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[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3202 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 3202
To direct the Director of the National Security Agency to develop
guidance to secure artificial intelligence related technologies, and
for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
November 19, 2025
Mr. Young (for himself and Mr. Kelly) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Select Committee on
Intelligence
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To direct the Director of the National Security Agency to develop
guidance to secure artificial intelligence related technologies, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Advanced Artificial Intelligence
Security Readiness Act of 2025''.
SEC. 2. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY GUIDANCE.
(a) Requirement.--The Director of the National Security Agency,
acting through the Artificial Intelligence Security Center (or
successor office), shall develop and disseminate security guidance that
identifies potential vulnerabilities in covered artificial intelligence
technologies and artificial intelligence supply chains, with a focus on
cybersecurity risks and security challenges that are unique to
protecting artificial intelligence systems, associated computing
environments, or the wider artificial intelligence supply chain from
theft or sabotage by foreign threat actors.
(b) Elements.--The guidance developed and disseminated under
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) Identification of potential vulnerabilities and
cybersecurity challenges that are unique to protecting covered
artificial intelligence technologies and the artificial
intelligence supply chain, such as threat vectors that are less
common or severe in conventional information technology
systems.
(2) Identification of elements of the artificial
intelligence supply chain that, if accessed by threat actors,
would meaningfully contribute to the actor's ability to develop
covered artificial intelligence technologies or compromise the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of artificial
intelligence systems or associated artificial intelligence
supply chains.
(3) Strategies to identify, protect, detect, respond to,
and recover from cyber threats posed by threat actors targeting
covered artificial intelligence technologies, including--
(A) procedures to protect model weights or other
competitively sensitive model artifacts;
(B) ways to mitigate insider threats, including
personnel vetting processes;
(C) network access control procedures;
(D) counterintelligence and anti-espionage
measures; and
(E) other measures that can be used to reduce
threats of technology theft or sabotage by foreign
threat actors.
(c) Form.--The guidance developed and disseminated under subsection
(a) shall include--
(1) detailed best practices, principles, and guidelines in
unclassified form, which may include a classified annex; and
(2) classified materials for conducting security briefings
for service providers.
(d) Engagement.--In developing the guidance required by subsection
(a), the Director shall--
(1) engage with prominent artificial intelligence
developers and researchers, as determined by the Director, to
assess and anticipate the capabilities of highly advanced
artificial intelligence systems relevant to national security,
including by--
(A) conducting a comprehensive review of publicly
available industry documents pertaining to the security
of artificial intelligence systems with respect to
preparedness frameworks, scaling policies, risk
management frameworks, and other matters;
(B) conducting interviews with subject matter
experts;
(C) hosting roundtable discussions and expert
panels; and
(D) visiting facilities used to develop artificial
intelligence;
(2) leverage existing expertise and research, collaborate
with relevant National Laboratories, university affiliated
research centers, and any federally funded research and
development center that has conducted research on strategies to
secure artificial intelligence models from nation-state actors
and other highly resourced actors; and
(3) consult, as appropriate, with other departments and
agencies of the Federal Government as the Director determines
relevant, including the Bureau of Industry and Security of the
Department of Commerce, the Center for Artificial Intelligence
Standards and Innovation of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
Department of Defense.
(e) Reports.--
(1) Initial report.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the guidance
required by subsection (a), including a summary of progress on
the development of the guidance, an outline of remaining
sections, and any relevant insights about artificial
intelligence security.
(2) Final report.--Not later than 365 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the guidance
required by subsection (a).
(3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (2)--
(A) shall include--
(i) an unclassified version suitable for
dissemination to relevant individuals,
including in the private sector; and
(ii) a publicly available version; and
(B) may include a classified annex.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``artificial intelligence'' has the meaning
given such term in section 238(g) of the John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public
Law 115-232; 10 U.S.C. note prec. 4061).
(2) The term ``artificial intelligence supply chain'' means
artificial intelligence models computing environments for
performing model training or inference tasks, training or test
data, frameworks, or other components or model artifacts
necessary for the training, management, or maintenance of any
artificial intelligence system.
(3) The term ``congressional intelligence committees''
means the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(4) The term ``covered artificial intelligence
technologies'' means advanced artificial intelligence (whether
developed by the private sector, the United States Government,
or a public-private partnership) with critical capabilities
that the Director determines would pose a grave national
security threat if acquired or stolen by threat actors, such as
artificial intelligence systems that match or exceed human
expert performance in chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear matters, cyber offense, model autonomy, persuasion,
research and development, and self-improvement.
(5) The term ``technology theft'' means any unauthorized
acquisition, replication, or appropriation of covered
artificial intelligence technologies or components of such
technologies, including models, model weights, architectures,
or core algorithmic insights, through any means, such as cyber
attacks, insider threats, and side-channel attacks, or
exploitation of public interfaces.
(6) The term ``threat actors'' means nation-state actors
and other highly resourced actors capable of technology theft
or sabotage.
<all>
Introduced in Senate
Read twice and referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence.
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