No official summary available for this bill.
[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2614 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 2614
To establish a program and strategy to support internet freedom and
counter censorship efforts in Iran, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
April 2, 2025
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina (for himself and Mr. Panetta) introduced
the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Financial
Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration
of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee
concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To establish a program and strategy to support internet freedom and
counter censorship efforts in Iran, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Maximum Support Act''.
SEC. 2. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to provide maximum support to
the people of Iran in their desire to bring about a new political
system in Iran based upon democracy, human rights, and rule of law for
all citizens of Iran.
SEC. 3. PROGRAM AND STRATEGY TO SUPPORT INTERNET FREEDOM AND COUNTER
CENSORSHIP EFFORTS IN IRAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the
Secretary of the Treasury and the CEO of the U.S. Agency for Global
Media, shall establish a new interagency task force to support internet
freedom and counter censorship efforts in Iran. In addition the
Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury and CEO of the U.S. Agency
for Global Media, acting as part of this task force, shall develop and
submit to Congress a strategy to support the Iranian people in
countering state and non-state actors' efforts to create deliberate
barriers to internet access, including shutting down or slowing
connectivity and blocking online content protected by international
human rights standards.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) A description of efforts to establish a Virtual Private
Network (VPN) service specifically designed to enable the
Iranian people to bypass government censorship and access the
internet freely. The objectives of this VPN service shall
include--
(A) ensuring secure and uncensored internet access
for users in Iran;
(B) providing robust protection against
surveillance and data interception by Iranian
authorities and others;
(C) maintaining high standards of speed and
reliability to ensure usability; and
(D) regularly updating and adapting the service to
respond to new security challenges and censorship
techniques employed by the Iranian government, IRGC and
Iranian judiciary.
(2) A description of the use of enhanced satellite
communications through direct-to-cell technology and eSIM and
eSIM device distribution, including--
(A) the incorporation of services such as services
that provide seamless internet access directly to
cellular devices and other technology to facilitate
seamless internet access in Iran; and
(B) a program for the distribution of eSIMs and
eSIM devices to individuals in Iran, enabling them to
connect to satellite internet services quickly and
securely.
(3) A description of Iranian regime restrictions on the
import of cell phones--
(A) detailing Iranian government, IRGC, and Iranian
judiciary restrictions on iPhone 14, iPhone 15, and
iPhone 16 devices out of fear of satellite internet
technology including requirements that such phones be
registered with the government and the impact of past
bans on such phones;
(B) outlining steps to counter the regime's efforts
to restrict access to devices capable of utilizing
satellite-based internet services; and
(C) describing measures by the Secretary of State
to curb any efforts by the regime to create secondary
or black markets that would allow the Iranian
government, IRGC, or Iranian judiciary or their
affiliates to profit from the sale of these devices
through controlled channels.
(4) A detailed vetting plan for technology companies or
individuals contracted to expand internet access in Iran,
ensuring that no companies or individuals affiliated with the
Iranian regime are involved in initiatives to promote internet
freedom.
(5) A description of which VPNs in Iran are built by the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other entities
controlled by the Government of Iran or its Supreme Leader and
how such VPNs are used by the regime to surveil and monitor
users, as well as a plan to counter these deceptive tactics and
raise public awareness about the risks associated with regime-
affiliated VPNs.
(6) A detailed plan to support satellite-to-cell internet
technology in Iran, ensuring that--
(A) such technology cannot be censored or jammed by
the regime; and
(B) access does not require the transfer or sale of
hardware that could be controlled by the IRGC or sold
on secondary markets.
(7) providing secure communication tools, encryption
technology, and cybersecurity software designed specifically
for high-risk users;
(8) cybersecurity training programs for Iranian activists,
dissidents, and journalists focused on identifying regime-
sponsored cyberattacks, phishing schemes, and digital
surveillance tactics;
(9) rapid response technical support for individuals and
organizations experiencing cyber threats or attacks; and
(10) a system of regular evaluation and reporting to
Congress detailing cybersecurity threats encountered and
measures undertaken to mitigate such threats.
(c) Form.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form.
(d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 60 days after the date on
which the strategy required by subsection (a) is developed, the task
force shall submit to Congress a plan for implementing the strategy.
SEC. 4. CONFISCATION OF THE ASSETS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND PUPPET
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) In General.--The President shall--
(1) confiscate, through instructions or licenses or in such
other manner as the President determines appropriate, funds of
the Government of Iran and all agents or instrumentalities of
the Government of Iran that are subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States; and
(2) deposit funds confiscated under paragraph (1) in the
general fund of the Treasury to be used for purposes described
in subsection (c).
(b) Vesting.--All right, title, and interest in funds confiscated
under subsection (a) shall vest in the Government of the United States.
(c) Purposes.--Funding may be provided to provide maximum support
to persons and entities within Iran which are working for a transition
to a democratic government based upon human rights and rule of law. To
the extent practicable, funding must be provided to persons and
entities with transparent measurable results, including through
providing detailed annual information on expenditures and outcomes. In
particular, funding may be provided to:
(1) Establish a strikers fund to provide assistance to
vetted Iranians engaged in nonviolent strikes and other forms
of nonviolent opposition to the regime in Iran done in a way
which does not materially benefit the regime in Iran.
(2) Providing humanitarian assistance and medical supplies
to the people of Iran delivered through partners that uphold
internationally recognized humanitarian principles with robust
monitoring to ensure assistance is reaching intended
beneficiaries in a way which does not materially benefit the
regime in Iran.
(3) Establish a fund to support efforts to document and
publicize gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights and international humanitarian law in Iran, including
efforts related to extrajudicial killings, torture, severe
forms of trafficking in persons such as slavery, forced labor,
and sexual exploitation, and to hold perpetrators accountable.
(4) The funding of efforts of the task force to promote
internet freedom in Iran described in section 3(a) of this Act.
(d) Audit.--The Comptroller of the United States, and the Inspector
Generals of the Department of State, Department of Treasury, and USAID
shall report to Congress annually after engaging in annual audits of
funds expended based upon subsection(c), including whether or not the
regime in Iran materially benefitted from any expenditure of funds. If
the Comptroller of the United States, or any of the Inspector Generals,
determine that the regime in Iran has benefited from any expenditure
such expenditures must be immediately terminated, and any
recommendations to prevent future diversion of funds must be
immediately implemented.
SEC. 5. STRATEGY TO ENSURE SANCTIONS DO NOT IMPEDE INTERNET FREEDOM FOR
THE PEOPLE OF IRAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the
Secretary of the Treasury, shall develop and submit to Congress a
strategy to ensure that sanctions imposed on the regime in Iran do not
inadvertently prevent Iranian civilians from accessing technology and
tools necessary for internet freedom and open communication.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) An examination of existing sanctions and their impact
on the availability of internet freedom tools for the people of
Iran, including--
(A) an assessment of any unintended restrictions
that limit access to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs),
secure messaging applications, satellite communication
technology, cloud-based services, and other tools
necessary for circumventing government censorship; and
(B) an analysis of how sanctions may affect the
ability of technology companies and non-governmental
organizations to provide services and support to the
Iranian people without materially benefiting the
regime.
(2) The issuance of specific licenses and waivers that
facilitate internet freedom in Iran while ensuring that such
measures do not enable or provide financial benefit to the
regime, including--
(A) the development of clear guidelines for private
sector entities on how they can provide internet-
related services to Iranian civilians without violating
U.S. sanctions;
(B) a streamlined process for approving waivers and
licenses that support internet access and digital
communication tools for the Iranian people; and
(C) measures to prevent the misuse of such licenses
and waivers by entities affiliated with the Iranian
government or Iranian judiciary or the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or other affiliated
of the Iranian government including a regular review
process to ensure that waivers are not being misused by
regime-aligned groups.
(3) A plan to work with technology companies, civil society
organizations, and international partners to expand access to
censorship-resistant communication technologies in Iran,
including--
(A) identifying key stakeholders capable of
providing secure and effective internet access
solutions;
(B) ensuring companies seeking to provide such
services are properly vetted to prevent inadvertent
assistance to the Iranian regime; and
(C) enhancing public awareness campaigns within
Iran about the availability of secure internet access
tools.
(4) A detailed mechanism for continuously monitoring and
assessing the effectiveness of these measures, including--
(A) regular reporting to Congress on the impact of
licenses and waivers issued to facilitate internet
freedom in Iran;
(B) recommendations for further actions to improve
access to open and secure communication technologies;
and
(C) an evaluation of the Iranian regime's attempts
to counteract these measures and strategies to mitigate
such efforts.
(c) Form.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form.
(d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 60 days after the date on
which the strategy required by subsection (a) is developed, the task
force shall submit to Congress a plan for implementing the strategy.
SEC. 6. STRATEGY TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE IN
THEIR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW POLITICAL SYSTEM BASED
ON THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and submit to
Congress a strategy detailing steps to provide maximum support to the
Iranian people in their efforts to bring about a transition to a new
political system and government based on the rule of law, democracy,
and human rights.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) Diplomatic efforts of the department of state.--A
description of how the Secretary of State will--
(A) use diplomatic efforts to support the Iranian
protest movements in their pursuit of democratic
governance; and
(B) establish a Special Representative for Maximum
Support including an Office for the Special
Representative to coordinate U.S. Government efforts to
assist the Iranian people in their democratic
aspirations and to serve as a key liaison with
international partners in support of this objective.
(2) Maximum economic pressure by the department of the
treasury.--A description of how the Secretary of the Treasury
will--
(A) implement and enforce sanctions targeting key
sectors of the Iranian economy that sustain the
regime's oppressive activities;
(B) disrupt the financial networks that facilitate
the Iranian regime's terrorist activities and human
rights abuses; and
(C) coordinate with international partners to
maximize the effectiveness of economic measures aimed
at weakening the regime's ability to suppress its
people.
(3) Intelligence support for the iranian protest
movement.--A description of how the Intelligence Community
will--
(A) use intelligence-gathering capabilities to
monitor and expose the Iranian regime's efforts to
suppress dissent and target protestors;
(B) provide support to Iranian civil society actors
and opposition groups to enhance their security and
operational capabilities; and
(C) assist in identifying and countering
disinformation campaigns initiated by the Iranian
regime to delegitimize democratic movements.
(4) Media freedom and information campaigns.--A description
of how the United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) will--
(A) expand and enhance broadcasting efforts to
provide the Iranian people with accurate and unbiased
news coverage on the situation in Iran;
(B) utilize social media platforms to expose and
highlight the Iranian regime's crimes against its own
people, including human rights abuses, corruption, and
acts of violence against protestors; and
(C) support independent Iranian journalists and
media outlets in their efforts to report freely and
counter the regime's propaganda.
(5) Interagency coordination.--A plan for ensuring
coordination between relevant agencies, including the
Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the
Intelligence Community, and USAGM, to ensure a comprehensive
and unified approach in supporting the Iranian people's pursuit
of democracy.
(c) Form.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex if
necessary.
(d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 60 days after the date on
which the strategy required by subsection (a) is developed, the task
force shall submit to Congress a plan for implementing the strategy.
SEC. 7. DESIGNATION OF THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND
SECURITY AS A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security
(MOIS) is the primary intelligence apparatus of the Government
of Iran, responsible for espionage, covert operations,
surveillance, cyberattacks, kidnappings, assassinations of
dissidents abroad, and direct support for terrorist proxies.
(2) MOIS provides financial, logistical, and operational
support to terrorist groups already designated as Foreign
Terrorist Organizations by the United States, including
Hezbollah and designated militias operating in the Middle East.
(3) MOIS poses a direct and ongoing threat to the national
security of the United States, American citizens abroad, and
U.S. allies through continued support for terrorism, espionage
operations, and acts of violence.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the activities of MOIS satisfy the statutory criteria
for designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1189); and
(2) formally designating MOIS as an FTO would advance the
national security interests of the United States, strengthen
enforcement against its global operations, and enhance
international efforts to isolate its terrorist networks.
(c) Determination and Report.--
(1) Requirement for determination.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and
the Attorney General, shall determine, pursuant to the criteria
specified in section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C. 1189), whether MOIS meets the criteria to be
designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
(2) Designation.--If the Secretary of State determines that
MOIS meets such criteria, consistent with section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), the Secretary
shall designate MOIS as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and
promptly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
detailed justification for such designation, including an
assessment of threats posed by MOIS.
SEC. 8. STRATEGY TO ENCOURAGE DEFECTIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury and Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and
submit to Congress a strategy aimed at encouraging and facilitating
defections by Iranian officials and members of security forces who seek
to support democratic change in Iran.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) identification of mechanisms to securely communicate
with potential defectors, including secure digital channels
utilizing encryption technologies and private intermediaries;
(2) measures providing assurances of safety and security to
defectors and their families;
(3) establishment of a dedicated interagency working group
tasked with managing defections, ensuring defector safety,
verifying information provided by defectors, and mitigating
potential intelligence risks;
(4) incentives for defectors who can significantly
contribute to democratic change or who provide actionable
intelligence about regime operations, including potential
financial assistance, employment support, and housing
assistance in coordination with relevant domestic agencies;
(5) measures for publicizing successful defections, when
appropriate and consistent with security protocols, to
encourage additional defections within the regime; and
(6) coordination with international partners to share best
practices, jointly facilitate defections, and ensure defectors
receive international protection, as needed.
(c) Form.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex if
necessary.
(d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 60 days after the
submission of the strategy, the interagency working group shall submit
to Congress a detailed implementation plan for the strategy.
SEC. 9. CYBERSECURITY ASSISTANCE TO IRANIAN DISSIDENTS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Director of National Intelligence, shall establish a cybersecurity
support program specifically tailored to assist Iranian dissidents,
journalists, and civil society organizations in countering cyber
threats posed by the Iranian regime.
(b) Elements.--The cybersecurity support program shall include--
(1) providing secure communication tools, encryption
technology, and cybersecurity software designed specifically
for high-risk users;
(2) cybersecurity training programs for Iranian activists,
dissidents, and journalists focused on identifying regime-
sponsored cyberattacks, phishing schemes, and digital
surveillance tactics;
(3) rapid response technical support for individuals and
organizations experiencing cyber threats or attacks; and
(4) a system of regular evaluation and reporting to
Congress detailing cybersecurity threats encountered and
measures undertaken to mitigate such threats.
SEC. 10. STRATEGY TO ENCOURAGE DEFECTIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury and Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and
submit to Congress a strategy aimed at encouraging defections by
Iranian officials and members of security forces who seek to support
democratic change in Iran.
(b) Strategy Described.--The strategy required under subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) identification of mechanisms to securely communicate
with potential defectors, including secure digital channels
utilizing encryption technologies and private intermediaries;
(2) measures providing assurances of safety and security to
defectors and their families;
(3) establishment of a dedicated interagency working group
tasked with managing defections, ensuring defector safety,
verifying information provided by defectors, and mitigating
potential intelligence risks;
(4) incentives for defectors who can significantly
contribute to democratic change or who provide actionable
intelligence about regime operations, including potential
financial assistance, employment support, and housing
assistance in coordination with relevant domestic agencies;
(5) measures for publicizing successful defections, when
appropriate and consistent with security protocols, to
encourage additional defections within the regime; and
(6) coordination with international partners to share best
practices, jointly facilitate defections, and ensure defectors
receive international protection, as needed.
(c) Form.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex if
necessary.
(d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 60 days after the
submission of the strategy, the interagency working group shall submit
to Congress a detailed implementation plan for the strategy.
<all>
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Financial Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Financial Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Financial Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Financial Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
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