical infrastructure
resilience; and
(F) support trainings and information sharing,
technology exchanges, reverse trade missions, and pilot
projects that provide Pacific Islanders with access to
proven, cost-effective solutions for mitigating the
risks associated with critical infrastructure
vulnerabilities and related interdependencies.
(b) Coordination.--The program developed under this section should
be coordinated with like-minded allies, partners, and regional and
international organizations to encourage alignment of efforts and to
avoid duplicative investments and programming.
(c) Disaster Preparedness.--The Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, in consultation with the relevant
Federal departments and agencies with technical and practical
expertise, shall work with Pacific Island countries to--
(1) provide technical assistance, education, and training,
including through grants and cooperative agreements for
qualified United States and local nongovernmental
organizations, to enhance early warning systems, emergency
management and preparedness procedures, and post-disaster
relief and recovery; and
(2) enhance coordination of existing disaster mitigation
and response plans in the Pacific Islands region, including by
United States allies and partners in the region.
(d) International Financial Institutions.--The Secretary of the
Treasury shall direct the representatives of the United States to the
World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian
Development Bank to use the voice and vote of the United States to
support sustainable, resilient, and high quality infrastructure
projects in the Pacific Islands.
SEC. 170. OCEANIA RESTORATION AND HAZARDS REMOVAL PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall establish an Oceania
Restoration and Hazards Removal Program (in this section referred to as
the ``Program'').
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Program is--
(1) to coordinate with the countries of Oceania--
(A) to support survey and clearance operations of
buried and abandoned bombs, mortars, artillery shells,
and unexploded ordnance from battlefields of World War
II; and
(B) to identify, isolate, and where appropriate,
mitigate environmental risks associated with submerged
maritime vessels that pose a threat to public health or
marine resources because of the presence of oil, fuel,
corrosive metals, or other toxins; and
(2) to build the national capacity of the countries of
Oceania to identify, isolate, and mitigate risks related to
explosive ordnance hazards, submerged maritime vessels, or
related hazardous marine debris through survey and disposal
training, funding to relevant nongovernmental organizations,
and support to regional cooperation initiatives with countries
that are allies and partners of the United States, including
Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea,
and the United Kingdom.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary of State $1,000,000 for each of fiscal
years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section.
SEC. 171. COORDINATION WITH OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES AND COOPERATION AND
PARTICIPATION OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES.
The Federal officials responsible for carrying out policies and
actions under sections 168 and 169 should, as appropriate--
(1) coordinate with existing programs and efforts of
relevant agencies of the United States Government, including
with regard to the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the
Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau;
(2) seek the cooperation and participation of United States
private sector, United States nongovernmental organizations,
and United States institutions of higher education; and
(3) work with civil society organizations and other
relevant stakeholders in Pacific Island countries, as
appropriate.
SEC. 172. FINDINGS RELATED TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S
INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) State-owned enterprises of the PRC are subject to the
direction of both the state and the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), and the CCP strives to increase their influence over the
global economy by pursuing predatory and exploitative trade,
economic, and industrial practices designed to out-compete the
United States and other market economies.
(2) The PRC's control of key components of critical global
supply chains, including critical minerals, semiconductors,
batteries, solar panels, and pharmaceuticals, as outlined in
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's February
2023 ``Annual Threat Assessment'', represents a direct threat
to United States national security and harms global economic
competition.
(3) The CCP's industrial strategy, as articulated in the
Made in China 2025 plan, aims to dominate global manufacturing
in crucial energy technologies, including advanced materials,
batteries, and power equipment.
(4) The PRC, by far the world's largest polluter, accounts
for approximately \1/3\ of global carbon dioxide
(CO<INF>2</INF>) emissions according to the International
Energy Administration and subsidizes its industries,
manufacturers, and exports by neither implementing nor
enforcing adequate environmental or labor protection standards.
(5) The PRC's industrial sectors like agriculture, mining,
automotive production, and computer and electronics
manufacturing emit 3 times more carbon dioxide as compared to
the United States' same industrial sectors, and nearly 2 times
more carbon dioxide than the global average of the production
of comparable goods in other foreign countries, according to
industry tracking data from the International Energy Agency.
(6) The CCP seeks to utilize the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI) to increase
the dependence of low-income and lower-middle income countries
in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas on the PRC at the
expense of trapping such countries in long-term, high-
polluting, debt-ridden, low-quality infrastructure projects
that undermine developing countries' efforts to sustainably
grow and industrialize their economies to maximize benefits and
participation for their citizenry, while increasing global
pollution.
(7) The United States--
(A) has adopted many environmental protections,
including the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.),
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1251
et seq.), the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C.
2601 et seq.), and more than 15 other major
environmental protection laws that--
(i) add costs to the production of goods in
order to secure the benefits of environmental
protection and conservation efforts; and
(ii) serve to meaningfully decrease
greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide
(CO<INF>2</INF>), methane (CH<INF>4</INF>),
nitrous oxide (N<INF>2</INF>O), sulfur
hexafluoride (SF<INF>6</INF>),
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons
(PFCs), and other fluorinated greenhouse gases;
(B) is the world's largest consumer market and its
economy is highly integrated into the world; and
(C) bears responsibility to ensure that the United
States market does not incentivize forum shopping for
the production of goods to jurisdictions with low
environmental standards to obtain a competitive cost
advantage while undermining efforts to address
transnational environmental and resource challenges as
well as global public health.
(8) Any realistic pathway to substantially reduce global
carbon emissions will require the PRC to be held accountable
for its role as the world's largest polluter.
SEC. 173. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES TO THE BELT
AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE.
(a) In General.--The President should seek opportunities to partner
with multilateral development finance institutions to develop financing
tools based on shared development finance criteria and mechanisms to
support investments in developing countries that--
(1) support low carbon economic development; and
(2) promote resiliency and adaptation to environmental
changes.
(b) Partnership.--The Chief Executive Officer of the United States
International Development Finance Corporation should seek to partner
with other multilateral development finance institutions and
development finance institutions to leverage the respective available
funds to support low carbon economic development, which may include
nuclear energy projects, environmental adaptation, and resilience
activities in developing countries.
(c) Joint Cooperation on Infrastructure Projects.--
(1) Joint support.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary
of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, and other relevant agency heads may
co-finance, or provide joint support for, infrastructure
projects that advance the development of the United States
overseas and provide viable alternatives to projects that would
otherwise be included within the PRC's Belt and Initiative and
Global Development Initiative.
(2) Conditions.--Co-financing agreements and arrangements
authorized pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be approved
unless--
(A) the projects to be financed--
(i) promote the public good; and
(ii) will have substantially lower
environmental impact than the proposed Belt and
Road Initiative and Global Development
Initiative alternative; and
(B) the appropriate committees of Congress are
notified not later than 15 days in advance of entering
into such co-financing arrangements.
SEC. 174. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO SECURE CRITICAL MINERAL SUPPLY
CHAINS.
(a) Statement of Policy on Critical Mineral Supply Chains.--It is
the policy of the United States--
(1) to collaborate with allies and partners of the United
States to build secure and resilient critical minerals supply
chains, including in the mining, processing, and valuation of
critical minerals, as well as with respect to advanced
manufacturing that includes critical minerals;
(2) to prioritize the development and production of
critical minerals domestically, both to supply domestic needs
and for export to allies and partners that participate in
secure and resilient supply chains for critical minerals;
(3) to reduce or eliminate reliance and dependence on
critical mineral supply chains controlled by the PRC, the
Russian Federation, Iran, or any other adversary of the United
States;
(4) to work with allies and partners on enhancing
evaluation capability and technology in trusted countries that
produce critical minerals to avoid the export of mined and
processed critical minerals to adversaries of the United
States;
(5) to identify and implement market-based incentives for
the purposes of facilitating the creation and maintenance of
secure and resilient critical mineral supply chains in
collaboration with allies and partners;
(6) to prioritize securing critical mineral supply chains
in United States foreign policy, including through the use of
economic tools to invest responsibly in projects in partner
countries in a manner that both benefits local populations and
bolsters the supply of critical minerals to the United States
and allies and partners of the United States; and
(7) that collaboration with allies and partners to build
secure and resilient critical mineral supply chains shall not
replace United States efforts to increase domestic development
and production of critical minerals.
(b) International Negotiations Relating to Protecting Critical
Mineral Supply Chains.--
(1) In general.--The President is authorized to negotiate
an agreement with international partners for the purposes of
establishing a coalition--
(A) to facilitate--
(i) the mining, processing, and supply of
critical minerals; and
(ii) advanced manufacturing that includes
critical minerals; and
(B) to secure an adequate supply of critical
minerals and relevant products, manufacturing inputs,
and components that are heavily dependent on critical
mineral resources for the United States and other
members of the coalition (in this subsection referred
to as ``member countries'').
(2) Negotiating objectives.--The overall objectives for
negotiating an agreement described in paragraph (1) should be--
(A) to establish mechanisms for member countries to
build secure and resilient supply chains for critical
minerals, including in--
(i) the mining, refinement, processing, and
valuation of critical minerals; and
(ii) advanced manufacturing of products,
components, and materials that are dependent on
critical minerals;
(B) to improve economies of scale and joint
cooperation with international partners in securing
access and means of production throughout the supply
chains of critical minerals and manufacturing processes
dependent on critical minerals;
(C) to establish mechanisms, with appropriate
market-based disciplines, that provide and maintain
opportunities among member countries for creating
industry economies of scale to attract joint investment
among those countries, including--
(i) cooperation on joint projects,
including cost-sharing on building appropriate
infrastructure to access deposits of critical
minerals; and
(ii) creation or enhancement of national
and international programs to support the
development of robust industries by providing
appropriate sector-specific incentives, such as
political risk and other insurance
opportunities, financing, and other support,
for--
(I) mining and processing critical
minerals;
(II) manufacturing of products,
components, and materials that are
dependent on critical minerals and are
essential to consumer technology
products or have important national
security implications; and
(III) associated transportation
needs that are tailored to the
handling, movement, and logistics
management of critical minerals and
products, components, and materials
that are dependent on critical
minerals;
(D) to establish market-based rules for member
countries regarding adoption of qualifying tax and
other incentives to stimulate investment, as balanced
by market-based disciplines to ensure a fair playing
field among those countries;
(E) to establish recommended best practices to
protect--
(i) labor rights;
(ii) the natural environment and ecosystems
near critical mineral industrial sites; and
(iii) safety of communities near critical
mineral industrial activities;
(F) to advance economic growth in developing
countries with critical mineral reserves, including for
the benefit of the citizens of those countries;
(G) to establish rules allowing for the
establishment of a consortium that is resourced and
empowered to bid and compete in acquiring and securing
potential deposits of critical minerals in countries
that are not members of the coalition described in
paragraph (1) (in this subsection referred to as
``nonmember countries'');
(H) to establish a mechanism for joint resource
mapping with procedures for equitable sharing of
information on potential deposits of critical minerals
not less frequently than annually;
(I) to establish appropriate mechanisms for the
recognition and enforcement by a member country of
judgments relating to environmental and related harms
caused by mining operations within such member country
in contravention of that country's laws; and
(J) to improve supply chain security among member
countries by providing for national treatment
investment protections among those countries that are
equal to, or better than, the standards in the United
States model bilateral investment treaty.
(c) Minerals Security Partnership Authorization.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, acting through the
Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the
Environment, is authorized to lead United States participation
in the ``Minerals Security Partnership'', for the following
purposes:
(A) To identify and support investment and advocate
for commercial critical mineral mining, processing, and
refining projects that enable robust and secure
critical mineral supply chains, in consultation with
other Federal agencies, as appropriate.
(B) To coordinate with relevant regional bureaus to
develop regional diplomatic engagement strategies
related to critical minerals projects and to identify
projects that are priorities.
(C) To coordinate with United States missions
abroad on projects, programs, and investments that
enable robust and secure critical mineral supply
chains.
(D) To coordinate with current and prospective
members of the Minerals Security Partnership.
(E) To establish a mechanism for information-
sharing with members of the Minerals Security
Partnership.
(F) To establish policies and procedures, and if
necessary, to provide funding to facilitate cooperation
on joint projects with members of the Minerals Security
Partnership and the Mineral Security Forum, including
those related to cost-sharing agreements, political
risk insurance, financing, equity investments, and
other support, in coordination with other Federal
agencies, as appropriate.
(G) If an agreement described in subsection (b) is
entered into, to support the establishment of the
coalition described in that subsection.
(2) Database.--As part of the Minerals Security
Partnership, the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary,
is authorized to establish and maintain a database of critical
mineral projects for the purpose of providing high quality and
up-to-date information to the private sector in order to spur
greater investment, increase the resilience of global critical
minerals supply chains, and boost United States supply.
(3) Qualifications for personnel.--With respect to staffing
personnel to carry out the Minerals Security Partnership, the
Secretary shall prioritize individuals with the following
qualifications:
(A) Substantive knowledge and experience in issues
related to critical minerals supply chain and their
application to strategic industries, including in the
defense, energy, and technology sectors.
(B) Substantive knowledge and experience in large-
scale multi-donor project financing and related
technical and diplomatic arrangements, international
coalition-building, and project management.
(C) Substantive knowledge and experience in trade
and foreign policy, defense-industrial base policy, or
national security-sensitive supply chain issues.
(4) Private sector coordination.--The Secretary of State
shall ensure close coordination between the Department of
State, the private sector, and relevant civil society groups on
the implementation of this subsection.
(5) Project selection.--
(A) In general.--The United States, through its
participation in the Minerals Security Partnership,
shall prioritize projects that advance the national and
economic security interests of the United States and
allies and partners of the United States.
(B) Criteria requirements.--The United States
should advocate for the Minerals Security Partnership
to use environmental, social, or governance standards,
including as criteria for project selection, that are
consistent with United States law or international
agreements approved by Congress.
(d) United States Membership in the International Nickel Study
Group.--
(1) United states membership.--The President is authorized
to accept the Terms of Reference of and maintain membership of
the United States in the International Nickel Study Group
(INSG).
(2) Payments of assessed contributions.--For fiscal year
2024 and thereafter, the United States assessed contributions
to the INSG may be paid from funds appropriated for
``Contributions to International Organizations''.
(e) Critical Mineral Defined.--In this section, the term ``critical
mineral''--
(1) has the meaning given the term in section 7002 of the
Energy Act of 2020 (30 U.S.C. 1606); and
(2) includes any other mineral or mineral material
determined by the Secretary of State--
(A) to be essential to the economic or national
security of the United States; and
(B) to have a supply chain vulnerable to
disruption.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State $75,000,000 for fiscal year
2025 to enhance critical mineral supply chain security, including to
implement this section.
Subtitle D--Digital Technology and Connectivity
SEC. 176. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY FOR CRITICAL AND EMERGING
TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish an Office of the
Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology (referred to in this
section as the ``Office''), which may be located within the Bureau for
Cyberspace and Digital Policy.
(b) Leadership.--
(1) Special envoy.--The Office shall be headed by a Special
Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology, who shall--
(A) be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate;
(B) have the rank and status of ambassador; and
(C) report to the Ambassador-at-Large for
Cyberspace and Digital Policy.
(c) Membership.--The Office may include representatives or expert
detailees from other key Federal agencies or research and technology-
focused fellowship programs, as determined by the Special Envoy for
Critical and Emerging Technology and with the consent of the
Ambassador-at-Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy, in coordination
with relevant Department stakeholders and appropriate senior officials
of the Department of State and such agencies.
(d) Purposes.--The purposes of the Office are to assist the
Secretary of State in the coordination of Department and interagency
action in support of the functions described in subsection (e).
(e) Critical and Emerging Functions.--The Secretary of State
shall--
(1) establish, in coordination with relevant bureaus,
offices and other Federal agencies, an interagency security
review process for proposals regarding United States
Government-funded international collaboration on certain
critical and emerging technologies and associated research;
(2) establish and coordinate an interagency strategy to
facilitate international cooperation with United States allies
and partners regarding the development, use, and deployment of
certain critical and emerging technologies and associated
standards and safeguards for research security, intellectual
property protection, and illicit knowledge transfer;
(3) facilitate technology partnerships with countries and
relevant political and economic unions that are committed to--
(A) the rule of law and respect for human rights,
including freedom of speech, and expression;
(B) the safe and responsible development and use of
certain critical and emerging technologies and the
establishment of related norms and standards, including
for research security and the protection of sensitive
data and technology;
(C) a secure internet architecture governed by a
multi-stakeholder model instead of centralized
government control;
(D) robust international cooperation to promote
open and interoperable technological products and
services that are necessary to freedom, innovation,
transparency, and privacy; and
(E) strengthening multilateral coordination on
certain critical and emerging technologies, as defined
in subsection (f), in coordination with relevant
Department stakeholders and bureaus, including through
diplomatic initiatives, information sharing, and other
activities, to defend the principles described in
subparagraphs (A) through (D) against efforts by state
and non-state actors to undermine them;
(4) support efforts to harmonize critical and emerging
technology governance regimes with partners, coordinating on
basic and pre-competitive research and development initiatives,
and collaborating to pursue such opportunities in certain
critical and emerging technologies;
(5) coordinate with other technology partners on export
control policies for certain critical and emerging
technologies, as defined in subsection (g), including
countering illicit knowledge and data transfer related to
certain critical and emerging technologies research and use;
(6) conduct or support diplomatic engagement, in
coordination with other relevant Department stakeholders and
bureaus, offices, and relevant Federal departments and
agencies, with allies and partners to develop standards and
coordinate policies designed to counter illicit knowledge and
data transfer in academia related to certain critical and
emerging technology research;
(7) coordinate with allies, partners, and other relevant
Federal agencies, with the concurrence of other relevant
Department stakeholders and bureaus, to prevent the
exploitation of research partnerships related to certain
critical and emerging technologies;
(8) share information regarding the threat posed by the
transfer of certain critical and emerging technologies to
authoritarian governments, including the People's Republic of
China and the Russian Federation, and the ways in which
autocratic regimes are utilizing technology to erode individual
freedoms and other foundations of open, democratic societies;
and
(9) collaborate with private companies, trade associations,
and think tanks to realize the purposes described in paragraphs
(1) through (8), in coordination with relevant Department
stakeholders and bureaus.
(f) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the
Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence
and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees an unclassified
report, with a classified index, if necessary, regarding--
(1) the activities of the Office related to paragraphs (1)
through (9) of subsection (e), including any cooperative
initiatives and partnerships pursued with United States allies
and partners, and the results of such activities, initiatives,
and partnerships;
(2) the activities of the Government of the People's
Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Russian
Federation in sectors related to certain critical and emerging
technologies and the threats they pose to the United States;
and
(3) an inventory of all international research and
development programs for certain critical and emerging
technologies funded by the Department or USAID that include
participation by institutions or organizations that are
affiliated with, or receive support from, the Government of the
People's Republic of China or the Government of the Russian
Federation.
(g) Critical and Emerging Technologies.--In this section, the term
``certain critical and emerging technologies'' means technologies
determined by the Secretary from the critical and emerging technologies
list published by the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) at
the Office of Science and Technology Policy, as amended by subsequent
updates to the list issued by the NSTC.
SEC. 177. REALIGNING THE REGIONAL TECHNOLOGY OFFICER PROGRAM.
Section 9508(a)(1) of the Department of State Authorizations Act of
2022 (division I of Public Law 117-263; 22 U.S.C. 10305(a)(1)) is
amended by inserting ``, and shall be administered by the Bureau for
Cyberspace and Digital Policy'' before the period at the end.
SEC. 178. ANNUAL SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY MONITORING REPORT ON THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than May 1, 2025, and annually
thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
the heads other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the
advanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of the PRC.
(b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) the domestic semiconductor manufacturing capabilities
of the PRC;
(2) year-by-year technological development efforts by the
PRC in the fields of advanced semiconductor manufacturing and
artificial intelligence chipmaking, including relevant
government plans and initiatives;
(3) engagement between the PRC and other foreign countries
with respect to advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment
capabilities;
(4) an analysis of the impact of United States and allied
and partner export controls on covered items related to the
development of advanced semiconductor manufacturing in the PRC;
and
(5) an assessment of whether such export controls remain
effective in curbing the development of advanced semiconductor
manufacturing equipment capabilities in the PRC and
recommendations for enhancing effectiveness of such controls.
(c) Form.--
(1) In general.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form and shall include a
classified annex, providing additional details and supporting
intelligence, as available.
(2) Public availability.--The unclassified portion or a
synopsis of the report required under subsection (a) shall be
made available on a publicly accessible internet website of the
Federal Government.
SEC. 179. COMBATTING AI-ENABLED DISINFORMATION.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the rapid development of publicly available, affordable
generative artificial intelligence (AI) technology, including
the use of large language models (LLM) to fuel natural language
processing applications, has the potential to fundamentally
alter the nature of disinformation and propaganda campaigns by
enabling finely tailored, auto-generated disinformation
swiftly, in any language, at scale, and at low-costs;
(2) academia and private industry, including social media
platforms, play a critical role in establishing safeguards for
powerful, publicly available tools for producing AI-generated
content, and it is in the United States national security
interest to ensure that these technologies are not misused by
foreign malign actors to enhance influence operations abroad;
(3) the ability to identify, track, and label original
text, audio, and visual content is becoming increasingly vital
to United States national interests as sophisticated AI-
generated content creation becomes increasingly available to
the public at low costs;
(4) coalitions such as the content authenticity initiative
(CAI) and the coalition for content provenance and authority
(C2PA) play important roles in establishing open industry
standards for content authenticity and digital content
provenance; and
(5) the Department, as the lead agency for United States
foreign affairs, including public diplomacy, should work within
the interagency process to develop a common approach to United
States international engagement on issues related to AI-enabled
disinformation.
(b) Statement of Policy.--it shall be the policy of the United
States--
(1) to share knowledge with allies and partners of
instances when foreign state and non-state actors have
leveraged generative AI to augment disinformation campaigns or
propaganda;
(2) to work with private industry and academia, as
appropriate, to mitigate the risks associated with public
research on generative AI technologies; and
(3) to support efforts in developing digital content
provenance detection techniques and technologies in line with
United States national security interests.
(c) Establishment of Countering AI-Enabled Disinformation Task
Force.--
(1) Establishment.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
establish within the Department a Countering AI-Enabled
Disinformation Task Force (referred to in this section as the
``Task Force'') to--
(A) identify potential responses to the growing
threat of AI-enabled disinformation and its use by
foreign state and non-state actors to augment influence
operations and disinformation campaigns;
(B) work closely with private industry and academia
to identify and coordinate efforts in developing
digital content provenance detection techniques and
technologies;
(C) develop the department's internal coordination
across regional and functional bureaus on the issue of
AI-enabled disinformation;
(D) develop a unified approach to international
coordination on--
(i) establishing standards around digital
content provenance techniques and technologies,
specifically as it relates to countering AI-
enabled disinformation campaign; and
(ii) assessing the potential for
establishing frameworks around the
proliferation of tools that facilitate AI-
enabled disinformation; and
(E) identify any additional tools or resources
necessary to enhance the Department's ability to--
(i) detect AI-enabled foreign
disinformation and propaganda;
(ii) rapidly produce original counter-
messaging to address AI-enabled disinformation
campaigns;
(iii) expand digital literacy programming
abroad to include education on how media
consumers in recipient countries can identify
and inoculate themselves from synthetically
produced media; and
(iv) coordinate and collaborate with other
governments, international organizations, civil
society, the private sector, and others, as
necessary.
(2) Membership.--The Task Force shall be comprised of a
representative from relevant offices, as determined by the
Secretary, which may include--
(A) the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy;
(B) the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and
Public Affairs;
(C) the Global Engagement Center;
(D) the Center for Analytics of the Office of
Management Strategy and Solutions;
(E) appropriate offices and Bureaus at the United
States Agency for International Development; and
(F) any other officials or offices the Secretary
determines appropriate.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Artificial intelligence.--The term ``artificial
intelligence'' has the meaning given that term in section
238(g) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232; 10 U.S.C. 4001 note).
(2) Digital content provenance.--The term ``digital content
provenance'' means the verifiable chronology of the origin and
history of a piece of digital content, such as an image, video,
audio recording, or electronic document.
SEC. 179A. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Innovation in artificial intelligence and other
emerging technology domains has become increasingly global.
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, worldwide spending on research and development
more than tripled between 2000 and 2020. The United States
accounted for almost 70 percent of such spending in 1960, but
less than \1/3\ \\ in 2018.
(2) Many allies and partners of the United States are
technological powers in their own right, with robust research
and development activities and world-leading capabilities in
fields such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors,
robotics, and biotechnology.
(3) Adversaries of the United States, including the PRC,
the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, also
emphasize technology and innovation in their geopolitical
strategies. In particular, the Chinese Communist Party believes
innovation is essential to its continued rule and is investing
heavily in research and development as part of a strategy to
``leapfrog'' the United States into global leadership.
(4) The United States and its allies and partners
collectively control a much larger share of research and
development activity than the PRC. Together, the United States
and six like-minded countries, namely, Japan, Germany, the
Republic of Korea, India, France, and the United Kingdom,
account for more than \1/2\ of global spending on research and
development, while the PRC accounts for approximately \1/4\.
(5) The National Science Board's ``Vision 2030'' report,
issued in May 2020, states, ``Staying at the frontiers of
discovery requires leaning into internationalism, particularly
given the nation's falling share of global knowledge
production, paired with the rising importance and impact of
international collaboration and knowledge- and technology-
intensive industries.''.
(6) Previously, in 2008, the National Science Board
reported, ``The U.S. Government could play a more effective
role in supporting international S&E (science and engineering)
partnerships by developing a coherent international S&E
strategy to coordinate the activities and objectives of the
various Federal agencies that play a role in such partnerships.
. . . No single U.S. agency is responsible for coordinating or
supporting international S&E partnerships, and few U.S.
agencies that do S&E work have explicit missions in
international relations.''.
(7) Numerous Federal departments and offices administer
joint research and development activities with international
partners, including the Office of International Science and
Engineering within the National Science Foundation, the
Division of International Relations within the National
Institutes of Health, and the Office of International Science &
Technology Cooperation within the Department of Energy.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) international collaboration on research and development
is critical to maintaining United States leadership in
artificial intelligence and other critical technologies;
(2) Federal initiatives related to international
collaboration on research and development should--
(A) be consistently and adequately funded;
(B) be coordinated across agencies to increase
impact, minimize undue duplication, and ensure
alignment with policies and strategic objectives of the
United States; and
(C) incorporate national security safeguards,
including vetting processes, to protect against
exploitation by strategic competitors of the United
States;
(3) implement data privacy regimes, including with respect
to data sharing agreements between the United States and its
partners;
(4) the United States should work expeditiously with its
allies and partners to resolve issues related to data privacy;
and
(5) the United States, and Federal departments and agencies
must adopt rigorous safeguards and countermeasures to protect
research institutions, key science and technological research
data, and national security-sensitive knowledge from efforts by
United States adversaries to gain access to such information,
including by exploiting international research collaboration.
SEC. 179B. OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN UNION TRADE AND
TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL.
(a) In General.--Not later than December 1, 2024, and annually
thereafter for a period of 3 years, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative shall
jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on
the United States-European Union Trade and Technology Council (TTC),
including a description of--
(1) the goals of the Council, its achievements to date, and
opportunities for cooperation in key areas;
(2) a status update on deliverables of the TTC,
particularly those itemized in public statements and fact
sheets published by the United States Government;
(3) the expected impact of the progress made on each
deliverable on growing two-way trade, achieving mutual
recognition of relevant regulatory standards, and increasing
the ease of doing business, including quantitative assessments;
(4) the expected impact of deliverables on national
security, including technology security;
(5) a description of any trade or technology topics that
the United States has sought to incorporate into the TTC;
(6) a description of engagements during the reporting
period with the private sector on issues addressed in the TTC,
and the results of those engagements; and
(7) other relevant updates with respect to the work of the
TTC's working groups.
(b) First Report.--The first report submitted pursuant to
subsection (a) shall cover progress from the first TTC ministerial on
September 29, 2021, through June 1, 2024.
(c) Subsequent Reports.--All subsequent reports submitted shall
cover the previous year.
(d) Form of Report.--The reports required under this section shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 179C. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State and the Administrator for
the United States Agency for International Development, in coordination
with other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall develop and
implement a digital connectivity initiative specific to Pacific Island
countries.
(b) Elements and Conduct of Pacific Islands Digital Connectivity
Initiative.--The initiative developed pursuant to subsection (a)
shall--
(1) include an assessment of opportunities to coordinate
with regional allies, including through the United States-Japan
Global Digital Connectivity Partnership and the United States-
Japan-Australia Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership;
(2) identify and address country-driven digital
transformation priorities;
(3) conduct an assessment of the digital ecosystem of
Pacific Island countries, such as through the United States
Agency for International Development's (USAID) Digital
Ecosystem Country Assessments, to identify opportunities and
risks;
(4) seek to develop human and institutional capacity and
infrastructure to catalyze private sector investments in
Pacific Island countries' digital ecosystem;
(5) assist in the development of digital policy and
regulatory schemes in Pacific Island countries, including
information and communications technology (ICT) regulations and
procurement best practices and relevant reforms;
(6) advance digital platforms and solutions for the
delivery of public services and enhance digital skills and
literacy;
(7) seek to expand access to open, interoperable, reliable,
and secure internet for Pacific Island communities;
(8) identify roles that digital technologies can play in
addressing important challenges for Pacific Island countries,
including the environment, sustainable fishing, readiness,
including in response to tsunami warnings;
(9) identify ways to support women-owned enterprises in the
digital ecosystem of Pacific Island countries;
(10) seek to expand the availability of and access to
secure and reliable subsea cable systems;
(11) regularly assess opportunities for which United States
businesses, or those of other like-minded partners, would be
competitive;
(12) promote exports of United States ICT goods and
services to advance a secure ICT supply chain and increase
United States company market share in Pacific Island digital
markets;
(13) support the development and expand availability of
telehealth services for Pacific Island country communities; and
(14) build digital connectivity among educational
institutions within the region as well as with educational
institutions in the United States.
(c) Pacific Island Countries Defined.--In this section, the term
``Pacific Island countries'' means the Cook Islands, the Republic of
Fiji, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands,
the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Nauru, Niue, the
Republic of Palau, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the
Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, the Kingdom of Tonga,
Tuvalu, and the Republic of Vanuatu.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $3,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to
carry out this section.
SEC. 179D. CYBER AND DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
(a) Interagency Working Group To Counter PRC Cyber and Digital
Security Activities in Developing Countries.--The Secretary of State
shall establish an interagency Working Group, which shall include the
National Cyber Director and representatives from the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, the United States Agency for International
Development, and such other agencies of the United States Government as
the Secretary considers appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber and
digital security activities in developing countries, which could
coordinate, as appropriate, with other related interagency mechanisms.
(b) Duties.--The Working Group established pursuant to this section
shall develop and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
set of recommendations for--
(1) bolstering the capacity of governments in governments
in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean to ensure the
integrity of their data networks and critical infrastructure,
where applicable;
(2) providing alternatives to Huawei and other untrusted
vendors of cyber and digital security technology; and
(3) an action plan for United States embassies to assist
host-country governments with respect to protecting their vital
digital networks and infrastructure from the PRC.
Subtitle E--Countering PRC Malign Influence
SEC. 181. SENSE OF CONGRESS DISTINGUISHING THE PRC GOVERNMENT FROM THE
CHINESE PEOPLE.
(a) Findings.--Since the establishment of the People's Republic of
China in 1949, the Chinese people have attempted to highlight the
abuses of the Communist Party of China, including in 1989 with the
Tiananmen Square protests and resulting massacre, and most recently
through mass demonstrations in November 2022, known as the ``White
Paper Movement'' to protest censorship and the harsh zero-COVID policy,
but the efforts of the Chinese people have consistently been met with
brutal suppression by CCP authorities and further efforts to monitors,
control, and politically indoctrinate Chinese citizens.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the challenges and threats posed by the PRC stem
primarily from the actions and behavior of the CCP and the PRC
government, not the people of China or people of Chinese
descent;
(2) the United States Government should seek to support the
aspirations of the Chinese people, and other peoples suffering
in oppressive, authoritarian regimes, by promoting human rights
and supporting their ability to express their own opinions and
views about their government;
(3) the United States is a diverse nation, and the strength
and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by the diverse
ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its citizens, including
Asian Americans and people of Chinese descent; and
(4) the United States Government and governments around the
world must actively oppose racism and intolerance in all forms,
and use all available and appropriate tools to combat the
spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination.
SEC. 182. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUNTERING THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA INFLUENCE FUND.
(a) Countering the People's Republic of China Influence Fund.--
There is authorized to be appropriated $600,000,000 for each of fiscal
years 2025 through 2029 for the Countering the People's Republic of
China Influence Fund to counter PRC malign influence. Amounts
appropriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain
available until expended and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise
authorized to be appropriated to counter such influence.
(b) Policy Guidance, Coordination, and Approval.--
(1) Coordinator.--The Secretary of State shall designate an
existing senior official as the Coordinator for the Countering
the People's Republic of China Influence Fund (in this section
referred to as ``Coordinator'') to provide policy guidance,
coordination within the Department and the interagency as
appropriate, and recommendations for the obligation of funds
authorized pursuant to subsection (a).
(2) Duties.--The Coordinator designated pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall be responsible for--
(A) on an annual basis, the identification of
specific strategic priorities for using the funds
authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a),
such as geographic areas of focus or functional
categories of programming that funds are to be
concentrated within, consistent with the national
interests of the United States and the purposes of this
section;
(B) the coordination and approval of all
programming conducted using the funds authorized to be
appropriated under subsection (a), based on an
assessment that such programming directly counters PRC
malign influence, including specific activities or
policies advanced by such influence, pursuant to the
strategic objectives of the United States;
(C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a
sufficiently direct nexus to countering PRC malign
influence and adheres to the requirements outlined in
subsection (d);
(D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and
evaluation of the effectiveness of all programming
conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated
under subsection (a) to ensure that it advances United
States interests and degrades the ability of the
Government of the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), or entities acting on their behalf, to advance
the activities described in subsection (c); and
(E) ensuring, to the maximum extent practicable,
that all approved programming under subsection (a) is
carried out in coordination with other Federal
activities to counter the malign influence and
activities of the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or
entities acting on their behalf.
(3) Assistant coordinator.--The Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development shall designate an
official with direct responsibility for policy with respect to
the PRC to assist the Coordinator designated pursuant to
paragraph (1), particularly with respect to such assistance
handled by the United States Agency for International
Development.
(c) PRC Malign Influence Defined.--In this section, the term ``PRC
malign influence'' means influence of the Government of the PRC and the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or entities acting on their behalf
globally that--
(1) undermines a free and open international order;
(2) advances an alternative, repressive international order
that bolsters the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party's
hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by coercion and
dependency;
(3) undermines the national security, territorial
integrity, or sovereignty of the United States or other
countries; or
(4) undermines the political and economic security of the
United States or other countries, including by promoting
corruption or elite capture, and advancing coercive economic
practices.
(d) Activities To Counter PRC Malign Influence.--In this section,
countering malign influence through the use of funds authorized to be
appropriated by subsection (a) include efforts--
(1) to promote transparency and accountability, and reduce
corruption, including in governance structures targeted by the
malign influence of the Government of the PRC or the CCP;
(2) to support civil society and independent media to raise
awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative
impact of activities and initiatives of the Government of the
PRC and the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, including
the Belt and Road Initiative and other initiatives that lack
transparency, fail to meet international standards, and are
associated with coercive economic practices;
(3) to counter transnational criminal networks that
benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of the
Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their
behalf;
(4) to encourage economic development structures that help
protect against predatory lending schemes, including support
for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such as
digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;
(5) to counter activities that provide undue influence to
the security forces of the PRC;
(6) to expose foreign influence operations and propaganda
of the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on
their behalf;
(7) to counter efforts by the Government of the PRC, the
CCP, or entities acting on their behalf to legitimize or
promote authoritarian ideology and governance models, including
its model of a state-dominated cyber and digital ecosystem;
(8) to counter efforts by the Government of the PRC, the
CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, to silence,
intimidate, or exact reprisal against individuals outside of
their sovereign borders, including members of diaspora
populations such as political opponents, repressed religious or
spiritual practitioners, marginalized ethnic community members,
civil society activists, human rights defenders, researchers,
and journalists;
(9) to provide alternatives to problematic PRC technology
offerings, which could provide the Government of the PRC undue
access to or influence over global data flows or sensitive
information, and compete with problematic PRC efforts to
leverage or make gains in the development of advanced and
emerging technologies;
(10) to counter PRC activities that directly enable
critical supply chain monopolization or other monopolistic
practices;
(11) to counter aggressive PRC efforts to make inroads into
the nuclear energy sectors of countries to the detriment of
United States national security, strategic, and
nonproliferation interests; and
(12) to counter efforts by the Government of the PRC, the
CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, to undermine the
democratic processes and institutions of United States allies
and partners.
SEC. 183. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.
(a) Extension.--Section 1287(j) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended
by striking ``the date that is 8 years after the date of the
enactment'' and inserting ``the date that is 13 years after the date of
the enactment''.
(b) Amendments.--Section 1287 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``foreign state and
foreign non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts,'' and
inserting ``foreign state and non-state influence operations'';
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (3)--
(i) by striking ``propaganda and
disinformation,'' and inserting ``foreign
influence operations''; and
(ii) inserting ``, including by working
directly with United States embassies and
consulates'' before the period at the end;
(B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``refute foreign
propaganda and disinformation,'' and inserting
``counter foreign influence operations''; and
(C) in paragraph (8)--
(i) by striking ``propaganda and
disinformation,'' and inserting ``foreign
influence operations,''; and
(ii) by striking ``propaganda and
disinformation is'' and inserting ``foreign
influence operations are''.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
Secretary of State should empower the Global Engagement Center to
expand its coordinating capacity, including through the exchange of
liaison officers with Federal departments and agencies that manage
aspects of identifying and countering foreign influence operations.
(d) Complementing United States Embassy Operations.--In carrying
out its mandate as outlined in section 1287 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, the Global Engagement Center
should ensure its efforts complement United States Embassy operations
where applicable, including--
(1) working with key posts to equip and support officers
tasked with countering foreign influence operations;
(2) supporting posts in developing country-specific
programs to counter foreign influence operations; and
(3) working with regional bureaus to ensure effective
coordination and mutual visibility and input into regional
strategies and activities related to foreign influence
operations.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2025 for the Global
Engagement Center to counter foreign state and non-state influence
operations.
SEC. 184. AMENDMENT TO THE MUTUAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1961.
Section 108A(a)(1) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2458a) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the semicolon and
inserting ``and,''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(D) which is not an exchange with the People's
Republic of China, unless the Secretary of State has
determined and certified to the appropriate committees
of Congress that participation by Federal employees in
the exchange is in the national security interest of
the United States.''.
SEC. 185. COUNTERING MALIGN INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN THE AMERICAS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) foreign influence operations pose serious threats to
national sovereignty, democratic governance and human rights;
(2) foreign influence operations in Latin America and the
Caribbean--
(A) have been carried out by the Maduro regime and
other foreign state actors, including the PRC, the
Republic of Cuba, the Russian Federation, and the
Islamic Republic of Iran; and
(B) have undermined United States national
interests, including by--
(i) undermining democratic electoral
processes;
(ii) exacerbating political polarization;
and
(iii) spreading false narratives contrary
to the interests of the United States and its
allies; and
(3) the United States Government should ensure sufficient
attention and resources are allocated to efforts to protect
independent media spaces, strengthen transparency of links
between local media ecosystems and foreign actors, and counter
Spanish-language and other non-English language foreign
influence operations in Latin America and the Caribbean,
including through Global Engagement Center research, grants,
and programs.
(b) Strategy.--The Secretary of State shall develop and implement a
strategy for protecting independent media spaces and countering the
creation and amplification of foreign state and nonstate influence
operations in Latin America and the Caribbean and to identify
initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean to counter efforts by
the Governments of the PRC and the Russian Federation to undermine
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and democratic processes and
institutions in the region.
(c) Multilateral Diplomacy.--The Secretary of State should convene
summits, forums, and multi-stakeholder initiatives to address global
threats to independent media ecosystems and develop solutions to the
challenges posed by foreign influence operations, which could include--
(1) a ``Latin America and Caribbean Tech Challenge'' that
is--
(A) sponsored by the Global Engagement Center; and
(B) aimed at advancing the development of
innovative solutions to counter disinformation and
propaganda across Latin America and the Caribbean; and
(2) a high-level, multi-stakeholder summit convened by the
Secretary of State in Latin America and the Caribbean that
seeks to--
(A) strengthen information sharing and other
cooperation among regional governments, independent
media, academia, tech companies, and civil society
organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean for
purposes of developing joint solutions to counter
disinformation;
(B) counter efforts by the PRC and Russia to
undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
democratic processes and institutions of United States
allies and partners; and
(C) promote efforts to protect the sustainability
of independent media and freedom of the press.
SEC. 186. GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE.
Section 552 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348a)
is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) Restriction Related to People's Republic of China.--None of
the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to
carry out this chapter, including for the Global Peace Operations
Initiative of the United States Department of State, may be used to
train or support foreign military forces in peacekeeping training
exercises by the Government of the People's Republic of China or the
People's Liberation Army unless, by not later than October 1 of each
year, the Secretary of State certifies to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives that such training or support is important to
the national security interests of the United States.''.
SEC. 187. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS UNDER THE FENTANYL SANCTIONS ACT.
Section 7212 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2312) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(3) the President determines has knowingly engaged in, on
or after the date of enactment of this paragraph, a significant
activity or financial transaction that has materially
contributed to, foreign opioid trafficking; or
``(4) the President determines--
``(A) has received any property or interest in
property that the foreign person knows--
``(i) constitutes or is derived from the
proceeds of an activity or transaction
described in paragraph (3); or
``(ii) was used or intended to be used to
commit or to facilitate such an activity or
transaction;
``(B) has knowingly provided significant financial,
material, or technological support for, including
through the provision of goods or services in support
of--
``(i) any activity or transaction described
in paragraph (3); or
``(ii) any foreign person described in
paragraph (3);
``(C) is or has been owned, controlled, or directed
by, or has knowingly acted or purported to act for or
on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any foreign
person described in paragraph (3) or subparagraph (A)
or (B).''.
SEC. 188. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO AGENCIES OR
INSTRUMENTALITIES OF FOREIGN STATES.
The President shall--
(1) impose one or more of the sanctions described in
section 7213 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2313)
with respect to each agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state (as defined in section 1603(b) of title 28, United States
Code) that the President determines--
(A) has engaged in, on or after the date of
enactment of this section, a significant activity or
transaction that has materially contributed to opioid
trafficking; or
(B) has provided, or attempted to provide,
financial, material, or technological support for,
including through the provision of goods or services in
support of, any activity or transaction described in
subparagraph (A); or
(2) impose the sanction described in subsection (a)(6) of
such section 7213 on each foreign person that the President
determines--
(A) is a senior official of an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state described in
paragraph (1); or
(B) that the President determines is or has been
owned, controlled, or directed by, or has knowingly
acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly
or indirectly, an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state described in paragraph (1).
SEC. 189. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY AND
INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
IN CUBA.
(a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions described
in subsection (b) with respect to any foreign person that the President
determines has engaged in, after the date of enactment of this Act, a
significant transaction or transactions, or any significant dealings
with, or, after the date of enactment of this Act, has provided
significant material support to or for a military or intelligence
facility of the PRC in Cuba.
(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection with respect to a foreign person are the following:
(1) Asset blocking.--The exercise of all powers granted to
the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block
and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in
property of the foreign person if such property and interests
in property are in the United States, come within the United
States, or are or come within the possession or control of a
United States person.
(2) Exclusion from the united states and revocation of visa
or other documentation.--In the case of a foreign person who is
an alien, denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United
States of, the alien, and revocation in accordance with section
221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1201(i)), of any visa or other documentation of the alien.
(c) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President shall exercise
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and
1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties.--A person that knowingly violates, attempts
to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued
to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties
set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to
the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act
described in subsection (a) of that section.
(d) Exceptions.--
(1) Importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--The authorities and requirements
to impose sanctions authorized under this section shall
not include the authority or a requirement to impose
sanctions on the importation of goods.
(B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term
``good'' means any article, natural or manmade
substance, material, supply, or manufactured product,
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding
technical data.
(2) Compliance with united nations headquarters
agreement.--Sanctions under subsection (b)(2) shall not apply
to an alien if admitting the alien into the United States is
necessary to permit the United States to comply with the
Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force
November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United
States, or other applicable international obligations.
(e) National Security Waiver.--The President may waive the
imposition of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign
person on a case-by-case basis if the President submits to the
appropriate committees of Congress a determination that the waiver is
in the national interests of the United States.
(f) Termination of Sanctions.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, this section shall terminate on the date that is 30 days after
the date on which the President determines and certifies to the
appropriate committees of Congress (and Congress has not enacted
legislation disapproving the determination within that 30-day period)
that all military or intelligence facilities of the PRC in Cuba have
been closed.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Alien.--The term ``alien'' has the meaning given that
term in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101).
(2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a
person that is not a United States person.
(3) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or
entity.
(4) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) an individual who is a United States citizen or
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to
the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or any jurisdiction within the United
States, including a foreign branch of such an entity;
or
(C) any person in the United States.
SEC. 190. STRATEGIC STABILITY DIALOGUE AND ARMS CONTROL.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States and the PRC have both made
commitments to advancing strategic security through enforceable
arms control and non-proliferation agreements as states parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done
at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.
(2) The United States has long taken tangible steps to seek
effective, verifiable, and enforceable arms control and non-
proliferation agreements that support United States and allied
security by--
(A) controlling the spread of nuclear materials and
technology;
(B) placing limits on the production, stockpiling,
and deployment of nuclear weapons;
(C) decreasing the risk of misperception and
miscalculation; and
(D) avoiding the destabilizing effects of nuclear
arms competition.
(3) The PRC's current nuclear expansion, part of a massive
modernization of the PLA that is expected to be completed by
2035, combined with the PLA's aggressive actions, has
increasingly destabilized the Indo-Pacific region.
(4) The long-planned United States nuclear modernization
program will not increase the United States nuclear weapons
stockpile, predates China's conventional military and nuclear
expansion, and is not an arms race against China.
(5) The United States extended nuclear deterrence--
(A) provides critical strategic security around the
world;
(B) is an essential element of United States
military alliances; and
(C) serves a vital non-proliferation function.
(6) The United States has, on numerous occasions, called on
the PRC to participate in strategic arms control negotiations,
and has sought to engage the PRC in a strategic stability
dialogue, but the PRC has so far declined. Such negotiations
and dialogue would benefit the entire world by developing
guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer into
conflict.
(7) Provocations such as the ``balloon incident'' in 2023
and the inability of United States officials to reach PRC
counterparts via deconfliction lines underscore the need for
further engagement on risk reduction, including through near-
term dialogue and eventual arms control negotiations.
(8) The Governments of Japan, the United Kingdom, Poland,
Slovenia, Denmark, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the
Netherlands, Romania, Austria, Montenegro, Ukraine, Slovakia,
Spain, North Macedonia, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Croatia,
and Albania, as well as the Deputy Secretary General of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have all encouraged the PRC
to join arms control discussions.
(b) Report on the Future of United States-PRC Interactions on
Nuclear and Strategic Issues.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
a report that outlines the strategy and objectives in engaging
the Government of the PRC on nuclear and strategic issues,
which shall include--
(A) areas of potential dialogue between the
Governments of the United States and the PRC, including
the interplay of ballistic, hypersonic glide, and
cruise missiles, conventional forces, nuclear, space,
artificial intelligence and cyberspace issues, as well
as other new strategic domains, which could reduce the
likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were
to occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in
the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) the types of strategic military capabilities of
the PRC that the United States Government is most
interested in limiting;
(C) an assessment of whether additional crisis
consultation mechanisms should be developed to avoid,
manage, or control inadvertent nuclear, conventional,
and unconventional military escalation between the
United States and the PRC;
(D) the personnel and expertise required to
effectively engage the PRC in strategic stability and
arms control dialogues; and
(E) opportunities and methods to encourage
transparency and predictability from the PRC with
regard to the growth and purpose of its nuclear and
related strategic forces.
(2) Form of report.--The report required under paragraph
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 191. TRACK 1.5 DIALOGUES WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON
NUCLEAR MATTERS.
Not later than 15 days before any United States Government official
participates in a Track 1.5 dialogue on nuclear policy with any
institution under the direct control of the PRC or the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Ministry of Defense, or the People's Liberation Army of the PRC, the
Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations
in the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of
Representatives a notification of such United States official
participation and a justification for such participation, including
how--
(1) the Track 1.5 dialogue supports official talks between
the United States and the Peoples Republic of China on arms
control, crisis stability, or other dialogues related to
nuclear policy; and
(2) United States Government official participation in the
Track 1.5 dialogue directly supports the national security
interests of the United States.
SEC. 192. OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Biological weapons convention.--The term ``Biological
Weapons Convention'' means the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washington,
London, and Moscow, April 10, 1972.
(2) Life sciences dual use research of concern.--The term
``life sciences dual use research of concern'' means life
sciences research that--
(A) involves the Peoples Republic of China; and
(B) based on current understanding can be
reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge,
information, products, or technologies that could be
misapplied to do harm with no, or only minor,
modification to pose a significant threat with
potential consequences to public health and safety,
agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the
environment, materiel, or national security.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States
to--
(1) conduct rigorous scrutiny of, and regularly review,
collaboration on international biological, bacteriological,
virological, and other relevant research that could be
weaponized or could reasonably be considered life sciences
dual-use research of concern, and incorporate national security
and nonproliferation considerations and country-specific
conditions into decisions regarding such collaboration;
(2) ensure that, in the search for solutions to pressing
global health challenges, United States Government support for
public health research and other actions does not advance the
capabilities of the PRC in the area of life sciences dual use
research of concern or inadvertently contribute to the
proliferation of biological weapons technologies; and
(3) declassify, to the maximum extent possible, all
intelligence relevant to the PRC's compliance or lack of
compliance with its obligations under the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC), and other national security concerns
regarding PRC biological, bacteriological, virological, and
other relevant research that could be weaponized or could
reasonably be considered life sciences dual use research of
concern that may be outside the scope of the BWC.
(c) Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern.--
(1) Secretary of state.--The Secretary of State shall--
(A) ensure robust and consistent Department of
State participation in interagency processes and review
mechanisms related to oversight of life sciences dual-
use research of concern;
(B) participate in interagency working groups and
task forces related to vetting United States Government
funding related to international cooperation in
nonproliferation, life sciences, high containment
laboratories, and infectious diseases, to develop
policies and processes for post-award oversight of
grants and funding for life sciences dual use research
of concern, including as aligned with current laws and
regulations and for grants or funding from other
Federal departments and agencies, in order to keep
apprised of any national security or foreign policy
concerns that may arise with respect to an
international project or a project involving a foreign
partner, funded by another Federal department or
agency;
(C) conduct periodic reviews of the adequacy of
consultative mechanisms with other Federal Departments
and agencies with respect to oversight of life sciences
dual use research of concern, especially consultative
mechanisms mandated in United States law, and identify
recommendations for improving such consultative
mechanisms;
(D) direct Chiefs of Mission to ensure Country Team
Assessments are submitted to the Department of State
and the head of the Federal department or agency
proposing to sponsor a program or collaboration to
assess whether such program or collaboration involves
life sciences dual use research of concern, and ensure
that such Assessments are integrated into relevant
interagency processes; and
(E) direct Chiefs of Mission to increase embassy
reporting on life sciences dual use research of
concern, biosecurity hazards trends in the development
of synthetic biology and biotechnology, and other
related matters.
(2) Administrator of the united states agency for
international development.--The Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development shall report to and
consult with the Department of State on any proposed programs,
projects, initiatives, or funding for life sciences dual use
research of concern.
(d) United Nations Agencies, Programs, and Funds.--
(1) Requirement.--The Permanent Representative of the
United States to the United Nations should use the voice, vote,
and influence of the United States at the United Nations to
block representatives from any country listed in paragraph 2
from serving in leadership positions within any United Nations
organ, fund, program, or related specialized agency with
responsibility for global health security (including animal
health), biosecurity, atomic, biological or chemical weapons,
or food security and agricultural development.
(2) List of countries specified.--The countries described
in paragraph (1) are--
(A) the People's Republic of China;
(B) the Russian Federation;
(C) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(D) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
(E) the Assad Regime of Syria; and
(F) any other country specified in the report
required by section 403(a) of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)) in the relevant
calendar year.
(3) Sunset.--This section shall terminate on the date that
is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Subtitle F--Strengthening United States Public Diplomacy
SEC. 196. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS TO PROMOTE UNITED STATES
EDUCATION, EXCHANGE, CULTURAL, AND THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS
PROGRAM.
There is authorized to be appropriated, for each year of the 5-year
period beginning on October 1, 2025, $20,000,000, to promote education,
training, research, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-
Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).
SEC. 197. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TRAINING.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the PRC has invested heavily in public diplomacy
efforts that promote positive narratives of the PRC while
obfuscating the nefarious actions of the government against its
own people, its use of threats and coercive diplomacy to demand
deference from other countries, its use of United Front Work
Department, affiliated organizations, and other tools and
tactics to conduct malign influence operations and undermine
democratic values in other countries, and its anti-competitive
economic practices;
(2) these include huge state-sponsored investments into
media outlets throughout the world, advancement of censorship,
and the establishment of cultural centers; and
(3) the United States must respond with investment,
training, and personnel to effectively counter these public
diplomacy efforts.
(b) Hiring.--The Secretary of State should prioritize increasing
recruitment, hiring of, and the placement of public diplomacy officers
for the purposes of strategic competition.
(c) Training.--The Secretary of State shall require all Foreign
Service Officers to regularly complete public diplomacy training
courses through the Foreign Service Institute or other Department-
approved professional development training in public diplomacy,
including preparing them to--
(1) counter foreign malign influence, especially the
effective use by the PRC, Russia, and other relevant countries
of tools to influence and manipulate foreign audiences, present
narratives favorable to their regimes, undermine democratic
values and fundamental freedoms, and obfuscate harmful or
coercive policies and practices;
(2) understand foreign media landscapes to understand how
United States public diplomacy efforts can be most effective;
and
(3) partner with local organizations focused on countering
malign foreign influence, including through disinformation,
public influence campaigns, and other means.
(d) Developing Department-Wide Guidance.--The Under Secretary for
Public Diplomacy shall, in consultation with United States missions
abroad, develop Department-wide guidance for public diplomacy officers
and senior officers at posts to enable them to better counter foreign
malign influence, as described in subsection (c).
(e) Form of Guidance.--The guidance required under subsection (d)
may take the form of--
(1) regularly updated cables;
(2) a handbook for the development of public diplomacy
efforts at post to counter foreign malign influence; and
(3) other forms of guidance as determined appropriate by
the Under Secretary.
SEC. 198. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Peoples' Republic of China, Russia, and other
strategic competitors vastly overshadow the United States in
efforts to shape global public opinion in favor of their own
narrow political, commercial, and economic interests, including
through promoting disinformation and propaganda as well as
investing in exchange programs, scholarships, cultural
diplomacy, and other programs;
(2) the United States must utilize its full spectrum of
public diplomacy tools to promote United States interests and
security as well as combat Russian and PRC disinformation; and
(3) the Department of State should ensure that adequate
resources are available for posts to generate locally tailored
public diplomacy programming that advances United States
national security objectives.
(b) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a strategy to modernize and increase
the operational and programming capacity of American Spaces, American
Corners, and American Centers throughout the world, including on--
(1) leveraging public private partnerships;
(2) options for United States Government stipends or
additional pay to augment the current salaries of local staff
at partner organizations hosting American Spaces to locally
employed staff of American Spaces and American Corners; and
(3) opportunities for United States businesses and
nongovernmental organizations to better utilize American Spaces
in alignment with overall United States Government priorities.
SEC. 199. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING FOREIGN
INFORMATION OPERATIONS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that the PRC is increasing its
spending on public diplomacy, including influence campaigns,
advertising, and investments into state-sponsored media publications
outside of the PRC. This includes, for example, more than
$10,000,000,000 in foreign direct investment in communications
infrastructure, platforms, and properties, as well as bringing
journalists to the PRC for training programs.
(b) The United States Agency for Global Media.--The United States
Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-Federal
entities shall, consistent with the other executive branch undertakings
in this Act led by the President or the Secretary of State, and in
accordance with the highest standards of journalism, undertake the
following actions to support independent journalism, counter foreign
malign influence, and combat surveillance in countries where the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and other malign actors are promoting
foreign information operations, propaganda, and manipulated media
markets:
(1) Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of America (VOA) shall
expand coverage and digital programming in China for all China
services and other affiliate language broadcasting services.
(2) All USAGM operating entities shall seek to increase
coverage on CCP influence in their coverage regions, including
RFA in Asia, RFE/RL in Central Asia, MBN in the Middle East,
Office of Cuba Broadcasting in Cuba, and Voice America
globally.
(3) Radio Free Asia (RFA) shall expand its Mandarin-
language Asia Fact Check Lab to expose and analyze false
narratives on social media by pro-Beijing influencers and
content creators.
(4) Voice of America shall continue the bilingual Asia Fact
Check Lab, established in 2022, and expand on the Jiehuang
Pindao initiative to continue identifying and exposing PRC
information operations.
(5) Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc. (MBN) shall
expand coverage of the PRC's influence in the Middle East and
North Africa, a topic that is void on indigenous media in the
region.
(6) USAGM shall expand existing training and partnership
programs that promote journalistic standards, investigative
reporting, cybersecurity, and digital analytics to help expose
and counter false CCP narratives.
(7) The Open Technology Fund shall continue its work to
support applied research, and the development and deployment of
tools and technologies to circumvent censorship and
surveillance by the CCP, both inside the PRC as well as abroad
where the PRC has exported these technologies.
(8) Voice of America shall continue its mission of
providing accurate, objective, and comprehensive news as well
as presenting the policies of the United States clearly and
effectively.
(9) The Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) shall continue
its work promoting freedom and democracy by providing the
people of Cuba with objective news and information, including
exposing and reporting on Chinese disinformation and malign
influence for its Cuban and Latin American audiences.
(10) RFE/RL shall establish an investigative unit dedicated
to working across Central Asia to develop multimedia responses
to local information operation efforts by the CCP and other
malign actors.
(11) All USAGM operating units may establish or further
develop investigative units.
(12) The networks and grantees of the United States Agency
for Global Media shall continue their mission of providing
credible and timely news coverage, including on the PRC's
malign behavior and activities across the world.
(c) Authorizations of Appropriations.--
(1) USAGM.--There is authorized to be appropriated, for
each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the United States
Agency for Global Media, $1,500,000.
(2) Media support.--There is authorized to be appropriated,
for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029, $250,000,000 for
ongoing and new programs to support local media, build
independent media, combat PRC information operations inside and
outside of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship,
and monitor and evaluate these programs. Such funds shall be
directed to--
(A) RFA to expand--
(i) its China language services (including
Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and Tibetan);
(ii) its coverage in Southeast Asia and the
Pacific Islands to counter the Chinese
Communist Party's propaganda;
(iii) its Global Mandarin digital brand
WHYNOT/Wainao, which engages Chinese-speaking
populations both inside China and around the
world;
(iv) its investigative unit, which probes
PRC influence and relevant issues including
transnational repression and cross-border crime
in Asia, the Pacific, and globally; and
(v) its Asia Fact Check Lab, which counters
and analyzes PRC disinformation and malign
influence in the information space.
(B) RFE/RL to increase Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik,
Turkmen, and Uzbek language services;
(C) the Open Technology Fund for censorship
circumvention and privacy enhancing technologies which
contribute to--
(i) enabling Chinese citizens to safely
access independent news and information; and
(ii) countering Chinese information control
technologies in authoritarian countries where
they are being exported and adopted;
(D) MBN to increase coverage of China's influence
in the region through its award-winning investigative
reporting, including expansion of its digital series
``Did it Really Happen?'' to counter false narratives
being spread by the PRC through social media;
(E) OCB to increase efforts to expose and counter
China's active propaganda and disinformation machine
within Cuba, including expanded fact-checking,
journalistic training, and investments in technology;
and
(F) Voice of America to expand--
(i) its coverage addressing China's malign
influences within China and across Africa,
Latin America, Asia, and Eurasia;
(ii) direct reporting in key regions,
including Taiwan and the Pacific Islands,
including establishing a Mongolian Service; and
(iii) Open-Source Intelligence journalism,
to leverage data mining capabilities to uncover
insights into China's domestic developments and
its global activities.
(d) Report to Congress.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, USAGM shall submit to Congress a report on
the audience size and partnerships developed in furtherance of its
efforts to counter CCP's malign influence.
SEC. 199A. SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, acting through the Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall support civil society and foreign media
organizations in the implementation of programs to train foreign media
personnel on investigative techniques, provide journalist protection,
improve media literacy among the school-aged and general populations,
boost access to accurate and reliable news and information generally,
as well as other media-related activities in order to ensure public
accountability related to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global
Development Initiative, the PRC's use of and export of surveillance and
other technologies, and other influence operations abroad direct or
directly supported by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of
the PRC.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State, for each of fiscal years 2025
through 2029, $100,000,000 in support of the activities outlined in
subsection (a), including for ongoing and new programs in support of
press freedom, training, media literacy, and protection of journalists.
TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES, PARTNERSHIPS, AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters
PART I--PROMOTING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE
INDO-PACIFIC
SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING THE PRC'S SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA'S
WAR ON UKRAINE.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the PRC and the Russian Federation are strengthening
their relationship to advance their mutual interests, including
in creating divisions between the United States and its allies
and partners;
(2) the PRC is supporting Russia's unprovoked, full-scale,
and brutal invasion of Ukraine, including through increasing
trade with Russia by 30 percent in 2022, and another 26.3
percent in 2023, purchasing 2,140,000 barrels of Russian crude
oil per day in 2023 under embargo by the transatlantic
alliance, selling high-precision machinery, electronics, base
metals, textiles and apparel, vehicles, ships, aircraft to
Russia, abetting sanctions evasion in countries on Russia's
borders, and amplifying Russian propaganda and false
information;
(3) the PRC has explored providing weapons and ammunition
to the Russian Federation in order to support that country's
unlawful, imperialist war of aggression against Ukraine;
(4) the Government of the PRC is not taking sufficient
action to prevent PRC-based companies from exporting lethal
equipment to the Russian Federation, as revealed by the
credible evidence that PRC companies and entities have--
(A) shipped unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia that
were designated on customs forms as being ``for use in
the special military operation.'';
(B) supplied Iran with drone parts that were later
used by Russian forces in Ukraine;
(C) sent ``Tiger'' armored personnel carriers to
Chechen forces, raising the possibility that these
vehicles being could be deployed to Ukraine;
(D) shipped tens of thousands of kilograms of
smokeless gunpowder to a munitions factory in Russia;
(E) provided Russia with optical parts used in
tanks and armored vehicles;
(F) provided nitrocellulose used in gunpowder; and
(G) allowed the shipment of dual use engines for
missiles and drones to Russia;
(5) because of the PRC's ongoing support for Russia's war
against Ukraine, the United States has sanctioned numerous PRC
and Hong Kong-based entities;
(6) the PRC's support for Russia's war against Ukraine
threatens European stability and security, including that of
those countries that the United States is committed to defend
under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty;
(7) the United States, the European Union, and European
countries must continue and increase implementation of
sanctions and other appropriate economic tools against PRC
firms supporting the Russian Federation's war against Ukraine,
including those supporting Russian paramilitary organizations;
(8) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) 2022
Strategic Concept correctly recognizes the need to prepare for,
and respond to, the threats posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic
security, including threats derived from its relationship with
the Russian Federation and its efforts to divide United States
and European allies;
(9) NATO members must work to implement and build on steps
identified in NATO's Strategic Concept, including building
greater NATO expertise on the PRC and its military and
intelligence apparatuses, using NATO summits as an opportunity
to check progress and update priorities, and making any needed
adjustments to NATO's operational plans to account for the
ownership or involvement of PRC state-owned enterprises and
other entities in space, key seaports, communications nodes,
and airports;
(10) the Government of the PRC has been clear about its
desire to be included in diplomatic discussions about ending
Russia's war in Ukraine, including through the February 2023
publication of a 12-point position paper on the ``political
settlement of the Ukraine crisis'' and the appointment of a
Special Envoy for Eurasian Affairs;
(11) the Government of the PRC has done nothing to deliver
tangible outcomes on the elements of its position paper beyond
symbolic actions;
(12) although the PRC's position paper calls for the full
implementation of the July 2022 United Nations-brokered Black
Sea Grain Initiative as a means to maintain global food
security, and despite Xi Jinping's emphasis on food security
for his own country, the Government of the PRC did nothing to
pressure the Russian Federation to return to the deal, which it
abrogated in July 2023;
(13) President Joseph R. Biden rightly dismissed the PRC's
``peace plan'' (referring to the 12-point position paper) as
something that would not help ``anyone other than Russia,'' as
he stated in February 2023;
(14) the United States should remain wary of PRC engagement
in Ukraine and instead focus its efforts on strengthening the
coalition of like-minded partners in support of Ukraine's full
sovereignty and territorial integrity;
(15) given the PRC's significant support for Russia, Xi
Jinping and the Government of the PRC should not be viewed as
impartial brokers that will bring this war to an end on terms
that will be positive for Ukraine, its independence, and the
security of Europe;
(16) although Russia and the PRC have disagreements, both
countries assess that their partnership is critical to
countering the United States;
(17) PRC diplomatic involvement in Ukraine would lead to
greater PRC involvement in European security issues, while also
presenting the PRC as a responsible party to the international
community;
(18) it is of vital importance that the United States and
Europe remain united in confronting the security and economic
risks posed by a significant PRC role in diplomatic efforts to
end Russia's war in Ukraine, executing policies that account
for greater Sino-Russian alignment, and working together
closely on planning ahead for reconstruction of Ukraine;
(19) as earlier PRC investments in Ukraine targeted
strategic sectors, any post-war PRC investments in Ukraine
would give the PRC access to valuable military technology and
know-how, as Ukraine inherited roughly one-third of the Soviet
Union's defense-industrial base and 15 percent of Soviet
military research and development facilities, and during its
war against Russia, has made great strides in the development
of certain defense items; and
(20) given the PRC's documented track record on corruption,
a role for the PRC in Ukraine's reconstruction would likely
undercut extensive ongoing United States and European efforts
to align Ukrainian governance and anti-corruption standards
with those of Western institutions, as well as the European
Union's (EU) progress in helping Ukraine adhere to the
standards required for its eventual entry into the EU.
SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States alliances in the Indo-Pacific provide
a unique strategic advantage to the United States and are among
the United States' most vital relationships, enabling the
United States Government to advance its vital national
interests, defend its territory, expand its economy through
international trade and commerce, establish enduring
cooperation among like-minded countries, prevent the domination
of the Indo-Pacific by a hostile power or powers, and ensure
the region's sea, skies, and other shared domains remain free
and open and are lawfully governed;
(2) the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are critical allies in
advancing a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and
tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and have a strong
record of collaboration on shared interests in areas such as
defense and security, economic prosperity, infrastructure
connectivity, and fundamental freedoms;
(3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in
the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, Taiwan, and Vietnam as well
as regional architecture such as the Quad, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), which are essential to further shared
interests;
(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region
demands consistent United States and allied commitment to
strengthening and advancing our alliances so that they are
postured to meet key challenges, and will require sustained
political will, concrete partnerships, economic, commercial,
and technological cooperation, consistent and tangible
commitments, high-level and extensive consultations on matters
of mutual interest, mutual and shared cooperation in the
acquisition of key capabilities important to allied defenses,
and unified mutual support in the face of political, economic,
or military coercion;
(5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships
and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken
collective ability to advance shared interests;
(6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize
human rights, good governance, and anti-corruption throughout
the Indo-Pacific region;
(7) the Indo-Pacific region is vulnerable to natural shocks
and stresses, making humanitarian and disaster relief,
stewardship of natural resources, and food and water security
important areas of cooperation between the United States and
partner countries; and
(8) the United States should continue to engage and deepen
cooperation with allies and partners of the United States in
the Indo-Pacific region, in the areas of--
(A) disaster risk reduction, including efforts to
enhance effective forecasting, reduce vulnerability,
and build resilience to natural shocks and stresses;
(B) disaster response and early recovery;
(C) humanitarian assistance and food security;
(D) sustainable uses of forest and water resources
with the goal of promoting economic security while
preserving biodiversity and access to safe drinking
water; and
(E) fisheries and marine resource conservation.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States--
(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security
cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand,
including, as appropriate, through diplomatic engagement,
regional development, energy security and development,
scientific and health partnerships, educational and cultural
exchanges, missile defense, intelligence-sharing, space, cyber,
and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;
(2) to uphold United States multilateral and bilateral
treaty obligations, including--
(A) defending Australia under article IV of the
Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security
Treaty (ANZUS);
(B) defending Japan, including territories under
the administration of Japan, under article V of the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the
United States of America and Japan;
(C) defending the Republic of Korea under article
III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United
States and the Republic of Korea;
(D) defending the Philippines under Article IV of
the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and
the Republic of the Philippines; and
(E) defending Thailand under Article IV of the 1954
Manila Pact and the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962;
(3) to strengthen and deepen the United States regional and
multilateral partnerships, including with ASEAN, and to support
ASEAN centrality in the region;
(4) to cooperate with Australia, Japan, the Republic of
Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand to promote human rights
bilaterally and multilaterally, including through regional
fora;
(5) to support the continued development and implementation
of an enhanced trilateral security partnership between
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States under the
auspices of ``AUKUS''; and
(6) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and
security cooperation with regional partners, such as India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, and
Vietnam.
SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH THE QUAD.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should continue to reaffirm its
commitment to quadrilateral cooperation among Australia, India,
Japan, and the United States (the ``Quad'') to enhance and
implement a shared vision to meet shared regional challenges
and to promote a free, open, inclusive and resilient Indo-
Pacific that is characterized by democracy, rule of law, and
market-based economic growth, and is free from undue influence
and coercion;
(2) the United States should seek to expand collaboration
with Quad partners to bring concrete benefits to the Indo-
Pacific region, including benefits with respect to the rule of
law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution
of disputes, democratic values, economic prosperity and
security, infrastructure development, energy access and
security, technological advancement, territorial integrity,
peace and prosperity, and democratic resilience;
(3) the United States should seek to expand avenues of
cooperation with the Quad, including more coordinated policies
related to such shared interests as protecting cyberspace and
advancing maritime security;
(4) the cooperation under the Indo-Pacific Partnership for
Maritime Domain Awareness, announced at the fourth Quad leaders
meeting on May 24, 2022, will contribute to the region's shared
maritime domain awareness picture, which is a critical
component to achieving peace, stability, and prosperity in the
maritime domain;
(5) Quad commitments to address shared challenges in new
areas such as resilience in the Pacific Islands region, space,
cyberspace, and critical and emerging technologies, and to
continue to work to address pandemic preparedness, to provide
quality infrastructure investment, humanitarian assistance, and
disaster relief, and to enhance people-to-people ties,
including through the announcement of a Quad Fellowship in
September 2021, further advance the important cooperation among
Quad nations that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region;
(6) the United States and other Quad nations, including
through partnerships with multilateral development banks,
should work together to finance and otherwise cooperate on
development and infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific
region that are sustainable and offer a viable alternative to
the investments of the PRC in that region under the Belt and
Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative; and
(7) in consultation with other Quad countries, the
President should continue to prioritize clear, concrete
deliverables related to Quad priorities, particularly for
leader-level working groups, to increase the Quad's operational
effectiveness and strategic value by demonstrating that the
Quad can deliver tangible results while remaining agile enough
to adjust as needs and conditions change.
SEC. 204. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENHANCING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN
PARTNERSHIP.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the United
States Indo-Pacific strategy;
(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy as
key elements for the continued peace and stability of the
greater Indo-Pacific region, and a vital national security
interest of the United States;
(3) to secure United States interests and preserve the
ability of the people of Taiwan to determine their own future,
and to strenuously oppose any action by the PRC to use force to
change the status quo of Taiwan;
(4) to strengthen cooperation with the military of Taiwan
under the framework of the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-
8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances, with
consideration of the ongoing military buildup in the PRC and
the military balance in the Taiwan Strait, and to transfer
defense articles to Taiwan to enhance its capabilities,
including to advance its ability to contribute to denying the
PRC coercion and potential invasion;
(5) to support Taiwan's implementation of its asymmetric
defense strategy;
(6) to encourage Taiwan to continue increasing its defense
spending and undertaking defense reforms that enable the full
resourcing and effectiveness of its defense strategy;
(7) to support Taiwan's vibrant democracy and free and fair
elections, and promote dignity and respect for the
democratically elected leaders of Taiwan, who represent more
than 23,000,000 people, by using the full range of diplomatic
and other appropriate tools available to promote Taiwan's
international space;
(8) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's meaningful
participation in the United Nations and its specialized
agencies, the World Health Assembly, the International Criminal
Police Organization, and other international bodies as
appropriate;
(9) to advocate for information sharing with Taiwan in the
International Agency for Research on Cancer;
(10) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United
States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners;
(11) to enhance bilateral trade, including through new
agreements and the United States-Taiwan 21st Century Trade
Initiative;
(12) to include Taiwan as a partner in the Indo-Pacific
Economic Framework;
(13) to actively engage in negotiations in pursuance of a
bilateral free trade agreement and tax agreement to avoid
double taxation and promote trade and investment;
(14) to expand bilateral economic and technological
cooperation, including improving supply chain security;
(15) to support United States educational and exchange
programs with Taiwan, including by promoting the study of
Chinese language, culture, history, and politics in Taiwan;
(16) to expand people-to-people exchanges between the
United States and Taiwan;
(17) to ensure that distinctions in practice regarding
United States relations with Taiwan are consistent with the
longstanding, comprehensive, strategic, and values-based
relationship the United States shares with Taiwan, and
contribute to the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues;
and
(18) to further enhance United States relations with Taiwan
by forming a robust partnership that--
(A) meets current geopolitical challenges;
(B) fully accounts for Taiwan's democratic status;
and
(C) remains faithful to United States principles
and values, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act
and the Six Assurances.
SEC. 205. EXPANDING EXPERTISE ON TAIWAN MATTERS.
(a) Permanent Personnel Realignment.--Not later than the end of
fiscal year 2024, the Secretary of State shall realign up to twelve
full-time equivalent personnel to the American Institute in Taiwan.
(b) Additional Personnel.--
(1) American institute in taiwan.--The American Institute
in Taiwan should increase staffing by not less than four
additional full-time equivalent personnel at the American
Institute in Taiwan in Washington.
(2) Office of taiwan coordination.--There is authorized to
be appropriated $800,000 for four additional full-time
equivalent personnel at the Office of Taiwan Coordination at
the Department of State.
(c) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after the Secretary of
State carries out the requirement in subsection (a), the Secretary
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a notification
that includes a description of the role of each realigned full-time
equivalent personnel and how such realignment addresses gaps in the
American Institute in Taiwan's ability to advance United States
interests with respect to Taiwan.
SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-SOUTH KOREA ALLIANCE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On October 1, 1953, the United States and the Republic
of Korea signed the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United
States and the Republic of Korea.
(2) First agreed to in 1991, the ``Agreement between the
United States of America and the Republic of Korea Concerning
Special Measures Relating to Article V of the Agreement under
Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United
States of America and the Republic of Korea Regarding
Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed
Forces in the Republic of Korea'' (referred to in this section
as the ``SMA''), established the sharing of non-personnel
stationing costs associated with the presence of United States
forces in the Republic of Korea.
(3) After eight rounds of consultations, the United States
and the Republic of Korea reached consensus on ad ref texts for
a renewed SMA on October 3, 2024.
(4) The renewed SMA and the accompanying Implementing
Arrangement for the Special Measures Agreement (``SMA IA'')
were signed in Seoul, South Korea, on November 4, 2024,
becoming the 12th iteration of the SMA.
(5) Under the renewed SMA and consistent with United States
objectives, the United States and the Republic of Korea agreed
to a topline 8.3 percent increase in the contribution from the
Republic of South Korea as compared to the calendar year 2025
contribution.
(6) The renewed SMA meets additional United States priority
objectives, including maintaining the United States position of
protecting the authority of the United States Forces Korea
(USFK) Commander to allocate funds within and between the three
cost categories in accordance with operational and mission
requirements.
(7) The renewed SMA and IA entered into force on November
29, 2024, following notification in writing by the United
States and the Republic of South Korea that their respective
domestic procedures necessary for the agreement's entry into
force had been completed.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
uphold and reinforce the United States alliance with the Republic of
Korea, including by--
(1) maintaining the presence of approximately 28,500
members of the United States Armed Forces deployed to the
Republic of Korea;
(2) affirming the United States extended deterrence
commitment using the full range of United States defense
capabilities, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Between
the United States and the Republic of Korea, signed at
Washington, October 1, 1953, in support of the shared objective
of a peaceful and stable Korean Peninsula; and
(3) upholding the renewed SMA agreement reached and signed
on November 4, 2024, between the United States and the Republic
of Korea.
SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES-JAPAN-REPUBLIC OF KOREA
COOPERATION.
It is the sense of Congress that it is in the national interest of
the United States--
(1) to support Japan and the Republic in Korea (ROK) in
building on the steps taken to address major issues in their
bilateral relations, including the ROK's plan to resolve a
World War II forced labor dispute announced in March 2023 and
follow-on bilateral leaders summit;
(2) to encourage Japan and the ROK to increase engagement
in security cooperation on a bilateral and trilateral basis
with the United States;
(3) to emphasize the shared threats that Japan and the ROK
face as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
accelerates its provocative missile tests with a tempo and
diversity of missiles that suggests it is simulating wartime
use to signal to United States allies that it can control
escalation in a conflict;
(4) to prioritize the exchange of information among the
three militaries, particularly in the area of theater missile
defense;
(5) to encourage Japan and the ROK to resolve their
history-related disputes with mutually acceptable and durable
solutions that allow cooperation to continue without
interruption;
(6) to encourage and facilitate Japan and the ROK deepening
cooperation on cyber defense, including through the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), which
Japan joined in 2018 and the ROK joined in 2022;
(7) to participate in trilateral inter-parliamentary
exchanges with Japan and the ROK, including through efforts
like the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission Thomas S. Foley
Legislative Exchange program; and
(8) to promote trilateral development and humanitarian
assistance cooperation to collectively enhance the stability,
security, and democratic norms of partner countries through an
affirmative and sovereign development model.
SEC. 208. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED FOR THE SENATE TO GIVE ITS
ADVICE AND CONSENT TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the national interest for the United States to
become a formal signatory of the United Nations Convention on
the law of the Sea (UNCLOS), done at Montego Bay December 10,
1982;
(2) the United States Senate should promptly give its
advice and consent to the ratification of the UNCLOS; and
(3) joining the UNCLOS should remain a top priority for the
United States, the importance of which was most recently
underscored by the strategic challenges the United States faces
in the Indo-Pacific, the Arctic, and the Black Sea regions.
SEC. 209. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC
AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.
(a) Sense of Congress.--Congress--
(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of
force by the PRC to impede operations or freedom of overflight
in international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to
alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific
region;
(2) urges the Government of the PRC to refrain from
implementing the declared East China Sea Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea,
and to refrain from taking similar provocative actions
elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;
(3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration
decision is final and legally binding on both the Philippines
and the PRC and that the PRC's claims to offshore resources
across most of the South China Sea are unlawful; and
(4) urge the PRC to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of
Arbitration ruling, despite the PRC's obligations as a state
party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to--
(1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and
partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding
United States policy regarding Article IV of the United States-
Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, and restate its position
that the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands fall within the
scope of Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense
Treaty;
(2) oppose claims that impinge on lawful use of the sea, or
the airspace above it, and oppose the militarization of new and
reclaimed land features in the South China Sea;
(3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC's
claims in the South China Sea, namely--
(A) that the PRC claims in the South China Sea,
including claims to offshore resources across most of
the South China Sea, are unlawful;
(B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime
claim vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the
Permanent Court of Arbitration found to be in the
Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its
continental shelf;
(C) to reject any claim by the PRC to waters beyond
a 12-nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands
it claims in the Spratly Islands; and
(D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or
maritime claim to James Shoal;
(4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in
destabilizing activities, including occupation or efforts to
unlawfully assert administration over areas subject to disputed
claims;
(5) encourage disputes to be managed without intimidation,
coercion, or force;
(6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in
accordance with international law;
(7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime
claims, including claims to territorial waters or territorial
seas, must be derived from land features and otherwise comport
with international law;
(8) oppose the imposition of unilateral fishing regulations
covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations
which have raised tensions in the region;
(9) support a Code of Conduct only if that Code of Conduct
reflects the interests of Southeast Asian claimant states and
does not serve as a vehicle for the PRC to advance its unlawful
maritime claims and keep the United States out of the Indo-
Pacific region;
(10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules
and guidelines, including the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972
(COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation
between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other
countries, including the PRC;
(11) support the development of regional institutions and
bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense
Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded
ASEAN Maritime Forum, to increase practical cooperation in the
region and reinforce the role of international law;
(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other
countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and
capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States
Government to explore the development of appropriate
multilateral mechanisms for a ``common operating picture'' in
the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would
serve to help countries protect their sovereignty in a manner
consistent with international law and deter risky and dangerous
activities;
(13) oppose actions by any country to prevent another
country from lawfully exercising its sovereign rights related
to the resources of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and
continental shelf by making claims to those areas in the South
China Sea that are not consistent with international law; and
(14) assure the continuity of operations by the United
States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate,
operations in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm
the principle of freedom of operations in international waters
and airspace in accordance with established principles and
practices of international law.
SEC. 209A. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNIVERSAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.
(a) Sense of Congress.--Congress--
(1) condemns Russia's March 2024 veto of, and the PRC's
abstention on, the United Nations Security Council Resolution
renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts tasked with
monitoring United Nations sanctions against the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as irresponsible and
dangerous actions that undermine international efforts to
counter the threat posed by the DPRK's unlawful nuclear and
ballistic missile program;
(2) despite the expiration of the mandate of the Panel of
Experts, remains committed to working with relevant United
Nations agencies, members of the Security Council, and all
United Nations Member States, to uphold the United Nations
sanctions regime against the DPRK's unlawful nuclear and
ballistic missile program, and to advance the global
nonproliferation regime; and
(3) supports the establishment of new multilateral
mechanisms to monitor United Nations Member State
implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions
targeting the DPRK to shine a light on Member States who are
evading sanctions and abetting the DPRK regime's unlawful
weapons program.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
sustain economic pressure on the Government of the DPRK until the
regime undertakes actions toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible
denuclearization, including by--
(1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to implement
and enforce existing United Nations sanctions with regard to
the DPRK and its nuclear and missile programs;
(2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and in
accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, to
end the practice of hosting DPRK citizens as guest workers,
recognizing that such workers are demonstrated to constitute an
illicit source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nuclear
ambitions;
(3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to pursue
rigorous interdiction of shipments to and from the DPRK,
including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United
Nations Security Council resolutions;
(4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities--
(A) to cease business activities with United
Nations-designated entities and their affiliates in the
DPRK; and
(B) to expel from the PRC individuals who enable
the DPRK to acquire materials for its nuclear and
ballistic missile programs;
(5) working with likeminded partners, think tanks, research
organizations, and civil society to develop and implement
alternative, independent mechanisms to monitor United Nations
Member State adherence to United Nations sanctions targeting
the unlawful DPRK weapons program and publicly shine a light on
Member States that evade and violate those sanctions; and
(6) implementing and enforcing United Nations Security
Council resolutions with respect to the DPRK and United States
sanctions, including those pursuant to the North Korea
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-
122), the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act (Public Law 115-44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear
Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of Public Law
116-92), and relevant United States executive orders.
SEC. 209B. ESTABLISHING A SENIOR OFFICIAL FOR THE COMPACTS OF FREE
ASSOCIATION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
(a) In General.--The Secretary shall designate a senior official at
the Department of State responsible for administering the Compacts of
Free Association at the Department of State (in this section referred
to as the ``Senior Official''). The Senior Official shall report to the
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
(b) Duties.--The Senior Official shall--
(1) be responsible for the conduct of United States foreign
policy with respect to the countries affiliated with the United
States Government under the Compacts of Free Association (in
this section referred to as the ``Compacts''), namely the
freely associated states of--
(A) the Republic of Palau;
(B) the Marshall Islands; and
(C) the Federated States of Micronesia;
(2) assist the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs in providing overall direction,
coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities
of the United States Government in these countries, including
ensuring the timely transfer of assistance and provision of
benefits through the United States Department of the Interior,
as laid out in the Compacts;
(3) oversee and evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of
United States policy with respect to these countries as well as
of the plans, programs, resources, and performance for
implementing that policy, including programs and other
activities implemented by the Department of the Interior;
(4) directly supervise the policy and operations of the
Compacts and provide guidance to relevant United States
missions within the Indo-Pacific region;
(5) ensure the provision of an adequate, regular flow of
information to posts abroad on United States Government
policies, policy deliberations, and diplomatic exchanges in
Washington, DC; and
(6) ensure the continuity of implementation of commitments
and Compact obligations and benefits, consistent with United
States national interests in the Indo-Pacific region.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $250,000 to support the Senior Official in the conduct and
discharge of the duties described in subsection (b).
PART II--ENHANCING DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH
SEC. 211. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT
WITH PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES.
(a) Authority.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Commerce are authorized to hire Locally Employed Staff in Pacific
Island countries for the purpose of providing increased diplomatic
support and promoting increased economic and commercial engagement
between the United States and Pacific Island countries.
(b) Availability of Funds.--There is authorized to be appropriated
to the Department of State and the Department of Commerce for fiscal
year 2025, not more than $10,000,000 to each agency to carry out the
purposes of this section.
(c) Exception for American Samoa.--The Secretary of State may, as
appropriate, treat the territory of American Samoa as a foreign country
for purposes of carrying out this section.
SEC. 212. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the
Department of State $12,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through
2029 for the International Military Education and Training Program for
Latin America and the Caribbean.
(b) Modernization.--The Secretary of State shall take steps to
modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding pursuant to
subsection (a) to ensure that such programs are rigorous, substantive,
and the preeminent choice for international military education and
training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.
(c) Required Elements.--The programs referred to in subsection (a)
shall--
(1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to
Latin American and Caribbean security services;
(2) provide practical skills and frameworks for--
(A) improving the functioning and organization of
security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(B) creating a better understanding of the United
States and its values; and
(C) using technology for maximum strategic impact
and effective operations; and
(3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin
America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and
operate in compliance with international human rights law and
international humanitarian law.
(d) Limitation.--Security assistance under this section is subject
to the limitations of section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).
SEC. 213. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Young African Leaders Initiative, launched in 2010,
is a signature effort to invest in the next generation of
African leaders;
(2) Africa is a continent of strategic importance and it is
vital for the United States to support strong and enduring
partnerships with the next generation of African leaders;
(3) the United States Government should prioritize
investments to build the capacity of emerging young African
leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, including through efforts to--
(A) enhance leadership skills;
(B) encourage entrepreneurship;
(C) strengthen public administration and the role
of civil society;
(D) enhance peace and security in their respective
countries of origin and across Africa; and
(E) connect young African leaders continentally and
globally across the private, civic, and public sectors;
(4) youth in Africa have a positive impact on efforts to
foster economic growth, improve public sector transparency and
governance, and counter extremism, and should be an area of
focus for United States outreach on the African continent; and
(5) the Secretary of State should increase the number of
fellows from Africa participating in the Mandela Washington
Fellowship above the estimated 700 fellows who participated
during fiscal year 2021.
(b) Young African Leaders Initiative.--
(1) In general.--There is established the Young African
Leaders Initiative, (``YALI'').
(2) Purpose.--YALI shall seek to build the capacity of
young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa in the areas of
business and entrepreneurship, civic leadership, or public
administration, including through efforts to--
(A) support young African leaders by offering
professional development, training, and networking
opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership,
innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights,
entrepreneurship, good governance, peace and security,
and public administration;
(B) provide increased training to young African
leaders to promote economic growth, strengthen ties
between United States and African businesses, build
resilience to predatory lending practices, and improve
capacity in strategic sectors, including critical
minerals extraction, technology and media; and
(C) identify additional ways to connect all YALI
alumni to United States public and private resources
and institutions.
(3) Fellowships.--
(A) In general.--YALI shall support the
participation in the United States in the Mandela
Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders of
fellows from Africa who--
(i) are between 25 and 35 years of age;
(ii) have demonstrated strong capabilities
in entrepreneurship, innovation, public
service, and leadership; and
(iii) have had a positive impact in their
communities, organizations, or institutions.
(B) Oversight.--The fellowships described in
paragraph (1) shall be overseen by the Secretary of
State through the Bureau of Education and Cultural
Affairs.
(C) Eligibility.--The Secretary of State shall
establish and publish--
(i) eligibility criteria for participation
as a fellow under paragraph (1); and
(ii) criteria for determining which
eligible applicants will be selected.
(4) Reciprocal exchanges.--Subject to the approval of the
Secretary of State, United States citizens may--
(A) engage in reciprocal exchanges with alumni of
the fellowship described in paragraph (3); and
(B) collaborate on projects with such fellowship
alumni.
(5) Yali regional leadership centers and networks.--The
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development shall establish not fewer than 4 regional
leadership centers in sub-Saharan Africa to offer in-person and
online training throughout the year on business and
entrepreneurship, civic leadership, and public management to
young African leaders between 18 and 35 years of age who have
demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship,
innovation, public service and leadership, and peace-building
and conflict resolution, and who have had a positive impact in
their communities, organizations, or institutions.
(6) Activities.--
(A) United states-based activities.--The Secretary
of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant
Federal departments and agencies, shall oversee all
United States-based activities carried out under YALI,
including--
(i) the participation of Mandela Washington
Fellows in a six-week Leadership Institute at a
United States educational institution in
business, civic engagement, or public
management, including academic sessions, site
visits, professional networking opportunities,
leadership training, community service, and
organized cultural activities; and
(ii) the participation by Mandela
Washington Fellows in an annual Mandela
Washington Fellowship Summit, to provide such
Fellows the opportunity to meet with United
States leaders from the private, public, and
non-profit sectors.
(B) Africa-based activities.--The Administrator for
the United States Agency for International Development,
in coordination with the Secretary of State and the
heads of other relevant Federal departments and
agencies, should continue to oversee and support YALI
activities in sub-Saharan Africa, including--
(i) continued leadership training and other
professional development opportunities for
Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African
Leaders alumni upon their return to their home
countries, including online courses, training,
and access to funding;
(ii) training for young African leaders at
regional leadership centers established in
accordance with paragraph (5), and through
online and in-person courses offered by such
centers; and
(iii) opportunities for networking and
engagement with--
(I) alumni of the Mandela
Washington Fellowship for Young African
Leaders;
(II) alumni of programs at regional
leadership centers established in
accordance with paragraph (5);
(III) United States and like-minded
diplomatic missions, business leaders,
the diaspora, and others as
appropriate; and
(IV) where practicable and
appropriate, other United States-funded
regional leadership programs, including
the Young Southeast Asian Leaders
Initiative (YSEALI), the Young Leaders
of the Americas Initiative (YLAI), the
Young Pacific Leaders (YPL), and the
Young Transatlantic Innovation Leaders
Initiative (YTILI), and through
Department of State programs such as
the Community Engagement Exchange
Program and other initiatives.
(C) Implementation.--To carry out this subsection,
the Secretary of State and the Administrator for the
United States Agency for International Development, in
coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal
departments and agencies, shall seek to partner with
the private sector to pursue public-private
partnerships, leverage private sector expertise, expand
networking opportunities, and identify funding
opportunities as well as fellowship and employment
opportunities for YALI.
SEC. 214. STRENGTHENING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN AFRICA.
(a) Bolstering United States Diplomatic Presence in Africa.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress a plan to strengthen
United States diplomatic presence in Africa, including to
ensure that United States embassies in Africa have sufficient
personnel to focus on the activities, policies, and investments
of the PRC.
(2) Elements.--The plan required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(A) A review of the incentives available for United
States diplomatic personnel who serve in posts in
Africa, which includes proposals to provide additional
incentives for hard-to-fill posts in Africa, including
those that leverage relevant talent in the Department,
including talent within the civil service, and which
addresses requirements for promotions and onward
assignment for the Foreign Service.
(B) An identification of--
(i) the number and average duration over
the last 5 years of vacancies in the political
and economic sections of United States
embassies relative to the full-time equivalent
positions allocated for the economic and
political sections in such embassies; and
(ii) the number of Foreign Service Officers
who are working in ``stretch'' positions in the
political and economic sections of United
States embassies in Africa and a list of
proposals to reduce those vacancies and stretch
positions.
(C) An assessment of whether United States
embassies in Africa have adequate staff to implement
initiatives such as Prosper Africa and those emanating
from the African Leaders Summit and a proposal to
better meet the staffing needs to implement those and
other high-priority initiatives.
(b) Africa Heads of State Summit.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and biennially thereafter, the
President shall convene a United States-Africa Leaders Summit
(in this subsection referred to as the ``Summit'') in order to
establish stronger bilateral and multilateral diplomatic,
economic, security, and cultural ties between the United States
and African countries.
(2) Participation.--Each Summit convened pursuant to this
subsection shall have participation, including in meetings with
United States officials, from--
(A) leaders of civilian-led governments of African
countries in good standing with the African Union, each
of which the President has determined--
(i) has held a credible election associated
with the current head of government or state;
or
(ii) is the head of a transitional
government, is implementing a roadmap to hold
credible elections, and is unaffiliated with
actions that were related to an
unconstitutional change of administration; and
(B) civil society from each of the African
countries represented at the Summit.
(3) Unit to plan and implement.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall
establish a dedicated unit within the Bureau of African
Affairs of the Department of State to coordinate, plan,
and implement the Summit on a biennial basis, which
should include robust interagency consultation and may
include, on a temporary basis, personnel seconded from
the United States Agency for International Development
and other Federal agencies as appropriate, and which
shall be led by an individual who has previously been
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
(B) Planning efforts.--The unit established under
this paragraph shall--
(i) use lessons learned from the 2022
African Leaders Summit and subsequent Summits
to inform planning of future Summits;
(ii) lead interagency efforts to provide
guidance to United States embassies in African
countries related to planning each Summit and
engagement with governments and civil society
in advance of each Summit;
(iii) lead efforts to implement commitments
made at previous Summits; and
(iv) consult regularly with the appropriate
committees of Congress on the planning in
advance of, and follow-up for, each Summit.
SEC. 215. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN REGARDING ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Government of the PRC is exporting its model for
internal security and state control of society through advanced
technology and artificial intelligence; and
(2) the inclusion of communication networks and
communications supply chains with equipment and services from
companies with close ties to or that are susceptible to
pressure from the Government of the PRC or security services
without reliable legal checks on governmental powers can lead
to breaches of citizens' private information, increased
censorship, violations or abuses of human rights, and
harassment of political opponents.
(b) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Chief Executive Officer of the
United States Agency for Global Media, working through the Open
Technology Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, shall expand and prioritize
efforts to provide anti-censorship and anti-surveillance technology and
services to journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean, in order to
enhance their ability to safely access or share digital news and
information.
(c) Support for Civil Society.--The Secretary of State, through the
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
and in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development, shall work with civil society partners
to--
(1) support and promote programs that support internet
freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin
America and the Caribbean;
(2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable
access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(3) provide integrated support to civil society for digital
safety and related technology programs in Latin America and the
Caribbean;
(4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin
America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary
to ensure public accountability and prevent government
overreach in the digital sphere;
(5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in
Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and
develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance
and human rights topics;
(6) provide training for journalists and civil society
leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve
transparency and accountability in government and the private
sector;
(7) provide training on investigative reporting of
incidents of corruption, unfair trade, and coercive and anti-
competitive business and commercial practices perpetrated by
the PRC, including the role of the Government of the PRC in
such practices;
(8) assist civil society organizations to strengthen their
capacity to monitor the activities described in paragraph (7);
and
(9) identify local organizations to support the activities
to be carried out under this subsection.
Subtitle B--International Organizations
SEC. 221. SAFEGUARDING THE INTEGRITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) the United Nations system is critical to advancing
peace and security, human rights, and development;
(2) the United States benefits from opportunities at the
United Nations to engage in multilateral diplomacy to advance
its own interests and to work with other members of the
international community to address complex and shared
challenges; and
(3) the United States therefore has an interest in
safeguarding the integrity the United Nations System.
(b) Prioritizing the United Nations System.--The Secretary of
State, in coordination with the United States Ambassador to the United
Nations as appropriate, shall prioritize and instruct the senior
leadership of the United States Mission to the United Nations and other
United States Missions to the United Nations to--
(1) promote United States participation in the United
Nations System, and that of United States allies and partners
who are committed to upholding the integrity of the United
Nations;
(2) ensure that United Nations employees are held
accountable to their obligation to uphold the United Nations
charter, rules, and regulations;
(3) hold United States citizens and lawful permanent
residents serving within the United Nations accountable for
conduct, or conspiring or attempting to engage in conduct,
outside of the United States that would constitute a crime if
the conduct had occurred within the United States;
(4) monitor and counter undue influence, especially by
authoritarian governments, within the United Nations System;
(5) promote meaningful participation and inclusion of
Taiwan throughout the United Nations System and its affiliated
agencies and bodies; and
(6) advance other priorities deemed relevant by the
Secretary of State and the United States Representative to the
United Nations to safeguard the integrity of the United Nations
System.
SEC. 222. UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN UNITED NATIONS SPECIALIZED
AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Congress and the executive branch share responsibility
for the foreign relations of the United States pursuant to
Article I and Article II of the Constitution of the United
States.
(2) While the executive branch has a unique role in
speaking for the United States with other governments, it is
not unconstrained under United States law in doing so.
(3) The Senate has a constitutional role in the treaty-
making process, and when the Senate expressly imposes
limitations or requirements that the executive branch must
satisfy before withdrawing from or terminating a treaty
relationship, the executive branch must adhere to those
limitations or requirements.
(4) The Senate has provided advice and consent to
ratification of various agreements for the United States to
join United Nations bodies, and Congress has authorized United
States participation in other United Nations bodies where
treaty ratification was not required, including the World
Health Organization.
(5) Congress therefore has a clear role--consistent with
its constitutional responsibilities in foreign affairs, advice,
and consent to ratification of treaties, and the making of
Federal law--in whether and how the United States participates
in the United Nations, including whether it seeks to withdraw
from such participation.
(6) Robust United States engagement in international
organizations, including the World Health Organization, is
critical in countering efforts by the PRC to bolster its
influence around the world.
(b) Withdrawal From World Health Organization.--Section 4 of the
Joint Resolution entitled, ``Providing for membership by the United
States in the World Health Organization and authorizing an
appropriation therefor,'' approved June 14, 1948 (22 U.S.C. 290c), is
amended by inserting before the period at the end the following ``:
Provided further, That not less than 180 days before providing notice
to withdraw the United States from the World Health Organization, the
President and Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives a notification that such withdrawal is
in the national interests of the United States''.
(c) Withdrawal From Other Specialized Agencies or Related
Organizations of the United Nations.--Not less than 180 days before
taking formal action to initiate the United States withdrawal from a
United Nations specialized agency or related organization, the
President and Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives a notification that such withdrawal is
in the national interests of the United States.
SEC. 223. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE ON MULTILATERAL STRATEGY AND
PERSONNEL.
There is established within the Bureau of International
Organizations of the Department of State an Office on Multilateral
Strategy and Personnel (MSP) with the following responsibilities:
(1) Developing, coordinating, and maintaining a whole-of-
government strategy to strengthen United States engagement and
leadership with multilateral institutions and international
organizations, to include managing efforts to counter third-
countries seeking to undermine the integrity of the United
Nations.
(2) Coordinating whole-of-government efforts related to the
United Nations Junior Professional Officer (JPO) program,
including--
(A) recruiting qualified individuals who represent
the rich diversity of the United States to apply for
United States-sponsored JPO positions;
(B) collecting and collating information about
United States-sponsored JPOs from across the United
States Government;
(C) establishing and providing orientation and
other training materials with United States agencies
sponsoring JPOs;
(D) maintaining regular contact with current and
former United States-sponsored JPOs, including
providing career and professional advice to United
States-sponsored JPOs;
(E) making, informing, and advising on strategic
decisions, including about the location and duration of
United States-sponsored JPO positions to strengthen
United States national security interests and the
competitive advantage of United States-sponsored JPOs
for future employment; and
(F) sponsoring events, including representational
events as appropriate, to support United States-
sponsored JPOs.
(3) Coordinating and overseeing a whole-of-government
United States strategy and efforts in relation to promoting
qualified United States candidates for elected or appointed
senior positions at multilateral institutions and international
organizations, including--
(A) creating a whole-of-government strategy that
identifies and prioritizes upcoming openings of
leadership positions at multilateral institutions and
international organizations;
(B) developing and executing processes to identify
and recruit qualified candidates to apply or run for
these offices;
(C) consulting across the Department and
interagency as they implement selection processes; and
(D) creating and implementing a strategy to obtain
the support necessary for United States candidates for
priority leadership positions including--
(i) liaising and coordinating with
international partners to promote United States
candidates; and
(ii) working with embassies to engage
officials and other entities needed to support
relevant United States candidates.
(4) Promoting detail and transfer opportunities for
qualified United States personnel to multilateral organizations
including by--
(A) liaising with multilateral institutions to
promote and identify detail and transfer opportunities;
(B) developing and maintaining a database of detail
and transfer opportunities to multilateral
organizations;
(C) promoting these detail and transfer
opportunities within the United States Government and
making the database available to those eligible for
details and transfers; and
(D) facilitating any relevant orientation,
trainings, or materials for detailees and transferees,
including debriefing detailees and transferees upon
their return to the United States Government.
(5) Promoting internship and volunteer opportunities at
multilateral institutions and international organizations and
coordinating orientation and career development opportunities,
as relevant.
(6) Promoting and entering into partnership arrangements
with multilateral institutions and international organizations
to encourage United States nationals participation in such
organizations.
SEC. 224. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS TO PROMOTE UNITED STATES
CITIZEN EMPLOYMENT AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) In General.--The President should direct United States
departments and agencies to, in coordination with the Secretary of
State--
(1) fund and recruit Junior Professional Officers for
positions at the United Nations and related specialized and
technical organizations; and
(2) facilitate secondments, details, and transfers to
agencies and specialized and technical bodies of the United
Nations.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated an additional $50,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025
through 2031 for the Secretary of State to support Junior Professional
Officers, details, transfers, volunteers, and interns that advance
United States interests at multilateral institutions and international
organizations, including to recruit, train, and host events related to
such positions, and to promote United States citizen candidates for
employment and leadership positions at multilateral institutions and
international organizations.
SEC. 225. UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AND REPRESENTATION IN STANDARDS-
SETTING BODIES.
(a) Enhancing Representation and Leadership of United States at
International Standards-Setting Bodies.--The President shall--
(1) establish an interagency working group to provide
assistance and technical expertise to enhance the
representation and leadership of the United States at
international bodies that set standards for equipment, systems,
software, and virtually defined networks that support 5th and
future generation mobile telecommunications systems and
infrastructure, such as the International Telecommunication
Union and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project; and
(2) work with allies, partners, and the private sector to
increase productive engagement with respect to the standards
described in paragraph (1).
(b) Interagency Working Group.--The interagency working group
described in subsection (a) shall--
(1) be chaired by the Secretary of Commerce or a designee
of the Secretary at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level or
above;
(2) be vice-chaired by the Secretary of State or a designee
of the Secretary at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level or
above to focus on cooperation with allies and partners with
respect to international standards-setting bodies; and
(3) consist of the head (or designee) of each Federal
department or agency the President determines appropriate.
Subtitle C--South China and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024
SEC. 231. SHORT TITLE.
This part may be cited as the ``South China Sea and East China Sea
Sanctions Act of 2024''.
SEC. 232. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PRC PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
PRC'S ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE EAST
CHINA SEA.
(a) Initial Imposition of Sanctions.--On and after the date that is
120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may
impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any
PRC person, including any senior official of the Government of the PRC,
that the President determines--
(1) is responsible for or significantly contributes to
large-scale reclamation, construction, militarization, or
ongoing supply of outposts in disputed areas of the South China
Sea;
(2) is responsible for or significantly contributes to, or
has engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions, including the
use of coercion, to inhibit another country from protecting its
sovereign rights to access offshore resources in the South
China Sea, including in such country's exclusive economic zone,
consistent with such country's rights and obligations under
international law;
(3) is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in,
directly or indirectly, actions that significantly threaten the
peace, security, or stability of disputed areas of the South
China Sea or areas of the East China Sea administered by Japan
or the Republic of Korea, including through the use of vessels
and aircraft by the PRC to occupy or conduct extensive research
or drilling activity in those areas;
(4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided
financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or
services to, or in support of, any person subject to sanctions
pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), or (3); or
(5) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person subject to
sanctions pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions that may be imposed with
respect to a person described in subsection (a) are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President may, in accordance
with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all
property and interests in property of the person if such
property and interests in property are in the United States,
come within the United States, or are or come within the
possession or control of a United States person.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.--In the case of an
alien, the alien may be--
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
documentation to enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
or paroled into the United States or to receive
any other benefit under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--An alien described in
subparagraph (A) may be subject to revocation
of any visa or other entry documentation
regardless of when the visa or other entry
documentation is or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under
clause (i) may--
(I) take effect immediately in
accordance with section 221(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1201(i)); and
(II) cancel any other valid visa or
entry documentation that is in the
alien's possession.
(3) Exclusion of corporate officers.--The President may
direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United
States, any alien that the President determines is a corporate
officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling
interest in, the person.
(4) Export sanction.--The President may order the United
States Government not to issue any specific license and not to
grant any other specific permission or authority to export any
goods or technology to the person under--
(A) the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50
U.S.C. 4801 et seq.); or
(B) any other statute that requires the prior
review and approval of the United States Government as
a condition for the export or reexport of goods or
services.
(5) Inclusion on entity list.--The President may include
the entity on the entity list maintained by the Bureau of
Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and set
forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export
Administration Regulations, for activities contrary to the
national security or foreign policy interests of the United
States.
(6) Ban on investment in equity or debt of sanctioned
person.--The President may, pursuant to such regulations or
guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any United
States person from investing in or purchasing equity or debt
instruments of the person.
(7) Banking transactions.--The President may, pursuant to
such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any
transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions
or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent
that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States and involve any interest of the person.
(8) Correspondent and payable-through accounts.--In the
case of a foreign financial institution, the President may
prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions
on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent
account or a payable-through account by the foreign financial
institution.
(c) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and
1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in subsections
(b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person
that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or
causes a violation of regulations prescribed under subsection
(b)(1) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person
that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of
such section 206.
(d) Exceptions.--
(1) Inapplicability of national emergency requirement.--The
requirements of section 202 of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply for
purposes of subsection (b)(1).
(2) Exception for intelligence, law enforcement, and
national security activities.--Sanctions under this section
shall not apply to any authorized intelligence, law
enforcement, or national security activities of the United
States.
(3) Compliance with international agreements.--Paragraphs
(2) and (3) of subsection (b) shall not apply if admission of
an alien to the United States is necessary to permit the United
States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters
of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success, June 26, 1947,
and entered into force, November 21, 1947, between the United
Nations and the United States and other international
obligations of the United States.
(4) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--The authority or a requirement to
impose sanctions under this section shall not include
the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on
the importation of goods.
(B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term
``good'' means any article, natural or manmade
substance, material, supply, or manufactured product,
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding
technical data.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Account; correspondent account; payable-through
account.--The terms ``account'', ``correspondent account'', and
``payable-through account'' have the meanings given those terms
in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.
(2) Alien.--The term ``alien'' has the meaning given that
term in section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C. 1101(a)).
(3) PRC person.--The term ``PRC person'' means--
(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of
the PRC; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the PRC
or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
Government of the PRC.
(4) Financial institution.--The term ``financial
institution'' means a financial institution specified in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J),
(K), (M), (N), (P), (R), (T), (Y), or (Z) of section 5312(a)(2)
of title 31, United States Code.
(5) Foreign financial institution.--The term ``foreign
financial institution'' has the meaning given that term in
section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or
any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).
(6) Person.--The term ``person'' means any individual or
entity.
(7) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or of any jurisdiction within the United
States, including a foreign branch of such an entity;
or
(C) any person in the United States.
SEC. 233. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING PORTRAYALS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
OR THE EAST CHINA SEA AS PART OF CHINA.
It is the sense of Congress that the Government Publishing Office
should not publish any map, document, record, electronic resource, or
other paper of the United States (other than materials relating to
hearings held by committees of Congress or internal work product of a
Federal agency) portraying or otherwise indicating that it is the
position of the United States that any part of the territory or
airspace in the South China Sea that is disputed among two or more
parties, or of the territory or airspace of areas administered by Japan
or the Republic of Korea, including in the East China Sea, is part of
the territory or airspace of the PRC.
SEC. 234. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON 2016 PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION'S
TRIBUNAL RULING ON ARBITRATION CASE BETWEEN PHILIPPINES
AND PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Finding.--Congress finds that on July 12, 2016, a tribunal of
the Permanent Court of Arbitration found in the arbitration case
between the Philippines and the PRC under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea that the PRC's claims, including those to
offshore resources and ``historic rights'', were unlawful, and that the
tribunal's ruling is final and legally binding on both parties.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States and the international community
should reject the unlawful claims of the PRC within the
exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf of the
Philippines, as well as the maritime claims of the PRC beyond a
12-nautical-mile territorial sea from the islands it claims in
the South China Sea;
(2) the provocative behavior of the PRC, including coercing
other countries with claims in the South China Sea and
preventing those countries from accessing offshore resources,
undermines peace and stability in the South China Sea;
(3) the international community should--
(A) support the ruling described in subsection (a)
in compliance with international law; and
(B) take all necessary steps to support the rules-
based international order in the South China Sea; and
(4) all claimants in the South China Sea should--
(A) refrain from engaging in destabilizing
activities, including illegal occupation or efforts to
unlawfully assert control over disputed claims;
(B) ensure that disputes are managed without
intimidation, coercion, or force;
(C) clarify or adjust claims in accordance with
international law; and
(D) uphold the principle that territorial and
maritime claims, including over territorial waters or
territorial seas, must be derived from land features
and otherwise comport with international law.
TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES
Subtitle A--Promoting Human Rights in People's Republic of China
PART I--PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS FOR CITIZENS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA AND FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN CHINA
SEC. 301. PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--The Secretary shall carry out programs, including
through nongovernmental organizations, that prioritize the protection
and advancement of the freedoms of association, assembly, religion, and
expression for, democracy and human rights activists, women, and ethnic
and religious minorities in the PRC.
(b) Consultation Requirement.--In carrying out this section, the
Assistant Secretary of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall consult
with the appropriate committees of Congress regarding--
(1) strengthening the capacity of the organizations
referred to in subsection (a);
(2) protecting members of the groups referred to in
subsection (a) who have been targeted for arrest, harassment,
forced sterilizations, coercive abortions, forced labor,
intimidation, or subject to transnational repression, including
members residing outside of the PRC; and
(3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest possible
audiences within the PRC about United States Government efforts
to protect freedom of association, expression, assembly, and
the rights of women and ethnic and religious minorities.
SEC. 302. REPORT ON CORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF SENIOR OFFICIALS OF
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Annual Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through
2028, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury and any other relevant United States
Government official, shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a report identifying those senior PRC officials who
are responsible for, or complicit in, or who have directly or
indirectly engaged in, significant corruption.
(2) Elements.--
(A) In general.--The report required under
paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:
(i) A general description of the corrupt
sources of wealth of senior PRC officials.
(ii) A description of corruption, including
activities taking place outside of China,
engaged in by senior PRC officials.
(iii) A description of any gaps in the
ability of the intelligence community to
collect information described in clauses (i)
and (ii).
(iv) The names of other individuals and
entities who facilitate or benefit from
significant corruption by senior PRC officials,
both inside and outside of the PRC.
(B) Scope of reports.--The first report submitted
under paragraph (1) shall include comprehensive
information on the matters described in subparagraph
(A). Each succeeding report submitted under paragraph
(1) may consist of an update or supplement to the
preceding report submitted under that paragraph.
(3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall
include an unclassified executive summary of the elements
described in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (2)(A), and may
include a classified annex.
(4) Assessment of applicability of sanctions.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after
submission of each report required by paragraph (1),
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of the Treasury, as appropriate, shall--
(i) evaluate whether any foreign person
identified under this section may meet the
criteria for the potential imposition of
sanctions under existing sanctions authorities,
including--
(I) the Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C.
10101 et seq.); and
(II) section 7031(c) of the
Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2023 (division K of
Public Law 117-328; 8 U.S.C. 1182
note); and
(ii) submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a report, in writing, setting forth
the results of that assessment.
(B) Form.--The report required by subparagraph
(A)(ii) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should undertake every effort and pursue every opportunity to
expose the corruption and related practices of senior PRC officials,
including General Secretary of the Communist Party and President Xi
Jinping.
(c) Corruption Defined.--In this section the term ``corruption''
includes, among other activities--
(1) the misappropriation of state assets;
(2) the expropriation of private assets for personal gain;
(3) abuse of an official position related to government
contracts or the extraction of natural resources; and
(4) bribery.
SEC. 303. CHINA EXIT BANS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall collect and analyze
available information on the application of exit bans by the PRC,
including trends with respect to the application of such exit bans to
United States nationals. Such data shall be--
(1) used to update of travel warnings as appropriate, and
in disseminating such information to relevant State and local
authorities, with a special emphasis on domestic jurisdictions
with large numbers of at-risk populations;
(2) shared, as appropriate, with allies and partner nations
about potential risks and vulnerabilities their citizens may
face in traveling to the PRC;
(3) used to inform United States actions to hold the PRC
accountable for these actions; and
(4) submitted to the appropriate committees of Congress.
(b) Exit Ban Defined.--In this section the term ``exit ban'' means
a restriction imposed by the Government of the PRC that prevents
foreign nationals, including United States nationals, including legal
permanent residents of the United States, from leaving the PRC without
a fair and transparent legal cause or recourse for the impacted party.
PART II--MATTERS RELATED TO HONG KONG
SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND CIVILIAN SECURITY IN HONG KONG.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2025 for the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State to
promote democracy, human rights, and civilian security in Hong Kong.
(b) Administration.--The Secretary of State shall designate an
office within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to
administer and coordinate the provision of the funds described in
subsection (a) within the Department of State and across the United
States Government.
SEC. 306. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET FREEDOM AND
CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The PRC has repeatedly violated its obligations under
the Joint Declaration by suppressing the basic rights and
freedoms of Hong Kongers.
(2) On June 30, 2020, the National People's Congress passed
a ``National Security Law'' that further erodes Hong Kong's
autonomy and enables authorities to suppress dissent.
(3) The PRC continues to utilize the National Security Law
to undermine the fundamental rights of the people of Hong Kong
through suppression of the freedom of speech, assembly,
religion, and the press.
(4) Article 9 of the National Security Law authorizes
unprecedented regulation and supervision of internet activity
in Hong Kong, including expanded police powers to force
internet service providers to censor content, hand over user
information, and block access to platforms.
(5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong Broadband Network
blocked public access to HK Chronicles, a website promoting
pro-democracy viewpoints, under the authorities of the National
Security Law.
(6) On February 12, 2021, internet service providers
blocked Hong Kong users' access to the Taiwan Transitional
Justice Commission website in Hong Kong.
(7) Major tech companies, including Facebook, Twitter,
WhatsApp, and Google have stopped reviewing requests for user
data from Hong Kong authorities.
(8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy activists in
Hong Kong were arrested and charged under the National Security
Law on the charge of ``conspiracy to commit subversion''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should--
(1) support the ability of the people of Hong Kong to
maintain their freedom to access information online; and
(2) focus on investments in technologies that facilitate
the unhindered exchange of information in Hong Kong in advance
of any future efforts by the Chinese Communist Party--
(A) to suppress internet access;
(B) to increase online censorship; or
(C) to inhibit online communication and content-
sharing by the people of Hong Kong.
(c) Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish a
Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program in the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State which shall
include a working group dedicated to developing a strategy to
bolster internet resiliency and online access in Hong Kong (in
this subsection, the ``Program''). The working group shall
consist of--
(A) the Under Secretary of State for Civilian
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights;
(B) the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs;
(C) the Chief Executive Officer of the United
States Agency for Global Media;
(D) the President of the Open Technology Fund;
(E) the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development; and
(F) the Ambassador-at-large for Cyberspace and
Digital Policy;
(2) Independence.--During the period beginning on the date
of the enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2027,
the Program shall be carried out independent from internet
freedom programs focused on the rest of the PRC.
(3) Consolidation of department of state program.--
Beginning on October 1, 2026, the Secretary of State may--
(A) consolidate the Program with the mainland China
initiatives in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor; or
(B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance
with paragraph (2).
(d) Support for Internet Freedom Technology Programs.--
(1) Grants authorized.--The Secretary of State, working
with the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development and the President of the Open
Technology fund as appropriate, are authorized to award grants
and contracts to private organizations to support and develop
programs in Hong Kong that promote or expand--
(A) open, interoperable, reliable, and secure
internet; and
(B) the online exercise of human rights and
fundamental freedoms of individual citizens, activists,
human rights defenders, independent journalists, civil
society organizations, and marginalized populations in
Hong Kong.
(2) Goals.--The goals of the programs developed with grants
authorized under paragraph (1) should be--
(A) to support unrestricted access to the internet
in Hong Kong;
(B) to increase the availability of internet
freedom tools in Hong Kong;
(C) to scale up the distribution of such
technologies and tools throughout Hong Kong;
(D) to prioritize the development of tools,
components, code, and technologies that are fully open-
source, to the extent practicable;
(E) to conduct research on repressive tactics that
undermine internet freedom in Hong Kong;
(F) to ensure information on digital safety is
available to human rights defenders, independent
journalists, civil society organizations, and
marginalized populations in Hong Kong; and
(G) to engage private industry, including e-
commerce firms and social networking companies, on the
importance of preserving unrestricted internet access
in Hong Kong.
(3) Grant recipients.--Grants authorized under this
subsection shall be distributed to multiple vendors and
suppliers through an open, fair, competitive, and evidence-
based decision process--
(A) to diversify the technical base; and
(B) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad actors.
(4) Security audits.--New technologies developed using
grants authorized under this subsection shall undergo
comprehensive security audits to ensure that such technologies
are secure and have not been compromised in a manner
detrimental to the interests of the United States or to
individuals or organizations benefitting from programs
supported by these funds.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) Open technology fund.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Open Technology Fund $2,000,000 for each of
fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section. This
funding is in addition to the funds authorized for the Open
Technology Fund pursuant to section 309A of United States
International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6208a).
(2) Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor.--In
addition to the funds authorized to be made available pursuant
to paragraph (1), there is authorized to be appropriated to the
Office of Internet Freedom Programs in the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State $2,000,000
for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this
section.
PART III--MATTERS RELATED TO XINJIANG
SEC. 311. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TREATMENT OF UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC
MINORITIES IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Uyghurs are one of several predominantly Muslim Turkic
groups living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
in the northwest of the PRC.
(2) Following Uyghur demonstrations and unrest in 2009 and
clashes with government security personnel and other violent
incidents in subsequent years, PRC leaders began a campaign of
large-scale atrocities in the XUAR including arrests and
extreme security measures, under the pretext of combatting
alleged terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism.
(3) In May 2014, the PRC launched its ``Strike Hard Against
Violent Extremism'' campaign, which resulted in additional
human rights violations against minorities in the XUAR under
the pretext of fighting terrorism.
(4) In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo
member Chen Quanguo, former Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party
Secretary, known for overseeing intensifying security
operations and human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed as
Party Secretary of the XUAR.
(5) Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities sought to forcibly
``assimilate'' Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities into Chinese
society through a policy of cultural erasure known as
``Sinicization''.
(6) Since 2018, credible reporting, including from the BBC,
France24, and the New York Times, has shown that the Government
of the PRC has built mass internment camps in the XUAR, which
it calls ``vocational training'' centers, and detained Uyghurs
and other groups in them and other facilities.
(7) Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbitrarily detained
an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs--12.5 percent of the XUAR's
official Uyghur population of 12,000,000--and a smaller number
of other ethnic minorities in the ``vocational training''
centers and other detention and pre-detention facilities.
(8) In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than two percent
of the PRC's total population but 21 percent of all arrests in
China.
(9) The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other sources have
revealed that detainees are forced to renounce many of their
Islamic beliefs and customs and repudiate Uyghur culture,
language, and identity.
(10) Investigations by Human Rights Watch and other human
rights organizations have documented how detainees are subject
to political indoctrination, forced labor, crowded and
unsanitary conditions, involuntary biometric data collection,
both medical neglect and intrusive medical interventions, food
and water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence, and torture.
(11) Research by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute
suggests that, since late 2019, many detainees have been placed
in higher security facilities and convicted of formal crimes.
(12) Human Rights Watch has reported that the PRC uses data
collection programs, including facial recognition technology,
to surveil Uyghurs in the XUAR and to identify individuals whom
authorities may detain.
(13) PRC authorities have placed countless children whose
parents are detained or in exile in state-run institutions and
boarding schools without the consent of their parents.
(14) New York Times reporting revealed that numerous local
PRC officials who did not agree with the policies carried out
in XUAR have been fired and imprisoned.
(15) Associated Press reporting documented widespread and
systemic efforts by PRC authorities to force Uyghur women to
take contraceptives or to subject them to sterilization or
abortion, threatening to detain those who do not comply.
(16) PRC authorities prohibit family members and advocates
inside and outside China from having regular communications
with relatives and friends imprisoned in the XUAR, such as
journalist and entrepreneur Ekpar Asat.
(17) PRC authorities have imposed pervasive restrictions on
the peaceful practice of Islam in the XUAR, to the extent that
Human Rights Watch asserts the PRC ``has effectively outlawed
the practice of Islam''.
(18) Individuals who are not detained in camps have been
forced to attend political indoctrination sessions, subjected
to movement restrictions, mass surveillance systems,
involuntary biometric data collection, and other human rights
abuses.
(19) International media, nongovernmental organizations,
scholars, families, and survivors have reported on the systemic
nature of many of these abuses.
(20) On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 independent United
Nations experts jointly expressed alarm over China's
deteriorating human rights record, including its repression in
Xinjiang, and called on the international community ``to act
collectively and decisively to ensure China respects human
rights and abides by its international obligations''.
(21) On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations member countries
issued a public statement condemning human rights violations by
PRC authorities and calling on the PRC to allow the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered access to
Xinjiang.
(22) United States Congress passed the Uyghur Human Rights
Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145).
(23) United States Congress passed the Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of
Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note), which has been used
to sanction PRC officials and entities for their activities in
the XUAR.
(24) United States Congress passed the Uyghur Forced Labor
Prevention Act (Public Law 117-78.)
(25) The United States Government has implemented
additional targeted restrictions on trade with Xinjiang and
imposed visa and economic sanctions on PRC officials and
entities for their activities in the XUAR.
(26) The United States Government has documented human
rights abuses and violations of individual freedoms in the
XUAR, including in the 2019 Department of State Report on
International Religious Freedom.
(27) On January 19, 2021, then-Secretary of State Michael
Pompeo ``determined that the PRC, under the direction and
control of the CCP, has committed crimes against humanity,
genocide against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other
ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang'' and that
these crimes are ongoing.
(28) On January 19, 2021, during his confirmation hearing,
Secretary of State Antony Blinken testified that ``forcing men,
women, and children into concentration camps, trying to in
effect reeducate them to be adherents to the Chinese Communist
Party--all of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide''.
(29) On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the Treasury Janet
L. Yellen, during her confirmation hearing, publicly stated
that China is guilty of ``horrendous human rights abuses''.
(30) On January 27, 2021, in response to a question from
the press regarding the Uyghurs, Secretary Blinken stated that
his ``judgement remains that genocide was committed against the
Uyghurs''.
(31) On March 10, 2021, in response to a question on
Xinjiang during his testimony before the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives, Secretary Blinken
reiterated, ``We've been clear, and I've been clear, that I see
it as genocide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and
we'll continue to make that clear.''
(32) The 2020 Department of State Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices: China states that ``[g]enocide and crimes
against humanity occurred during the year against the
predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious
minority groups in Xinjiang''.
(33) United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Michelle Bachelet traveled to China in May 2022 and during this
mission visited the XUAR, but the PRC did not provide her with
the unfettered and unmonitored access that would have been
needed to make a fulsome assessment of the conditions and
experiences of those most affected by the PRCs repressive
policies.
(34) On August 31, 2022, the United Nations Office of the
High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) issued its
``Assessment of the Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China'' and in
this report noted that the human rights abuses being committed
against the Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim groups in
the XUAR ``may constitute international crimes, in particular
crimes against humanity''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the atrocities, including genocide, committed by the
PRC against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim Turkic
groups in Xinjiang, including forced labor, sexual violence,
the internment of over 1,000,000 individuals, and other
horrific abuses must be condemned;
(2) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United
States Ambassador to the United Nations should speak publicly
about the ongoing atrocities in the XUAR, including in formal
speeches at the United Nations and other international fora;
(3) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United
States Ambassador to the United Nations should appeal to the
United Nations Secretary-General to take a more proactive and
public stance on the situation in the XUAR, including by
supporting calls for an investigation and accountability for
individuals and entities responsible for abuses against the
people of the XUAR;
(4) the United States should continue to use targeted
sanctions and all diplomatic tools, including the Uyghur Human
Rights Policy Act and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act,
available to promote accountability for those responsible for
the atrocities in Xinjiang;
(5) United States agencies engaged with China on trade,
climate, defense, or other bilateral issues should include
human rights abuses in the XUAR as a consideration in
developing United States policy;
(6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia Uyghur, the
only Uyghur-language news service in the world independent of
PRC government influence;
(7) United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Bachelet's visit to China in May 2022 may have inadvertently
lent credence to the PRC's narrative that its actions in the
XUAR were part of a legitimate counter-terrorism operation
given the PRC;
(8) in any future visits to China senior United Nations
officials, and in particular the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, should insist on unfettered and
unmonitored access, including to XUAR; and
(9) the Secretary of State, working with the United States
Ambassador to the United Nations, and the United States
Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice should outline
a strategy to work with international partners to promote
justice for the PRC's crimes in the XUAR and investigate the
atrocity crimes and other human rights abuses that have taken
place in the XUAR, collect, preserve, and analyze this
evidence, so that it can be used by a future competent court to
adjudicate these cases.
SEC. 312. SENSE OF CONGRESS CALLING ON ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC
COOPERATION MEMBERS TO TAKE ACTION ON ATROCITIES IN
XINJIANG.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States is committed to the right to freedom
of religion or belief and the principle that all persons should
be free to practice or not practice the religion or belief of
their choice without fear of persecution;
(2) the international community plays an important role
elevating awareness when countries are discriminating against,
persecuting, or committing atrocities, including genocide, or
other abuses against persons based on their religion or
ethnicity;
(3) countries that are home to significant populations of
religious communities being persecuted and abused elsewhere are
uniquely positioned to take a leadership role in exerting
diplomatic pressure and promoting accountability with respect
to such abuses; and
(4) the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and its
member states should, as ``The Collective Voice of the Muslim
World'', which ``endeavors to safeguard and protect the
interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting
international peace and harmony among various people of the
world,'' be the leading global voice in--
(A) advocating, including with respect to Uyghurs
and other ethnic and religious minorities in the PRC,
for Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which provides, ``Everyone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually
or in community with others and in public or private to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice, and teaching.'';
(B) seeking to raise awareness about the plight of
the Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and elsewhere
in the PRC;
(C) calling on the PRC to stop committing
atrocities, including genocide, against Muslims and
other religious and ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region and elsewhere in the PRC;
(D) taking action to support justice for Uyghurs
and other ethnic and religious minorities in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and elsewhere in the
PRC; and
(E) safeguarding against the refoulement of Uyghurs
and other ethnic and religious minorities back to the
PRC.
SEC. 313. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY ACT.
Section 6(h) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public
Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended by striking ``5 years
after'' and inserting ``10 years after''.
SEC. 314. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEMATIC RAPE,
COERCIVE ABORTION, FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY
CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR
AUTONOMOUS REGION.
(a) In General.--Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy
Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (G);
and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new
subparagraph:
``(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced
sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive
implantation policies and practices.''.
(b) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendment made by
subsection (a)--
(1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act;
and
(2) applies with respect to each report required by section
6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted
after such date of enactment.
PART IV--MATTERS RELATED TO TIBET
SEC. 317. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET.
(a) Rank of United States Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.--
(1) In general.--Section 621 of the Tibetan Policy Act of
2002 (subtitle B of title VI of Public Law 107-228; 22 U.S.C.
6901 note) is amended--
(A) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and (d),
as subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after subsection (a) the following
new subsection:
``(b) Rank.--The Special Coordinator shall either be appointed by
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, or shall be
an individual holding the rank of Under Secretary of State or
higher.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--Section 616(e)(2) of the Tibetan
Policy Act of 2002 is amended by striking ``section 621(d)''
and inserting ``section 621(e)''.
(b) Tibet Unit at United States Embassy in Beijing.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish a
Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the United States
Embassy in Beijing, People's Republic of China.
(2) Operation.--The Tibet Unit established under paragraph
(1) shall operate until such time as the PRC permits--
(A) the United States Consulate General in Chengdu,
People's Republic of China, to reopen; or
(B) a United States Consulate General in Lhasa,
Tibet, to open.
(3) Staff.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary should assign not
fewer than 2 United States direct-hire personnel to the
Tibet Unit established under paragraph (1).
(B) Language training.--The Secretary shall make
Tibetan language training available to the personnel
assigned under subparagraph (A), consistent with the
Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (subtitle B of title VI of
Public Law 107-228; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note).
SEC. 318. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT ON THE OR
REINCARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF
TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.
(a) Reaffirmation of Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States, as provided under section 342(b) of division FF of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116-260), that any
``interference by the Government of the PRC or any other government in
the process of recognizing a successor or reincarnation of the 14th
Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas would represent a clear abuse of
the right to religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan
people''.
(b) International Efforts To Protect Religious Freedom of Tibetan
Buddhists.--The Secretary of State should engage with United States
allies and partners--
(1) to support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders' sole
religious authority to identify and install the 15th Dalai
Lama;
(2) to oppose claims by the Government of the PRC that the
PRC has the authority to decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th
Dalai Lama; and
(3) to reject interference by the Government of the PRC in
the religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.
Subtitle B--Promoting Human Rights Globally
SEC. 321. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
THAT COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.
The President shall direct the Permanent Representative of the
United States to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States to--
(1) reform the process for suspending rights of membership
in the United Nations Human Rights Council for states that
commit gross and systematic violations of human rights,
including--
(A) ensuring information detailing the member
country's human rights record is publicly available
before a vote on suspension of the rights of
membership; and
(B) making the vote of each country on the
suspension of rights of membership from the United
Nations Human Rights Council publicly available;
(2) reform the rules on electing members to the United
Nations Human Rights Council to seek to ensure United Nations
members that have committed gross and systematic violations of
human rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council; and
(3) oppose the election to the Human Rights Council of any
United Nations member--
(A) currently assessed to engage in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of human rights pursuant to
section 116 or section 502B of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n, 2304);
(B) currently designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism;
(C) currently designated as a Tier 3 country under
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22
U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);
(D) the government of which is identified on the
list published by the Secretary of State pursuant to
section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of
2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c-1(b)) as a government that
recruits and uses child soldiers; or
(E) the government of which the United States
determines to have committed genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, or ethnic cleansing.
SEC. 322. PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND
OTHER MULTILATERAL BODIES.
The Secretary of State and the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations shall use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations and other
multilateral bodies--
(1) to oppose efforts by the PRC and other authoritarian
actors to prevent the full participation of civil society
actors, including human rights defenders, and block the
accreditation of non-governmental organizations at the United
Nations and other multilateral bodies;
(2) to ensure that the United Nations bolsters the
protection and safe participation of civil society actors who
are subject to transnational repression, state-sponsored
harassment, and reprisals by the PRC and other governments;
(3) to increase monitoring and reporting to identify and
track reprisals against human rights defenders, who engage with
the United Nations and other multilateral bodies;
(4) to oppose efforts by the PRC and other authoritarian
actors to sponsor the participation of government-organized
nongovernmental organizations in the Committee on Non-
Governmental Organizations of United Nations Economic and
Social Council, which organizations are used as instruments of
the state, including to repress participation and debate by
legitimate civil society actors;
(5) to support the use of targeted sanctions, censure of
member states, and all diplomatic tools, including working with
other foreign governments, available to hold accountable
persons that engage in reprisals against human rights
defenders; and
(6) to oppose efforts by the PRC to reduce funding for
human rights monitoring and civilian protection posts within
Security Council approved United Nations peacekeeping missions.
SEC. 323. INCLUSION OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY ABUSE IN HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) is
amended--
(1) in section 116 (22 U.S.C. 2151n), by adding at the end
the following new subsection:
``(h) Surveillance Technology.--
``(1) In general.--The report required under subsection (d)
shall to the extent feasible include a description of the use
of foreign commercial spyware by the government of each country
in which there are systematic acts of political repression, to
conduct surveillance, including passive or active monitoring,
against activists, journalists, opposition politicians, or
other individuals for the purposes of suppressing dissent or
intimidating critics.
``(2) Defined term.--In this subsection, the term `foreign
commercial spyware' means the term referred to in section 6318
of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263).''; and
(2) in section 502B (22 U.S.C. 2304)--
(A) by redesignating the second subsection
designated subsection (i) as subsection (j); and
(B) by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(k) Surveillance Technology.--
``(1) In general.--The report required under subsection (b)
shall to the extent feasible include a description of the use
of foreign commercial spyware by the government of each country
in which there are systematic acts of political repression, to
conduct surveillance, including passive or active monitoring,
against activists, journalists, opposition politicians, or
other individuals for the purposes of suppressing dissent or
intimidating critics.
``(2) Defined term.--In this subsection, the term `foreign
commercial spyware' means the term referred to in section 6318
of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263).''.
SEC. 324. STRENGTHENING PUBLIC REPORTING ON CORRUPTION.
It is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) the PRC and its representatives are engaged in
corruption across the globe, targeting public sector officials
with the goal of inducing them to make official decisions that
suit the interests of the PRC in exchange for personal
financial gain;
(2) people across the globe do not want leaders who make
deals to enrich themselves and their families in exchange for
their country's natural resources or agreeing to take on
onerous national debts and loans, which the nation will be
forced to pay back; and
(3) uncovering and bringing to light evidence of this sort
of corruption serves the objective of empowering people
everywhere to bring such practices to end.
SEC. 325. AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDING FOR PUBLIC REPORTING ON CORRUPTION
AND CORRUPT PRACTICES.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall support and
strengthen media and civil society initiatives to uncover and report on
evidence of corruption, with a goal of bringing to light the corrupt
practices of the PRC and its representatives in every region, and the
local leaders who are accepting these payments.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated an additional $3,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025
through 2029 for the Secretary of State to carry out this section.
TITLE IV--MODERNIZING THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO MEET THE CHINA
CHALLENGE
SEC. 401. ESTABLISHING AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDO-PACIFIC
AFFAIRS.
(a) Repeal.--Section 122 of the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (22 U.S.C. 2652b) is repealed.
(b) Authorization.--The Secretary of State is authorized to
establish a Bureau for Indo-Pacific Affairs, to be headed by an
Assistant Secretary for Indo-Pacific Affairs appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
Assistant Secretary shall report to the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs.
(c) Duties.--The Assistant Secretary for Indo-Pacific Affairs
shall--
(1) be responsible for overseeing and coordinating
diplomatic efforts related to the Indo-Pacific region, and to
advance United States interests, promote regional stability,
and foster economic growth and development through diplomatic
engagement, public affairs, policy coordination, and strategic
partnerships within the Indo-Pacific region;
(2) advance United States interests with respect to the
PRC, especially by advancing a policy of strategic competition
to contend with the threats and challenges posed by the PRC to
the United States, its allies, and other partners in the Indo-
Pacific region;
(3) assist the Secretary of State in providing overall
direction and coordination of interdepartmental activities of
the United States Government in the countries within the Indo-
Pacific region, including directing United States policies for
Indo-Pacific countries, directing and overseeing the
effectiveness of the applicable strategies, plans, programs,
resources, and performance for implementing that policy, and
monitoring for and indications of developing crises and
initiating appropriate action in a timely manner;
(4) provide active direction to chiefs of mission (COMs) in
carrying out their official duty to implement U.S. foreign
policy and lead their missions effectively, and facilitate
supported needed by COMs at their missions;
(5) directly supervise the policy and operations of the
bureau and provide overall guidance to the United States
missions within the region;
(6) direct and oversee the provision of an adequate,
regular flow of information to posts abroad on United States
Government policies, policy deliberations, and diplomatic
exchanges, especially on matters that may result in
negotiations, initiatives, policy actions, or other official
representations of Department policy abroad; and
(7) other responsibilities, as determined by the Secretary,
related to the advancement of United States foreign policy and
national security in the Indo-Pacific.
(d) Realignment.--The Secretary of State is authorized to realign
bureaus and offices within the Department of State to implement this
provision.
(e) Definitions.--The terms ``Indo-Pacific'' and ``Indo-Pacific
region'' mean the following 39 countries and their surrounding
waterways: Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, the
People's Republic of China, Cook Islands, Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia,
Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal, New
Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea,
Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste,
Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. The terms also include Taiwan and
its surrounding waterway.
SEC. 402. ENHANCING STRATEGIC COMPETITION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the
PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development,
military, informational, and technological realms that
maximizes the United States strengths and increases the costs
for the PRC of harming United States interests and the values
of United States allies and partners;
(2) to lead a free, open, and secure international system
characterized by freedom from coercion, rule of law, open
markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commitment
to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights,
and good and transparent governance;
(3) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and
partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and Europe, by
pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative
initiatives that advance shared interests and values and
bolster the confidence of partner countries that the United
States is and will remain a strong, committed, and constant
partner;
(4) to encourage and collaborate with United States allies
and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency
to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values,
free from coercion and external pressure;
(5) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy
competition in United States-China economic relations by--
(A) advancing policies that harden the United
States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or
trading practices and the coercion of United States
businesses; and
(B) tightening United States laws and regulations
as necessary to prevent the PRC's attempts to harm
United States economic competitiveness;
(6) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth
in emerging markets around the world, including through the use
of United States Government tools that--
(A) support greater private sector investment and
advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded
in the rule of law;
(B) promote open markets;
(C) establish clear policy and regulatory
frameworks;
(D) improve the management of key economic sectors;
(E) combat corruption; and
(F) foster and support greater collaboration with
and among partner countries and the United States
private sector to develop secure and sustainable
infrastructure;
(7) to lead in the advancement of international rules and
norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and
integrated markets;
(8) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of
United States companies and businesses in partner countries
that seek fair competition;
(9) to ensure that the United States leads in the
innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-
generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum
information science, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by--
(A) providing necessary investment and concrete
incentives for the private sector and the United States
Government to accelerate development of such
technologies;
(B) modernizing export controls and investment
screening regimes and associated policies and
regulations;
(C) enhancing United States leadership in technical
standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing
norms regarding the use of emerging critical
technologies;
(D) reducing United States barriers and increasing
incentives for collaboration with allies and partners
on the research and co-development of critical
technologies;
(E) collaborating with allies and partners to
protect critical technologies by--
(i) crafting multilateral export control
measures;
(ii) building capacity for defense
technology security;
(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in supply
chains; and
(iv) ensuring diversification; and
(F) designing major defense capabilities for export
to allies and partners;
(10) to collaborate with advanced democracies and other
willing partners to promote ideals and principles that--
(A) advance a free and open international order;
(B) strengthen democratic institutions;
(C) protect and promote human rights; and
(D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
(11) to develop comprehensive and holistic strategies and
policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns;
(12) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United
Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral
organizations and defend the integrity of these organizations
against co-optation by illiberal and authoritarian nations;
(13) to prioritize the defense of fundamental freedoms and
human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC;
(14) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral
organizations, leveraging their significant and growing
capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that
sustains and strengthens a free and open order and addresses
regional and global challenges to hold the Government of the
PRC accountable for--
(A) violations and abuses of human rights;
(B) restrictions on religious practices; and
(C) undermining and abrogating treaties, other
international agreements, and other international norms
related to human rights;
(15) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, repression, and
other malign behavior to attain unfair economic advantages and
to pressure other nations to defer to its political and
strategic objectives;
(16) to maintain United States access to the Western
Pacific, including by--
(A) increasing United States forward-deployed
forces in the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) modernizing the United States military through
investments in existing and new platforms, emerging
technologies, critical in-theater force structure and
enabling capabilities, joint operational concepts, and
a diverse, operationally resilient and politically
sustainable posture; and
(C) operating and conducting exercises with allies
and partners--
(i) to mitigate the Peoples Liberation
Army's ability to project power and establish
contested zones within the First and Second
Island Chains;
(ii) to diminish the ability of the
People's Liberation Army to coerce its
neighbors;
(iii) to maintain open sea and air lanes,
particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the East
China Sea, and the South China Sea; and
(iv) to project power from the United
States and its allies and partners to
demonstrate the ability to conduct contested
logistics;
(17) to deter the PRC from--
(A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including by
developing more combat-credible forces that are
integrated with allies and partners in contact, blunt,
and surge layers and able to defeat any PRC theory of
victory in the First or Second Island Chains of the
Western Pacific and beyond, as called for in the 2018
National Defense Strategy;
(B) using grey-zone tactics below the level of
armed conflict; or
(C) initiating armed conflict;
(18) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military
communication and improve de-escalation procedures to de-
conflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict,
including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges
between civilian and military officials and other measures, in
alignment with United States interests; and
(19) to cooperate with the PRC if interests align,
including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the
United Nations, as appropriate.
(b) Establishing and Expanding the Regional China Officer
Program.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be established at
the Department of State a Regional China Officer (RCO) program
to support regional posts and officers with reporting,
information, and policy tools, and to enhance expertise related
to strategic competition with the PRC.
(2) Authorization.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to the
Department of State to expand the RCO program, including for--
(A) the placement of Regional China Officers at
United States missions to the United Nations and United
Nations affiliated organizations;
(B) the placement of additional Regional China
Officers in Africa;
(C) the hiring of locally employed staff to support
Regional China Officers serving abroad; and
(D) the establishment of full-time equivalent
positions to assist in managing and facilitating the
RCO program.
(3) Program funds.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$50,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for each
Regional China Officer to support programs and public diplomacy
activities of the Regional China Officer.
(c) Sense of Congress on Data-Driven Policy Making.--It is the
sense of Congress that--
(1) the Office for China Coordination should employ at
least one full-time equivalent Data Officer, who shall not be
dual-hatted, focused on strategic competition with the PRC; and
(2) the Department should, to the extent possible within
existing authorities, prioritize access for the Office for
China Coordination to databases, commercial software, and other
data to support policy-making related to strategic competition
with the PRC.
SEC. 403. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND ROTATIONAL
PROGRAM RELATED TO STRATEGIC COMPETITION.
(a) In General.--The Secretary shall promote policies that enable
greater opportunities for the Department of State workforce to acquire
skills, education, training, and work experience relevant to strategic
competition with the PRC and to promote the increased effectiveness of
the workforce.
(b) Professional Development.--The Secretary shall, to the extent
possible and consistent with existing authorities, expand educational
and professional development opportunities for the workforce of the
Department related to strategic competition with the PRC.
(c) Rotational Program.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall, consistent with
existing authorities and in order to improve the Department's
coordination with other Federal departments and agencies with a
significant role in the economic, technological, defense,
public diplomacy, information, intelligence, and law
enforcement aspects of United States competition with the PRC,
establish an interagency rotational program at the Department.
(2) Skills and experience objectives.--The rotational
program shall facilitate rotations for Department personnel to
other relevant Federal departments and agencies to acquire
skills and experience related to--
(A) PRC malign influence operations, including
activities and polices designed to subvert or undermine
open societies, repress fundamental freedoms in other
countries, engage in information operations, shape
narratives favorable to the Chinese Communist Party, or
suppress narratives unfavorable to it, and otherwise
use coercive, covert, or corrupt methods to exert
improper influence on governments, private sector,
civil society, universities and other academic
institutions, State and local legislators, and other
relevant actors in the United States and abroad;
(B) economic tools relevant to national security,
including sanctions, export controls, and investment
screening;
(C) trade and investment in partner countries;
(D) commercial diplomacy and advocacy for United
States businesses in emerging markets;
(E) energy security;
(F) security cooperation;
(G) cyber and technology;
(H) space;
(I) critical minerals and other strategic sectors
where the PRC is dominant;
(J) supply chain security and cooperation;
(K) development and foreign assistance, including
executing high-standard infrastructure development,
especially in the transport, energy, and digital
sectors;
(L) development finance; and
(M) other issue areas that the Secretary determines
necessary for the Department workforce to develop for
the purposes of strategic competition with the PRC.
(3) Program design, monitoring, and evaluation.--
(A) Rotations and secondments.--In designing the
rotational program required under this subsection, the
Secretary may, if appropriate and consistent with
existing authorities, include rotations or secondments
for Department personnel to international
organizations, private sector entities, or to the
governments agencies of United States partners and
allies.
(B) Data tracking.--The Secretary shall collect and
analyze data related to the rotational program required
under this subsection, including to track the--
(i) number of personnel who participate;
(ii) the duration of the rotations;
(iii) the grade and job series and sending
bureau or office;
(iv) the receiving department or agency,
bureau, and office;
(v) information as to whether the rotation
was reciprocal between the sending and
receiving bureau or offices;
(vi) information regarding whether a
backfill was acquired, and if so, through what
mechanism; and
(vii) any other information that the
Secretary deems necessary to inform adjustments
to program design to meet the objectives
described in subsection (a).
SEC. 404. REFOCUSING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY EFFORTS FOR STRATEGIC
COMPETITION.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps and
Department of State civil service personnel must be sufficient
to meet the current and emerging security challenges of the
21st century, particularly those posed by the PRC and Russia;
(2) an increased focus on the PRC in the international
security sphere is necessary to achieve Department of State
objectives in strategic affairs and nonproliferation;
(3) this effort must be implemented with a focus on
increasing the number of Foreign Service Officers and civil
servants at the Department of State to--
(A) ensure the Department is resourced at
sufficient levels to ensure that diplomatic tools
remain central to the implementation of a long-term
competitive strategy with the PRC; and
(B) coordinate with allies and partners efforts to
improve the security of United States and allied
interests in the face of the PRC's military
modernization and expansion;
(4) emerging technologies such as cyber, artificial
intelligence, quantum technologies, space, hypersonic missiles,
fractional orbit bombardment system and advances in missile
defense systems will increasingly impact the strategic balance
between the United States and its great power adversaries; and
(5) strategic threats will be increasingly addressed
through risk reduction measures such as the promotion of
international norms in multilateral forums, increasing
communication and fostering predictability with adversaries,
and close cooperation and security integration with allies and
partners.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States--
(1) to ensure Department of State funding levels for
international security reflect the importance and significance
of the Indo-Pacific region to the political, economic, and
security interests of the United States; and
(2) to increase funding and the proportion of personnel
dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the
Department of State's International Security budget.
(c) Action Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the
appropriate committees of Congress an action plan with the following
elements:
(1) Identification of requirements to advance United States
international security objectives in the Indo-Pacific and the
personnel and budgetary resources needed to meet them, assuming
an unconstrained resource environment.
(2) Identification of offices responsible for managing
bilateral and multilateral arms control, nonproliferation, and
disarmament agreements that are expired, are expiring, or that
have not been implemented since calendar year 2021 with the
objective of revising their mission to focus on competitive
strategies and risk reduction initiatives in the Indo-Pacific
region.
(3) A plan to increase the size of the Department's
international security budget.
(4) Budgeting dedicated to the Indo-Pacific, including the
reallocation of personnel and resources, with a focus on the
threat posed by PRC military modernization and expansion.
(5) A plan to increase the number of positions in bureaus
that report to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security and overseas missions with
responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a
description of increases and a description of how such
increases in personnel will advance United States objectives in
the Indo-Pacific region.
(6) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the
Department will meet in implementing the action plan.
(7) A description of any barriers to implementing the
action plan.
(d) Updates to Action Plan.--Not later than 180 days after
submitting the action plan required under subsection (c), and every 180
days thereafter for 2 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress an update on the implementation of
the action plan, including supporting data and a detailed assessment of
benchmarks reached.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 501. SAVINGS PROVISIONS.
(a) Consultation and Notification Required.--The obligation of any
funds authorized to be appropriated by the provisions of this Act shall
be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent with section 634A
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular
notification procedures of--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) Qualifying Non-Binding Instruments.--Any nonbinding instrument
related to the provisions of this Act shall be considered a qualifying
non-binding instrument for purposes of section 112b of title 1, United
States Code.
SEC. 502. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION ON MAINTAINING ONE CHINA POLICY.
Nothing in this Act may be construed as a change to the one China
policy of the United States, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations
Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), the three United States-People's Republic
of China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.
<all>
Introduced in Senate
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Llama 3.2 · runs locally in your browser
Ask anything about this bill. The AI reads the full text to answer.
Enter to send · Shift+Enter for new line