This resolution affirms that Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons is a credible threat to the United States and an existential threat to Israel and other allies and partners in the Middle East.
The resolution also (1) demands that Iran cease engaging in activities such as enriching uranium and developing a nuclear warhead, and (2) asserts that all options should be considered to address the nuclear threat posed by Iran.
[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 105 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. RES. 105
Affirming the threats to world stability from a nuclear weapons-capable
Islamic Republic of Iran.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
February 4, 2025
Mr. Moskowitz (for himself and Mr. Lawler) submitted the following
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Affirming the threats to world stability from a nuclear weapons-capable
Islamic Republic of Iran.
Whereas numerous officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have repeatedly made
statements against the United States, Israel, and their allies and
partners, including--
(1) the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, who stated--
G (A) ``As long as America continues its wickedness, interference,
and savagery, the Iranian nation will not abandon `Death to America''';
G (B) ``The Zionist regime is a deadly, cancerous growth and a
detriment to this region. It will undoubtedly be uprooted and destroyed'';
G (C) ``We will definitely do everything necessary to prepare the
Iranian nation for confronting the Arrogant Powers, whether militarily, in
terms of armament, or politically. Our officials are already working on
this''; and
G (D) ``The United States of America and the Zionist regime will
definitely receive a crushing response for what they do against Iran and
the Resistance Front'';
(2) an adviser to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Kamal Kharrazi, who stated, ``We have no decision to build a nuclear bomb
but should Iran's existence be threatened, there will be no choice but to
change our military doctrine''; and
(3) former foreign ministry spokesperson of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Nasser Kanani, who stated, ``This action of the three European
countries [France, Germany and the United Kingdom] is the continuation of
the hostile policy of the West and economic terrorism against the people of
Iran, which will face the appropriate and proportionate action of the
Islamic Republic of Iran'';
Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran is directly responsible for the death and
injury of United States servicemembers, including--
(1) between 2005 and 2011, when the Quds Force, a branch of Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, provided explosively formed penetrators
to Iranian-backed fighters in Iraq and killed 195 United States troops and
wounded nearly another 900 United States troops;
(2) since the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, where Iranian-backed
proxies have attacked United States troops in the region more than 170
times; and
(3) on January 28, 2024, when an Iranian-backed proxy launched a drone
that killed 3 United States troops and wounded nearly another 40 United
States troops stationed at Tower 22 in Jordan;
Whereas the United States Government has reported--
(1) ``Iran's annual financial backing to Hizballah--which in recent
years has been estimated at [$700,000,000]--accounts for the overwhelming
majority of [Hizballah's] annual budget'';
(2) ``Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran'';
and
(3) ``Iran also provides up to [$100,000,000] annually in combined
support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas'';
Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran's support to the Houthis, including through
the provision of ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned weapons
systems, has allowed the Houthis to carry out attacks against United
States partners;
Whereas, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has
engaged in acts of international terrorism and continuously threatened
the United States, Israel, and their partners and allies;
Whereas, on January 19, 1984, the United States designated the Islamic Republic
of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism for repeatedly providing support
for acts of international terrorism;
Whereas, on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had
enriched uranium for the first time to a level close to 3.5 percent at
the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz, Iran;
Whereas, on December 23, 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 1737 (2006), which imposed sanctions with respect to the
Islamic Republic of Iran for its failure to suspend enrichment
activities;
Whereas the United Nations Security Council subsequently adopted Resolutions
1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929 (2010), all of which targeted the
nuclear program of, and imposed additional sanctions with respect to,
the Islamic Republic of Iran;
Whereas, on February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had
launched its first satellite, which raised concern over the
applicability of the satellite to the ballistic missile program;
Whereas, in September 2009, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France
revealed the existence of the clandestine Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, years after construction started on the
plant;
Whereas, on January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted a test of a
medium-range ballistic missile, which traveled an estimated 600 miles
and provides the Islamic Republic of Iran the capability to threaten
United States military installations in the Middle East;
Whereas, in 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the nuclear archive of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, which contained tens of thousands of files
and compact discs relating to past efforts at nuclear weapon design,
development, and manufacturing by the Islamic Republic of Iran;
Whereas, on September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the existence of a secret
warehouse housing radioactive material in the Turquz Abad district in
Tehran, and an inspection of the warehouse by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (referred to in this preamble as the ``IAEA'') detected
radioactive particles, which the Government of Iran failed to adequately
explain;
Whereas, on June 19, 2020, the IAEA adopted Resolution GOV/2020/34, which
expressed ``serious concern . . . that Iran has not provided access to
the Agency under the Additional Protocol to two locations'';
Whereas, on April 17, 2021, the IAEA verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran
had begun to enrich uranium to 60 percent purity;
Whereas, on August 14, 2021, the former President of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Hassan Rouhani, stated, ``Iran's Atomic Energy Organization can
enrich uranium by 20 percent and 60 percent and if . . . our reactors
need it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity'';
Whereas, on April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran confirmed the
relocation of a production facility for advanced centrifuges from an
aboveground facility at Karaj, Iran, to the fortified underground Natanz
Enrichment Complex;
Whereas, on April 19, 2022, the Department of State released a report stating
there are ``serious concerns'' about ``possible undeclared nuclear
material and activities in Iran'';
Whereas, on May 30, 2022, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran
had achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms (95.5 pounds) of 60 percent
highly enriched uranium, roughly enough material for a nuclear weapon;
Whereas, on June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran turned off surveillance
cameras installed by the IAEA to monitor uranium enrichment activities
at nuclear sites in the country;
Whereas, on July 14, 2022, in The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership
Joint Declaration, which was signed between President Biden and Israel,
the United States stressed its commitment ``never to allow Iran to
acquire a nuclear weapon, and that [the United States] is prepared to
use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome'';
Whereas, on July 27, 2022, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,
Mohammad Eslami, announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran is building
a new nuclear reactor at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, which
will be one of the largest nuclear facilities in Iran;
Whereas, on December 2, 2022, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi
stated, ``Iran informed us they were tripling . . . their capacity to
enrich uranium at 60 percent, which is very close to military level,
which is 90 percent'';
Whereas, on January 25, 2023, Director General Grossi stated, ``One thing is
true: [the Islamic Republic of Iran has] amassed enough nuclear material
for several nuclear weapons'';
Whereas, on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of
Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7 percent, which is just short of the 90
percent threshold for weapons-grade fissile material;
Whereas, on September 4, 2023, an IAEA report estimated the total uranium
stockpile of the Islamic Republic of Iran to be 3795.5 kilograms
(8367.65 pounds) and that the Islamic Republic of Iran has enough
fissile material, that if further enriched, would be sufficient to
produce several nuclear weapons;
Whereas, on October 18, 2023, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231
(2015) lapsed and many proliferation-related penalties and restrictions
were lifted, allowing the Islamic Republic of Iran to test or transfer
ballistic missiles, which may contribute to the further development of a
nuclear weapon delivery system;
Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the Governments of the United States, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom jointly declared, ``The production of
high-enriched uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification.
These decisions demonstrate Iran's lack of good will towards de-
escalation and represent reckless behavior in a tense regional context .
. . Iran must fully cooperate with the IAEA to enable it to provide
assurances that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.'';
Whereas, on February 27, 2024, a spokesperson for the Department of State
stated, ``We remain seriously concerned about Iran's continued expansion
of its nuclear program in ways that have no credible civilian purpose,
including its continued production of highly enriched uranium'';
Whereas, on June 3, 2024, Director General Grossi stated, ``Many countries have
said if Iran gets nuclear weapons, they will do the same. Adding nuclear
weapons to the cauldron of the Middle East is a very bad idea.'';
Whereas, on June 5, 2024, by a vote of 20 to 2, the United States joined other
nations in formally censuring the Islamic Republic of Iran for advances
in their nuclear program and failure to cooperate with the IAEA;
Whereas, on June 18, 2024, it was reported that intelligence agencies of the
United States and Israel were looking into information that the Islamic
Republic of Iran may have developed a computer model that could be used
for research and development of nuclear weapons;
Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
published an assessment, in accordance with Iran Nuclear Weapons
Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note;
Public Law 117-263), which stated, ``Iran continues to increase the size
of its uranium stockpile, increase its enrichment capacity, and develop,
manufacture, and operate advanced centrifuges. Tehran has the
infrastructure and experience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium,
at multiple facilities'';
Whereas, on November 28, 2024, the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the IAEA
that it planned to start enriching uranium with thousands of advanced
centrifuges at its Fordow and Natanz plants, while also installing more
uranium-enriching centrifuges at those locations;
Whereas, on December 5, 2024, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence published another assessment, in accordance with Iran
Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 (22
U.S.C. 8701 note; Public Law 117-263), which stated--
(1) ``Iran's 20-percent and 60-percent enriched uranium stockpiles are
far greater than needed for what it claims it will use the uranium for and
Iran could produce more than a dozen nuclear weapons if its total uranium
stockpile were further enriched''; and
(2) ``Iran probably will consider installing or operating more advanced
centrifuges, further increasing its enriched uranium stockpile, enriching
uranium up to 90 percent, or threatening to withdraw from the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons''; and
Whereas, on December 9, 2024, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom released
a joint statement that--
(1) condemns ``Iran's latest steps . . . to expand its nuclear
programme to significantly increase the rate of production of uranium
enriched up to 60 percent'';
(2) expresses extreme concern ``to learn that Iran has increased the
number of centrifuges in use and started preparations to install additional
enrichment infrastructure''; and
(3) ``strongly urge[s] Iran to reverse these steps, and to immediately
halt its nuclear escalation'': Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the House of Representatives--
(1) affirms that the Islamic Republic of Iran's continued
pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability is--
(A) a credible threat to the United States; and
(B) an existential threat to Israel and other
allies and partners in the Middle East;
(2) asserts all options should be considered to address the
nuclear threat the Islamic Republic of Iran poses to the United
States, Israel, and our allies and partners; and
(3) demands the Islamic Republic of Iran to immediately
cease engaging in any and all activities that threaten the
national security interests of the United States, Israel, and
our allies and partners, including--
(A) enriching uranium;
(B) developing or possessing delivery vehicles
capable of carrying nuclear warheads; and
(C) developing or possessing a nuclear warhead.
SECTION 1. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this resolution may be construed to authorize the use of
military force or the introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities.
<all>
Submitted in House
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
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