No official summary available for this bill.
[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2142 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 2142
To improve the missile defense capabilities of the United States, and
for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 23, 2025
Mr. Sullivan (for himself and Mr. Cramer) introduced the following
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed
Services
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To improve the missile defense capabilities of the United States, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Ground and Orbital Launched Defeat
of Emergent Nuclear Destruction and Other Missile Engagements Act of
2025'' or the ``GOLDEN DOME Act of 2025''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF THE SENATE.
(a) Findings.--
(1) Missile defense review.--Congress finds that the 2022
Missile Defense Review found the following:
(A) Since the release of the 2019 Missile Defense
Review, missile-related threats have rapidly expanded
in quantity, diversity, and sophistication.
(B) United States national security interests are
increasingly at risk from wide-ranging missile arsenals
that include offensive ballistic, cruise, and
hypersonic weapons.
(C) In support of the homeland missile defense
mission, continued modernization and expansion of all
current deployed systems with capabilities guarding
against the homeland threat, including the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, will remain essential
to our comprehensive missile defeat approach. In
addition, the United States will also continue to
improve defensive capabilities to address the threat of
evolving hypersonic missile, cruise missile, and
unmanned system strikes by any adversary against the
homeland.
(D) The continued evolution and progress of
missiles and unmanned systems as a principal means by
which adversaries seek to project conventional or
nuclear military power makes missile and unmanned
system defense a core deterrence-by-denial component of
an integrated deterrence strategy.
(E) Missile and unmanned system defense
capabilities add resilience and undermine adversary
confidence by introducing doubt and uncertainty into
strike planning and execution, reducing the incentive
to conduct small-scale coercive attacks, decreasing the
probability of attack success, and raising the
threshold of conflict.
(F) Should deterrence fail, missile defense
capabilities sufficient to negate long-range missile
threats of any type are among the most critical
national security capabilities for the United States.
(2) Congressional commission on the strategic posture of
the united states.--Congress finds that, in its October 2023
report, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture
of the United States recommended the following:
(A) The United States should develop and field
homeland integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) that
can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and
China, and determine the capabilities needed to stay
ahead of the North Korean and Iranian threat.
(B) The Secretary of Defense should direct
research, development, test and evaluation into
advanced integrated air and missile defense
capabilities leveraging all domains, including land,
sea, air, and space. These activities should focus on
sensor architectures, integrated command and control,
interceptors, cruise and hypersonic missile defenses,
unmanned systems, and area or point defenses. The
Department of Defense should urgently pursue deployment
of any capabilities that prove feasible.
(3) Commission on the national defense strategy.--Congress
finds the following:
(A) In its July 2024 report, the Commission on the
National Defense Strategy found the following:
(i) There is an increasing threat from
expanding ability of China, Russia, and North
Korea to deliver nuclear weapons against the
United States, including the territories of the
United States.
(ii) The military planners of the
Department of Defense and United States
Northern Command need to prepare for a worst-
case scenario in which nuclear and other
strikes are launched against the United States,
which could be done in large numbers with
specialized delivery systems.
(B) In the report described in subparagraph (A),
the Commission shared the same threat assessment about
missile attacks as the Commission on the Strategic
Posture of the United States and agreed with the
recommendation that the United States should enhance
missile defense for the homeland.
(4) Policy.--Congress finds that it is the policy of the
Federal Government that--
(A) the Federal Government will provide for the
common defense of the citizens of the United States and
the United States by deploying and maintaining a next-
generation missile defense shield;
(B) the Federal Government will deter and defend
the citizens and critical infrastructure of the United
States against any foreign attack on the United States
homeland; and
(C) the Federal Government will guarantee the
secure second-strike capability of the Federal
Government.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) as the advanced long-range missile and unmanned system
threat continues to evolve, the threat of attack by ballistic,
cruise missile, hypersonic missile, and unmanned system remains
a significant threat to the United States with potentially
catastrophic consequences;
(2) China is rapidly expanding and modernizing its
conventional forces to include ballistic missile systems posing
an increasing threat to citizens, forces, and allies of the
United States;
(3) over the past 40 years, the sophistication and quantity
of threats, including ballistic, hypersonic, cruise, and
unmanned systems has become substantial;
(4) contending only with rogue nation threats and
accidental or unauthorized missile launches is no longer
sufficient in the current and reasonably foreseeable future
threat environment;
(5) by empowering the United States with a second-strike
capability, the Golden Dome will deter adversaries from attacks
on the homeland;
(6) to improve capabilities to defend adequately against
increasing numbers and sophistication of threats to the
homeland, rapid development and deployment of space-based
sensors and interceptors which take advantage of lower cost and
technical commercial advances in recent years must be among the
Defense Department's highest priorities;
(7) there is a need to fully integrate undersea, ground,
air, and space-based sensors, interceptors, and command nodes
through a secure and redundant communications architecture;
(8) there is a need to clearly delineate and appropriately
empower the leaders and agencies responsible for development,
integration, and execution of the Golden Dome;
(9) the United States must make achieving total domain
awareness, from the seafloor to Outer Space to cyberspace, to
provide early warning and defeat of missile threats from both
the northern and southern hemispheres across all warfighting
domains a top priority;
(10) a central component of Golden Dome will be the network
and command and control systems;
(11) substantial command and control and fire control
capabilities exist now, but require investment to support any
Golden Dome reference architecture;
(12) a flexible, open-architecture approach for the Golden
Dome will support spiral development;
(13) Golden Dome prioritizes the defense of United States
citizens in the homeland against all air and missile threats
from all countries and requires prioritization of critical
assets to inform the Commander of United States Northern
Command and the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific
Command; and
(14) significant additional missile defense modeling and
simulation tools that measure friendly and adversary effects,
such as kinetic, non-kinetic, directed energy, are required.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Commercial solution.--
(A) In general.--The term ``commercial solution''
means a product, other than real property, that--
(i) is of a type customarily used by the
general public or by nongovernmental entities
for purposes other than governmental purposes;
and
(ii)(I) has been sold, leased, or licensed
to the general public; or
(II) has been offered for sale, lease, or
license to the general public.
(B) Inclusion of commercial products, components,
and services.--The term ``commercial solution''
includes commercial products, components, and services
in alignment with the Federal Government's preference
for the acquisition of commercial products and
commercial services, as set forth in sections 1906,
1907, and 3307 of title 41, United States Code, and
sections 3451 through 3453 of title 10, United States
Code, which establish acquisition policies more closely
resembling those of the commercial marketplace and
encourage the acquisition of commercial products and
commercial services.
(2) Congressional defense committees.--The term
``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given such
term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code.
(3) Golden dome.--The term ``Golden Dome'' shall means the
holistic missile defense architecture described in this Act.
(4) Missile.--The term ``missile'' means a ballistic,
hypersonic, cruise, hypersonic cruise, or loitering munition.
(5) Program manager.--The term ``Program Manager'' means
the Golden Dome Direct Report Program Manager appointed under
section 4(a)(4)(A).
(6) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Defense.
(7) Unmanned system.--The term ``unmanned system'' means a
remote-operated or autonomous unmanned system of any size
maneuvering in land, sea, air, or space that is capable of
single attacks, swarm attacks, or sensor and data collection
and reconnaissance.
SEC. 4. IMPROVING UNITED STATES MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.
(a) Development of a Holistic Missile Defense Strategy; Golden Dome
Administration.--
(1) Development of a holistic missile defense strategy.--
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Defense shall develop a holistic missile
defense strategy informed by discussions with and suggestions
from such other government agencies as the Secretary deems
necessary to determine which critical infrastructure must be
defended, against which adversaries, and from which specific
capabilities, including from both missiles and unmanned
systems.
(2) All-domain awareness.--The strategy developed pursuant
to paragraph (1) shall include plans for a system of layered
sensors from the seafloor to space and cyberspace to provide
persistent all-domain awareness.
(3) Integrated, redundant command and control.--The
strategy developed pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include
plans for integrated, secure, open, and redundant command and
control software and technology architecture for the nationwide
missile defense system and shall designate a clear human chain
of command for control of such systems and responses.
(4) Leadership.--
(A) Establishment of a golden dome direct report
program manager.--There is established a Golden Dome
Direct Report Program Manager, who shall be appointed
by the Secretary from among the general officers of the
Army, Air Force, Space Force, or flag officers of the
Navy and Marine Corps.
(B) Grade.--The individual serving as the Program
Manager, while so serving, shall have the grade of
general without vacating the permanent grade of the
officer and will be placed directly under the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Department of
Defense order of precedence.
(C) Responsibilities.--The Program Manager shall be
responsible for the acquisition, contracting,
development, testing, and initial operations and
sustainment of Golden Dome.
(D) Reporting and authority.--Subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, the
Program Manager shall--
(i) report directly to the Deputy Secretary
of Defense;
(ii) have the acquisition authorities
equivalent to Defense Acquisition Executives,
including milestone decision authority,
contracting authority, direct hiring authority,
direct liaison authority with congressional
oversight committees, original classification
authority, expedited military construction
authority, and technical authority for missile
defense of the homeland;
(iii) have full authority to budget for
Golden Dome and perform oversight of funds
identified to be in support of Golden Dome
across all categories of budget authority,
regardless of reprogramming thresholds; and
(iv) establish Golden Dome program elements
and programs consistent with the format used by
the President for submittal of the budget of
the President pursuant to section 1105(a) of
title 31, United States Code, to facilitate
oversight by Congress.
(E) Exception from certain manual and directive.--
Programs or projects carried out under the authority of
this section shall not be subject to the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual
and Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, or
successor manuals and directives. The Program Manager
shall use all lawful acquisition and procurement
methods necessary outside of this process to carry out
the accelerated implementation and execution of Golden
Dome.
(F) Protection from intervention.--Unless otherwise
directed by the President, the Secretary, or statute,
no officer other than the Secretary of Defense may
intervene to exercise, authority, direction,
interference, including unreasonable delays in
answering requests for information or other requests
relating to the implementation or execution of Golden
Dome or its subsystems, or control over the Program
Manager in the discharge of responsibilities specified
in subparagraph (C) and authority specified in
subparagraph (D).
(G) Authority to work with other federal
agencies.--
(i) In general.--The Program Manager may
work with other Federal agencies, including the
Department of Homeland Security, the Federal
Communications Commission, the Federal Aviation
Administration, and the various elements of the
intelligence community, to expedite research,
testing, and execution of any Golden Dome-
related systems.
(ii) Priority for decision requests.--In
any case in which a Federal agency receives a
decision request under clause (i) relating to
the planning and implementation of Golden Dome,
the head of the Federal agency shall prioritize
the decision request.
(5) Leveraging distributed, advanced, additive
manufacturing.--The Secretary shall develop and implement a
plan for leveraging distributed, advanced, or additive
manufacturing to rapidly develop technologies and munitions
critical for the strategy required by paragraph (1).
(6) Leveraging commercial solutions.--To the maximum extent
practicable, the architectures developed by the Department of
Defense as part of Golden Dome shall use commercial solutions,
including subcontracting by prime contractors at all tiers to
incorporate commercial items or nondevelopmental items as
components of items, supplied to the Department of Defense for
rapid deployment.
(7) Testing requirements.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of Defense and the
Program Manager shall ensure that a robust testing
regime is established for all kinetic and nonkinetic
interceptors or similar systems throughout the system's
lifecycle. To the maximum extent practicable, testing
shall include execution of end-to-end missile defense
detection, tracking, and destruction techniques that
exercise multiple components of the Golden Dome system.
(B) Testing schedule.--
(i) In general.--In carrying out
subparagraph (A), the Secretary and the Program
Manager shall ensure that, not later than 540
days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, a demanding testing cadence begins,
commencing with a virtual exercise commencing
on or before the date that is 540 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(ii) Test plans.--Not later than 90 days
before carrying out a test under this
paragraph, the Secretary and the Program
Manager shall present to the congressional
defense committees a detailed plan for the
test.
(iii) Briefings.--In any case in which the
Program Manager fails to conduct a test under
this paragraph in accordance with a timeline
specified in this paragraph, the Program
Manager shall provide the applicable
subcommittees of the congressional defense
committees an in-person briefing in each month
for with the test is delayed.
(C) Live-fire exercise requirement.--At a minimum,
kinetic and nonkinetic systems deemed to be mission
essential by the Secretary to the capabilities of
Golden Dome shall be tested on a semiannual basis in a
live-fire exercise, starting after the virtual test
described in clause (i).
(D) Participants.--
(i) Required participation.--Each exercise
under this paragraph shall include the
following participants:
(I) The Program Manager.
(II) A representative from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
(III) A representative from each of
the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and
Space Force.
(IV) A representative from the
National Security Agency.
(V) Representative from North
American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) or United States Northern
Command (USNORTHCOM).
(VI) A representative from Indo-
Pacific Command.
(ii) Invited for participation.--For each
exercise under this paragraph, the Program
Manager shall invite the participation of the
following:
(I) A representative from the Coast
Guard.
(II) A representative from the
Federal Aviation Administration.
(III) A representative from the
congressional defense committees.
(E) Waivers.--
(i) In general.--Pursuant to a request
submitted to the Secretary under clause (ii),
the Secretary may waive the requirement in
subparagraph (B) for an individual system.
(ii) Requests.--The Program Manager may
submit to the Secretary a request for a waiver
of the requirement in subparagraph (B) for an
individual system.
(iii) Congressional notification.--Not
later than 14 days after granting a waiver
under clause (i), the Secretary shall provide
the congressional defense committees an in-
person briefing of the waiver with a detailed
explanation of the reasons for the decision of
the Secretary to grant the waiver.
(F) Annual reports.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less
frequently than once each year thereafter, the
Secretary shall, in consultation with the heads of such
government agencies as the Secretary considers
relevant, submit to the congressional defense
committees a report detailing key regulations
preventing rapid, iterative testing of systems vital to
Golden Dome.
(b) Accelerating Development of Non-Kinetic Capabilities.--The
Secretary shall use all authorities available to the Secretary to
accelerate development of non-kinetic capabilities to negate missile or
unmanned system threats prior to launch or after launch. Such
capabilities may include cyber (offense and defense), supply chain
interdiction, artificial intelligence-driven battle management,
electromagnetic spectrum, directed energy weapons, and high-power
microwave defense options capable of defeating large-scale missile or
unmanned system attacks.
(c) Accelerating Development of Information Fusion Platform Using
Artificial Intelligence To Detect Threats.--The Secretary shall use all
authorities available to the Secretary to accelerate development and
rapid prototyping of high technology readiness level (TRL) capabilities
in order to acquire and field an information fusion, software-centric
platform that utilizes machine learning and artificial intelligence
technologies capable of delivering air, land, space, and maritime
domain awareness and early warning capabilities for homeland defense
across disparate novel and legacy systems. Such platform shall employ a
common data layer that can support the rapid integration of new sensors
and effectors across all tiers of the integrated air and missile
defense system.
(d) Acceleration of Development for Proliferated Warfighter Space
Architecture of Space Development Agency.--
(1) In general.--In support of Golden Dome, the Director of
the Space Development Agency shall use all authorities
available to the Director to accelerate development and rapid
fielding of satellites and associated systems for tranches 3,
4, and 5 of the proliferated warfighter space architecture of
the Agency.
(2) Status of space development agency.--The Space
Development Agency shall remain an independent element of the
United States Space Force, and shall be exempt from the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System requirements
process.
(e) Accelerating Space Sensor Layer for Golden Dome.--The Secretary
of Defense shall, acting through the Program Manager and in
coordination with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the
Director of the Space Development Agency, use all the authorities
available to the Secretary to accelerate the deployment of the
Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor by procuring, not later
than December 1, 2025, at least 40 space vehicles with Hypersonic and
Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor payloads.
(f) Requirement for Next Generation Interceptor Fielding and Silo
Construction.--The Program Manager shall, with support from the Missile
Defense Agency, take such actions as may be necessary to expand Next
Generation Interceptor production and silo construction at Fort Greely,
Alaska, to field up to 80 interceptors at Fort Greely for defense of
the United States. Interceptor testing and initial fielding shall be
completed not later than January 1, 2028.
(g) Requirement for Combatant Commands To Account for Missile
Defense Interceptors and Sensor Requirements in Their Annual
Requests.--For each fiscal year beginning after the date of the
enactment of this Act, each commander of a combatant command shall
include the missile defense interceptor requirements, terrestrial-based
sensor requirements, space-based sensor requirements, and counter-
unmanned system requirements of the combatant command of the commander
in the supporting information for the Department of Defense submitted
along with the budget of the President to Congress for such fiscal year
pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code.
(h) Accelerating Development of Glide Phase Interceptor.--
(1) Use of authorities to accelerate development.--The
Program Manager shall use all authorities available to the
Secretary to accelerate development of the Glide Phase
Interceptor to defend against hypersonic threats to the United
States homeland.
(2) Report on potential for parallel development.--Not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall submit to the
Secretary and the Program Manager a report on the potential for
parallel development of capabilities, revised program schedule,
and the risk associated with pursuing only one alternative for
the Glide Phase Interceptor.
(i) Accelerating Production and Fielding of Ground Mobile
Interceptors.--The Program Manager shall use all authorities available
to the Program Manager to accelerate the production and fielding of
ground mobile interceptors and radars for forward deployment and
homeland defense as the Secretary and President consider appropriate.
(j) Accelerating Development of Resilient Positioning, Navigation,
and Timing for Missile Defense Systems.--The Program Manager shall use
all authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate
development and fielding of resilient positioning, navigation, and
timing (PNT) solutions that can operate effectively in ground
positioning system (GPS)-denied environments. Such solutions may
include the following:
(1) Quantum-enhanced inertial navigation and atomic clock
technologies to maintain continuous positioning, navigation,
and timing functionality in ground positioning system-degraded
or denied scenarios.
(2) Enhanced terrestrial-based navigation systems for
greater assured positioning in ground positioning system-
contested environments.
(3) Robust data fusion techniques that integrate multiple
positioning, navigation, and timing sources, such as radar-
based tracking, vision-aided navigation, and low-Earth orbit
(LEO) signals, to sustain operational effectiveness during
electronic warfare (EW) attacks or cyber intrusions.
(4) Commercially available, field-proven alternative
positioning, navigation, and timing solutions that leverage
advanced sensor fusion, artificial intelligence-driven error
correction, and resilient positioning, navigation, and timing
processing to provide assured navigation for mobile and fixed
defense platforms, including those currently deployed in
hypersonic tracking and integrated air and missile defense
applications.
(k) Accelerating Development of Autonomous Agents To Defend Against
Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Systems.--The Program Manager shall use
all authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate
development of autonomous agents to cost-effectively defend the United
States homeland and forward-deployed armed forces against raids of both
large cruise missiles and unmanned systems as the Secretary considers
appropriate.
(l) Accelerating Development and Fielding of Low-Cost Scalable
Interceptor.--The Program Manager shall use all authorities available
to the Program Manager to accelerate development, test, and fielding of
a low-cost scalable interceptor that can augment existing production
lines and provide resiliency to the integrated air and missile defense
system.
(m) Accelerating Development and Deployment of Space-Based Sensors
and Interceptors.--
(1) In general.--The Program Manager shall use all
authorities available to the Secretary to accelerate
development and deployment of proliferated space-based sensors
and interceptors capable of ballistic and hypersonic missile
intercept.
(2) Requirement.--The Program Manager shall ensure that
development and deployment described in paragraph (1) will--
(A) substantially avail itself of commercial space
capabilities to reduce cost and time to deploy;
(B) ensure that space-based interceptors and
ground-based interceptors are fully integrated; and
(C) provide an autonomy layer that supports time-
critical targeting through advancements in information
technology and mitigates latency issues.
(n) Report To Reduce Cost Savings Per Round for Space-Based
Interceptors.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Program Manager shall submit a feasibility study to
the congressional defense committees outlining multiple methods for
reducing the cost per round of various space-based interceptors
including kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities and informed by
traditional and nontraditional defense technology companies.
(o) Accelerating Modernization of Certain Terrestrial Domain
Capabilities.--The Program Manager shall use all authorities available
to the Program Manager to accelerate modernization of terrestrial-based
radar capabilities, including those located at or known as Cobra Dane,
Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), Upgraded Early
Warning Radar (UEWR) in Greenland and Cape Cod, Homeland Defense Radar
and Maui Space Surveillance Complex in Hawaii, and the Alaska Radar
System.
(p) Modernization of Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack
Characterization System.--The Program Manager shall use all authorities
available to the Program Manager to accelerate the modernization and
digitization of the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization
System (PARCS) to improve detection of intercontinental and sea-
launched missile threats, as well as improve space domain awareness
capabilities.
(q) Site Selection and Program Execution Plan for Southern
Hemisphere-Facing Early Warning Radar System.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Program Manager shall
submit to Congress a report detailing a site selection and proposed
program execution plan for a southern hemisphere-facing early warning
radar system capable of detecting threats from next generation complex
missile attacks.
(r) Site Selection and Program Execution Plan for Highly Flexible
Missile Defense Sites.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Program Manager shall submit to Congress a
report detailing a plan for a highly flexible, and if necessary mobile,
terrestrial missile defense network capable of defending critical nodes
across the United States, including noncontiguous States and
territories, from likely attack vectors.
(s) Site Selection and Program Execution Plan for Construction of
Alaska-Based Aegis Ashore System.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Program Manager shall submit to
Congress a report detailing a site selection and proposed program
execution plan for an Alaska-based Aegis Ashore missile defense system.
(t) Completion and Certification of Aegis Ashore System in
Hawaii.-- The Program Manager shall use all authorities available to
the Program Manager to accelerate completion and certification of an
Aegis Ashore system based in Hawaii.
(u) Acceleration of Munitions Production for Missile Defense.--The
Program Manager, working with the Services, shall use all authorities
available to the Program Manager to accelerate production of critical
munitions used for missile interception, including Standard Missile 3
Blocks IB and IIA and PAC-2 and PAC-3 munitions, to ensure their
availability as an additional sub-layer of the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system.
(v) Expedited Military Construction Authority.--
(1) Waiver of regulations.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may waive all legal
requirements the Secretary, in such Secretary's sole
discretion, determines necessary to ensure expeditious
construction, deployment, testing, and operation of Golden
Dome, including mission and life support. Any such decision by
the Secretary shall be effective upon being published in the
Federal Register.
(2) Federal court review.--
(A) In general.--The district courts of the United
States shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all
causes of action or claims arising from any action
undertaken, or any decision made, by the Secretary
pursuant to paragraph (1). A cause of action or claim
may only be brought alleging a violation of the
Constitution of the United States. The court shall not
have jurisdiction to hear any claim not specified in
this subparagraph.
(B) Time for filing of complaint.--Any cause or
claim brought pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be
filed not later than 60 days after the date of the
action or decision made by the Secretary. A claim shall
be barred unless it is filed within the time specified.
(C) Ability to seek appellate review.--An
interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of
the district court may be reviewed only upon petition
for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States.
(w) Acceleration of Integrated Air and Missile Defense Technology
Exchanges.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall, in collaboration with
the Secretary of State, look for and exploit opportunities to
accelerate technology exchanges and transfers of integrated
missile defense technology, including over the horizon radar
with trusted allies under current defense agreements and
arrangements.
(2) Utilizing partner technology.--The Secretary may
utilize the technology of trusted partners to fill capability
gaps in Golden Dome that are identified as an urgent need by
the Program Manager.
(3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to require the Secretary to exchange technology
with a foreign country if the President or the Secretary
determines that doing so would present a grave national
security threat to the United States.
(x) Development and Securing of Supply Chains Critical to Missile
Defense.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall, in collaboration with
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the
Secretary of the Interior, identify critical shortages and
vulnerabilities in supply chains critical to missile and
unmanned system defense component production and shall use all
authorities available to the Secretaries to develop and secure
such supply chains.
(2) Advanced data analytics techniques and artificial-
intelligence-driven supply chain mapping tools.--In carrying
out paragraph (1), the Secretary may leverage advanced data
analytics techniques and artificial-intelligence-driven supply
chain mapping tools to assess supply chain vulnerabilities
related to missile defense and unmanned systems defense
systems, and other critical technologies.
(y) Authorization for Procurement and Fielding of Dirigibles To
Support Missile Defense.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of the Army may procure and
field such dirigibles, including airships and aerostats, in
support of the missile defense of the United States homeland
from ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, and unmanned
systems as the Secretary of Defense determines are necessary to
the defense of the United States from long-range missile
threats.
(2) Requirements.--The requirements of paragraph (1)
cover--
(A) high altitude air defense systems to detect,
characterize, track, and engage current and emerging
advanced missile and unmanned system threats; and
(B) both short-term and long-term solutions that
leverage the innovative dirigible and associated sensor
development that the Armed Forces, partners of the
United States, such as Israel, and United States
industry have undertaken during the 30-year period
ending on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) Consideration.--In carrying out paragraph (1), the
Secretary of the Army shall consider the use of dirigibles in
supporting resilient military and emergency communication
networks in a crisis.
(z) Requirement for Acceleration of Procurement and Fielding of Air
Moving Target Indicator Systems.--The Program Manager shall use all the
authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate the
procurement and fielding of air moving target indicator (AMTI) systems
capable of detecting, tracking, and distinguishing airborne moving
targets from stationary or cluttered backgrounds.
(aa) Requirement for Accelerated Development and Expansion of
Integrated Undersea Surveillance System.--The Program Manager shall use
all the authorities available to the Program Manager to accelerate the
development and expansion of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance
System to detect and track undersea threats like submersibles that
carry missiles near United States shorelines.
SEC. 5. PROTECTION OF THE SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE.
(a) Finding.--Congress finds that robust competition in the space
industrial base is essential to assuring United States space
superiority and the ability of the United States Space Force to provide
national security mission-critical space warfighting systems and
operations across the joint force.
(b) Requirement To Maximize Competition.--Chapter 382 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``Sec. 4821. Preservation of space industrial base
``(a) In General.--The head of an agency shall, to the maximum
extent practicable--
``(1) ensure that space acquisitions employ procedures that
maximize competition;
``(2) ensure that mission-critical national security space-
based systems that deliver tactical data from low Earth orbit
within a program and across the Armed Forces shall be procured
from an open competition allowing for competition between
multiple vendors, and those vendors' products shall comply with
interfaces and standards that maximize resilience and
interoperability with Department of Defense systems; and
``(3) ensure that a contract or other agreement for a
mission-critical space-based tactical data delivery system
acquired or contracted as-a-service must require the
performance, cost, and speed of delivery of the capability to
be demonstrably competitive to any existing program currently
delivering that capability which it seeks to replace or
substitute, and use reasonable best efforts to avoid the as-a-
service contract if the agency head believes in good faith that
it will result in a major contraction in the space an
industrial base available to support the Department of Defense.
``(b) Implementation.--The head of an agency shall, to the maximum
extent possible, ensure that acquisition, contracting, and other
procurement officials develop guidance--
``(1) to achieve and act in accordance with the
requirements of subsection (a) and with the intent to deliver
mission-critical space-based tactical data delivery systems in
accordance with government standards and interfaces; and
``(2) to prevent the major reduction and consolidation of
the space industrial base.''.
SEC. 6. PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES ASSETS FROM INCURSIONS.
Section 130i of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting
``(1) Notwithstanding'';
(B) by striking ``any provision of title 18'' and
inserting ``sections 32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters
119 and 206 of title 18''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(2) The Secretary of Defense shall delegate the authority under
paragraph (1) to take actions described in subsection (b)(1) to the
commander of a combatant command, the Secretary concerned, or such
other official of the Department of Defense as the Secretary of Defense
considers appropriate.'';
(2) in subsection (b)(1)(B), by inserting before the period
at the end the following: ``, including through the use of
remote identification broadcast or other means'';
(3) in subsection (e)(4)--
(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; or'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as
subparagraph (D); and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the
following new subparagraph:
``(C) would support another Federal agency with
authority to mitigate the threat of unmanned aircraft
systems or unmanned aircraft in mitigating such
threats; or'';
(4) by redesignating subsections (g), (h), (i), and (j) as
subsections (h), (j), (k), and (l), respectively;
(5) by inserting after subsection (f) the following new
subsection:
``(g) Exemption From Disclosure.--Information pertaining to the
technology, procedures, and protocols used to carry out this section,
including any regulations or guidance issued to carry out this section,
shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552(b)(3) of title 5 and
any State or local law requiring the disclosure of information.'';
(6) by inserting after subsection (h), as redesignated by
paragraph (4), the following new subsection:
``(i) Applicability of Other Laws to Activities Related to the
Mitigation of Threats From Unmanned Aircraft Systems or Unmanned
Aircraft.--Sections 32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters 119 and 206 of
title 18, and section 46502 of title 49, may not be construed to apply
to activities of the Department of Defense or the Coast Guard, whether
under this section or any other provision of law, that--
``(1) are conducted outside the United States; and
``(2) are related to the mitigation of threats from
unmanned aircraft systems or unmanned aircraft.'';
(7) in subsection (k), as so redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``subsection (j)(3)(C)''
and inserting ``subsection (l)(3)(C)''; and
(ii) by striking ``December 31, 2026'' and
inserting ``December 31, 2030''; and
(B) in paragraph (2)--
(i) by striking ``180 days'' and inserting
``one year''; and
(ii) by striking ``November 15, 2026'' and
inserting ``November 15, 2030''; and
(8) in subsection (l), as so redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs,'' after ``the Committee on the
Judiciary,''; and
(ii) in subparagraph (C), by inserting
``the Committee on Homeland Security,'' after
``the Committee on the Judiciary,'';
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (6) as
paragraphs (4) through (7), respectively;
(C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following
new paragraph (3):
``(3) The term `combatant command' has the meaning given
that term in section 161 of this title.''; and
(D) in paragraph (4), as redesignated by
subparagraph (B)--
(i) in clause (viii), by striking ``; or''
and inserting a semicolon;
(ii) in clause (ix), by striking the period
at the end and inserting a semicolon; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following
new clauses:
``(x) protection of the buildings, grounds,
and property to which the public are not
permitted regular, unrestricted access and that
are under the jurisdiction, custody, or control
of the Department of Defense and the persons on
that property pursuant to section 2672 of this
title;
``(xi) assistance to Federal, State, or
local officials in responding to incidents
involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or
chemical weapons, high-yield explosives, or
related materials or technologies, including
pursuant to section 282 of this title or the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et
seq);
``(xii) activities permitted by section
2692(b) of this title; or
``(xiii) emergency response that is limited
to a specified timeframe and location.''.
SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act
$23,023,100,000 for fiscal year 2026, of which--
(1) $500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to SM-3 Block 1B;
(2) $500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to SM-3 Block IIA;
(3) $1,000,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to development, testing, and additional
procurement of ground mobile interceptors and radars;
(4) $1,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to PAC-2 and PAC-3 Munitions and MM-104
Patriot batteries;
(5) $500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to Alaska-based Aegis Ashore station
construction;
(6) $460,000,000 shall be available for Next Generation
Interceptor production and expansion of missile interceptor
fields available at Fort Greely, Alaska, to up to 80 units with
the Next Generation Interceptor;
(7) $260,000,000 shall be available for construction of an
additional Next Generation Interceptor site in the continental
United States as the Secretary deems necessary;
(8) $250,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to completion and certification of Hawaii
Aegis Ashore system and upgrades to the Maui Space Surveillance
Complex;
(9) $100,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to Space Development Agency satellite
sensors;
(10) $750,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to modernization of terrestrial-based domain
awareness radars;
(11) $2,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to research and development relating to non-
kinetic missile defense capabilities across the military
departments;
(12) $5,900,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to research and development and deployment of
space-based missile defense and sensor networks;
(13) $3,100,000,000 shall be available for the requirements
of this Act relating to procurement of Hypersonic and Ballistic
Tracking Space Sensor space vehicles;
(14) $63,100,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to Missile Defense Complex (MDC) and Fire
Team Readiness Facility (FTRF);
(15) $50,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to procurement and fielding of dirigibles;
(16) $750,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to innovation and modernization of all domain
sensor capabilities, of which $76,000,000 shall be available to
procure and rapidly field a high technology readiness level
machine learning and artificial intelligence information and
data fusion platform;
(17) $450,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to counter-hypersonic programs for advanced
glide phase interceptors;
(18) $1,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to research, development, and deployment of
positioning, navigation, and timing systems;
(19) $90,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to procurement and fielding of the Integrated
Undersea Sensor System;
(20) $2,500,000,000 shall be available for requirements of
this Act relating to procurement and fielding of air moving
target indicator systems;
(21) $100,000,000 shall be available for requirements
relating to integrated command and control software and
technology architecture;
(22) $75,000,000 shall be available for the development and
fielding of a new low-cost, highly scalable ground interceptor;
and
(23) $125,000,000 shall be available for the development
and fielding of autonomous agents to defend against cruise
missile threats and unmanned systems.
<all>
Introduced in Senate
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.
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