This resolution expresses the sense of the House of Representatives that Congress should continue to support the A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft program for national security reasons.
[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 307 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. RES. 307
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Congress
should continue to support the A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft
program, also known as the Warthog and A-10C or OA-10C.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
April 13, 2021
Mrs. Kirkpatrick (for herself, Mr. Gallego, Mr. O'Halleran, Mr.
Stanton, Mr. Ruppersberger, and Mrs. Hartzler) submitted the following
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Congress
should continue to support the A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft
program, also known as the Warthog and A-10C or OA-10C.
Whereas the A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft (referred to in this preamble as
the ``A-10'')--
(1) has seen action in every major United States Military conflict
since the first production A-10 was delivered to Davis-Monthan Air Force
Base in October 1975; and
(2) since that time, has received several upgrades that are reflected
in the 281 A-10s in service as of the date of adoption of this resolution;
Whereas, since Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the A-10 has become a preferred
close air support platform for ground troops, striking fear in the
enemies of the United States and inspiring pride in the members of the
Armed Forces;
Whereas the A-10, which has been the backbone of the close air support mission
of the Air Force for more than 40 years, has proven to be a highly
accurate, mobile, and durable weapons-delivery platform that can be used
against all ground targets;
Whereas the A-10 supports close air support with a variety of forward-firing,
free-fall, and precision-guided munitions;
Whereas the A-10 is able to perform combat search and rescue, air interdiction,
armed reconnaissance, suppression of enemy air defenses, special
operations forces support, and countersea operations in low-threat and
high-threat environments, day or night;
Whereas the A-10 provides the Air Force with an extensive ability to survey the
battlefield and then fix, engage, target, and destroy a wide range of
mobile and fixed targets as an arsenal aircraft, including tanks and
other highly armored vehicles in quantity;
Whereas the A-10 was specifically designed with protection from small-arms fire,
including self-sealing fuel tanks, redundant flight controls, and a
titanium cockpit tub, which has proven vital to the safe return of
pilots despite heavy damage from enemy ground fire;
Whereas the A-10 has the lowest rate of friendly fire incidents of any combat
fighter or bomber;
Whereas the A-10 has one of the largest carrying capacities for a fighter-type
aircraft and can carry a wide range of munitions and electronic
countermeasures without sacrificing air-to-ground capabilities;
Whereas the close air support provided by the A-10, which has proven invaluable
on the battlefield, is better than the close air support provided by any
other fighter aircraft because--
(1) the A-10 has excellent maneuverability at low air speeds and
altitudes; and
(2) the close air support provided by the A-10 is simple and effective;
Whereas the slower airspeeds of the A-10 enable longer loiter times, increasing
support to troops in contact and battlefield coverage;
Whereas, of all combat planes in the arsenal of the United States, the A-10 is
the least expensive to operate and purchase;
Whereas, while the A-10 flew only 30 percent of the total sorties of the Air
Force during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, these aircraft achieved
more than half of the confirmed Iraqi equipment losses and fired 90
percent of the precision-guided Maverick missiles;
Whereas, during Operation Allied Force in 1999--
(1) A-10s destroyed more field-deployed Serbian weaponry than any other
allied weapon system; and
(2) combat search and rescue support from the A-10 was 100 percent
effective, successfully rescuing 1 F-117 pilot and 1 F-16CG pilot;
Whereas, during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom
in 2003, the A-10 flew 32 percent of the combat sorties in both
theaters, and from 2006 to late 2013, the A-10 flew 19 percent of close
air operations in Iraq and Afghanistan;
Whereas the A-10 is an effective close air support platform to counter violent
extremist organizations, including the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria;
Whereas the continuing demands for close air support in Iraq and Afghanistan
keep the A-10 a relevant platform, but one that requires upgrades;
Whereas, if the A-10 is removed from service, certain gaps in responsive close
air support, forward air controller, air interdiction, strike control
and reconnaissance, and combat search and rescue support could widen;
Whereas the A-10 can be serviced and operated with high sortie rates from
austere bases with limited facilities or logistical support near battle
areas, including unprepared dirt, grass, and narrow road runways, and
from airfields that are too short or rough to handle fast jets;
Whereas global power is essential to preserving global security and stability,
and the A-10 is essential to ensuring that the United States is able to
continue providing unmatched airpower, to gain and maintain air
superiority, and to extend its global reach;
Whereas the A-10 program supports the Air Force, including the Air National
Guard and Air Force Reserve;
Whereas, as of the date of adoption of this resolution, the A-10 is flying in
operational combat squadrons at--
(1) Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona;
(2) Eglin Air Force Base, Florida;
(3) Moody Air Force Base, Georgia;
(4) Gowen Field Air National Guard Base, Idaho;
(5) Fort Wayne Air National Guard Station, Indiana;
(6) Warfield Air National Guard Base, Maryland;
(7) Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan;
(8) Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri;
(9) Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; and
(10) Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea;
Whereas the 355th Wing at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, with an inventory of 84
A-10s--
(1) has deployed 12 times since September 11, 2001, primarily in
support of troops on the ground; and
(2) is responsible for training all A-10 pilots;
Whereas the 175th Wing at Warfield Air National Guard Base, with an inventory of
21 A-10s, has deployed 6 times since September 11, 2001, primarily in
support of troops on the ground; and
Whereas the 442nd Fighter Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, with an inventory of
27 A-10s, has deployed 9 times since September 11, 2001, primarily in
support of troops on the ground: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that
Congress should continue to support the A-10 Thunderbolt II program in
future fiscal years because--
(1) continued support for the A-10 Thunderbolt II program
is imperative to the national security of the United States;
and
(2) the United States cannot afford to risk its national
security, or the national security of its allies, by allowing
that program to fall short of its vital mission.
<all>
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Referred to the House Committee on Armed Services.
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