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[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2222 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 2222
To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of undersea
communication cables vital to Taiwan's national security, economic
stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics
employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
July 9, 2025
Mr. Curtis (for himself and Ms. Rosen) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of undersea
communication cables vital to Taiwan's national security, economic
stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics
employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience
Initiative Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Undersea communication cables (in this Act referred to
as ``undersea cables'') are critical infrastructure essential
for global communication, commerce, and national security,
particularly for Taiwan, whose economic and security stability
relies heavily on undersea cable connectivity.
(2) The Government of the People's Republic of China has
increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the security
and sovereignty of Taiwan, including suspected sabotage of
undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the incidents
involving the severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of
Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025.
(3) Undersea cables are a primary target in the strategy of
the Government of the People's Republic of China to cripple the
communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a military
conflict, as part of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption
of undersea cables would significantly impact the ability of
Taiwan to communicate both domestically and internationally,
leading to a breakdown in military, economic, and social
functions.
(4) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on undersea
cables has been compounded by an increasing number of foreign
vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including
Chinese-linked vessels, which are perceived as direct threats
to Taiwan's critical infrastructure.
(5) The ability of the Government of the People's Republic
of China to disrupt or sever undersea cables is a critical
element of its military strategy aimed at softening Taiwan's
defenses and isolating Taiwan from international support in the
event of an invasion or military confrontation.
(6) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly
the People's Republic of China, have increased the risk of
sabotage and disruption to undersea cables serving Taiwan and
other nations. Notably, in February 2023, the Matsu Islands of
Taiwan experienced major internet disruptions due to two
undersea cables being severed, with suspicions pointing toward
deliberate external interference. Furthermore, in January 2025,
Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an international undersea
cable and identified a ``suspicious vessel''--the Chinese-
linked cargo ship Shunxin39--near the affected area. The Coast
Guard of Taiwan has indicated concerns that that vessel may
have been involved in deliberately cutting the cable. In a
subsequent incident, Taiwan seized the Togo-flagged Hong Tai
58, suspected of deliberately severing an undersea cable. The
Coast Guard of Taiwan acknowledged the possibility of China's
involvement as part of a ``grey area intrusion''.
(7) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage
to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the
Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting
Chinese and Russian involvement in several incidents, although
some damages have been attributed to natural causes. Those
incidents highlight the vulnerability of those critical systems
to gray zone tactics and the difficulty of proving sabotage or
holding perpetrators accountable.
(8) The sabotage of undersea cables constitutes gray zone
tactics designed to destabilize and undermine international
security without direct military confrontation.
(9) Several regional mechanisms have been established to
bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic
Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad
Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at
enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in the
Indo-Pacific.
(10) To counter the threats described in this section and
safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the
United States and its allies to take decisive action to bolster
Taiwan's defenses for undersea cables and foster international
cooperation to protect those critical assets.
SEC. 3. TAIWAN UNDERSEA CABLE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 360 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the
Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to
be known as the ``Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative'' (in
this section referred to as the ``Initiative'').
(b) Priority.--The Initiative shall prioritize the protection and
resilience of undersea cables near Taiwan, with a focus on countering
threats from the People's Republic of China to the critical
infrastructure of Taiwan.
(c) Key Focus Areas.--
(1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities.--In
carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced
undersea cable monitoring systems for Taiwan capable of
detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time,
including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early
warnings from global intelligence networks.
(2) Rapid response protocols.--In carrying out the
Initiative, the Secretary of State shall--
(A) establish rapid response protocols for
repairing severed undersea cables or mitigating
disruptions; and
(B) work with allies of the United States to help
Taiwan develop the logistical capacity to respond
quickly to attacks on undersea cables and minimize
downtime.
(3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness.--In carrying out
the Initiative--
(A) the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of
the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard
of Taiwan and regional allies, shall enhance maritime
domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the
detection of suspicious vessels or activities near
critical undersea cable routes; and
(B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist
in joint patrols and surveillance, particularly in the
Taiwan Strait and surrounding maritime zones, to
monitor potential threats and prevent sabotage.
(4) International frameworks for protection.--
(A) In general.--In carrying out the Initiative,
the Secretary of State shall seek to establish
cooperative frameworks with regional allies and global
partners to protect the undersea cable networks near
Taiwan.
(B) Elements.--The frameworks established under
subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the
United States in joint drills, intelligence-sharing
platforms, and collaborative surveillance operations to
enhance collective security against sabotage.
(5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening.--In carrying out the
Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and support
the hardening of critical undersea cables near Taiwan,
including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and
using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to
natural disasters and deliberate interference.
SEC. 4. COUNTERING CHINA'S GRAY ZONE TACTICS.
(a) Working With Partners To Counter Chinese Sabotage.--The
President shall work with Taiwan and like-minded international partners
to implement strategies that directly counter the use by the Government
of the People's Republic of China of undersea cable sabotage as part of
its gray zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on
that Government to adhere to international norms regarding the
protection of undersea infrastructure.
(b) Raising Awareness.--The President shall work with Taiwan to
raise global awareness of the risks posed by interference by the
Government of the People's Republic of China in undersea cables,
including through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and
international forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection
of critical infrastructure.
SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SABOTAGE OF UNDERSEA
CABLES.
(a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions described
in subsection (b) with respect to any person of the People's Republic
of China that the President determines is responsible for or complicit
in damaging undersea cables critical to the national security of
Taiwan.
(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all
of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to
block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
interests in property of a person described in subsection (a),
if such property and interests in property are in the United
States, come within the United States, or are or come within
the possession or control of a United States person.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien
described in subsection (a) shall be--
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
documentation to enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
or paroled into the United States or to receive
any other benefit under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--The visa or other entry
documentation of an alien described in
subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of
when such visa or other entry documentation is
or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under
clause (i) shall--
(I) take effect immediately; and
(II) automatically cancel any other
valid visa or entry documentation that
is in the possession of the alien.
(c) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and
1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry
out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same
extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in
subsection (a) of that section.
(d) Exceptions.--
(1) Exception for intelligence activities.--This section
shall not apply with respect to activities subject to the
reporting requirements under title V of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized
intelligence activities of the United States.
(2) Exception to comply with international agreements.--
Sanctions under subsection (b)(2) shall not apply with respect
to the admission of an alien to the United States if such
admission is necessary to comply with the obligations of the
United States under the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of
the United Nations, signed at Lake Success on June 26, 1947,
and entered into force on November 21, 1947, between the United
Nations and the United States, or the Convention on Consular
Relations, done at Vienna on April 24, 1963, and entered into
force on March 19, 1967, or other international obligations of
the United States.
(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--The authorities and requirements
to impose sanctions under this section shall not
include the authority or requirement to impose
sanctions on the importation of goods.
(B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term
``good'' means any article, natural or manmade
substance, material, supply or manufactured product,
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding
technical data.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms ``admission'',
``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings given those terms
in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1101).
(2) Person of the people's republic of china.--The term
``person of the People's Republic of China'' means--
(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of
the People's Republic of China; and
(B) an entity owned or controlled by the Government
of the People's Republic of China, organized under the
laws of the People's Republic of China, or otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of the
People's Republic of China.
(3) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or of any jurisdiction within the United
States, including any foreign branch of such an entity;
or
(C) any person in the United States.
SEC. 6. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to
Congress a report detailing--
(1) any incidents of interference in undersea cables near
Taiwan; and
(2) any actions taken in response to such incidents.
<all>
Introduced in Senate
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Committee on Foreign Relations. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.
Committee on Foreign Relations. Reported by Senator Risch with an amendment in the nature of a substitute and an amendment to the title. Without written report.
Committee on Foreign Relations. Reported by Senator Risch with an amendment in the nature of a substitute and an amendment to the title. Without written report.
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 323.
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