No official summary available for this bill.
[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2352 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 2352
To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to place reasonable
limits on contributions to Super PACs which make independent
expenditures, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 26, 2025
Ms. Lee of Pennsylvania (for herself, Mr. Khanna, Mr. McGovern, Ms.
Jayapal, Ms. Tlaib, Mr. Deluzio, and Mrs. Ramirez) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on House
Administration
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to place reasonable
limits on contributions to Super PACs which make independent
expenditures, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Abolish Super PACs Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds as follows:
(1) Contribution limits to political action committees
(PACs), including those that make independent expenditures,
help secure elections by limiting both the risk of corruption
and the risk that significant contributions will create the
appearance of corruption.
(2) Since contribution limits on super PACs were lifted in
2010, the number, influence, and wealth of super PACs have
exploded. Obtaining millions or billions of dollars in
contributions to super PACs is now critical to the success of
Federal candidates' campaigns.
(3) As the influence of super PACs grows, so does the
likelihood that they will serve as a conduit for corrupt
agreements between contributor and candidate, whose
communications are not subject to coordination limitations.
(4) Between 2008 and 2020, the amount of independent
expenditures increased more than 700 percent, and in 2024, more
than $4.48 billion in independent expenditures were spent on
United States elections. The money for these expenditures
largely came from contributions to 2,459 registered super PACs.
(5) In 2012, the first modern elections for Federal office
held without contribution limits to super PACs, the top 1
percent of all individual super PAC contributors contributed
76.76 percent of all individual super PAC contributions, and
that percentage rose to 96.94 percent in 2024. Recent elections
have been influenced by individual contributors who gave more
than $100 million to super PACs.
(6) As bribery laws have long recognized, unlawful quid pro
quo exchanges can occur where the bribe is funneled into a
third party, such as a super PAC. See, e.g., section 201 of
title 18, United States Code; U.S. v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp.
606, 621-23 (D. N.J. 2018). Law enforcement in several States
have prosecuted cases that involve bribes directed to super
PACs. However, bribery is notoriously difficult to prosecute,
and these laws do not adequately protect American voters from
corruption.
(7) Without reasonable limitations on contributions, super
PACs create an appearance of corruption. A bipartisan majority
of Americans believe that large super PAC contributions are
made in exchange for political favors, and that corruption is
pervasive in the Federal Government. This is, as the Supreme
Court recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, ``disastrous'' to
``confidence in the system of representative government'' 424
U.S. 1, 27 (1976).
(8) Placing limits on super PAC contributions will also
lessen the risk of foreign interference in United States
elections, making it more difficult for foreign entities to
funnel contributions to super PACs via third-party
contributors.
(9) SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
the appellate court case that voided existing contribution
limits to super PACs, wrongly treated contributions as
expenditures and wrongly assumed that because uncoordinated
independent expenditures cannot give rise to quid pro quo
corruption, that contributions to independent expenditure
committees similarly cannot give rise to corruption. But they
can and do.
(10) In the 14 years since SpeechNow unleashed billions of
dollars in unregulated contributions, super PACs have obtained
unprecedented wealth and value to candidate campaigns and can
facilitate vast, nearly untraceable corrupt transactions.
(11) Because Super PACs have become uniquely important to
candidate campaigns and can accept millions and even hundreds
of millions of dollars from single entities, candidates and
contributors have reason and opportunity to guide corrupt
contributions into super PACs, establishing a significant risk
of corruption and creating an appearance of corruption that
undermines the public's faith in their representatives and our
political system.
(12) Reasonable limits on contributions to super PACs are
lawful and necessary to protect American democracy and American
voters.
(b) Purpose.--It is the purpose of this Act--
(1) to limit the risk of corrupt agreements between
candidates and contributors by placing reasonable limits on
contributions to political action committees that make
independent expenditures;
(2) to limit the appearance of corruption created by
uncapped contributions to political action committees that make
independent expenditures; and
(3) to restore the public's faith in our elections.
SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE
COMMITTEES.
(a) Limitations.--Section 315(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30116(a)(1)(C)) is amended by striking
``to any other political committee'' and inserting ``to an independent
expenditure committee or any other political committee''.
(b) Definition.--Section 301 of such Act (52 U.S.C. 30101) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(27) Independent expenditure committee.--
``(A) In general.--The term `independent
expenditure committee' means a political committee
which--
``(i) makes independent expenditures
aggregating $5,000 or more during a calendar
year; or
``(ii) makes contributions to other
independent expenditure committees aggregating
$5,000 or more during a calendar year.
``(B) Treatment of separate accounts.--The term
`independent expenditure committee' includes an account
of a political committee which is established for the
purpose of making independent expenditures or
contributions to other committees making independent
expenditures.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall
apply with respect to contributions and independent expenditures made
during the first calendar year which begins after the date of the
enactment of this Act and each succeeding calendar year.
<all>
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Referred to the House Committee on House Administration.
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